

**PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION:
NEPALESE PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to explore the knowledge, attitudes and practices on political transformation of Nepalese society through People's Liberation Army. A cross-sectional descriptive study was designed to assess the knowledge, attitude and existing practices on Maoist Led People's War. It was felt that the PLAs have knowledge about guerilla war strategy and political war led strategy that is necessary to reform the society from feudalistic to people's democratic society. The problem statement of this study was devised as to identify the status, impacts, problems and corrective measures about the PLAs role on socio political transformation. Global evidence and research findings have shown that all conflicts are at risk, and vulnerable environment in community, transformation is difficult to deliver.

By reviewing different literatures, thesis, theories, national and international journals related to people's war, the researcher made the study more substantive and authentic by incorporating relevant ideas that the researcher gathered through literature review. The researcher followed quantitative as well as qualitative research design with focus on its descriptive cross sectional and phenomenological premise which encompasses ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. The ontological framework for this study subscribes to the notion of multiple realities regarding the issue of socio political transformation of the society through PLAs. The epistemological assumption dwelt on subjective discourse by research participants. Following my research question, the researcher carried out interview, focus group discussion and field observation with the research participants. By adopting stratified

random sampling technique, structured instruments were used to collect the data and analyzed by using descriptive as well as inferential statistical methods. PLAs and political leaders were the main actors of this study. The knowledge, attitude and practices were assessed using semi-structured interview and qualitative data were obtained from focus group discussion.

The findings revealed that the knowledge varied according to ethnicity, age, and level of education. PLAs were found with good knowledge on guerilla strategy and socio political transformation as compared to other ideology based conflict led people in the sample areas. The diversity of ethnicity, level of education, occupation, and culture were found with different levels of knowledge, practice and attitude of the respondents. Most of the PLAs were found with the knowledge about the socio economic development, conflict resolution strategy and political ideology. Lower is the age higher is the level of knowledge. PLAs with vocational and entrepreneurial skills were found more knowledge about reintegration for social harmony. The findings were in line with the national and international trends. The attitude of PLAs was found less positive towards the national integration in dominated environment and expected with more reform in future.

Even though existing strategies were promoting social transformation including awareness raising and improving based on the availability of funds, social cohesion and supply of education and vocational trainings, encouraging for institutional capacity building, in reality most of the political environment were found poor, facilities were not available in demand. As a result, the PLAs have not been able to cope with changing physical facilities for safe resettlement in the society.

The study has been concluded by feeling the need of knowledge about

entrepreneurial skills not only for PLAs, but also war victims, and wounded people. Children of Martyrs and neglected ones are the teachers of tomorrow. The vocational education is extremely important to reduce the economic gap and conflict hazards and meet the target of conflict resolution issues in Nepal.

The abstract of the thesis of Shiva Raj Pandit *for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science* was presented on December, 2014.

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ACRONYMS

PLA	Peoples Liberation army
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CPN –M	Communist Party Of Nepal (Maoist) {Later turned UCPN (Maoist)}
UN	United Nations
RNA	Royal Nepal Army
INSEC	Informal Sector Service Centre
USA	United State of America
YCL	Young Communist league
MLM	Maoism, Leninism and Maoism
UNMIN	United Nation Mission in Nepal
ML	Marxit- Leninsit
ANRCC	All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committe
CA	Constituent Assembly
CPN (D)	Communist Party of Nepal (Democratic)
CPN (M)	Communist Party Of Nepal (Maoist) {Later turned UCPN (Maoist)}
CPN (ML)	Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)
CPN UML	Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist & Leninist)
HOR	House of Representatives (<i>Pratinidhi Sabha</i>)
NA	National Assembly (<i>Rashtriya Sabha</i>)
NC	Nepali Congress

NC (D)	Nepali Congress (Democratic)
NSP	Nepal Sadbhavana Party
NWPP	Nepal Workers & Peasants' Party
PFN	Peoples' Front Nepal
NPD	Nepal People's Democracy
PM	Prime Minister
RPP	Rashtriya Prajatantra Party
SPA	Seven Party Alliance
UPFN	United People's Front Nepal
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German International Co-operation)
NPC	Nepal Prajatantra Congress
NRC	Nepali Rastrya Congress
INC	Indian National Congress
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
AMMAA	Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies,
SC	Special Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
SSR	Security Sector Reform
CoM	Council of Ministers
IMF	International Monetary Fund
PGW	Protracted Guerilla War
PRP	People's Liberation Party

CPI (ML)	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
LTTE	Liberation of Tamil Tiger Elam
RIM	Revolutionary International Movement

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

War is the father of all, and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as humans;
some he makes slaves, others free. - Heraclitus

Social scientists have shed enough light on why, when and how individuals and groups participate in violence. The fact that revolutionary social movements are reactions to social dislocation, perceived or real exploitation and disorder explains the salience of their search for social redress and cultural authenticity and their moral rigor (Berhe, 2008). Many conflict researchers have claimed in their research reports that, when people find it impossible to peacefully engage a government that fails to bring about political freedom and social justice, and their reasonable demands were not met with harsh measures, they react individually or collectively in defense of the intent of bringing about desired change. In this process, when conditions are conducive, an organized movement is formed. In, many cases, the movements resort to unconventional ways and means to struggle to achieve what believe is legitimate, socially just and politically right.

According to Bhattachan (2003) collective violence is at the center stage in the beginning of this twenty first century in all parts of the world, be it developed or underdeveloped states, including Nepal. He further stressed that collective violence, specially revolution, insurgency and rebellion, is best explained by Marxist theories represented by Karl Marx, aggregate-psychological theories by Ted Gurr, systems/value consensus theories by Chalmers Johnson, and political-conflict theories by Charles Tilly,

structural theories by Theda Skocpol, and political process theories represented by Doug McAdam. According to him, Charles Tilly has more recently introduced the concept of "politics of collective violence" which is new concept but the reality explained by the concepts existed in the past; exist at present and will continue to exist in future.

The Revolution, before and after the Second World War has been the struggle for freedom and independence against the colonial and dictatorial rulers (Shrestha, 2004). Accurate statistics of war had little known, even then, it has been said that 14553 wars had taken place in the past 5,000 years leaving to mankind only 292 years of peace. Since the end of World War II, a total of 244 armed conflicts had been active in 151 locations worldwide. The annual incidence of conflict since 1989 was recorded in different number that has been illustrated in annex 3 and 4. It has shown the trend in the number of armed conflicts since 1989-2009.

Historically, major wars, can be traced as the examples in the name of The English Revolution, The American Revolution, The French Revolution, The Chinese Revolution and Russian Revolution (Shrestha, 2004). He further explained that the English Revolution (1642-89) that brought the execution of Charles I, the rise of the commonwealth, the dethronement of James II, and the establishment of a constitutional government under William III and Mary, The 'American Revolution' the war of independence carried on by the thirteen American colonies against Great Britain (1775-83), 'The French Revolution' was also important in the history of revolution, which began in 1778, with the overthrow of the French monarchy and culminated in the Empire of Napoleon I, 'The Chinese revolution' –the events during the years ,1911-1912,inspired by Sun Yat-Sen,which overthrew the authority of the Dowager Empress and the Manchu Empire and resulted in the establishment of a republic. Same way "The Russian

revolution" - the conflict (1917-1922), beginning in a Petrograd uprising on 12th March, 1917, that resulted in a Provisional moderate government and the abdication of Nicholas II. On 6th November (24th October, old style), the Bolsheviks under Lenin overthrew this government (the October Revolution), and after resisting counter-revolution and a liberation revolution until December 1992, united the Soviet states into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Communist (Bolshevik) control. Chinese Revolution had liberated China in 1949 (Shrestha, 2004). Most of the patriotic revolution, revolutionary parties employed the freedom fighters. For example, Indian and American patriotic movements, people formed the National Army against British imperialism. Russian and Chinese communist revolutionary parties were recruited the Peoples Army (Red Army) against the dictatorial rulers (Chalaune, 2009).

Most of the violent conflicts of the twentieth century were War Between the States; almost all major conflicts around the world that took place in the 1990s were fought within the state. As a result, the frequency and intensity of the volatile internal conflicts has been increasing in number around the world. Between 1989 and 1996, 95 of the 101 armed conflicts identified around the world were such internal confrontations (Harries, 1998). CPN (Maoist) armed conflict were recorded in 101 as a internal confrontation in the world record. Among these armed conflicts, 35% in the world and 50% in the American Continent countries were back to war after the conflict resolution (KantipurDaily, 2013).

Committed revolutionary groups set the stage of the struggle but such groups do not necessarily have the organizational capacity and strength to confront head on an established state at least at the initial stage. Therefore, such revolutionary groups resort to unconventional methods of struggle one of the known as guerrilla war, which war-

method was used by many revolutionaries groups .This insurgency movement is carried out by irregular forces to win over the mass of the population from the control of a government with the aim of finally overthrowing it. Guerrilla warfare was indeed an age-old tactic 'but only in modern times has it became the acknowledged weapon of the weak, symbol of our age registering success to less than setbacks from China to Cuba, Malaya to Mozambique (Berhe, 2008) and considered a component of the doctrine of 'People's War' articulated by modern revolutionaries like Mao Tse-Tung, Amilcar Cabral or Che Guevara.

In China, Guerilla warfare was started from 1927 to1936; the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerilla tactics constantly. Many bases were established and the guerilla bands formed armed the Reds were able to develop in to regular armies and then they proceeded upon a ten-years period of resistance and participated in the Japanese war. The internal unification of China gained valuable experience in the struggle against Japanese imperialism (Bihari,1982).The success of guerilla warfare largely depends upon powerful political leader, who must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy (Mao Zedong, 1967). From 18 September 1931, a strong anti Japanese guerilla campaign and activity opened and exploded in each of the three northeast provinces (Shrestha, 2004). Mao Zedong, during the civil war, summarized the People's Liberation Army's principles of warfare. In the world, there were more than 5 dozens of war were fought using the methods of guerrilla war. Among these wars 3 dozens of guerrilla war were successive and 2 dozens were unsuccesed.

The people's war and movement in Nepal were the intensive political class struggle, launched by all kinds of exploited, excluded and suppressed class, caste, region,

gender etc. for their liberation, national liberation; for the achievement of the nationality. There were, more than one dozen of armed struggle were launched by different groups and organization in different time and places (Pathak, 2004) . Among these armed struggle, Nepali Congress (1950) and CPN (Maoist) (1996-2006), armed struggles were the major armed conflicts in Nepal. Both armed struggles had had the political objectives and goals. Nepali Congress armed struggle (1950) began the new era, modernization and political transformation of Nepal. In the same way CPN (Maoist) armed struggle had abolished the feudal kingship and began a new republic political system in Nepal. In the course of political change and transformation, both parties had recruited militant organization against the Rana regime and feudal kingship, which was not employed in Nepal past by any parties. Nepali Congress's formed people's liberation army (1948), (Tilouine, 2013), later this militant organization popularly known as a Mukti Sena and CPN (Maoist) militant organization's known as a people's liberation army (PLA). The first militant organization, Mukti Sena had abolished the 104 years Rana regime and CPN (Maoist) militant organization, PLA and with support of seven party alliances abolished the 240 years feudal monarchical system from Nepal. Both armed struggle were based on the political ideology.

In World history, many armed struggles and political events had been brought revolutionary and significant political changes in statecraft (Karki, 1986). Same as in Nepal different armed struggles had played important role for political transformation of Nepal. Among these armed struggles people's liberation army role for political transformation is most significant and vital. But there is hardly any study about their role, which lost their life for the nation. So, I have mentioned in this research about their contribution and political transformation.

An Overview of Armed Struggle in Nepal

The modern state of Nepal was, of course, born in the violence of Gorkha's expansion. Whilst Prithivi Narayan relied where he could on subverting enemy principalities by winning over influential persons within them his success largely depended on ruthless coercion (Tilounie, 2013). War with the East India Company (1814), and Intra-elite Conflict (1777-1934), were remarkable in the Nepal's history (Tilounie, 2013). Nepal's democratic movement was began from the 1930s onwards, organized opposition to the Rana regime inside the country. Nepali Congress party raised the weapons 1948 against Rana regime with the help of Mukti Sena (Armed wing of Nepali Congress) (Tilounie, 2013). In 1951-52, Bhim Datt Pant had raised the armed against the local feudal in western part of Nepal. He employed some youth for armed struggle. In between 1951 to 1921, small scale of armed movements were emerged in different parts of the Nepal; like, Peasants movements of Khanibas in Dhading district and Dang district was targeted against the local landlords (Basnet, 2013). In 1960, Terai Liberation Front' started the armed revolution to end of the discrimination and exploitation of indigenous people of Western Terai. It had taken up armed against the discrimination, used the guerilla war strategy (Tilounie, 2013), copying of the same war strategies, the peasant movement in Naxalbari, west Bengal of India, the Jhapa district committee of the CPN (ML) organized the revolutionary youth peasants in to All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committee (ANRCC) in 1970. ANRCC had launched armed movement in Jahpa district in 1971. It applied the Marxit-Leninist revolutionary theory and practically adopted strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare of Mao-Zedong in first time in Nepal (Pathak, 2004). At the same time, peasants movement against the local feudal in Siraha, Dhanusa,

Mahotari and Jugedi in Chitwan district, were more remarkable armed struggles. Same way, police intervention at Thabang of Rolpa district (1981) and Piskar incident of Sindhupalchowk district also were most forceful police operation by the state force. All these movements were targeted against the local feudal and party less Panchyat sytem (Tilounie, 2013). *Satyagrah* of Nepali Congress and Bombard in singhdarbar (1985) were the popular incidents of Nepal.

Although conflict origins, and the growth of popular dissatisfaction against Nepal's traditional autocratic system can be traced throughout the 20 th century from the 1950s onwards, but efforts to established a representative from government were either unsuccessful or repeatedly thwarted by the ruling Shah dynasty. The 1979 Nepalese student's protests marked a significant turning point; a series of violent protests during months of April and May forced the monarchy to agree to a constitutional referendum. Although, small, the democratic reforms that followed laid the foundations for further campaigns of civil disobedience throughout the 1980s. After this movements king had compulsive redy to declare the referendum 1979.

The first people's movement (1990) against the feudal kingship was also most historical political movements of Nepal. The main leftist parties united with in a people's movement and combined with weeks of protests this quickly pressured king Birendra into established a multi-party political system and constiotutional monarchy later. This movement had partially reduced the kingship power, but it was failed to resolve the political, social and economic contradiction of Nepalese peoples, which were riding as a deep rooted in Nepal's society, last hundred years ago. In the history of Nepal, armed conflicts were generated in three dimensions for the identity of orgin, race, color, sex, etc resources, and power and ideology (Hachhethu, 2001).

After the First Janandolan (1990), parliamentary election was held in 1992. In this election Nepali Congress party, won the subsequent majority seats and formed the government. However political instability amidst a climate of economic chaos followed, and the newly formed parties on the radical left began a performance of political agitation through industrial and violent action. The government's forceful repression of these protests and other similar movements only served to further radicalise many activists and further increase tensions.

The country's political life, since 1990 has been marked by prolonged instability. For nearly two decades the government was largely in the hands of the NC with short periods of CPN (UML) control. However the NC's leadership squabbled frequently and the party splintered early in the 21st century. The killing in 2001 of the king and most members of the royal family by the crown prince (suspected) were further heightened tensions. After the royal massacre, PM Koirala who was serving his third term as prime minister was forced to resign.

In this way, if we analyzed the trend and nature of armed conflicts looking like is: in every decade, structural, INCB (Identity, Need, Class-Based) and politico-ideological conflict has occurred in Nepal. Thus, there had been Makai Parva in 1920; the Prachanda Gorkha episode in 1932; the Parja Parisad movement in 1940; the Anti- Rana movement in 1950; the banning of the multiparty system in 1961; the Jhapa uprising in 1970; the people's movement I in 1990; the People's War, in full swing in 2000; and the Tarai-Madhes and ethnic conflict in 2009-11 were the major political movements of Nepal.

Since the formation of unitary state, Nepal's rulers left a record of misrule indicating complete negligence of the people's needs. New rulers of the democratic system established in the early 1990's, but, they did not bring this negative trend to end,

rather they carried on the corrupt and selfish practices of the past (Sijapati & Thapa, 2003). Socio-economic discrimination, pervasive poverty, rugged geography, political incompetence and leadership's inability were remaining unchanged whether, political movements had upraised after the NC armed struggle (in between 1950 to 1995).

In this historical context, CPN (Maoist) had started armed struggle (1996-2006) to resolved the of political, social and economic contradiction of Nepalese people's using the methods of guerrilla war and protracted , people's war theory to establish the people's democracy in Nepal, applying some international practices, which were guided by communist ideology (Pathak, 2004), objectives for sweeping away the constitutional monarchy, bureaucratic capitalism, feudalistic mode of society (semi-fedudalism-imperialism, and capitalism) and historical roots of social inequality put forwarding 40-point demands concerning nationality, democracy and livelihood to establish a patriotic , democratic, progressive, and prosperous People's Republic of Nepal.

Armed struggle of Nepal had forward ideologically and politically for a revolutionary social, economic and cultural transformation following the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and was oriented to develop Marxism-Lenism-Maoism (Passang, 2008). It seemed not possible to abolish the 240 years feudal kingship from Nepal without formation of People's Liberation Army (PLA) . Seven Parties Alliances roles had also responsible for abolish the monarchical system from Nepal (Mishra, 2009).

Armed struggle under the Nepali Congress

Rana had ruled in Nepal, 104 years (1846-1949), on full support of British Empire. It had controlled the nation by the military power. The Rana regime “was an undisguised military despotism” whose “main domestic pre-occupation was the exploitation of the

country's resources in order to enhance the personal wealth of the Rana rulers and his family.” (Joshi & Rose, 1966).

Above this social and political context, All India Nepali Rashtriya Congress was formed in October 1946 at Banaras an initiative of a group of Nepali political domiciles in India and this forum was developed into a political party in January 1947 with the merger of two other similiar groups-Nepalis Sang and Gurkha Congress- and ommiting the first word "All India" from its original name to include Nepalis both inside and outside the country (Hachhethu,2001). Two other parties were also founded in exile in Calcutta- the Nepal Parjatantra Congress (NPC) in 1948 and CPN in 1949. The latter's concern against the Rana system was similar to those of other groups, but, its ideology of class struggle made it different from the two other parties (Hachhethu, 2001) . The Nepali Rashtrya Congress (NRC) and the NPC had a common objective of replacing the Rana regime by a democratic system of govern with constitutional monarchy (Hachhethu, 2001) . Their initial difference – the NPC for armed movement and the NRC protest programs inside Nepal following Gandhi's way of civil disobedience movement –was resolved in favor of launching armed struggle against the Rana regime, which ultimately led to a merger of these two parties in April 9 under the name of Nepali Congress. In order to decide on the armed struggle under the consitutional framework of the party, a Conference of the representatives of the Nepali Congress was held on 26 and 27 September 1950 at Bairgania in India (Parmanand, 1982).

Anti-Rana movement was expedited through forming underground political organizations- Prachanda Gorkha in 1931 and Parja Parisad in 1935 by small group of enlightened people of Kathmandu. The objective of these secret societies was to overthrow the Rana rule through underground terrorist activities and then to introduce a

democratic political system (Hachhethu, 2001). The Parja Parisad and Nepali Congress were already formed in exile by leaders, such as, BP Koirala, Ganesh Man Singh, Subarn Samsher, K. P. Bhattarai, G. P. Koirala and many of others patriotic –minded Nepalese who urged the military and popular political movement in Nepal to overthrow the autocratic Rana regime. Among the prominent martyrs to die for the cause, executed at the hands of the Ranas, were Dharma Bhakta Mathema, Sukra Raj Sastri, Ganga Lal Shersrtha and Darsarth Chand. This turmoil culminated in king Tribhuvan, a direct descendent of Prithivi Nayan Shah, fleeing from his “Palace Prison” in 1950, to newly independent India touching off an armed revolt against the Rana administration (Parmanand, 1982).

The Gorkha soldiers, whose exposure to the outside world during the First and the Second World Wars, proved to be beneficial of the country. They played a crucial role in making the 1950-51 armed revolution against the Ranas successful (Hachhethu, 2001). The motivation of the founder leaders of the INC and the CNC was to liberate their own nation from the British colonial rule, while in Nepal political parties appeared as a logical development in the on-going struggle for democracy against native Rana regime (Uperti, 1992). He added that some Indian socialists fought as comrades in arms and Burmese socialists supported with the arms and ammunitions to launch armed struggle in Nepal.

Before the social and religious movements gained momentum and the secret organizations like Praja Parisad went in to action, the Rana rulers arrested almost all rebels. Four of them (Ganga Lal shrestha, Dharma Bhakta Mathema, Sukra Raj Shastri and Dasrath Chand) were sentenced to death in 1941. Several others were punished with life imprisonment. The sacrifice made by these four martyrs and courage shown by several

members of the Praja Parisad inspired Nepalis living in India did something there (Parmanand,1982) .

Nepali Congress believed on democratic norms and values. In this system ends and means are both non-violent. But the Nepal Democratic Congress needed an armed wing, for since its very inception to overthrowing the Rana regime by violent means (Parmanand, 1982). Before the Bairgania Conference, NC formed its' armed wing Mukti Sena in 1948. Mukti Sena had comprised some members of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army. After the conclusion of World War II many Gurkhas of the Indian and British armies had come back to join in Mukti Sena . During the armed revolution period, many retired army officials of the Rana rulers, students, hunters, villagers and the people, in general, came to join it in vast numbers. It was believed that about 2,000 Indian volunteers in Calcutta, 100 in Darjeeling, 300 each in Banaras and Patana, the rank and file of Mukti Sena, were participated in the armed struggle (The Hindu, 1950).

During the armed struggle periods, Mukti Sena carrying the party's four-star flag and successfully marched ahead with slogans like Inklab Jindabad (up with the revolution), Nepali Congress Jindabad (up with Nepali Congress) Shree- Panch Tribhuvan Jindabad (up with King Tribhuvan), Rana Sahi Murdabad (down with Rana oligarchy) we want democracy, to overthrow the Rana regime by armed revolution (Hachhethu, 2001). In this way, Nepali people came to know the NC as a party whose objective was liquidation of the Rana oligarchy and the establishment of democracy and constitutional monarchy in the country. The objective was to overthrow a century old autocratic Rana regime and establishment of democracy in Nepal. It was with this aim in mind that MP Koirala, the President of the party, was given the power of a dictator during the armed struggle (Sharma, 1976). The organization and use of the 'Mukti Sena' by the

Nepali Congress was one of its greatest achievements to liberate terms of organizing an armed revolution. At the time of formation of the Nepal Democratic Congress, Suvarana Shamsher was able to ensure and attract the support of some Gurkha ex-servicemen, disenchanted with the factional politics of the Nepali National Congress, and some former members of the Indian National Army (Parmanand, 1982).

After the collapsed of Rana regime in 1950, NC take over the control of government at local level and declared the provisional administrations named- *Janasarkar*, the same word as was later to be employed by the CPN (Maoist) (Tilaine, 2013) . According to Mohan Bikram Sing, Communist leader of CPN (Marxist- Leninist and Mao thought ideologist), one of the legend eye witness of NC armed struggle, said to researcher in an interview, that Mukti Sena had been capturing 80 percent principalities of the nation, and were marching ahead to achieve their goal.

Unfortunately, NC set back their armed group. Gautam (1998), stated that after the pressure of Indian Priminister, Neharu, NC leader called back their armed wing without achiving their goal. According to Narad Muni Thulung, a freedom fighter of NC had gave his account, Indian Priminister, Neharu, forced to BP Koirala to agree in the Delhi agreement (Thulung,1988).

In 12 January 1951, the NC emergency meeting had held in Gorakhpur, agendas were focused on Delhi agreement (Gautam, 1998). The debate divides into two fractions; some leaders had wanted to continue armed struggle and some were agreed to stop the struggle. But majority of NC's leaders agreed to stop armed struggle and they appealed to their liberation army to putdown their arms in 10, January 1951. After slight vacillation, the Nepali Congress also declared a ceasefire on 16 January, 1951 (Gupata, 1993). But, K I Sing, Ram Prashad Rai and his followers had appealed to Mukti Sena for continuation

of armed struggle. The goal of the 1950 revolution to have a constitution drafted by the constituent assembly became untenable largely as a result of unprincipled political elements who cared only power (Joshi & Rose, 1966). Constitutional Assembly election was main agenda of Delhi Agreement. But, King Trivhuvan had denied it and converted into parliamentary election that was held on 1958. After 55 years, CPN (Maoist) had raised again this CA demand for ends of a decade long armed struggle.

On 15 December 1960, king Mahendra sacked the first elected government and NC's majority government and took himself executive power, prohibited political parties and political activities. After the royal coup NC declared the armed struggle to smash the Panchayat regime and reinstate democracy. After of the coup 18 January 1962, a bomb was thrown over the arcade of King Mahendra in Rangbhum of Janakpur. NC leader Durganada Jha was arrested and accused him for bombing. 6 February 1962, NC cadres captured Bharatpur of Chitwan district by an armed revolution. But two days later the RA took its control killing dozens of rebels. On 3 October 1962, Om Jangbahadur Singh, the Bajhang king who had revolted against the Panchayat, was arrested by the RNA and killed in Bitthad Lek of the district along with 10 other Congress cadres.

NC leaders halted the armed struggle on 8 November 1962 with the hope that king will come to consensus. But, the King strengthened his regime and continued his policy for suppression. So, the Congress announced formally second time announced the armed struggle against the Panchayat regime, started from September 1972 (Sapkota, 2010)

On 16 December 1974 NC had captured the Solukhumbu district headquarters. These incidents popularly known as a Timburbote incident (*Kand*) where three dozens of NC cadres were killed. An armed team led by Captain Yagya Bahadur Thapa. Smae

way earlier, on 16 March NC cadets had thrown bomb near the arcade of King Birendra in Biratnagar. In 1976, NC formally gave up the policy of armed struggle and adopted the reconciliation policy (*Rastriya Melmilap*) (Sapkota, 2010) with the king and had adopted the peaceful means of agitation against the government and state authority.

Armed Struggle under the CPN (Maoist)

The political excluded group in Nepal continues after the restoration of democracy 1990. In fact, for some groups like the indigenous nationalities (adibasi janajati), political exclusion has increased in the parliament, cabinet, administration and judiciary after 1990 compared to the autocratic Panchayat years 1962-90 and the 1959-60 democratic years (Lawoti 2008). The presence of women in different influential realms, such as the parliament, administration, judiciary and cabinet has not changed much after 1990 (Lawoti, 2008). Political system had been held by upper class (Brahmans and Chhetri). More than 70% marginalized groups had been excluded from the political mainstream and were not represented in the decision-making process of the legislative and the executive at the local to the national levels as well as the other state mechanism. Major landholders and other ruling elites occupied the higher ranks in the military, police, bureaucracy and judiciary. Such as major landholders and other ruling elites had control over the national economy, trade and commerce. 65 % of cultivated land was owned by 10 % landholders and rich peasants. The richest 10% of the society were confining 46.5% of national income (Sapkota, 2010).

According to the CPN (Maoist) literature during 1996-1997, Nepal had per capita gross domestic product of \$180, the second lowest in the world. A pathetic 1.25 per cent of labour force was engaged in industry, 75 percent of the population was below the poverty line and 60 percent of the population was illiterate. Ten percent of landlords and

rich peasants owned 65 percent of cultivate land, as against 65 percent poor peasants owning a mere 10 percent of fertile land, and the richest 10 percent of society accounted for 46.5 percent of the national income (The Worker, 3, February 1997).

Since the formation of unitary state, Nepal's rulers left a record of misrule indicating complete negligence of the peoples needs. The third party of first people's movement (1989) and Unified People's Forum Nepal (later CPN(Maoist)) were excluded from the 1990 constitution engineering process and from the governance of the polity till 1996 (Lawoti, 2008). New rulers of the democratic system established in the early 1990's did not bring this negative trend to end. Rather they carried on the corrupt and selfish practices of the past. Same way, socio-economic discrimination, pervasive poverty, rugged geography, political incompetence and leadership's inability could be regarded as the cause of conflict in Nepal (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003) . Socio- economic agenda of the Maoists have considerable appeal for the poor and suppressed Nepalis people (Muni, 2003).

Galtung's multidimensional approach to conflicts and different representation explains the forms of violence observed in Nepal had ascribed to forms of structural violence (i.e.the failure of the state institutions to provide "equal rights and opportunities" to the population) and socio-cultural violence(i.e.regional,caste,ethnic,and gender based discrimination) carried out by the state .This types of analysis had widely accepted the causes of conflict.Upreti (2001), examine the causative factors of conflict like this way "rampant poverty, structural inequality, political oppression, social discrimination, failure of the public administration, widespread corruption " were considered as the background reasons of the conflict, political, ethnic, regional and caste affiliation had been regarded as the channel of violence triggered by some catalyst factors

such as inter and intra-party quarrels, bad governance from democratic leadership as well as the Royal Palace massacre and September 11 events .

The CPN (Maoist) launched armed struggle in the context of above socio-economic and political context of Nepal, on February 1996 party launched "People's War in Nepal under the slogans "Let us march ahead on the path of struggle towards establishing the people's rule by wrecking the reactionary ruling system of the state. The objective was to overthrow the old order, which included monarchic and privileged rule by an establishment of landed families, and to replace it with New people's democracy (Shah & Pettigrew, 2012) . People's war was a political phenomenal historical achievement in Nepalese history as it removed nearly 240 years of monarchy, creating a federal democratic republic in Nepal (Sapkota, 2010).

CPN (Maoist) had developed their own ideological framework from the its' Second Convention, which was held in 2001. This convention had passed 'Prachand Path' as theoretical guidelines of forthcoming armed struggle (Uperti, 2006). It had modified in Chunwang meeting agendas, which was held in 2005. Chunbang meeting was marked a profound transformation in entire sector of the Maoists party activities with the complete abandonment of its programme of Cultural Revolution- that had been launched between 2003-2005 in the base region and its surrounding districts with the aim of moving its full-timers to urban areas (Tilouine, 2013).

Maoist claimed that Prachand Path allows going beyond the classical communism and envisioned a model of revolution combining a Chinese strategy of protracted people's war (entering from villages to town and cities) and Russian strategy of armed insurrection (Sharma, 2003) . Maoist strongly believes in the philosophy of Mao-Zedong who proclaimed "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Maoist also

draw inspiration from 'revolutionary international movement' Peru left wing guerrilla movement – the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and from radical communist parties in different parts of the world (Sapkota, 2010).

There are several questions raised, why, and how were the major political movements emerged a decade time interval in Nepal? It is the serious question for all researchers and political activists. Arguments are very nearer that, unilateral, centralized, feudal, monarchic state authority, discriminative laws were the caused of armed conflicts. Same way all the sensitive organs of the state machinaries;like bureaucracy, military,court, police force,were not inclusive, all above were responsible to feudal kingship and theirs selectives followers,were the auxularies caused of armed conflict (Passang,2008).

During the people's wars Maoists have established the parallel government, people's court, tenure collection offices etc since 1998-2001. More than sixty percent of territory under the Maoist control . Two types of government defacto and dejure were practices . NGOs/INGOs suspended their activities and small police stations were closed. According to Minisery of Peace and Reconstruction Reports (2014) counter - incounter attacks 17886 peoples were deaths, 1530 disapered ,8191 wounded , 79571 peoples were internally displacement and 17484 (nos) property lost during the peoples war .

CPN (Maoist) halted their peoples' war even though it was going strong;the insurgency was advanced to the 'startegic offensive' stage from the 'startegic defence' and then 'startegic balance stages;number of their's armed ighers (PLA) were implementing the Prachand Path,which was a mix model of the Chinese model of protracted war in the countryside and Russian model of armed insurrection in urban areas (Kathmandu Post,June 4,2001) were targeted against the feudal kingship within and outside of the country. Nepal government strengthened theirs armed force, which were supported by

anti-communist and anti-terrorist support. In this circumstances, Chiraman of CPN (Maoist) had speeches on press conference during the late periods of armed struggle, had said, did not foresee the possibility of capturing state power at the centre through armed revolution alone (Press Conference on 8 November, 2006). Some experts had long before predicated that the war between the state and Maoist was un-winnable Militarily (cit. Hachheathu, 2007).

Many observers within and outside the country found it surprising that when the Maoist reviews all the national and international situation on the light of its' Chunbang meeting, some lesson learned from international experience of armed struggles; for example Sri Lanka's- LTTE, which armed group was suppressed by military and peace process was resolved by military means shows that military victory was impossible. Civil War can be sustained only if it is confined to a certain territory. CPN (Maoist had to faced variety of internal problems; during the expanding insurgency,) it had to deal with confrontations within the party on five occasions (Baral, 2006). To resolved the armed conflict, the party decided to adopt a strategy that called for waging an all-out struggle against the monarchy and possibly seeking India's assistance to start collaborative political efforts with mainstream Nepalese parties (Hachheathu, 2007).

Majority of scholars believed that the CPN (UML) had given up its Naxalite aims in 1982, dropped its Maoist ideal in 1989, and participated in the movement for the restoration of democracy in 1990; and it had officially declared its support for the multiparty system of democracy in 1993. The same logic applied by the CPN (UML) to transform itself was possibly being used to determine the transformation of the CPN (Maoist) from an insurgent group to a competitive party. It had modified its' ideology in June 2003, and passed a resolution called 'Democracy in the 21 st Century,' which

featured an insert that supported multiparty democratic competition (Hachheathu, 2007). The CPN (Maoist) itself took a several decisions to ensure its transformation from an armed rebel group to a competitive party as follows (Hachheathu, 2007).

In accordance with of the new components of its ideology and principles, CPN (Maoist)s pledged allegiance to the multiparty competitive system. On 21 November 2006, it announced the end of the decade-long insurgency. It agreed to place its soldiers from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in cantonments and to lock up their weapons under UN supervision. Its parallel government –from village to central levels, along with its Jana Adalat (people's court)-was disclosed. It changed from a rebel group to a mainstream political party by scrapping its military-related organizations, abandoning its wartime strategies and re-creating its organizational setup to reflect the changes,

It joined the Interim legislature, with 83 representatives (the total number of members in the Interim legislature is 330). It had become the part of the interim government.

The twelve-point agreement signed by the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (Maoist) on November 22, 2005, with Indian mediation and the subsequent mass movement of April 2006 transformed Nepal into a secular, federal democratic republic. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on November 21, 2006 formally ended a decade-long armed struggle and brought Maoist and its militant cadres (PLA) into the political mainstream. It has promises to end the conflict and bring about political, economic and social transformation (Bhatta, 2012). People's war was not only a violent expression to achieve the political power for establishing peoples republic rather it was a radical social and political movement which movement brought a significant political changes in the history of Nepal (INSEC, 2004). The report further heighlighted that, the

revolution, with the involvement of the oppressed peoples for centuries, brought historic change that marked the end of one era and the beginning of the new one.

Significance of the Study

Different approaches seem to be applicable to understand the conflicts; positive and negative. There are too many studies and research about the causes, consequences and impact of armed conflicts. Most of the research theses, articles, journals, had published on armed conflicts, revolution, insurgencies etc. But, they did not much research and studies on about contribution and transformation of people's liberation army.

In post-war countries integration, rehabilitation and transformation of rebellion groups into societies and mainstream politics is most important phenomenon. It's the main components of peace process. This academic research mainly covers with the political transformation, integration, fostering and hindering factors of PLA.

This study is more relevant and significant for peace builders, human rights activists, mediators, social workers and institutions I/NGOs as well as government and students, teachers and researchers.

Statement of the Problem

Maoist people's war was the most revolutionary event in the history of Nepal that brought a number of significant changes in the Nepalese society. It has not only exposed the hidden social contradictions of Nepalese peoples' movement, but also brought out comprehensive solution to the oppressed problems. The revolution, with the involvement of the oppressed peoples for centuries, brought historic change that marked the end of one era and the beginning of the new one. With the full support of people's liberation

army of CPN (Maoist) and other democratic alliance abolished 240 years feudal and autocratic monarchical ruling system from Nepal.

The major roles of people's liberation army for the political transformation of Nepal have been considered as one of the crucial points on conflict resolution. A number of hindering and fostering factors of the people's liberation army has been in the ground to be explored for understanding of the conflict resolution in Nepal. A number of problems faced during integration and rehabilitation of the liberation army after political resolution are needed to be analyzed. This study has focused to identify the possible measures to overcome the problems of integration and rehabilitation of the liberation army. For the convenience of the research study, a single statement of the problem was devised as "To What Extent People's Liberation Army Contributed in the Political Transformation of Nepal for Resolving Conflict?"

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to identify the role of people's liberation army in political transformation of Nepal through the national politics and its impact in socio-economic changes. The specific objectives of the study were to:

1. explore the role of people's liberation army in the political transformation of Nepal.
2. analyze the hindering and fostering factors of management of the people's liberation army.
3. assess the problems and corrective measures of integration and rehabilitation of the people's liberation army.

Research Questions

The Research questions of this study were designed in the following ways: The following research questions have been addressed in this study.

1. What were the major roles of people's liberation army for the political transformation of Nepal?
2. What were the hindering and fostering factors of the people's liberation army?
3. What were the problems faced during integration and rehabilitation of the liberation army after political resolution?
4. What could be the possible measures to overcome the problems of integration and rehabilitation of the liberation army?

Delimitation of Study

This research considered the following delimitations during the research study:

1. Study covered mainly on the CPN (Maoist) people's liberation army for the time being of in between 1996 up to 2012.
2. Research based on the role of people's liberation army in national politics covering the impact of social inclusion and socio-economic changes.
3. The study has been delimited to the political ideology based on socialism as well as democratic movement.

Organization of the Study

This thesis has been organized in seven chapters .The first chapter contains the background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions , theoretical link and conceptual framework. Chapter two has provided a

comprehensive literature review. Chapter three dealt with the research methodology. The fourth chapter includes analysis and sixth chapter, mentioned the summary, conclusion and implications of the present research. Table 1.1 has been presented the detail of the organization of the thesis.

Table 1.1

Organization of the Thesis

Chapters	Descriptions
I	Backgrounds of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, theoretical link and conceptual framework .
II	Literature Review
III	Research Methodology
IV	Empirical findings
VI	Discussion of the findings
V	Summary, conclusion and implication

Chapter Summary

This introductory chapter is the beginning of a quest for me as a researcher. This journey had so far taken me along the path of attempting to identify the problems and corrective measures on the political transformation and role of PLA in Nepal. This thesis is one of the few research works carried out in Nepal. An overview of the research was also sketched out as it is the background of this study. Significance, assumptions, Scope and Delimitations of the study has been presented before the presentation of the organization of the study.

The next chapter presents the selected literature review related to this research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, the related theoretical and previous studies have been thoroughly reviewed. The reviewed literatures were the theses, dissertations, books, journals, newspapers and yearly publications related to the areas of the present study. The literature review has been presented under thematic review, theoretical review, policy review and review of contemporary research studies and conceptual framework of the study.

Historical Development of People's War

People have their different perspectives and ideology to observe and understand the events and processes of the history. Communist observed the things from the perspectives of dialectical materialism. Materialistic interpretation of history and class struggle had the basic trends of Marxism theory that was developed by Marx in the 19 th century through his writing including Communist Manifesto and Das Capital (Baral, 2006). According to Marx and Engles ' the history of all hitherto existing society in the history of class struggles'. The two ideologues clearly point out the characteristics of the society, and that the two classes are always in the struggle. Philosophically communist believe on coercive measures to hold the government with state authority. The communist used the ideological perspective of Marxism on: Establishing a social state, class struggle, and dictatorship of the proletariat. Karl Marx and Fedric Angels, the global communist

movement still believes in towards the communist revolution. Revolutionary communist party believes in the need of forceful struggle to overturn the state controlled by either the feudalists or the capitalist. Despite its many ideological debates and differences of opinion, the revolutionaries around the world believe that the communist manifesto is still applicable even in the modern world (Pathak, 2004).

Experience in the class struggle taught to revolutionary parties and groups only the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisies and landlords; that's why only with guns can the whole world be transformed. Using this Marxism class struggle theory first time creatively in the Russian Revolution of 1917, V.I. Lenin discovered newer forms of it. He organized the communist parties on the basis of "democratic centralism" which is still being fashioned by the communist parties of the world (Baral, 2006). Lenin forged the alliance between peasants and workers to incite mass insurrections. As a result, the Great Socialist Revolution took place in a less industrialized society of Russia. The successful socialist revolution of 1917, proved wrong Marx's prediction that a highly industrialized society of Europe would host the first socialist revolution. Lenin not only applied Marxism in Russia but also refined it with new ideas such as imperialism, democratic centralism, peasants-workers' alliance and others. These ideas constitute Leninism (Baral, 2006).

Lenin developed Marxism to the new stage of proletariat revolutionary movement in former USSR, which opened up the gates for a new age of worldwide proletariat revolution, called Global Proletariat Revolutionary Era (Pathak, 2004). He further said that, Lenin defined the Marxist theory of class struggle and people and practically revolutionized the toiling laborers of the factories and industries. Lenin for the first time in the history of the world translated the Marxist revolutionary political ideology into

practice and established the dictatorship of the proletariat in the former USSR in 1997 after the October Revolution. The doctrine of Maoism was composed of the ideology of Marxism, practice of Leninism, and the methods of armed revolutionary military science. Deriving inspiration from this prospective, Mao Zedong and Che Guevara developed the military science and strategies of revolutionary warfare, which were currently being applied by the CPN (Maoist) in the 21st century in Nepal.

'Guerilla Warfare' developed by Mao and his associates in the Chinese Communist party from the 1920s until Mao's death in 1976 (The New Encyclopedia of Britannica, 1999:vol.7/805) and Che Guevara the principle, strategy, and tactics of guerrilla warfare were exercised to revolutionize the peasants to achieve the "New Democracy " in China the main aim of military science had, "Political power grows out of the barrel of gun" (Long live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, 1993). For this purpose, recruiting rebel's collection of arms and ammunitions is necessity.

Most communist parties of the world have a high regard for Mao's ideas of revolution. Some of them had put his revolutionary ideas in practice. In Nepal too, most of the communist group had recognized his ideas as revolutionary and ground breaking. They have however, taken Mao's ideas of revolution only as a thought. On the contrary, the CPN (Maoist) had elevated them to the level of an ism (Baral,2006) . An ism takes shape when a thought develops to guide a revolution of the global scale.

The philosophy of a political party transpires through the ideological stand. NC believed on social democratic philosophy and it believed on peaceful agitation to hold the state authority. Even though, NC raised the arm to abolish the Rana autocracy. It lasted for short period and fixed its objective armed revolution. NC passed the line of armed struggle in 1950, from Bairgania Conference. Nepali Congress arms struggle was guided

by the political ideology and its armed struggle were influenced by Mao Zedong military tactical theory (Ghimire, 2010) . Deriving inspiration from Mao Zedong and past armed struggles of Nepal, CPN (Maoist) developed the military science and strategies of revolutionary warfare and applied in 21st century in Nepal.

After 45 years later CPN (Maoist), Central Committee plan for the Historic Initiation of the People's War or armed struggle in Nepal, from September, 1995 to abolish the 240 years feudual kingship from Nepal (Hachhethu, 2005). It's Second Congress passed Prachand Path to contextualize the MLM ideology to Nepal (Baral, 2006) . The Second Congress was organized in February 2001. This Congress was the most significant for the Nepalese political history. In this Second National Convention Maoist confirmed the need both military models in the Nepali context. Baral deals about the Maoist Central Committee meeting that, the political report of the convention , the end of the cold war, the so-called univocal imperialist world, domination of imperialist capital in the oppressed . Third World countries on the pretext of globalization, direct control over the economy of ever country of the third world in the pretext of liberalization and privatization through financial institutions such as World Bank,IMF,world military strategy prepared by the imperialists on the basis of progress in the information of technology and science including electronics have necessitated the adoption of both models of military strategy in the People's War in the 21 st century (Janadesh,2004). The concept of democracy in the 21 th century, adopted by the Central Committee Meeting of the CPN (Maoist) in June 2003, was the refinement of the Path which was developed to guide the Nepali revolution (Baral, 2006).

The aim of the Maoist-led armed struggle was to solve the basic contradictions of Nepali people,were facing last hundred year. It put down three kinds of Nepali's

contradictions, during the initial stage of armed revolution. First kind of contradiction was between feudalism and the Nepali people. Its head was Monarchy. The second contradiction lies with imperialism. Though the United States of America represents imperialism in the world, the Indian expansionism was the immediate imperialist enemy for the Nepali people. Comprador and bureaucratic capitalism forms the third contradiction with which Nepali people should fight for political freedom. The CPN-Maoist divides this contradiction into two reactions-domestic and external (Baral, 2006).

The Maoist in Nepal had taken ample inspiration from Marx and Lenin to enrich their ideology. It had also secured maximum inspiration from Mao. It was sometimes felt that the Nepali Maoist had gone more after Mao than Marx and Lenin, This is because the theoretical premises put forth by Marx and Lenin were basically suited to the conditions of Europe while Mao's revolution was based on peasantry (Baral, 2006). So it was easy for the Nepali Maoists to copy many of the strategies and tactics adopted by Mao, though the idea of People's Democracy had been interpreted on the basis of Nepali realities.

While carrying out the peasant revolution in China, Mao discovered a string of political ideas. People's New Democracy, Protracted Guerrilla war, permanent Revolution and Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution were among the most prominent. People's Democracy was capitalist transition to socialism. To ensure the the grand beginning of People's New Democracy as the first step of communism in backward countries. Protracted Guerilla Warfare (PGW) was to be employed in the countryside to encircle cities (Baral, 2006). He further said that, need for protracted guerilla warfare was tool and influencing. Political freedom, therefore, comes out of the barrel of gun for Mao. Similar as in Cuba, Cuban Communist Movement, unlike Chinese revolutionary warfare

where revolutionaries diffused with the general masses in the countryside, the freedom fighter and military science strategies, Che Guevara selected the unfamiliar terrain—vegetated inaccessible hills, mountains, and deep forests. Cultivating crops quickly and strengthening the guerrillas' power (Pathak, 2004) . He further said that Che Guevara moved towards the cities defeating the authoritarian regime following Mao's strategy and tactics. He adopted the principles, strategy, and tactics of guerrilla warfare and struggled to liberate whole Latin America. However, he was killed in Bolivia before achieving his goals.

The cause of conflicts is mainly political, economic, lack of good governance and regional and international influences. Among them the main causes of revolution, before and after the Second World War have been the struggle for freedom and independence against the colonial and dictatorial rulers (Shrestha, 2004).

Democracy is not just a form of the government, it is also an ideal of the government . Normally, a regime, which denies people's fundamental rights, dishonours the human rights or misrules (Karki 1986), unequal distribution of national resources and opportunities, corruption as a culture, malpractices, unfair election system, no proper representation of marginalized groups in decision-making process of the legislative and the executive at the local to the national levels as well as the other state mechanism, then conflict arise within country . One of the leading and historical party, Nepali Congress raised the arms against the Rana regime in 1950, even, it believed on ballot and peaceful means to hold the government . Ideologically it believed on social democracy. In democracy people participate in political system and express their views by their representatives.

There are two way of means of influences of the governemnt, legal and illegal – particiaption in election, either a candidate or giving vote, deliverintg speeches, demostrating, pumphelating, ftree use of media etc. In short, they include those means of influences which are the recognized by the law of the state. Illeagal means are those which are restricted by the statutes, for examples, hijacking, kindanping, boming etc. (Karki, 1986). In this contrxt, why people adopt illegal means of participation ? why do they disregard the laws of their nations? is resistance justified, on what grounds? Normally, a regime, which denies peoples' fundamental rights, dishonours the human rights, extar judicial killing, misrules. Widespread social and economic injustice, in this context, peopele's raised the weapons. It is justifiable to revolt the regime. Revolt transforms the politics as well as socio-economy. In Nepal, there were to many war or conflicts upraising after and before the the unification of Nepal. Among these conflicts, more than one dozen of conflicts were related to armed struggle. Although Nepali Congress and CPN (Maoist) armed struggle were different and significant than other armed struggles. Both parties had formally formed their armed wings, named as people's liberation army. Both this two militant organizations were played vital role to abolished the Rana regime (104 years) and feudal kingship (240 years) from Nepal.

Liberation Army Making World History

Revolution before and after the Second World War, was fought against the dictator ruler and colonization of the countries. Making the world history, there are a number of armed parties and organizations are emerged. Revolutionaries armed organizations or groups are commonly known as a liberation army. Some of the poor and developing countries armed

organizations are: People's Revolutionaries Army (PRA) in Bolivia, National Liberation Action (NLA) in Brazil, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, People's Liberation Army in El Salvador, Guerrilla Army of Poor in Guatemala, Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua, Shining Path of Peru, Red Flag Group of New Zealand, Revolutionary Communist group of Columbia, Revolutionary Communist Party of USA etc (RIM, 2013). Although many of these parties and armed groups have ceased to exist, some have appeared in the forefront. Mostly these armed groups have used guerrilla warfare techniques.

Vietnam War was commonly thought as guerrilla warfare, which followed Maoist theory. The National Liberation Front (NLF), drawing its rank from the South Vietnamese peasantry and working class, used guerrilla tactics on the early phase of the war. National Liberation Front was in the process of being supplanted by regular units of the North Vietnamese Army. The communist victory illustrated the importance of the political element in modern guerrilla warfare. "The Party commands the gun" was the Maoist saying and this had reflected in guerrilla struggle that were the guiding principle for non-communist as well as from colonial liberation conflicts in Africa to Palestinian operation against Israel. Throughout the Vietnam War, communist party closely supervised all the levels of the conflict. The Southern Communist party, the People's Liberation Party (PRP) organized in 1962, to participate in the insurgency, and COVS, Central Office for Southern Vietnam, which particularly controlled military activity.

After World War II, during the 1940s and 1950s, thousands of fighters in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania participated in unsuccessful guerrilla warfare against Soviet occupation. In Lithuania guerrilla warfare was massive until 1958 and the last fighters were killed in combat in 1986 (5 years before Lithuania regained independence). In the late

1960s the Troubles began again in Northern Ireland . They had their origins in the partition of Ireland during the Irish War of Independence. They came to an end with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement 1998 ([www. guerrilla warfare.com](http://www.guerrilla-warfare.com)) .The violence was characterised by an armed campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland. by the Provisional Irish Republican Army ([www. guerrilla warfare.com](http://www.guerrilla-warfare.com)) . In India Shivaji Bhonsle, who founded the Maratha Empire in 1674 in western India, employed guerrilla warfare successfully against the Mughals in the hilly terrain of the Sahyadris? For this the Mughals referred to him as the mountain. Kashmir had been disputed both India and Pakistan. The territory had been disputed since the Indo-Pakistan in 1947. Many guerrillas fight for an independent Kashamiri state,while other guerrillas wish to annex parts of Kahmir in to Pakistani-Administered Kashmir .

The American Civil War followed the patterns of irregular warfare in 19th century. Structurally, irregular warfare can be divided into three different types conducted during the Civil War: 'People's War', 'partisan warfare', and 'raiding warfare'. The concept of 'People's war,' first described by Clausewitz in On War, was the closest example of a mass guerrilla movement in the era. South African War Guerrilla tactics were used extensively by the forces of the Afrikaner republics in the Boer Wars in South Africa (1880-1881; 1899-1902) against the invading British Army. In the First Boer War, the Boer commandos wore their everyday farming clothes, earthtone khaki, while the British still wore their bright scarlet red uniforms ([www.guerrilla warfare.com](http://www.guerrilla-warfare.com)). In world's history there were 25 civil wars including Nepal (2006), were successfully completed on the bases of guerrilla warfare tactics and people's liberation army and 23 guerrilla campaigns were not succeeded.

In Nepal, Nepali Congress party raised the arms in 1950 against Rana regime with the help of its armed wings Mukti Sena. Mukti Sena was organized by Nepali Congress in 1948 (Armed wing of Nepali Congress). Same way inspired by the peasant movement in Naxalbari, west Bengal, the Jhapa district committee of the CPN (ML) organized the revolutionary youth peasants into All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committee (ANRCC) in 1970. ANRCC had launched armed movement in Jhapa district in 1971. It applied the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and practically adopted strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. But it had not developed the regular arms force. CPN (Maoist) copied (1996), some past armed movements of Nepal and abroad. It developed the military armed wings, People's Liberation Army (PLA) against the monarchical system to establish the people's democracy in Nepal in 2001.

Social Democratic Movement through Liberation Army

According to Serchan (2001), Lakhan Thapa Magar, Nepal's first martyr, started rebellion in 1876 saying that as Jang Bahadur has not ruled according to religion, rules and regulations, I have come to depose him and establish the rule of law. He further added that the Rana Regime dated back to 1846, when Jang Bahadur Kunwar later took the name Rana (Hofman & Colleagues, 1999). Eliminated all enemies and possible competitors in the bloody Kot massacre, Jung Bahadur had become the Prime Minister of Nepal. This legendary figure was not only a master manipulator and ruthless power broker, he was also a remarkable statesman. Within a few years, he was able to consolidate all power within the Rana family and create a system of government which lasted 104 years (Hofman & Colleagues, 1999). The system which ruled by Rana was autocratic, dictators and families dominant.

The legacy of library Parva, Makai Parva, Jayntu Sanskrit movement was carried on by Nepal paraja parisad (1948) (Chhetri,2008) . It was the the first political party, president was Tank Parsad Acharya . Team of Tank Prasad were visited India,Burma and some other places to learn more about the method of secret terrorist activities . After their return, Parishad decided to function at two level movements –one to educate the people about political movements and two to associate some important Ranas to bring about a swift change in government (Parmanand,1982). The Parja Parisad and Nepali Congress were already formed in exile by leaders, such as, BP Koirala,Ganesh Man Singh,Subarn Samsheer Rana,Krishna Parshad Bhattarai,Girija Parsad Koirala and many of others patriotic –minded Nepalese who urged the military and popular political movement in Nepal to overthrow the autocratic Rana regime . Among the prominent martyrs to die for the cause, executed at the hands of the Ranas, were Dharma Bhakta Mathema, Sukra Raj Sastri,Ganga Lal Shersrtha and Darsartha Chand. This turmoil culminated in king Tribhuvan, a direct descendent of Prithivi Nayan Shah, fleeing from his “Palace Prison” in 1950,to newly independent India touching off an armed revolt against the Rana administration (Parmanand, (1982). April,9,1950, Formation of Nepali Congress through the merger of Nepali National Congress (Established on January 25,1947) ,and Nepali Democratic Congress (Established on August,4,1948) at Calcutta,a India and call for an armed struggle against Rana Regime.(www.Nepali Congress Arms Struggle).

In a nicely symmetrical fashion, communists were at this time using the word *Prajatantra* as a simple equivalent of English 'democracy'; the term had since of course become strongly associated with royalist ideology and had contrasted with the republican *Loktantra* . Finally,the name *Janmukti Sena* (People's Liberation Army) chosen for

Nepali Democratic Congress' militia when it was set up in 1948 (Karki, 2008) was employed again by the CPN (Maoist) . After the 1950 revolution, NC's *Janmukti Sena* popularly known as a Mukti Sena. In order to decide on the armed struggle under the constitutional framework of the party, a Conference of the representatives of the Nepali Congress was held on 26 and 27 September 1950 at Bairgania in India. It was with this aim in mind that MP Koirala , the President of the party, was given the power of a dictator during the armed struggle (Sharma,1976).

Since the parties had emerged with a mission they had suffered from the lack of clarity of thought once their mission to bring the end the Rana Regime Finally, it had launched the 1950-51, armed revolution carrying the party's four-star flag the Mukti Sena had successfully marched ahead with slogans like Inklab Jindabad (up with the revolution), Nepali Congress Jindabad (up with Nepali Congress) Shree- Panch Tribhuvan Jindabad (up with King Tribhuvan), Rana Sahi Murdabad (down with Rana oligarchy) we want democracy. This way Nepali people came to know the NC as a party whose objective was liquidation of the Rana oligarchy and the establishment of democracy and constitutional monarchy in the country (Hachhethu, 2001).

Some Indian socialists fought as comrades in arms and Burmese socialists supported with the armed and ammunitions (www.Nepali Congress Arms Struggle). The organization and use of the 'Mukti Sena' by the Nepali Congress was one of its greatest achievements in terms of organizing an armed revolution . At the time of formation of the Nepal Democratic Congress, Suvarana Shamsher was able to ensure and attract the support of some Gurkha ex-servicemen, disenchanted with the factional politics of the Nepali National Congress, and some former members of the Indian National Army. The Nepal Democratic Congress needed such an organization, for since its very inception, it, believed in overthrowing the Rana

regime by violent means (Parmanand ,1982). He further described that Mukti Sena comprised some members on Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army . After the conclusion of World War 2nd many Gurkhas of the Indian and British armies had come to join the Sena . Very soon, after the formation of the Nepali Congress, many people representing many walks of life and various parts of Nepal came to join it. During the armed revolution many retired army officials of the Rana rulers, students, hunters, villagers and the people,in general, came to join it in vast numbers. Indian government and the people whole heartly supported the cause of the insurgents and gave them shelter and indirect cooperation as far as possible. It was belived that about 2,000 Indian volunteers in Culcutta,100 in Darjeeling, 300 each in Banaras and Patana the rank and file of Mukti Sena . (The Hindu,1950). At the time of the armed revolution (November 1950-February 1951) against the Rana regime the NC was first introduced to a large number of Nepali people through its Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) which captured more than fifty percent of the Nepali territory (Upreti 1992).

The Nepali Congress at its Delegates Conference held in Jogbani on 9 and 10 April 1947, to which Ram Manohar Lohia, the Indian Socialist leader,was also specially invited, decided to launch a nation wide agitation in Nepal. Consequently,on 13 April 1947, the people of Nepal staged a massive anti-Rana demonstration at many places (Parmanand,1982). The National Congress, the democratic Congress belived in and preached violence as the means of to achieve its ends . In a long manifesto, the new party declared that its immediate aim was to put an end to the autocratic regime of the Ranas and to replace it by a Constitutional assembly to be elected on the basis of universal adult franchise (Parmanand, 1982). According to Chatterji a socialist leader from Bihar, India, trained a new recruits in guerilla warfare and brought a plane-load of arms and ammunition from Burma

(Chatterji,1967). No revolution is either completely violent or non-violent. The Nepalese revolution of 1950-51 was essentially violent, although on several fronts the capture of power by the Mukti Sena was without any blood shed.(Parmanand1982) . Ram Hari Joshi's memoirs briefly touches upon the scenes of the battlegrounds between the NC's *Mukti Sena* (liberation army) and the government's army. Historian Bhaveshwar Pageni and other writers, Narendra Nath Bastola, Ganesh Pokharel and Rakesh Basyal give sector-wise account of the 1950-51 revolution in West, East, and Mid-West and Far-West regions of the country respectively) (Hachhethu 2000). What shook the Rana regime, and gave its opponents their opportunity, was the British withdrawal from India in 1947. This meant the end of British protection, which had also had the effect of protecting the position of Ranas (Rose,1959). The Indian Revolutionaries had set up guerrilla camp inside the Saptari forest of Nepal . In their camp they had organized a free band of volunteers "Azad Dasta" (Lohia 1971). On the one hand, with India's gaining independence, the Nepalese radicals felt secure and were enthused to organize and intensify anti-Rana activities. On the other hand, the Rana rulers were alarmed at the likelihood of their obscurantist family oligarchy being in danger because with the eclipse of China, India "stood in 1950 as a foremost Asian country, the national leader of other Asian countries in the task of liquidating imperialism and colonialism....." More, the chief objective of her foreign policy in 1950 was the setting up of independent nationalist regimes in South East Asia (Parmanand ,1982). Prominent leaders of the Party were given the responsibility of organizing rebel forces and attacking the Rana garrisons in various areas by using guerrilla tactics (Parmanand,(1982). The purpose of the insurgency, mostly depending on guerrilla warfare in the Terai region, was not capture Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, but to capture the rich Terai area, granary of the country. The Change in the nature of the global politics that took place after the second

World War, inspired Asians and Africans to be champions of freedom, democracy and human rights (Parmanand, 1982).

On 8 December 1950, the Indian Government submitted a memorandum to the government of Nepal in which it suggested the constitutional reforms (Gupata, 1993). The government of Nepal acknowledged the receipt of the memorandum of 19 December. Five days later a special session of "Parliament" was convened at the Singha Darbar and the Maharaja placed the following proposals before the assembly (Gupata, 1993):

1. to convene a constituent assembly within three years on the basis of adult franchise to frame a new constitution for Nepal;
2. to set up a cabinet of 9 members of which at least 3 would be popular representatives and the cabinet would function on the basis of joint responsibility;
3. the provisions of the government of Nepal Act of 1948 would continue to be operative until the constitution was framed;
4. the formation of political parties would be allowed provided they keep within the law and
5. the Nepalese residing abroad could return to Nepal barring the "traitors and criminals".
6. The proposals could hardly satisfy the leaders of the Nepali Congress and the Indian Government.

After the Delhi Settlement, 1951, 10 January 1951, NC appealed to the Liberation army (Mukti Sena) to put down arms in the interest of the country (The Hindu, 1951). The mid-twentieth century began an era of moves towards the democratisation of Nepal. The newly independent India would play an important role in supporting King Tribhuvan, whom the Rana leader Mohan Samsher Jung Bahadur Rana in 1950 had attempted to depose and

replace with his infant king Gynendra and in supporting a new government consisting largely of the Nepali Congress, effectively ending the rule of the Rana dynasty (www.Nepali Congress Armed Struggle, Kingdom of Nepal).

The tripartite talks between the king, the Ranas and the Nepali congress commenced in New Delhi in the first week of February 1951. At the Conference the Nepali Congress placed the four demands as basis for discussion (Gupta, 1950). Armed revolution in 1950-51 which was successfully overthrow the century long Rana oligarchy (Parmanand, 1982). Delhi agreement coalition government form where five ministers were from Ranas and five from the Nepali Congress. Moreover, the Nehru government, and even the ruling party, the Indian National Congress, exercised considerable restraint in giving any covert and encouraging support to the Nepalese movement for the establishment of democracy in the country in the early phase. There were various arguments about Delhi agreement Gautam (2006) described in his book, Indian Prime Minister Nehru wanted to resolve the Nepal's armed struggle by peaceful process, because a year ago in China (1949) had established the communist government. Freedom fighters of Chinese Red Army were moved towards the northern part of Nepal. India was worried about the Red army, If, in Nepal there would be instability and unsecured situation it would be internationalized, so in this circumstance, Nehru imposed to Nepali Congress for the Delhi agreement.

Power struggle between the Ranas and Congress continued even with the formation of the coalition (Baidhya, 2001). Interim Constitution, 1951, ended the century-old autocratic rule of Ranas. The fundamental objective of the Act was to hold the election of a Constituent Assembly. (Baidya, 2001). Interim Constitution, 1951, was designed to consolidate the gains of the revolution of 1950 (Baidya, 2001). The Nepali

Congress party (NC), a dominating party at that time, proclaimed its ideology of "democratic socialism" only in 1956, after 10 years of its foundation (Hachhethu, 2001).

Nepali Congress Party acquired a radical image because its notable local leaders i.e. Bhim Dev Pant, Gauri Lal, Rup Sing etc. made targets of the local feudals through humiliating publicly, looting their property and distributing those among the poor people, and even killing some local exploiters during and immediately after 1950-51 revolution (Ganesh and Rakesh, 1993). The Mukti Sena had used an additional slogan- Jo Jotega So Khayaga (Hindi words meaning land to the tiller) particularly in the terai area. This gave an impression that the Nepali Congress would emancipate the peasant from the feudal landlords. So, apart from general identity of the democratic force, the people entertained several images of the party – associated with social and economic issues – in their local contexts (Hachhethu, 2001). In this way on the full support of Mukti Sena, Nepali Congress executed his social democratic movement and introduced it as an agent of change in social, economic and political structure of the country, then autocratic and feudals society of Nepal transform in new and democratic society.

The Nepali Congress's image as an instrument of social and economic change got further boost after it proclaimed as its ideology in 1956. Previously the Nepali Congress lacked clear policy and program-related by its leader (Koirala, 1996)- to follow up the party's avowed ideals; restructure of Nepalese society based on political liberty, economic equality and social justice (NC Manifesto, 1950). In 1956, the Nepali Congress formally declared its ideology of democratic socialism. At that time, most of the people and party activists understood socialism as redistribution of wealth. Land was the single most major source of wealth in the country. Ownership of the land was concentrated in a very small number of people while the majority of cultivators were

landless (Hachhethu 2001). On the eve of the 1950-51 revolution the Nepali Congress propagated redistribution of land and through bringing a change in the prevailing system of inequality in land holding (NC Manifesto, 1950). This impacted deeply in shaping its leaders and workers ideological orientation against the feudocracy. In many parts of the country, including Dhankuta, Dhanusa, Kathmandu, Tanhau and Bardiya, Congress activists had organized peasants in launching local movements for the protection of tenancy rights, reduction of land rents and end of the tradition of compulsory unpaid labor service by cultivators to local feudal lords, and destruction of fake documents forged by money lending feudals. Besides, the Nepali Congress's general policy of land several contents, i.e. abolition of bitra (tax-exempt land), Jagirdari (land assigned to civil servants in lieu of their employments), Jamindari (big land holding) and raja rajuta (small feudatory principalities) system, imposition of ceiling in land holdings, appropriation of excess lands and distribution of such lands to poor and landless peasants (Hachhethu, 2001). Some of the remarkable achievements made at that time were: nationalization of the forest and birta lands, legislation of abolishing raja rajauta system, introduction of property tax, spread of education, health and communication etc. in the country (Hachhethu, 2001). The achievements of armed revolution were: The interim constitution, The establishment public service commission, establishment of Panchayat Nayalaya (supreme court), establishment of Radio Nepal, the Advisory assembly, abolition of the Birta (rent-free land) system, economic welfare measures, reform in education and culture, national integration (Parmanad 1982). In this way Nepali Congress continued struggle, some time violently and some times peacefully, against the authoritarian regime. Nepali Congress used the violent means of struggle by its armed wing Mukti Sena.

Communist Ideology in Liberation Army

Socialist-oriented radicalism swept the world in the 1960s. It had impressive impact on the theory of revolution and use of force to hold the statecraft which is based on Marxist philosophy. Intellectual trends and revolutions was most important in the numerous revolutions that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. The successes of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Algerian and Cuban revolutions inspired intellectuals in other poor countries. With some variation, all had embraced socialism as the just and egalitarian ideology that would liberate the whole population and bring social justice to the majority of the working class and peasantry of their countries, if not the whole world under the banner of 'proletarian internationalism' (Berhe, 2008).

After the fall of Berlin and Russia, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) began the armed struggle in 1996, to liberate the Nepalese people's from all types of discrimination and structural violence. It believed on Marxist theory, which is based on force, the ultimate arbiter of social change the ruling power's monopoly of violence would be capable of the social energy necessary to invert a totally new order of society (Baral, 2006). Marx and Engels put forward a scientific proposition based on the dialectical and historical materialist world view regarding the revolutionary role and necessity of violence in class society (Prachanda, 1993). Armed struggle as the essence of entire teachings of Marx and Engels, Lenin further developed the Marxist concept on revolutionary violence in the course of applying it systematically in class struggle that led successfully to the Great Russian October Revolution (Prachanda, 1993). On the context of Marxist–Leninist theory, Mao-Tse Tung developed the principles of concrete practice of class struggle in the Chinese society. He also developed the proposition on revolutionary violence to a comprehensive theory of people's war, on the basis of

Marxist-Leninist military science (Prachanda,,1993). Based upon the scientific essence of the historical experience that revolutionary war is necessary to do away with the reactionary war, Mao, clearly proclaimed that , "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". Fundamentally, Marxist theory is based on two principles, the first is principle of class struggle and the second is principle of use of force.([www.marxistphilosophy and ideology.com](http://www.marxistphilosophyandideology.com)).

Baral (2006), analysis about Marxist view that - "It is a crime against the proletariat and the general in a masses of the people to start the armed struggle without the firm conviction of carrying it to the end. He further clear about Marxist theory that, this struggle to become a mere instrument for introducing partial reforms in the condition of the people, or terming in a simple compromise by exerting pressure on the reactionary classes. Thus, our armed struggle will be totally free from all sorts of petty bourgeois, narrow nationalist, religious communal and casteist illusions". Particularly for the Marxists, violence subscribes to a deeply constructive meaning in the social engineering process (Baral, 2006) . Regis Debray believes that "every genuinely new social order has been, and must be , inaugurated by a phase of revolutionary violence ". Accordingly, " modern revolutions do not happen, they had made: revolution (is) a project rather than a fatality" (emphasis original). Violence is therefore an instrument for accomplishing the goals of the revolutionary project (Baral, 2006).

Maoist Ideology in Liberation Army

The theory developed by Mao Zedong as the universal and invincible Marxist theory of war. He described the plan of people's war would be based on the aim of completing the new democratic revolution after the destruction of feudalism and imperialism, then immediately moving towards socialism, and by way of cultural revolutions based on the

theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, marching to communism- the golden future of the whole humanity (Baral, 2006). Mao's victory in China in 1949, established him as the prophet of "revolutionary warfare, "successfully transforming Marxism-Leninism from the industrial areas to the countryside especially towards the toiling peasants (The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993).

The doctrinaire principles of Maoism that 'political power comes through the barrel of the gun' was made by the Chinese leader Mao Tse-Tung in 1938, while he was addressing the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (www.bellum.nu/wp/mtt/mttpowas38.html) . This principle was the foundation of the Maoist people's war that formally started on the 13th of the February calling on the Nepali people to "March along the path of people's war to smash the state and establish a new democratic state (Karki and Kattel, 2007) . Mao Tes-Tung (1967), said that military affairs had only one means of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say, "If you are good military, naturally you are good politically,' If you are not good military, you can not be any good politically"- this is to go a step further and give a military affairs a leading position over politics.

In Chinese revolution (1949), Red army was an armed wing of Chinese Communist party . It had been carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Mao believed that guns can the whole world be transformed . Mao Tes-Tung (1967), further stated that, Red Army doing political work to those doing military work, and put forward the slogan," Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters. "The aim of our army in this war, as proclaimed time and again to the nation and the world, is the liberation of the Chinese people and of the Chinese nation. And today, our aim is to carry out the urgent demand of the people of the whole country, that is, to overthrow the arch –criminal of the

civil war, Chiang Kai-shek, and from a democratic coalition government in order to attain the general goal of liberating the people and the nation (Mao Tes-Tung, 1967). He developed the war strategy and tactics as a Chinese socio-economic context. Mao proclaimed "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun " . He takes up it as a Marxist ideology. Mao had underlined the necessity of transforming guerrillas into a regular army to achieve ultimate victory in war. The doctrine of insurrectionary warfare professed and practiced by Mao provides a broad blueprint for the types of war that the insurrectionists around the world had adopted and plasticized (Baral,2006).

People's New Democracy, Protracted Guerrilla War, permanent Revolution, Great Proletariat Cultural revolution were the characteristics features of Maoism that Mao developed as principles and methods during and after the Chinese revolution . The basic principle of protracted war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy (Pathak,2004) . Mao's victory in China in 1949 established him as the prophet of "revolutionary warfare, "successfully transforming Marxism-Leninism from the industrial areas to the countryside especially towards the toiling peasants (The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993).

The Vietnam War, for instance, where direction of war fought with the blueprint of the Maoist military doctrine . According to Che, the primacy of insurgency was the guerrilla forces not the politics and the organizational influence and control of the party over the masses of people to prepare them for accepting the political vanguard that would create the popular army (Baral,2006).

Mao had advocated the war like this way-" The abolition of war, we don't war; but war can only be abolished through the war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take of the gun" . In this way Mao's conception of war have been built upon

the basis of dialectical historical materialism (Prachanda,1993) . Mao has presented as inevitable factors a theoretical and practical solution that suggests centralizing in rural areas, conducting guerrilla warfare with a strategic plan under the leadership of the party so as transform peasants in to an imperishable source of revolution and invincible army. Mao said about the red army that "we the Chinese people and in all things we take the will of the Chinese people as our will". The policies of our army represent the urgent demands of the Chinese people. He further said that, guerrilla war is necessary to overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kaishek government; and establish a democratic coalition government (Sigdel, 2010) .

Maoist Movements and Liberation Army in South Asia

The south Asian history of the Maoist movements can be traced back to the mid-1960s, when Communist revolutionaries broke way from the communist party of India (Marxist) to from the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Shah & Pettigrew, 2012) . Shah and Pettigrew, further analyzed that why have Maoist insurgencies gained huge support in many parts of South Asia? The main cause of support for Maoism in these rural areas increasingly focuses on socio-economic problems: in particular, the unequal nature of development in South Asia, and the poverty and illiteracy of the affected masses. Crossfire between Maoists and the state, dragged in to the cancerous spread of the movement, often out of fear; on the other hand, the revolution was portrayed as a garnering great success in poor tribal or ethnic areas of South Asia that were natural sites rebel consciousness, emerging from the stereotype of ethnic or tribal communities as the original primitive rebels (Shah & Pettigrew, 2012).

West Bengali intellectuals, Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal, the CPI (ML) proposed armed struggle and rejected the parliamentary route to power. Drawing on Mao

Tse tung, their revolutionary hero, they analyzed the Indian economy as semi-colonial and semi –feudal, and proposed that the rural peasantry and proletariat (as opposed to the urban proletariat) should be the major revolutionary force to overthrow the government and the ruling classes . The Maoist route that they envisioned explicitly connected political ideology to military strategy. They sought to launch a protracted people's war of the peasantry and usher in a new democratic revolution as the first stage to Communism (Shah & Pettigrew, 2012) .

The Naxalbari Uprising of 1967, from which the Indian Maoist got the name "Naxalities" was often regarded as the beginning of the Indian Maoist Movement . Majumdar and Sanyal led a violent uprising from Naxalbari village in West Bengal in which peasants attacked local landlords, forcibly occupied land, burnt records and cancelled old debts . The overall goal, as stated in the CPI (ML) programme of 1970, and reiterated again in the CPI (Maoist) programme of 2004, was to form liberated areas in rural zones and then encircle and capture the cities (Shah and Pettigrew 2012) . CPI (Maoist) campaign was also initiated in the forested and hilly tracts of Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, Koraput in Orissa, and in the plains of Bhojpur in Bihar and Birbhum in West Bengal.

During the people's war periods in Nepal, same as in India CPI (Maoist) were set up people's courts to redistribute land and deliver justice, and there were programmes to initiate the mass mobilization of the rural poor . These achievements went hand in hand with a form of class struggle that entailed the tactical strategy of "annihilation of class enemies ": the dissolution of what the Naxalities called " the feudal classes" such as landlords, rich peasants, government employees, rival party members, as well as anyone suspected of being a police or agent . Nepal's People's War was ideologically similar to

the Shining Path undertaken by the Communist Party of Peru and the People's Wars conducted by the Communist party of the India (Marxist-Leninist), the Maoist Centre of India . Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE), Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), Communist Party Philippines etc . It is coordinate with the London base Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), similarly it is widely supported in terms of both political and economical dimensions in Europe, where several organizations are already formed (Pathak, 2004).


Communist philosopher V. Lenin defined the communist party as the “Vanguard of the revolutionary” for the working class. Che Guevara the principle, strategy, and tactics of guerrilla warfare were exercised to revolutionize the peasants to achieve the "New Democracy" in China .The main aim of military science is, "Political power grows out of the barrel of gun" (Long live Marxism-Leninsim-Maoism, 1993). The protracted nature of the people's war consists of three stages (i) Strategic defensive, (ii) Strategic stalemate, and (iii) Strategic offensive. Strategic defensive covers the period of enemy's strategic offensive and the CPN (Maoist)'s strategic defensive .Strategic stalemate was period of enemy's strategic consolidation and the CPN (Maoist)'s preparation for the counter offensive .Similarly strategic offensive was the last stage, which consists of the enemy's The basic principle of protracted war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy (Pathak,2004) .

In 1949 the Communist party of Nepal was founded against the backdrop of the Rana's autocratic regime in Nepal .Although,Nepali Congress formed the Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) against the Rana regime 1948 . It started armed struggle in 1950 and liberate the Nepali people from autocratic Rana regime. Communist Party of Nepal divided in differnts time and issues.

Emergence of CPN (Maoist)

In 1949 the Communist party of Nepal (CPN) was founded against the backdrop of the Rana's autocratic regime in Nepal. In the same year, Chinese revolution led by Communist Party of China gained its victory. The organization of CPN was developed during the periods of 1949 to 2002. The figure 2.1 clearly shows that, ideological and personality clashes among the leaders began eroding the organizational unity the CPN during the decades of 1960s and 1970s. The party divided in to three branches: the moderates, the extremists and radicals. Numerous splits within the CPN were affecting the party performance. In an effort to co-ordinate its activities, a 'central nucleus' comprising of Man Mohan Adhikari, Shambhu Ram Shrestha, Nirmal Lama and Mohan Bikram Singh was formed in 1971.

Figure 2.1: Emergence of CPN (Maoist)



Source: Hoftun, Martin et al, people's politics and ideology, 1999.

This group failed to incorporate Pushpa Lal of the radical faction since; he refused to compromise on his demands. In 1974 the 'central nucleus' split a party CPN (Fourth Convention led by Mohan Bikram and Nirmala Lama and the CPN led by Man Mohan Adhikari). The communist party led by Adhikari joined with smaller groups and formed the CPN (ML) in 1978. CPN (Marxist) to form the CPN (United –Marxist-Leninist) a nomenclature that is retained to this day. In 1972, this group had inspired by the cultural revolution of China and the Naxalite movement in West Bengal, it had launched

armed struggle against the local feudal in 1972 ,which is called “Jhapa uprising” (Thapa, 2001). It adopting the line of organizing peasants for guerrilla warfare against the class enemy. This new ultra-radical communist group was influenced by Cultural Revolution of China. At the time of the 1990 movement,the CPN (UML) was the largest party of Nepal (K.C., 2001). After the merger of the Marxist group in this party in January 1991, its name was changed to Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist – Leninist (Hachhethu, 2001).

The CPN (Maoist) in Nepal had grown from a small group of intellectuals into a formidable military and social force particularly in the countryside . In the decades before 1990, there were several Marxist Communist groups having relations to the uprising against monarchy, radicalism or struggles of peasants and workers (Prasad, 2005). They participated in the popular people's movement of 1989-90 as constituents of the United National People's Movement (UNPM), a joint front for the promotion of democracy. Following the political transformation in 1990, several communist groups, disgruntled with the democratic system under constitutional monarchy, broke away from their parent party, the United Left Front (ULF) (Prasad, 2005). To reserve the option of adopting a violent revolutionary path, they formed a two-tier organization: the revolutionary front (Communist Party of Nepal, UPFN) .The UPFN, on the otherhand, got divided into faction;one led by Nirmal Lama and Nirajan Baidhya, and the other by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachand) and Baburam Bhattarai faction (Prasad, 2005).

The first general election was held on May 12, 1991(Baisakh,12,2048) after the restoration of democracy in Nepal. A total no. of 1,345 candidates had contested from 20 political parties. But the CPN (Maoist), boycotted the election, because of its objection of the constitution . Although it later it did participate in the mid-term polls in November

1994. But, CPN (Mashed) boycotted the election from 1994 afterwards . In the first election, Nepali Congress won an absolute majority with 110 seats and formed the government and securing the 69 seats in the House of Representatives, the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) became a main opposition party in parliament. Winning 9 seats in the parliament, *Samyukta Jana Morcha Nepal* (United People's Front Nepal-UPFN) appeared as the third force in parliament (Pathak, 2004) .

Because of intra-party conflict in NC, PM Girija Prasad Koirala recommended and King agreed to dissolve the House of Representatives on July, 10, 1994. Election Commission announced the mid-term election on November 15, 1994. But, UPFN boycotted the election, arguing that the so-called democratic system could not fulfill the basic rights of the poor, ethnic groups, and downwards people, which would be possible only through the achievement of *Jantako Naulo Janabad* (People's New Democracy) (Pathak, 2004) .In mid-term election no one parties had succeeded to received majority seats in parliament . Three parties; respectively NC,Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), and Sadbhawana Party (SP) formed a coalition government under the premiership of Sher Bahadur Deuba on September 11, 1995. Prime Minister Deuba oppose and tried to eliminate political parties, especially the faction of UPFN,i.e. Its' leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai had accumulated revolutionary force and awakening the most poor, disadvantaged, marginalized, and vulnerable groups(Pathak,2004).

UPFN's – a wing of revolutionary party leader, Baburam Bhattarai submitted a 40-points demands to PM Sher Bdr Deuba on February 2, 1996, with an ultimatum of 15 days to respond to the demands. However, the UPFN announced the people's war four days earlier than the proposed deadline. The 40-point demands were categorized under nationality,people's democracy,and livelihood .Demands under nationality generally

prioritize national sovereignty . The demands concerning people's democracy relate to the formation of a new constitution and for holding an election of people's representatives for the establishment of republic –state. The people's livelihood demands were concerned with economic and social rights and the right to equal opportunity for all in access to food, clothing, primary education, employment, and basic health care, etc (Pathak, 2004). UPFN was the CPN (Maoist) upfront organization.

The Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) could be viewed as one of three paths that broader communist movements have taken in Nepal. The other two communist parties had taken were: i) Participation in the parliamentary process without fully accepting liberal democracy (this was the path taken by small communist parties such as the UPFN and the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP) in the post-1990 period); ii) The transformation of a hard-line communist party into a parliamentary party that also accepted all the mechanisms of liberal democracy as achieved by the CPN (UML) during the post-1990 political set up (Hachhethu, 2007).

Armed revolution meant that communist party would resort to *Janabadi Kranti* (People's revolution). According to Mao's prescription of using the three magic weapons for mounting a New People's Democracy (NPD) revolution; i) creating a disciplined party infused with the Marxism –Leninism doctrine; ii) creating a disciplined army to work under the party's leadership; and iii) creating a united front of all parties and groups willing to unite and work under the control of the communist party (Hachhethu, 2007).

CPN (Maoist) was established in 1995 as an autonomous party adopting the Marxist-Leninist-Maoism ideology. It had believed in Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution of more conservative opponents like Deng Xiaoping (Prasad, 2005).

It had tried to resolve the social, political and economic contradiction and issues by radical means, so it had announced and declared, the 'people's war' to establish a 'people's democracy' by putting an end to the multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy on 13 February 1996. It was not easy to abolish the feudal kingship and its force (Nepal Army) without formation of similar types of armed force. Realizing that, CPN (Maoist) formed and developed militant organization named - People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 2001. Aim of the PLA was to replace the 1990, constitution with a new one (Lawoti, 2008).

CPN (Maoist) used the theory of Chinese strategy of protracted people's war (entering from villages to town and cities) and Russian strategy of armed insurrection (Sharma, 2003) on the contrary parliament parties believe in capitalist type of multiparty democracy and monarchy (Upreti, 2006). Further the palace seems determined to establish supremacy of monarchy (in other word autocracy). These three ideological seemingly opposite ideologies are leading to ideological conflict between the warring parties (Upreti, 2006). Likewise, in relation to tactical slogan of democratic republic, quoting the decision of Chunwang meeting the party had regarded the democratic republic neither in the form of bourgeois parliament republic nor in the form of the new democratic republic. This meeting was emphasized on restructuring the state power, multi-party republic to resolve the problems related to class, nation, region and sex (Nepali Communist Andolan ra Jan Kranti ka Yetihasik Dastabej haru, 2069). It was not possible to abolish the 240 years feudal kingship from Nepal without employment of People's Liberation Army. Seven Parties Alliance's role had also been responsible for abolishing the monarchical system from Nepal (Mishra, 2009).

People's War Led by CPN (Maoist)

The political exclusion had continued after the restoration of till democracy in Nepal, 1990. In fact, for some groups like the indigenous nationalities (adibasi janajati), political exclusion has increased in the cabinet, administration and judiciary after 1990 compared to the autocratic Panchayat years 1962-90 and the 1959-60 democratic years (Lawoti, 2008). Same way, Gupta (2003), analyzing the Nepalese situations, were excluded from the 1990 constitution in engineering process. Anand Swaroop Verma and Gautam Navlaka (2007) stated in Economic and Political Weekly that, 1990 constitution transfer of power from palace to the political parties gave wind to people's expectations. Whereas in the Terai region, the people's expectations were for ending feudal landlordism which was rampant, in the far-flung areas in the east as well as west, the popular demand was to end the neglect of these regions. They further said that, Nepal economy was in crisis by 1994-95. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stipulates that any country whose foreign debt is 200-250 percent of the value of exports and debt servicing ratio is 20 percent of the same is in a "critical stage". Nepal's foreign debt jumped to 600 percent of the total export trade and debt servicing to exports reached 35 percent. The migration of people in search of jobs had picked up in the 1970s and began to surge towards the end of the 1980s. The economic embargo imposed by India in 1989 brought home rather painfully the dependent nature of the relationship with India (www.jstor.org/stable/4419604. Accessed: 21/03/2014.) According to CPN (Maoist) literature, during the 1996-1997, Nepal had per capita gross domestic product of \$ 180, the second lowest of the world. A pathetic 1.25 percent of the labour force was engaged in the industry. 71 percent of the population was below the poverty line and 60 percent of the population was illiterate. Ten percent of landlords and rich peasants owned 65 percent of cultivated land, as against 65 percent of poor peasants owning a mere 10

percent of arable land, and the richest 10 percent of society accounted for 46.5 percent of the national income.

Most of research papers and articles are similar as their findings that the root causes of armed conflict. The most common root causes of armed conflicts were political ideology and basic human needs. However the underlying causes were systematic structural violence. Johan Galtung – "introduced the term structural violence to refer to situations where injustice, repression, and exploitations are built into fundamental structure in society, and where individuals or groups were damaged due to differential access to social system. Same ways as a different viewers stated their views that, caste and gender discrimination, feudalistic suppression, lack of political representation/ decision making, education system, economic inequality and exploitation were the main root causes for the overt protracted armed conflict.

In this historical context CPN (Maoist) had started armed struggle (1996) to resolve the political, social and economic contradiction of Nepalese people's using the methods of guerrilla war and communist ideology (Pathak, 2004). Although armed struggles were not new phenomenon for Nepal's history. For example, Nepali Congress raised the weapons against the Rana in 1950. Bhim Datt Pant had raised the armed against the local feudal in 1951-52. Like ways, peasant's movements of Khanibas, Dhading and Dang district were targeted to local feudal and landlords (Nepali Communist Andolan ra Jan Kranti ka Yetihasik Dastabejharu, 2013). Terai Liberation Front' started the armed revolution 1960, to end the discrimination and exploitation of indigenous people of Western Terai (Marie & Tilounie, 2013). Peasant movement of Jhapa (Jhapa uprising), in 1971, peasants movement against the local feudal in Siraha, Dhanusa, Mahotari and Jugeedi in Chitwan district, were more remarkable peasants

movement against the local feudal . Same ways, students movement (1978), *Satyagrah* of Nepali Congress and Bombard in Singhdarbar (1985) and the *First Jana Andolan* (1989-90), were the historical movements of Nepal. But these movements were failed to resolve the political, social and economic contradiction of Nepalese peoples which, were riding as a deep rooted in Nepal's society. Although, 1990s movement had partially reduced the kingship power.

Armed struggle of Nepal had forward ideologically and politically for a revolutionary social, economic and cultural transformation following the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and was oriented to develop Marxism-Lenism-Maoism (Passang, 2008) . It had used the war tactics similarities with the methods of used by Chairman Mao Tse –Tung, during the early period of the Long March in China and the methods of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro and president Gonzalo and inspired by Naxalite uprising of India (Shrestha, 2004).

Maoist party of Nepal was ideological debate in question on how it can be initiated, sustained and developed in the particularly of Nepalese society. In china, when Mao launched people's war against trany rulers' Chiang Kaysek, there was semi fedual and semi – colonial socio-economic conditions. But, CPN (Maoist) copied the fusion of the Chinese model of protracted people's war with the Soviet model armed insurrection” (David, 2002). When the CPN (Maoist) was preparing to initiate armed struggle the question that had focused on the model, Russian or Chinese .Taking all these ideological and political factors into account, party from the very beginning tried to take up mass mobilization in the cities and guerrilla warfare in the countryside, ie.political and military offensive, simultaneously, while making later a principle (Sigdel, 2010). David (2002) said that, the doctrine pursuit of the Maoists in Nepal had close kingship with the

Naxalites in India, they were much conversant with the ideologies and strategies adopted and practised by the revolutionaries of the world communist movements than their own indigenous characteristics in the conduct of insurgency. The doctrine of Maoism is composed of the ideology of Marxism, practice of Leninism, and the methods of armed revolutionary military science 'Guerilla Warfare' developed by Mao and his associates in the Chinese Communist party from the 1920s until Mao's death in 1976 (The New Encyclopedia of Britannica, 1999). After a year of the initiation of people's war in Nepal, summing up experiences in the Second National Conference, 2001 at Chunwang in Rukum district. It had developed a politico-military strategy stressing on the need to have fusion of some aspects of the insurrectionary tactics with the protracted people's war from the beginning (Sigdel, 2010). Maoist originates from the "Three-in-one" principle: the overall framework consists of the party (40% of representatives), the army (20%), and the Front organizations (40%) (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003).

According to Mao Zedong's principle, which states that "the party, the people's army and the unified front are the three weapons for a people's revolution ... While the party itself was involved in spreading the party's ideology as well as formulating policies related to the 'People's War', the people's army was responsible for attacking 'enemies' and defending the areas under its control" (Sharma, 2003).

The Asian reports on Nepal's Maoist: Their aims structure and strategy highlighted that, their use of violence and terrorist tactics instrumental to their political goals. According to the report, the political nature of the Maoist movement was confirmed by the fact that the military wing of the party was subordinated to the close political control of the leadership and all military campaigns were planned and coordinated by the political branch of the party (www.cricis

group.org/liberty/documents/south asia/104 nepals Maoists their aims structure and strategy).

Development and recruiting of Mukti Sena and People's Liberation Army

The independence of neighbouring country, India to get rid of the British colony affected Nepalese people too. Then liberation movement flew in to Nepal from on May, 1948 to abolish the autocratic Rana regime . Formation of Mukti Sena by Nepali congress was the first militant organization of Nepal, Which militant organization named-People's Liberation Army (Tilounie,2013), later this militant organization was popularly known as a Mukti Sena, it adopted the strategy of armed revolution after Baingania Conference November,6,1950 ([www. nepali congress arme struggle.com](http://www.nepali congress arme struggle.com)). Mukti Sena comprised some members on Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army after the conclusion of World War 2nd many Gurkhas of the Indian and British armies had come to join the Sena (Parmananda, 1982). According to Chatraji (1970) , a socialist leader from Bihar, India, trained new recruits (PLA) of guerilla . It guided more or less by the political ideology and influences with the Mao Zedung military tactical theory (Ghimire, 2010) . Nepali Congress, Chairman Matrika Prashad Koirala was the supreme commander and Subarn Samser was the vice- commander of Mukti Sena.

In course of get rid of the cruel Rana tyranny a underground meeting was held in Calcutta for the first time in the office of Purna Singh . It was the result after the Second World War. The famous warriors of the Second World War, as well as members of Ajad Hind were presence in the historical meeting. It was decided in this meeting that an armed revolution brigade should be organized to wage war for the ending of the Rana regime, who were ruling over 104 years and establishment of the monarchical democracy in Nepal(Tamang,2006).

According to Tamang (2006) founder members of Mukti Sena prepared action party for the armed revolution. The aim and plan of action party were follows.

1. To complete the armed revolution targeting, specially Kathmandu, Biratnagar, Dhankuta, Birganj and Tansen.
2. To get the information of the concerned places by the commanders.
3. To collect the necessary information secretly about the weakness military armed stores, houses and their's armed stores.
4. To find out patriotic, honest, and trained ex-army to join the Mukti Sena and trained them.
5. To encourage the Mukti Sena organized for the revolution and to get to fulfill their responsibility.
6. To cope up guerrilla war methods as it was not possible to launch any conventional war.

Request of Prime Minister, Nehru, India, Nepali Congress shutdown their arms in 1951.

But, Dr. K I Sing, a commander Mukti Sena (he was appointed Bahirhawa front) condemn the Delhi agreement and appealed to Mukti Sena continued armed struggle (Gautam, 1998) even achieve their goal.


Recruiting and Development of PLA

According to Mao-"the party, the people's army and the unified front were the three weapons of people's revolution (Baral, 2004). CPN-Maoist theoretical orientation was publications, peaceful procession and rallies and organization building, growth, military recruitment, evolved through active protest including activity banning class closer, Banda, boycott of election and culminated in "people's war" encompassing violent activities (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). This theoretical orientation was used by Mao


Zedong in China during the civil war. Another vival slogan of Mao Zedong was -'power grows the barral of the gun'. Applying this political ideology, CPN (Maoist) formed the Young Communist League (YCL) during the first general election campaign after 1990 in Rolpa district, Mid-West region of Nepal. It was the inititial stage of armed group of CPN (Maoist) . Although, this was an armed front of the Unity Center formed to counter activities of the ruling Nepali Congerss party which was filing cases against the party. This YCL was transformed in to Ladaku Dal (fighting force) which was precursor to the PLA. 35 members (including women) of four Ladaku Dals launched the "People's War" by attacking a police post in Holeri on the night of 13 February 1996. This Ladaku Dal transformed in to squads in 1996 and it transformed in PLA in 2001 (Nepali Times 07 July, 2000) . Structure of people's liberation army was follows:

Figure: 2.2 Structure of People's Liberation Army

(Before 2001)



After the people's war (2001 up to)



Source: People's Liberation Army Information Centre, Kathmandu, 2010.

CPN (Maoist), military organization was classified into two categories regular and irregular militant groups. Regular militant group was known as the fighters group and irregular group was known as a supported group. The first group was included as a militia and squad and the second group was included as a section, platoon, company, batalien, birgade and division. The first group was known as a supportive group and the second group, which was known as fighter group. Central Military Commission was established in 1998, followed by regional military commissions, district military commissions, and companies, platoons and squads etc (Chalune, 2010). It had two sepearte wings as military and political division, the military wings known as a People's Liberation Army (PLA). It was formed in 2001, at Kureli of Rolpa district (Chalune, 2010). Although, CPN (Maoist) decided to develop the military structure in to a regular armed force after 1995 (Sapkota, 2010). The third extended meeting of the central committee of the Maoist party approved the political and military tactical line, taking formal initiation for the army formation for the first. The Fourth meeting, summrized and the set the policy in this meeting concluded that -'In this regard the party should after of all pay to attention to the structure of military organization. In the past there have been attemps to build military organization in the form of guerrilla war squads, local defensive squads and volunteer squads. Based on the new demands of development it has now become imperative to have qualitative improvement in this structure (Karki & Seddon, 2003). They further said

that, to develop people's military power in the form of three categories: main force, secondary force and basic force. The main force was built of regular guerrillas and that force was directly under the Regional Bureau. For the time being this force had maintained at platoon level, while keeping the aim of raising it to company level under the regional commands. It should be mandatory to have a member of Regional Bureau as commissar. The secondary force should be understood as a regular guerrilla squads, currently functioning under the District Party or to be developed accordingly. This kind of secondary force organization was also gradually developed through platoon formation and beyond but they remained as a supporting force under the leadership of District Party basic force (was the) people's militia organized in the form of local defence squads the main and secondary force constituted part of regular army. The above conceptualization, relating to main force, secondary force and basic force, represented an important leap in the development of military strength. Only by successfully implementing it ideologically and strategically will be able to guarantee the defence and development of the People's War (Karki & Seddon, 2003).

Indigenous nationalities, dalits and women had a high participation in the insurgency and join its militant organization (PLA) (Baral, 1988). It was comprised of all nationalities from the Aryans to the Mongol, from the Brahmins to the Dalits from the Sherpas of Mountains to the Paswans of Terai plain. The participants of women were approximately 40 percent. Most of the PLA fighters were age group of 18-30 years (Sapkota, 2010). Retired Gurkha soldiers of the British and the Indian army inhabitant many of the areas previously controlled by the communist party of Nepal (Maoist) during the Nepalese civil war and Nepalese security agencies have suspected that these former soldiers along with those retired and deserters from the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) were

involved in training of PLA . The main fighting and support force considered of ethnic groups Magars, Tharus, Limbus, Tamangs, Dalits, Brahmins and Chhetris, the last two also providing the political and military leadership . Among these 60 percent of PLA were deployed in the mid-west and their strongholds (Sapkota, 2010).

PLA had used four board strategic approaches' during the armed struggle ,which were follows (Shrestha,2004).

1. The conspiratorial strategy – In the beginning they emphasized an elite, small scale organization and low level violence against important place and persons.
2. The strategy of protracted popular war- They applied Mao-Tse Tung's warfare strategy and president Gonzalo of the Shining path Peru that focused on mass organization and the gradual escalation of violence.
3. Military focus strategy – They stressed military primacy and concentration on their guerrilla or conventional war.
4. Urban warfare strategy – They involved small scale organizations and moderate terrorist or guerilla attacks in many urban cities including the Kathmandu Valley.


According to PLA Commander, Udaya Bahadur Chalune, People's Liberation Army had used the following war strategies and tactics against the state force during the 10 years armed struggle periods (Chalaune, 2009). The major attacks were Caution domination attack, Explosive attack, Booby attack, Burning attack, Firing domination attack, Commando attack, Combine attack., False attack, Engagement attack and Calling attack.

The major guerrilla operations launched during the initial phase were confined to eliminating the system of local domination by the auxiliary organs of the state and branded class enemies. Through their initiatives of storming the police posts, inparticular, killing and harassing the police and local government officials, they had forced the state

withdrawal from villages and districts. They succeeded in creating a political void in areas, they overwhelm with their presence specially by using propaganda, holding meetings by assembling villagers and political recruitment . Snatching arms and ammunition from the police forces was the major incentive for their actions, the implications of which were psychologically spreading fear in the communities with the evidence of the defeat and retreat of the police forces from the areas they attacked(Karki & Seddon, 2003).

Struggle, organization, production and propaganda were the Mao's guiding philosophy of people's war.

Figure 2.3: Organization of the People's Liberation Army



Source: Baral,(2006),Nepal Facets of Maoist Insurgency.

Struggle, organization, production and propaganda were the Mao's guiding philosophy of people's war . In this orientation CPN-Maoist oriented theirs it used publications, peaceful procession and rallies and organization building, growth ,military recruitment, evolved through active protest including activity banning class closer, Banda ,boycott of

election and culminated in "people's war" encompassing violent activities (Thapa & Sijapati,2003).

During the armed period, PLA frequently were used two songs. The first was 'Lamo Bato'or' Long Road' . The chours refrain was ' A long track of a thousand miles begins with a single step; and the typical verses were;

He who loves the people wins

He who loots the people loses,

He who can win over death drives the world

He who can enjoy gunpowder can exist in every fierce battle

Bodies fall before bullets, but confindence never does

Physical remains degrade after death, but ideology never does. (Marie, 2013).

The second song was ' Hami Rata Manchhe' or We the Red people. The endlessly repeated chorus was 'We the red people, the people of 'Peoples' Liberation; and the typical verses were;

We can swallow fire, we can dry the oceans

We are the people who were created from the martyrs' blood

We are the people who go on destroying the enmies

Making earth and sky tremble, causing wind and strom to blow

Chewing up the hearts of fedualists and imperialists.

The 'grievance guerrillas' , who were equipped politically and ideologically with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism,seize weapons from the security forces and lead the guerrilla fighters to built a PLA and attain political and military supremacy over the reactionary state . The Party's ideological, political and military strength enables it to lead the war to create a base area as the centre of the revolution and people's political power.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) developed from having only a few dozen fighters in 1996, to having an estimated 30,000 fighters (PLA) by signing of the Comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in November 2006 (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010). But UNMIN verified only 19,600 PLAs during the verification process. After the signing of comprehensive peace agreement between SPA and CPN (Maoist), other parties also accepted the PLA as the state's force (Nepal Magazine, 2009).

Women Participation in People's War

Direct participation of women in the revolution began from the 'Paris Commune' in 1971. It was the first watershed in oppressed women's movement. Women combatants' participation in Soviet Union during the World War II, while fighting against Nazi occupation was phenomenal. The official figures state that about 8,000,000 women participated in Red Army and about another 200,000 received military training in Komosol schools (Yami, 2007). In China, exclusive women militias were formed to attack on Japanese force during their occupation in China and later to fight against the white army who continued to raid its' borders even after the birth of Republic China. In the same way, in Vietnam War, women were highly participated. According to Yami (2007) 40 percent of women combatants were participants in Vietnam War.

In Nepal, women participation in the armed struggle can be traced back during anti-Rana movement through various anti-Rana political parties during 1948-50. Women took active participation in the democratic movement in 1990. However, in such a movement, women were mainly drawn from the known political families or from urban educated women and were mainly based in urban areas. But when the CPN (Maoist) had started people's war in 1996 and women participated from grass roots levels, mainly rural

women actively participated in PLA. According to the third expanded meeting of Maoist, it had made recruiting policy of PLA formation. As a policy, at least two women guerrillas in each squad (in each guerrilla squad there were 9-11 members) must be involved. In this way, CPN (Maoist) had participated women in combatants the first time, where as women were banned for recruitment of Nepal army as its Section 10 of Army acts 1960.

Women PLA worked as combatants involved setting propaganda at night and production work during day. In revolutionary stronghold areas, people's court had been established, where along with other cases, against women's exploitation had been brought to book with the combined effect of Village Defense Committee, women's mass organization and the people (Yami, 2007). Many cases of occupying land by widows or single women had been restored to them through such courts. Different researches carried out about the women's participation in PLA had seemed that they often took time to decide to join the movements, but once they were into it, they stick to it much firmer then the made cadres . There had been fewer cases of female PLAs surrender or running way from war fields. They were also found least liable to disclose party related secrets. They were thus found to have greater preservance and patience than the men in people's war (Yami, 2007). Class war directly addressed the oppressive socio-economic relation, production, relation and poverty related other issues, from which the women were the worst sufferer. According to Marx and Engels (1848) "The communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations, no wonder that that's developments involve the most radical rupture with traditional idea".

Because of the structural violence and legal provision of Nepal, women's status was as like property-less. Property is the backbone of self sustaining peasant economy

and had prepared ground for joining women in mass in PLA. Yami (2007) had focused why the women were joined the PLA that being left alone to tend old and young children while men go to mercenary service or labor in urban centers of Nepal and India. They seemed like de-facto single women who have to fight against hunger in remote difficult terrain. Yami (2007) further said that the tendency to get daughters married at young age to beat poverty and the burden of chastity made young unmarried women attractive to join PLA. They are thus like what Marx had said about the proletariats, that they have nothing to loose about their chains.

One third of PLAs were women in total figures of Maoist PLAs. Although womens were actively participants in all mechanism of party organization and politics. Applying Maoist theory womens they had also joined all the fronts; the party, united fronts; and the people's liberation army, three instruments of revolution. Women became professional revolutionaries by joing PLA, militias and brigades. During the war-time more confident was that in the base areas they were able to practice what they preached in villages declared " women model village" they were practices special rights exercised equal rights to parental property where it was forbidden to beat women, where women were involved in constructing trekking trails, martyred gates, people's court, etc (Yami, 2007). According to her, participation status of women in party, peoples' liberation army and front organizations were as mentioned in table 2.6.

Table 2.1

Status of Women Participation in PLAs

Status in party/Army/ mass front or united front			Period of being whole timer
Field	Status	percent	Year

Party	Area committee	75.98	Before 1990
	District Committee	20.48	After 1990
	Regional Committee	2.36	After 1996
	Central Committee	1.18	-
Army	Section Commander	65.02	-
	Platoon	24.63	-
	Commander	9.85	-
	Battalion	0.49	-
United Front	District Committee	94.98	-
	Regional Committee	1.42	-
	Central Committee	4.6	-

Source: Yami, H. (2007). People's War & Women's liberation in Nepal, Kathmandu

Dalit and Indigenous people in People's War

Many development study surveys had showed that Dalit constitutes 20% of total population (Yami, 2007). Among these, 80% of Dalit population is living below poverty line. Most of them are landless and are staying in land of others. Marxist theory stated that social reforms are never carried out by the weakness of the strong; but always by the strength of the weak. From the inception of communist party of Nepal (1949), issues of Dalit and indigenous were raised for their emancipation of caste base discriminations. Maoist party successfully mobilized all oppressed mass including Dalit, indigenous and women. Dalit were participated under the banner of Dalit liberation fronts .It had Dalit department under the central committee of the party to make policy on Dalit issues (Yami, 2007). Maoist party had brought important resolution on this issue by giving

special rights of representation in all party, army and state organizations. Many areas, districts, regions, under the new state were being headed by Dalits. The head of Karnali-Bheri autonomous region belong to Dalit caste. About 20% of Dalits were found to participate in autonomous regional people's councils and 20-25% of Dalits were represented in villages people's committees. Similarly, 75% of Dalit oppression had been removed through out the country and about 90% in base areas around the country (Yami, 2007) .

According to Maoist Party report (2004), in special command of middle command alone 50,800 Dalit memberships had been distributed, there were 1775 Dalits in people's liberation army, 207 Dalits had been martyred since the initiations of people's war in 1996. In this region 17 Dalit model villages were functioning were about 90% of population had removed Dalit social marriage. Hence 2100 pairs had undertaken inter-caste mirage (Yami, 2007). Maoist had been given right of representations in new states; in economic fields. Their skill had been harnessed in war industry such as making, repairing local made guns, automatic guns, grenade etc, making uniforms for PLA, militia, dresses for cultural teams, bags etc, and making tannery industry. Government of Nepal had refrained them from joining military services, but Maoist had given them platform to join the PLA.

Different Liberation Fronts in People's War

According to party policy, CPN (Maoist) formulated a policy of inclusion of ethnicity representation from the beginning of the People's War. For this purpose, Maoists started including the representatives of people from all classes, professions and nationalities into all levels of the party fronts (united fronts). Even though few indigenous peoples' fronts

and Dalit organizations were formed in 1997, since 1999, Maoist party committed to provide the right of self-determination and autonomy to the oppressed nationalities after three years later peoples' war (Sapkota, 2010). Although different liberation front's of the nationalities and the professionals were formed. These liberation front's were; Nepal Dalit Liberation Front, Magar National Liberation Front, Tahru National Liberation Front, Newar National Liberation Front, Tamang National Liberation Front, Tamu National Liberation Front, Madhesi National Liberation Front, Limbuwan National Liberation Front, Kirat National liberation Front, Majhi National Front, Rai- Danuwar National Liberation front. Likewise; Lama National Liberation Front, Sherpa National Liberation Front, Kumal Liberation Front, Hyalmo National Liberation Front, and fronts of other nationalities were formed during the peoples' war periods. All these fronts supported to the peoples war for the right of self determination and autonomy to the oppressed nationalities.

Professional Organizations in People's War

CPN (Maoist) had mobilized its professional organizations during the people's war. Professional organizations were brought their policies, planning, and tactics into action to achieve the objectives of the people's war. These professional organizations were; Students' union, Trade union, Farmers' Association, Women's' union, Teachers' organization, Cultural organization, Intellectual organization and Youth organization. According to party policies (2004), these organizations had played, an important role to abolish the feudal kingship from Nepal.

Integration and Rehabilitation Process of Combatants in Post-War

Civil wars had far less likely to end in peace agreement. A study of 140 civil wars between 1945 and 1999 by Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambani of Yale University had showed that only 18 percent of civil wars have ended with a settlement (Upadhya & Gywali, 2013). The study of Katherine and Nicholas, they found that more than a third of civil wars settled through peace agreements have restarted within a few years. They attribute such phenomenon to time inconsistency in the peace agreement. Possibly, there are two major reasons for this. The first, once the rebels demobilize, they lose bargaining power and the government can renege on its promises. This makes rebels reluctant to stop fighting and they can be quick in remobilizing for a fight. The second reason could be that the rebels, having been involved in civil war for so long, may lack qualification and experience to acquire new vocations or professions. Typically, the state would be economically weak due to prolonged war in the past and it had not really to support the rebels economically. As a solution to these, many experts have proposed self-enforcing agreement where each party retains self-defending capability to discourage unilateral defection from the past peace agreement. One way to structure such an agreement is to integrate the rebel army into the (new) national army which will reduce the rebel insecurity vis-à-vis of government. The most recent example of this can be found in Democratic Republic of Congo where some groups agreed to integrate their rebel army into the national army while others (actually the rebels themselves) did not accept the idea of integration since they were not convinced that the result of the election would be in their favour.

After the post-conflict, integration and rehabilitation of rebel combatants had really messy and contentious process for any post-conflict country, therefore it had also time –consuming and looming with high risks of failure (Wagle, 2013) . Most of the civil wars are restarted due to the weakness of managing the rebel army. A report on the peace process of Democratic republic of Congo published by the New York-based independent watchdog Human Right Watch has mentioned that the government failure to integrate troops of former “belligerent” groups into the national army and to properly train and pay its soldiers underlay some military abuses such as those that occurred in December 2004 in North Kivu where government soldiers and combatants refusing integration fought and killed at least one hundred civilians, many of them targeted on an ethnic basis. Similar incidents were repeated elsewhere in 2005. Another research conducted by Professor Roger Kibasomba of the Institute for Security Studies also concludes that the lack of military integration in Democratic Republic of Congo is the single most destabilising factor that affects several other items on the agenda of transition. It also concludes that if integration and restructuring defence and security forces was achieved, it would contribute greatly in the post-transition stability of the country. The conflicts of Chad, Angola, Mozambique and even South Africa point out that the peace process either failed or became really messy in those countries mainly due to problems with integration of the combatants in the society. Former combatants need to be fully integrated and rehabilitated. If they had not properly integrated, many former soldiers could be potential threat to security and social stability as seen in their restoring to banditry in El Salvador and Guatemala (Jeong, 2006). Many Haitian soldiers were left at-large among the population without jobs following the rapid demobilization of the Haitian Army in 1994. Even though it was controversial due to many former soldiers

record of abuses, a programme funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and run by the International Organization for migration provided civilian job training for members of the defunct armed forces in order to encourage their reintegration into Haitian society (Jeong, 2006).

Veterans and their dependents were characterized by their lack of civic awareness, low skill levels, limited resources, and a culture of dependency (Ozerdem and Barakat 2005). In Mozambique, three of every four combatants were functionally illiterate, and 30 percent were under the age of eighteen. In most instances, combatants were school dropouts and often had minimal levels of literacy. Same in Nepal, UNMIN's verified 19602 combatants in 28 cantonments and among them numbers (2973), 6.59% combatants were under the age of eighteen.

Eritrea's 1993-1994 demobilization experience indicates that private sector training and psychological counseling had tailored to meet requirements of different groups based on gender and personal needs. A large number of former fighters made the transition to civilian life through a combination of programs, consisting of cash bonuses, access to government loans, grants of farm land, as well as vocational training (Jeong, 2006).

Overall peace process requires the quick installation of rehabilitation programs for ex-combatants. However, assistance for the social reintegration of the soldiers was not a quick fix, since economic reintegration was not feasible in the short term. In Mozambique, more than 70 percent of demobilized soldiers were not employed within the first two years of the post-war period. As it was a complex, time-consuming process, reintegration could not be achieved within an artificially imposed deadline (Jeong, 2006).

Many reintegration programs faced difficulties resulting from under-funding as well as inconsistent application and delay (Cooper, 2000). At the same time, targeting

ex-combatants at expense of noncombatants generates resentment. Employment projects for soldiers who have previously committed violence against civilians were not favorably accepted especially in communities where many civilians remain unemployed. Psychological resistance associated with fears of weak prospects of income or employment in civilian life on the part of former combatants had often another major obstacles for demobilization (Jeong, 2006).

Different experience shows that alternative sources of income gained through vocational training or agricultural employment promised by extremely supported peace agreements have not proven a sufficient substitute for livelihoods from legal and illegal use of arms. After the verification process in Nepal's PLA shows the different criminal activities occurred in the society. In Nicaragua, ex-combatants had often found that they can earn better living utilizing their military training and combat experience for legal activities such as armed banditry by attempting to learn and apply new profession (Jeong, 2006).

International assistance had tailored to different countries; in conique contrast to the short-term-focused training were offered in Angola and Namibia, the UN operation in Mozambique was oriented toward long-term goals as well as short-term objectives of reinsertion (Alden, 2001). The comprehensive nature of the demilitarization program in Mozambique was supported by UN funding. A commission on reintegration chaired by the UN undertook the planning, organization, supervision, and demobilized soldiers. A comprehensive programme of retraining and reintegraion of former combatants into civil society can also be supported by various levels of the government agencies and NGOs. A National Commission for the Rehabilitation of members of the former Army and disabled war veterans, established by the Ethiopian transitional government after the civil war in

1991, took charge of the demobilization and integration of rebel forces in co-ordination with regional and district offices (Jeong, 2006) .

Political will, needs-based planning, and donor coordination contribute to timely and effective completion for an integration and rehabilitation of combatants . In the cases of Cambodia and Angola, the UN operation for the disarmament and cantonment of troops provided essential supplies during the transition period . The UNDP and ILO developed vocational training programmes and small enterprise for the development projects for ex-combatants. The reintegration programme, supported by the World Bank's Emergency Relief and Recovery programme supported by the Emergency and Recovery Program and bilateral donors, offered housing, health, farmland, and credit as well as education (Jeong, 2006).

In Nepal, combatants were integrated and rehabilitated in their own's context .It established a unique Nepali model given Nepal's political, economic, security and military context of following basic internally acclaimed principles and practices (Wagle, 2013). Nonetheless every armed conflict and peace process had a unique in the political, social, economic and military context of different countries . But in Nepal's domestic -actors initiated, led and concluded indigenous and homegrown integration and rehabilitation process can not be compared with any other post- conflict countries, it might be termed as an 'expensive process' but the peace is less expensive than the war . On the basis of different studies conducted by different individuals and organizations, the rebel integration can be phased in the following five different phases (Upadhyaya & Gyawali, 2013) .

Phase One: Freedom of Voluntary choice

The process of integration of combatants is also the recognition of their demand for

which they fought the war for many years. It is also noteworthy that a peace process doesn't mean that the rebels are 100 percent right in their demands but just recognition that their points have some merit. So the first stage of the integration is giving the combatants a freedom of choice. Giving freedom of choice doesn't mean that the government tells the combatants that they are free to choose the profession they want, but it also includes creation of various opportunities that the combatants might be interested to join. This is possible through the process of economic development and the government should be able to get the private business sector involved in this process.

Phase II: Repatriation of foreign armed group

When a civil war breaks in any country, foreign armed group from a neighbouring country or even from elsewhere might come to take advantage of the poor law and order situation. So it is important to identify such groups and repatriate them to the country of their origin. Some difficulties might arise when some members of such groups are married with local people and have children. This will lead mainly to a political decision which needs joint effort of the rebel group as well as of local community.

Phase III: Setting new qualification for integration

This is the most important task of MI (Military Integration) for integration of rebel army in defence mechanism which includes national army for border security, internal security mechanism such as police force and in some cases other security mechanisms such as community police and industrial security forces. As the MI agreement creates a new situation, it becomes imperative to set a new qualification and standard on the new national defence mechanism. While setting the standard the parties also need to be serious about the existing state security mechanism. This is really a hard task but could be achieved easily if there is a good coordination between the parties and existing state

security mechanism. In many of the successful Military Integration agreements, combatants are integrated into national border security mechanism (National Army), Territorial Army, crime defence mechanism (police force) and other defence mechanism such as community watch and industrial security force depending upon the qualification and experience of the combatants. Here it is also noteworthy that any integrated personnel needs formal training for the specific role.

Phase IV: Socio-Economic Integration

This is also called Civil Re-Integration (CR) where a combatant who wants to return to public life voluntarily and the combatant who is disqualified to be integrated into the defence mechanism return to the society. The experience of Mozambique is very unique in this regards as most of the combatants preferred to participate in Civilian re-integration rather than to be integrated into national army. The Mozambique Civilian reintegration had two components: the first component provided demobilized combatants with information about job training and reintegration services, and the second component aimed to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life by giving a total of two years of cash payments and a stock of agricultural supplies. In Mali also only less than 2, 000 combatants were integrated in the army as more than 9,000 combatants preferred civilian reintegration as they were offered cash payment and either small monthly payment or enrolment into UNDP credit program for 3 years. Similar was the case of Angola where combatants who were formerly integrated into the army were taken out and paid 5 months salary plus integration allowance and reintegration kit for household and agriculture. This also happened in Namibia where more than 21,000 combatants were reintegrated into the society by receiving small monthly payment for some time even

after the peace process. In Nepal ,15585 PLAs were took part a voluntirly retired and return to the society (MoPR Report,2013) .

Phase V: Training newly integrated defence personnel

Due to the new standards and qualification agreed upon during an integration process, the existing army and the newly integrated defence personnel both need some amounts of training. The training needs to be more demanding for newly integrated personals as they were previously working in guerrilla-type setting and they need to know more about law and order, new policies and procedures and most importantly human rights standard and their specific rights and duties. In many cases, maintaining law and order becomes a major problem where adequate training is not given to the integrated combatants. The best example of this can be seen in Democratic Republic of Congo where the integrated army personnel were involved in looting civilian property and many other crimes.

Integration of combatant army into national defence system was seen as a key to providing security guarantee in many peace processes. Most of the international experiences where military integration agreement was successfully negotiated shows that they have adopted both military and civilian integration programs. In some places, civilian integration program has attracted more combatants than the military integration due to the economic and other benefits associated with such integration program. Where the rebels were integrated into the national defence system, the integration starts from giving voluntary choice on opportunities, setting the standard and qualification of defence mechanism personnel and integrating them into various security mechanism including military, police, paramilitary and industrial security forces, according to their qualifications. Last but not the least, involuntary civilian reintegration program and adequate training program for the integrated defence personal was designed for with a

assistance of international organisations and donor agencies, which had managed by Nepal government in different time period in past .

As post conflict situations differ greatly, contextual variables as the nature of conflict and the methods of its settlement had differing effects in particular strategies . The duration and priorities of implementation activities vary according to the divisiveness of groups, the extent of economic and social destruction, and the role of external actors . A comparative analysis of South Africa, Bosnia, and Rwanda suggests that the methods for ending violent conflict (through negotiated settlement of military victory) had an impact on post-conflict political configurations (such as majority rule, carving up territorial divisions, ethnic or radical hegemony through control of military and state institution). The settlement methods also create different prospects for democracy such as degrees of tolerance of oppositions . For example cases in which the outcome was determined by arms included Rwanda following the victory of Tutsi rebel forces; Ethiopia with the victory by rebel forces; and intervention in Kosovo by outside powers . South Africa, however did not get involved in an intensive military struggle between armed forces.

When there had been no clear vision in civil war, the involvement and cooperation of former adversaries is essential in such matters as the integration of militias and rebels into a national army . Ending conflict with a military victory creates unbalanced power relations that, in turn, lead to difficulties in democratic governance as was exemplified by Rwanda (Jeong, 2006) . The length and level of intensity of violent conflicts (civil war versus low—intensity conflict with limited armed struggle) may determine difficulties in social reconstruction . The experience of long civil war creates such challenges as a large number of refugees and / or large scale civilian death as well

as the need to rebuild an economic infrastructure . For example more than three decades of civil war in Guatemala (1962-1996) resulted in the estimated death of 100,000 people and at least 25,000 disappearances along with displacement of about one million refugees. Many of the killings were committed by the Guatemalan army, which massacred villagers in retaliation for the guerrilla attacks . Twelve years of brutal civil war in El Salvador, which ended with peace accords in 1992 (Jeong, 2006) . Same peace process were adopted in Nepal and Sudan's civil war resolution . In El Salvador ' civil war, around 75,000 people were killed .

A divisive political process had generated by the fractured nature of groups and a weak political and organizational infrastructure. When there were several rebel groups fighting independently, signing a peace accord with one of them does not necessarily mean the end of the civil war (e.g.,Burundi) . Allocation of government positions to two main rebel groups had been contentious issue in the Democratic Republic of Congo .Motivational factors can also differ, and a strong commitment to peace process tends to increase with a high level of psychological exhaustion following long-term civil conflicts (e.g. El Salvador and Mozambique) .Many researchs had been done about the post-conflict countries rebel integration and rehabilitation process . They found that, the nature of state apparatus such as a limited public administrative capacity as well as the depth of hostility among groups had compensated for or overcome by the existence of a international commitment. New issues arising during the implementation as well as old issues underlying adversarial relationships, had an impact on post-conflict settlement, as illustrated by the Northern Ireland and Palestinian-Israeli peace process . Where there were multiple parties were in conflict, any settlement arrangement becomes very complex;the government reach an agreement arrangement with one party that was

objected to by another party . In Burundi, a serious obstacles to the implementation of power-sharing terms between the government and main Hutu rebel group (regarding-the allocation of political,military, and police posts) may arise as another group enters the process . On the rehabilitation process poor or less developed countries with great income disparities (e.g. Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau) were under heavier pressure to meet the daily needs of their populations and pursue economic recession, in combination with a revival of ethnic rivalries, creates an unstable environment that may lead to renewed violence ((Jeong, 2006) .In Nepal CPN (Maoist) led PLA was main rebel group . Even in terai- regions there were small scale's armed group, but they did not hindered the main peace process . Armed rebel (PLA) were integrated and rehabilitated in society and Nepal Army in accordance with SPA and CPN (Maoist) agreement. As a same process had been adopted in Nepal, to resolve the NC armed struggle (1950) . NC's Mukti Sena were integrated according to tripartite talks between the king, the Ranas and the Nepali congress commenced in New Delhi (The Hindu, 1951) . Most of the Mukti Sena was integrated in Nepal Police and some of them were in societies.

Stages of Reculturation of Combatants in Post-War Countries

Almost in post-conflict countries,passed the several stages to reculturation of combatants in the society; Disarmament (D), Demobilization (D),Reinsertion (R),Resettlement (R),Rehabilitation (R),Reconciliation (R) Reintegration (R) or in short form 2D6R. It is applicable almost all post-conflict countries in the world (15 August 30, 2014). Although Nepal had applied the indigenous model . Nepal did not follow the technical process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) applied by many countries in their peace building and peace making process . Nepal did not even use the term-DDR, nevertheless, the ex- combatants were demobilized and disarmed in 2006 . Instead, Nepal

used the term – management of arms and armies (Wagle, 2013). Nepal also did not use the term security sector reform (SSR), but it had been following the principles of SSR model during the peace process. (Wagle, 2013). As mentioned before SSR model was preferred by CPN (Maoist) during the integration and rehabilitation process of PLA. Although DDR model is complex and multi-faceted political process where economic, socio-cultural, psychological, and reconciliatory issues come to the forefront for achieving a just peaceful society or nation, thus reducing the possibility of renewed conflict. The process of DDR has been initiated in three ways : (i) negotiated settlement between the conflicting parties such as in Zimbabwe in 1979, Namibia in 1988 and South Africa in 1990s; (ii) one party defeated to the other military for instance Uganda in 1986s, Rwanda 1994, Ethiopia in 1991 and Angola in 2003; and (iii) external intervention in the name of their own security such as Mozambique in 1990s, Sierra Leone in 1999 and Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 (15 August 30, 2014). In Nepal, the DDR process initiated in Nepal in January, 2007 and ended at the mid July, 2013.

Several writers, such as Michael O'Neill, Ben Rosamond, Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, Hans- Jürgen Bieling, Marika Lerch and Anne Faber have written theories of European integration and politics, but none of them focus on army integration in the post-conflict situation. Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. wrote a book on integration of the armed forces, but it mostly addressed world war rather than individual, community and nations' armed conflict (15 August, 2014).

According to international practices on conflict resolution process during the conflicting periods, warring/conflicting parties of Nepal had organized the peace talks for narrowing their distance.

Peace Talks and Negotiation with Conflicting Parties

When military solutions don't succeed or are proved unviable, the conflicting parties agree to negotiations. The Maoists in Nepal had been demanding that the government must create a proper atmosphere for talks. On the contrary various governments had not been consistent either in dealing with the insurgency or with the peace talks. Petty jealousy rules Nepalese politicians with the constant fear that the leader of a rival party might possibly succeed in resolving the insurgency. Hence, there was no national consensus on ways to deal with the armed struggle, leaving the field open to the PLA to pay one against the other. When the G.P. Koirala Government was in place, for instance Sher Bahadur Deuba was 'a soft-liner and accommodative' to the Maoist, while Koirala was 'a defamed fascist murderer'(Panday, 2005). Within a span of six months, the tables were turned, with Koirala being termed a 'democrat' and Deuba a 'pawn of the palace'. The same holds true for the leaders and the way they view the Maoists. Koirala struggled relentlessly while he was prime minister, and the only grievance, he had with the palace 'was not being able to use the army to quell the insurgency". However, when the army was ultimately mobilized under a state of emergency, he and his stalwarts soon started calling for peaceful negotiations, and the army's return to the barracks (Panday, 2005).

Almost all the parties with a significant political base in the country had formed their own governments in the past twelve years of multiparty rule. In other words, they had also had the chance to formulate their plan of actions to solve the Maoist imbroglio. Each of them have tried to deal a heavy blow on the insurgency by mobilizing the security agencies as if that was the sole solution to the problems of governance they themselves were responsible for creating. But, remarkably, the same parties showed their peaceful side by abstaining from supporting any violent suppression of the movement

from government quarters as soon as they relegated to their parliamentary opposition role (Upreti, 2003).

One, therefore, cannot but praise the craftiness of Maoist leaders in managing political contradictions to the advantage of the revolution. The *Prachandapath* brought out by Comrade Pushpa Kamal Dahal as a doctrine of the party tries to be as soft as possible on the demands that were high on the party's previous agenda. The document offers a way out from the present state of Limbo by citing the possibility of a dialogue, and asks for a guarantee for an all party convention, formation of an interim government representing all parties, and drafting of the People's Constitution.


Although it was not clear whether the Maoist Leadership sincerely desires to end these impasses in a peaceful manner, or prolong the conflict in the pursuit of final, decisive victory and in the meantime enjoy power, influence, media hype, and authority which could be considerably reduced once the conflict was settled amicably. Another factor that needs to be scrutinized before dissecting the various phases of failed negotiation in the context of Nepal was that both sides having more to gain from conflict than from peace. A mutually inconsistent goal that both the state and the rebels are seeking has left little room for compromise and consensus (Panday, 2005) . A good knowledge of various conflict resolution techniques, negotiation style, illustration of another models of peace-building in the multicultural societies as in the case of South Africa, the Jura conflict in Switzerland, Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and even in Mizoram, etc, could help in perhaps getting over this stalemate. A poor way of negotiations practised by Nepalese Leaders is of informing the press first that ' the government was willing to talk with the rebels', and notifying the rebels later. Proper homework, coordination with colleagues, full backing and trust of political constituency are a most

before initiating any such exercise. Although there are arguments on whether international mediator is needed, there is consensus on the essentiality of rigorous preparation, coordination, and use of negotiating skills form different types of conflict resolution exercises around the world (Panday,2005). The following were laid out as steps for peaceful resolution of protracted conflicts as in the case of the Jura canton and South Africa (Pandy, 2005).

1. Pre-negotiations (talks about talks).Building confidence.
2. Establishing conditions for negotiations.
3. Protecting peace process.

The peaceful resolutions of prolonged bloody conflict- according to some of the speakers who had had stints as manner, but all the time with careful judgement to sustain the peace process and not allowing either side to leave the process. It was also emphasized that both the parties may have to lose equally unhappy, but negotiated settlement was necessary in the larger interest of the people.

Fig. 2.4: Steps of Conflict Resolution



Source: Pandey,N.N. (2005). Nepal's Maoist Movement and Implications for India and China.

Major attempts for negotiations since the start of the insurgency in 1996 . Although in 2000, when the deputy prime minister, Ram Chandra Poudel, met a Maoist Leader of Kathmandu District Committee, and it instantly created euphoria with the hope that peace would replace widespread violence. The enthusiasm died down quickly. Sher Bahadur Deuba initiated negotiations with the rebels twice: First, when he was chairman of the High-Level Committee to recommend on Resolving the Maoist problem, and then as prime minister of the country in 2001.

Following talks were organized between the Nepal government and CPN (Maoist) during the periods of 1996 to 2005.

The First Round Talk: During the peace talks held at the Godavari Resort, both sides vowed to resolve the impasses, but the Maoists insisted on the earlier demands of a republic, a new constitution, and an interim government. Abiding by the Maoists' demand of creating a favourable atmosphere for the initiation of peaceful consultations, the Deuba Government released 33 Maoists detained under the Public Security Act. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Top Bahadur Rayamajhi and Agani Sapkota negotiated with ministers Chiranjivi Wagle, Mahesh Acharya, Narahari Acharya, Bijaya Kumar Gachedar and Chakra Prasad Banstola at the resort. Deuba asserted that he as prime minister could not agree to the agenda of scrapping the very Constitution under which he was the head of the government of the country.

At the talks held at Thakurdwara, Bardia district, the rebels once again put forth demands for a new constitution and an interim government pending establishment of the republican state. Additionally, they put forth the demand for the abrogation of the Treaty of 1950, and pulling out of Indian troops from Kalapani, together with imposition of the work permit system, and regulation of the open border with India. Inevitably, the talks were consigned to the dustbins of Nepal's recent political history.

Padma Ratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana were mediators bring to two sides together. MP Ramesh Nath Pandey also met Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai at an undisclosed location. Several efforts from the civil society too have produced no concrete results so far. Probably the government could embark on secret negotiations with the Maoist Leadership and leak it only after at least 80 percent of agreement is reached.

Second Round Talks: At the talks held at Thakurdwara, Bardia district, the Maoist once again put forth demands for a new constitutins and an interim constitution and an interim government pending establishment of a republician state . Additionally, they put forth the demand for the abrogation of the Treaty of 1950, and pulling out of Indian troops from Kalapani, together with imposition of the work permit system, and regulation of the open broader with India . Inevitably, the talks were consigned to the dustbins of Nepal's recent political history . The agenda put forth by the second round talks included . (Thapa and Sijapati,2003).

1. The present constitution that is acting as on obstacle to finding a solution to the problems faced by the country and the people should be scrapped and the people given the right to frame a new constitution .

2. In order to introduce a new system, the present parliament and government should be dissolved and an interim government formed.
3. Given the context that the traditional monarchy has come to an end and people have come to believe in the birth of republic, steps should be taken to institutionalize the development of a republic.

Third Round Talks: On 28 January 2003, the government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) had declared a ceasefire, paving the way for peace talks and giving the nation the best opportunity till date for ultimate resolution of the problem. In a day of dramatic developments, the statement from the CPN (Maoist) expressing their willingness for a peaceful solution to the problem was soon followed by a similar statement from the government, in which it agreed to withdraw a previous order Listing the Maoist as a terrorist outfit. The statement issued by the government said it would be initiating the process to notify the international community and Interpol to withdraw the 'red corner' notices issued against scores of the Maoist Leaders. This, among others, was a precondition laid by the Maoist outfit before there could be any talks.

Political parties reacted differently to the truce declared by the Maoists and the government, and expressed diverse views regarding their possible participation in the peace process. Nepali Congress (Democratic) Leader and former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba ruled out any possibility of his party joining the peace process. "The Country will suffer a great loss if the government does not hold talks with the rebels cautiously; Deuba warned (The Kathmandu Post, 2003).

After the declaration of truce, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, a member of Maoist negotiation team, said that the democratic and international situation then was conducive for peace talks. In an Interview with Nepal Television on 17 March 2004, Mahara,

however, admitted that international forces were not positive towards the Maoist movement since it was launched in 1996. He also said that the government too seemed more serious about the peace process this time.

In 4 October 2002 decision of the King to sack Prime Minister Deuba and subsequently appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand in his place. While Deuba's decision to dissolve the House, postpone general elections for more than six months in consultation with all major political parties and subsequently recommend to the King to invoke Article, 127 gave an ample moral, legal, and political basis to the King to take momentous decisions, Leaders of major parties, notably Koirala and CPN (UML) General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, have since then been terming the decision as an 'unconstitutional' and regressive step. A triangular contest of one-upmanship between the palace, parties, and Maoists overshadowed the political landscape of the country. The decision of the CIAA was widely viewed, therefore, as the Chand government's ploy to grill Koirala or his daughter and wreck the already pathetic images of the political parties, especially that of the NC. They got a reprieve from public opinions as soon as the Chand Government approved a rise in petroleum prices. Student agitations, protest rallies, and tyre-burning episodes started, much to the dismay of the government. It was soon fashioned to suit the agitation against the 4 October decision of the king. The Maoist had much gain from this agitation as they could use it as a fulcrum to blackmail the government for the release of their prisoners, while simultaneously making public contacts, calling on various officials of diplomatic mission stationed in Kathmandu, and, as the theory of Sir Thomson goes 'emerge hardened and solidified from the ceasefire.' During simultaneous meetings with the Leaders of the nine left parties, Dr Bhattarai called on the party leaders to forge a decisive struggle against the largest castle of

feudalism (Panday,2005). A 22-point conduct between the rebels and the government was announced on 13 March and the first round of talks held on 27 April at Shankar Hotel. It decided to form a four-member facilitator team for the talks. The team members include Damannath Dhungana, Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Karnadhowj Adhakari. The government's apparent strategy was perhaps to engage the rebels for an indefinite period try to build through informal meetings, were continuously building up the strength of the Army, and gradually force the Maoist to withdraw the demand of a Constituent Assembly and instead agree to a claim more acceptable to every stratum of the political milieu. However, time was not in its favour as the agitation turned violent, and although public support to the so called 'People's Movement' of the five agitating parties was minimal the government had to concentrate on two fronts at the same time (Panday,2005). On 6 May 2003, the government and Maoists agreed to hold the second round of dialogue. The date and time was confirmed after a four-hour-long meeting at the Gokarna resort attended by Maoist Leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai and Krishna Bahadur Mahara , and ministers Rameshnath Panday and Narayan Singh Pun. The informal meeting was another demonstration of interest on the part of the government to iron out differences with secrecy, agree on vital issues unofficially, and then gradually try to build up confidence on both sides. This meeting had made more hopeful for peace process of Nepal . (Panday,2005). Meanwhile, Maoist prisoners Rekha Sharma, Govind Acharya, Chandra Shrestha and others were released as a gesture to the Maoist. The Maoists, presenting their political, social and economic agenda in the earlier round of the talks, had called for an all-party conference, an interim government, election of the constituent Assembly, and integration of the people's liberation army with the RNA to form a national army under the control of the elected

representatives. Their demands included the army back to the barracks, making known the whereabouts of the missing Maoists (including politburo member Dandapani Neupane), freeing all Maoist detainees, and forming a high-level independent body consisting of human rights activities to investigate cases of rights violations between 1996 and 2003. The PLA also demanded rehabilitation of conflict-affected people, compensation to the families of martyrs, release of prisoners of conscience, and abrogation of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (TDA) (Punishment and control) Act.

On the day of the talks, the Maoists suddenly appeared to be more rigid than before, and demanded that army be restricted to a radius of 5 km from its barracks. According to them, the government agreed to this at the closed-door negotiations. Following the talks, spokesman of the Maoist negotiating team, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, disclose to the press that both sides had agreed upon a number of issues, including the restriction upon the army. The spokesman of the government team, Minister Pun, did not contradict this statement. He, however chose to keep mum of the issues (hinting that the agreement had not been reached) at a television interview hosted by Bhusan Dahal of Kantipur television after of his government. The government was obviously held responsible for agreeing on something that would affect the moral of the army adversely, while making it possible for the Maoists to continue their reign of terror, even though it never officially said that such a decision was ever taken. By restricting the movement of the state army and tolerating free movement around of the rebel's militia, it obviously had to face the disapproval of the place. Ultimately, the government spokesman, Pandey disclosed to the BBC that the 'two coordinators shall sit down and sort out the issue', which was read as denial of ever having reached such an agreement.

The Maoist promptly demanded the resignation of Pandey from the negotiation of Pandey from the negotiating team. Whether it was proper for a negotiating party to call for the resignation of a member of the other party is a different question altogether, and only history shall judge its propriety. (Panday,2005)..

Fourth Round Talks: With the Chand government getting marching orders, the new administration under Surya Bahadur Thapa formed a new team of negotiators-two ministers' Dr Prakash Chandra Lohani and Kamal Thapa. Conceivably, with the rumour that the Thapa government had been formed with the backdoor influence of New Delhi, and Thapa's own background of being a tough and unyielding leader, might have made the Maoists more hesitant to move about freely and linger on with the talks indefinitely. The government too wanted to move straight on to the political agenda rather than deal with other nitty-gritty issues, a move that proved disastrous to the whole peace process. At the fourth round of the talks held in Nepalgunj and Hapure, the government submitted 'road map for peace', which was rejected outright by the Maoist team. Party chairman Comrade Prachanda declared that the government's concept papers 'rendered the peace talks purposeless' and it not only failed to address the fundamental problems plaguing the country but also 'exposed the controversy through sugar coated pills to strengthen feudal regression that became evident after October 4'.

On 27 August, they unilaterally broke off the seven-month old ceasefire and the subsequent peace process with the government 'for the time being', saying it had lost its relevance. In his statement, Prachanda blamed the government for the developments. 'Since the old regime has ended the utility of the current cease-fire and the possibility of [a] forward-looking way out through the peace talks, our party wants to make it clear that

the cease-fire, code of conduct and the peace negotiations have lost their utility', Parchanda concluded.

However, he reiterated his party's willingness to sit for the dialogue again 'to protect people's sovereignty and their fundamental interests', and appealed both to people within, and outside, the country to help create an atmosphere conducive to the talks. Reacting to the Maoists' decision, the people, the political parties, and the business Community expressed 'shock' and urged the two sides to stick to the peace process.

Soft	Hard
Participants are friends	Participants are adversaries
The goal is agreement	The goal is victory
Make offers	Make threats
Disclose your bottom line	Mislead as to your bottom line
Be soft on the people and the problem	Be hard on the problem and the people

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to observe some salient points for the persistent errors that the Nepalese negotiating processes have seen from the very useful techniques put forth by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their best-seller, *Getting to Yes*. It aptly charts out a series of positional bargaining tips which would be extremely helpful for the Nepalese negotiators to learn about negotiation technique.

They, likewise, devise a straightforward method of negotiation that can be used under any circumstances (Panday,2005). Following are the steps of negotiation technique.

1. People: Separate the people from the problem.
2. Interests: Focus on interests, not positions.
3. Options: Generate a verity of possibilities before deciding what to do.
4. Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard

Since the Maoist movement has inflicted on the economy, polity, socio-cultural life of the Nepalese, and even the psyche of the entire state, negotiation has to taken as a serious business and not merely as a half-hearted exercise. As the movement stems from deep-rooted socio-economic and political grievances, the state gave concessions, experiment with available options, and go the extra mile for peace. The Maoists on the other hand had realized that a military victory against the state and continued to relentless struggle had harm for both sides then it had come to an understanding to evolve a broad consensus, which may warrant their having to climb down from their previous demands. (Panday,2005).

Peace Process and Agreements among Political Parties

The People's Movement of 2006 heralded significant political change in the history of Nepal and laid a strong foundation for Nepal's political transformation, restructuring the state, and providing space for conflict resolution and sustainable peace. Yet the historic movement of 2006 not only established the Federal Democratic Republic by putting an end to the 238-year old monarchy, but also ended the decade- long armed conflict by bringing the people's liberation army into the political mainstream through a peaceful dialogue process(Wagle,2013). He further said that, Nepal's peace process formally started when the government and the CPN (Maoist) signed the CPA on 21 November 2006, but the peace process informally begun following the signing of the Twelve- Point

Agreement between the then Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (Maoist) on 22 November 2005 (see detail on annex-8) . The Twelve- Point Agreement between the SPA and the CPN (Maoist) established strong landmark foundations for political parties to fight for democracy and peace whereby the parties had agreed to fight jointly against the King Gyanendra's despotic regime. In fact, the historic milestone of the peace process the Twelve-Point Agreement paved the way for peaceful people's movement for democracy and peace. Millions of Nepali people took to the streets in the 19-day long historic people's movement. As a result, the people's movement succeeded in establishing federal republic of Nepal (Wagle, 2013).

The armed conflict was formally put an end following the signing of the CPA thereby agreeing to armed conflict follow the rule Of law, honor universal human rights principles and democratic norms and values. Furthermore, the CPN (Maoist) agreed to put their Ex-PLA into 28 different cantonments and store armes in the containers under the supervision of the United Nations Mission to Nepal — (UNMIN). UNMIN carried out the task of verification of the arms and armies on 15 June 2007 and completed it on 27 December 2007. Likewise, another milestone of the peace process — the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) was signed on 8 December2006 between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist). The CPA in its article 4.4 also mentioned 'the Interim Council of Ministers were formed a Special Committee in order to supervised, integrate and rehabilitate the PLA(Wagle, 2013). '

As per the provision 4.1.3 of the AMMAA - 'only those PLA properly registered at cantonment sites where eligible for integration into the security forces fulfilling the standard norms. Discharged personnel were ineligible for integration, those eligible for integration into the security forces were determined by a Special Committee as agreed in

the CPA. This integration process was determined in subsequent agreement with the parties'. On 16 December 2009, the government and the CPN (Maoist) signed an agreement to release the disqualified combatants from the UN monitored cantonment within a month. The discharge took place from 7 January to 8 February 2010 (Wagle, 2013).

After the departure of UNMIN on 15 January 2011, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), formally handed over the cantonments and the combatants to the SC for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation, and their arms to the Army on 22 January 2011. However, monitoring of arms and armies was never the function of the Special Committee (SC), but the Secretariat of the SC was given the task to undertake those functions as decided by the SC (Wagle, 2013).

The decision of the SC to handover the ex-PLAs, cantonments and arms to the government on 10 April 2012, had brought to an end to dual army in the country. CPN (Maoist) had formally declared its' warred wing PLA in 2001. After 11 years of its formation it had dissolved. After the dissolved of armed wing PLA, Nepal's peace process was formally concluded on 12 April 2013 with the dissolution of the SC, which was formed for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of ex-PLA in October 2008. Apart from the abovementioned political agreements and constitutional provisions, there were a number of other agreements which have contributed to the peace process of Nepal (Wagle,2013).

The Seven-Point Agreement on Integration and Rehabilitation of PLA

Confusions and contradictions amongst major stake holders on integration and rehabilitation, ultimately, the major political parties took a historic decision by signing the Seven-Point Agreement on integration and rehabilitation of the ex-PLA on 1

November 2012 (Wagle,2013). The Seven-Point Agreement - a national consensus document addressed and settled all contentious issues like numbers to be integrated into the Nepal Army (NA), norms and modality of integration and rehabilitation, and rank determination of the combatants to be integrated into the NA including the minimum and maximum ceiling of the cash amount for voluntary retirement. In fact, the Seven-Point Agreement was a historic document that paved the way for completion of integration and rehabilitation which was, one of the critical issues of the peace process(Wagle, 2013).

The major political parties who represented the SC followed the liberal approach and became flexible putting aside their previous positions for the sake of success of peace process. Therefore, the major political parties were equally contributed to making the peace process a success by rationalizing their positions. The modalities of integration, the numbers to be integrated, rank harmonization, and rehabilitation and voluntary retirement packages were settled by the seven points agreement of four major parties on November1, 2011 .

Unlike other post-conflict countries, the agreement had envisioned and addressed the unique situation of our own on integration and, rehabilitation process . The agreement reflects the political, social economic, security and military context of Nepal . (Wagle, 2013). Although, 93 percent ex-PLA refused humiliating integration choosing voluntarily retirement option, moreover, the VMLRs outstayed without any financial supports.

Integration and Rehabilitation of PLA

As an international experience, Nepal had presented a unique model of combatants integration and rehabilitation process. Integration and rehabilitation process were done under a directorate of the Nepal Army comprising 65 percent Army personnel and

remaining 35 percent from the PLA. The directorate of the mandate of carrying out development related activities, forest conservation, industrial security and disaster management. PLA opting for integration had meet the standard norms of the security agency. However, the existing recruitment policy on age, academic qualification and marital status were made flexible. With regards to academic qualification of a specific post of the security agency, one step below was considered eligible. Similarly, age bar had also been relaxed up to three years of the maximum age set for entry into the security agency (Wagle,2013). Integration of PLA into security agency had been done in such a way that it didn't not the PLA cantonments bring any negative consequences in the career development of existing officers and other ranks . Wagle (2013) further stated about the policies and decisions of integration of PLA. Existing records of Maoist combatants residing in cantonments will be updated.Maoist combatants opting for integration will have to undergo all the trainings as per the standards of the army.All the weapons stored in the cantonments will automatically be brought under the government's ownership once the process of integration begins.

As per Seven-Points agreement, parties agreed to integrate 6,500 fighters (PLA) in to the newly- created Special Directorate under the Nepal Army (NA) . The Directorate, comprising 65 percent from the security agencies of the state and 35 percent from PLA (Bhatta, 2012) . PLA will be integrated on an individual basis and will have to meet the norms of the security force. But there will be some flexibility on age, marital satus and educational qualification (Bhatta, 2012) . But, according to integrated ex-PLA commander into Nepal Army said to researcher's (Interview on April first 2014) actually, our integration in Nepal Army was new recruitment rather than victory of worriers.We

were recruited in NA according to NA recruiting policies. We have treated us as new army personnel. They further said we have faced a lot of problems, like; discrimination on facilities (provident fund, loan etc) and mental and psychological stress.

Alternative package of education, training and vocational opportunities had been provided for ex-PLA opting for rehabilitation. Depending on the nature and time frame, the cost of the package was varied from Rs 0.9 million. Depending upon their responsibilities, the PLA opting for voluntary retirement was categorized into four levels and those falling in the highest category had received Rs. 0.8 million while remaining three levels in the descending order had received Rs. 0.7, Rs 0.6 and Rs 0.5 million respectively. The amount was made available in two tranches in two fiscal years.

The agreement offers a package of \$6,300 to \$10,000 for PLA opting for voluntary retirement and cash package of \$7,600 to \$11,400 depending on their rank for those who prefer rehabilitation. The agreement was made that this money had been paid within two years.

The Seven-Point Agreement was drafted in line with the Interim Constitution 2007, the CPA, the AMMAA and subsequent political agreements among political parties following fundamental principles of international practices of integration and rehabilitation. The agreement was the outcome of the perpetual dialogues and negotiation processes among the political parties, between the SC members, its Secretariat and political parties that envisioned and drafted the contents of the agreement and completed the process without the involvement of the international community.

The mainstream political parties of Nepal have mentioned their theoretical concepts on security in the first Constitutional Assembly election manifesto of 2008. The commitment paper of the CPN (Maoist) of April 2008 prioritized for new ideology for a

new Nepal with two armies Nepal Army and its' militant organization PLA in Nepal. It had focused to professionalized to its PLA and democratize to Nepal Army . A high level Security Commission should be formed to restructure the security based on new democratic republic. Special plans should be developed to utilize the experience of the ex-PLA men from Nepal and Gurkhas from Indian and British armies. The broader security disputes and infringes in Susta, Kalapani, and other places should be settled as soon as possible based on the facts (Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), Election Manifesto (Kathmandu, March 2008). The interim constitution, 2007 put the equal footing to the PLA similar to the Nepal Army making Nepal " a state with two armies" (December 15, 2009).

Several understandings, agreements, and accords, including the interim constitution (Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, Kathmandu) had been adopted to put the Nepal Army and the PLA under democratic civilian control during 8 years (November 2005 to April 2013) tenures. Article 3 of the Twelve-point understanding signed on November, 2005 in New Dehli which tried to keep both State and Maoist Armies under the United Nations or a reliable international to make free and fair elections. Same way the Interim constitution of Nepal 2007 stated the Council of Ministers (CoM) had control, mobilize, manage and democratize to the Nepal Army (Art 144.3) with inclusive character (Art. 144.4). However, the implementation of the constitutional has not followed because of three reasons: first, the political parties do not have courage to urge the Nepal Army to follow the constitutional rights. Second, the Nepal Army has able to put the political parties into their fold either through informally supporting to the traditional political forces and the Maoists leadership or refuting to the proposal of the general people (Himalya Times, 2012).

Role of UNMIN on Integration and Reahabilitation process of PLA

Nepal Government and CPN (Maoist) had expressed their desired for the UN to play an important role in the peace process leading to the election of CA. As a both sides desired in September 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan offered good offices to help the Nepal's peaceful solution of Nepal's conflict (Thapa, 2013). Samuel Tamrat an official with in DPA visited Nepal in mid-2003. He developed good relations with political actors. Indian officials and other representatives of the diplomatic communities. His role became significant for bringing conflicting parties in one place. Then SPA government and the CPN (Maoist) sent a letter to the Sectery General on 09 August 2006 by requesting United Nations assistance in creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election of the CA and the entire peace process. Peace talk agreement was held between SPA and CPN (Maoist) on 8 Nov. 2006 . This agreement was consolidated by signing CPA between SPA led government and CPN (Maoist) . In which both parties agreed for free and fair election for CA, basic arrangement for the cantonment of the PLA and storage of arms and munitions of both sides (Thapa, 2013) . Both parties declared the commitment to transform the existing cease fire into permanent peace (Comperhensive Peace Agreement, 2006).

On 22 November 2006, Secetary General wrote a letter to the president of the Security Council by requesting for the technical assessment mission to develop an integrated concept of operations for the UN political mission . He also proposed for the deployment of an advance group of up to 35 monitors and an initial 25 electoral personnel. The president of the Security Council agreed to the Secetary General's proposal at the 5676 th meeting of Security Council (Thapa, 2013). On 28 November tripartite negotiation of SPA, CPN (Maoist) and witnesses by UN prepared the methods

for monitoring of arms and armies. Secretary General on 9 January 2007 called for a small new United Nations political mission (UNMIN) in Nepal. This comprises unarmed military inspectors, electoral experts and police and civil administration teams, to monitor the peace accord between Government and PLA, that ended a decades (1996-2006) long armed struggle . In this process liberation army in Nepal army as well as others programs to disconnect the party and ideology .Among the various role UNMIN verified the Maoist PLA by its international experiences and UN rules. UNMIN was departure from Nepal on 15 January 2011, completed some major tasks of peace process. Following tasks were completed by UNMIN during its tenure.

Role of UNMIN in Verification Process

UNMIN verified PLA in accordance of CPA. This process was started from 21 November 2006. In this process seven temporary camps were established at first.

Table No.1 Temporary camps of the PLA.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Ladies</u>	<u>Gents</u>	<u>Total</u>
First div	Chula chuli	606	2617	3223
Second div	Dudhouli, Sindhuli	522	2312	2834
Third div	Jutpani, Chitwan	980	5023	6003
Fourth div	Arunkhola, Nawalparasi	933	4129	5062
Fifth div	Dahawan, Rolpa	909	3238	4147
Sixth div	Dharsarathpur, Surkhet	914	3896	4810
Seventh div	Talband, Kailali	982	4101	5083
Security of leaders		13	140	153
Total		5859	25456	31315

Source: Nepal Army Staff college, 2013, Kathmandu.

As per the negotiation between the Maoist, Nepalese government and UNMIN, Seven temporary camps were established for PLA and were kept there from 21 November 2006.

On 21 May 2007, government decided to provide Rs 3000 per month per PLA as pocket money. On the same day, government decided to construct 1000 accommodations having capacity to accommodate 15 combatants in each accommodation. The government of Nepal has been providing Rs 60 per PLA per day as ration allowance since 25 February 2007. Following table shows the recruiting process of Ex- PLA.

Table 2: Disqualified PLA Discharged from cantonments (January 7 to February 8, 2010).

Main Cantonment	Children (a)	Late recruit May2006 (b)	Unqualified (a+b)
Chulachuli- Division I	617	259	876
Dudhauli – Division II	277	95	372
Shakti Khor- Division III	367	219	586
Jhyaltung Danda – Division IV	424	198	622
Dahavan – Division V	396	56	452
Dasarathpur- Division VI	525	104	629
Masuria – Division VII	364	103	467
Kathmandu	3	1	4
	2,973 (74%)	1,035(26%)	4,008 (100%)

Source: Civil Military Relations: Theories to Practices: November, 2011

The rehabilitation package by the United Nations includes: formal schooling, vocational training, training as health workers, and setting up small/micro-enterprises.

By November 2010, a total of 2,225 discharged former PLAs were counseled under the packages. By December 2010, 399 enrollees (267 male and 132 female) had completed trainings and 105 graduates (62 male and 43 female) had started their own business. The United Nations Inter-agency Rehabilitation Project, managed jointly by UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund and the International Labor Organization, continued to support the socio-economic rehabilitation of the 4,008 disqualified personnel verified as minors and late recruits who were discharged from the Maoist army in February 2010. Of those disqualified, over 1,800 have received counseling on their rehabilitation options, over 420 have completed their training, and over 100 graduates of the program have achieved gainful wage or self-employment (AMMAA, 2006).

Role of JMCC in Conflict Resolution

The JMCC played an important role to coordinate between Maoist, Nepal Army and UNMIN. The JMCC is the monitoring, reporting and coordinating body chaired by UNMIN, with membership of both the Nepal Army and the Maoist army. The JMCC is responsible for supervision compliance by the parties with the AMMAA. The JMCC has nine members, three each from UNMIN, Nepal Army and Maoist. The JMCC has three main functions.

To assist the parties to the AMMAA implement the agreement. To serve as a dispute resolution mechanism-to resolve all dispute and military or operational difficulties, complaints, question or problems regarding implementation of the AMMAA. To assist in confidence- building; the JMCC works to gain the trust and confidence of the parties and promote the overall goals of the AMMAA among the people of Nepal. The JMCC shall reach its decisions by consensus. In the event of a deadlock, the representative of the UN

Secretary-General shall have final authority for reporting on the compliance of the parties with this agreement to the Secretary-General and to the interim government for resolution. The Chairman reported regularly to the representative of the Secretary-General and to the designated representatives of the parties regarding the activities of the JMCC. In order to achieve these goals, the JMCC resolved all problems and disputes at the lowest level possible. That meant delegation of authority to the Joint Monitoring Teams in the Sectors. The JMCC also promoted joint problem solving and build trust and confidence through active efforts to appropriately investigate and report on all incidents of concern to the parties. The first JMCC meeting was held in Summit Hotel in 17th December 2006. The intention was to meet twice a week. However, by the end of the second mandate period 80 meetings have taken place, the last one on 20th July 2008. JMCC has proven to be an important element of confidence building and problem solving before the situation escalates. The advantage of the JMCC was that the same military personnel, NA, PLA and UNMIN/AMO, who negotiated the AMMAA, also manned the key positions in the JMCC from day one. Although there was in way relations between the two armies, this relations had to be developed over time and fixed meeting time was a must to the develop this, not only meet when there was a problem.

Role on Constitution Assembly Election

A central element of UNMIN's activities was providing assistance to the constituent assembly election. The EAO, which was headed by Fida Nasrallah, had been broadly successful in this undertaking, although not without both political and technical challenges. These were rooted in the fluidity of the political context in which the electoral process developed the election was originally scheduled for June 2007, but postponed first to November 2007 and then to 10 April 2008 as well as elements of ambiguity in the

mission's electoral mandateⁱ. UNMIN made a positive contribution to the electoral process in Nepal, and that the UN's role was not to do "elections as we might have wanted". Assistance could not ensure decisions consistent with advice provided; rather it sought to enable such decisions to be taken on an informed basis. Given the difficult circumstances within which Nepal's fluid electoral process took shape, credibility and assistance could not be separated. The emergence of new sets of demands by marginalized groups who sought adequate representation in the constituent assembly was one factor that greatly complicated progress towards the elections.

The election was successfully completed. The Electoral Assistance Office, that monitored the April election, had already been closed. UNMIN provided technical assistance to the EC in the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere. An independent team of election monitors appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to him will review all technical aspects of the electoral process and the conduct of the election: this team was called the Electoral Monitoring Team (EMT) (UNMIN-2008).

UNMIN established a small United Nation police advisory team, comprising eight senior police advisers at national and regional levels to support the Nepal Police in their planning and preparations for the election. UN police advisers would liaise with the Nepal police and provide advice on the planning and execution of election security, with full respect for human rights and attention to the experiences of women and traditionally marginalized groups. However, they met with resistance from the Nepal Police and no effective support from the Home Ministry.

Technical Assistance through UNMIN

UNMIN's technical assistance is provided throughout all stages of the electoral process.

During the planning, preparation and conduct of election UNMIN had provided following assistance. Logistics and operational planning: advice on developing the structure and mechanisms needed for an efficient electoral operation.

Development of the electoral legal framework: support for the drafting of laws and regulations that meet international standards and the legitimate expectations of Nepalese voters for an inclusive and transparent election
Developing electoral procedures: help to translate the laws onto step-by-step procedures, particularly for polling and counting.
Voter registration, training, information technology, Policy development, Donor coordination and Party registration and candidate nomination. Voter education, Regulatory framework of media and Logistic, communication and electoral operations. are major components.

Operation of Electoral Expert Monitoring Team

The EEMT is a team of five independent electoral experts appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to him. The EEMT will review all technical aspects of the electoral process, and submit reports on the conduct of the election. One important chapter of the peace process had been complete with the successful conduct of the Constituent Assembly election. Writing a new constitution is an even more important aspect of the peace process. Nepal's original request for electoral observation had been modified to specify that the UN would provide technical assistance to the electoral process as well as a small expert monitoring team that would report confidentially to the Secretary-General. However, discussions of UNMIN's mandate had been completed in the latter part of 2006 when the full five-person Electoral Commission (EC) and its Secretary had yet to be

appointed, is a source of an initially complicated relationship with the EAO. The EAO's structure, size and composition (it aimed to support the EC by twinning technical experts in its offices at all levels) was not supported by a consensus within the Commission (UNMIN-2008). Within the EAO there was a clear sense that the level of assistance offered to the EC was neither always necessary nor regarded. Meanwhile the visible UN presence in the districts of electoral advisers and civil affairs officers, intended to build confidence and mitigate potential conflicts, at times created resentment from some local actors. Yet the UN's electoral team was also aware that Nepal was continued to value the credibility and legitimacy that UNMIN's engagement in the electoral process brought with it. (Bhandari, 2013) .

Role on Humanitarian Demining

UNMIN had a small team of mine actions experts who worked with the Nepal army and the Maoist Army to assist them fulfill their commitments. UNMIN and UNICEF had assisted the Government to establish a national authority that could deal with the threat of the unexploded remnants of the conflict, at a policy and operational level. Then Nepal Government had formed a National Mine Action Steering Committee and Technical Committee under Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. They were at the national level basically for policy formation and implementation purpose. De-mining of all Minefield Locations has already been completed. Along with the minefields, 24 IED field locations were also cleared. Action mainly comprises five complementary groups of activities:-

1. Mine Risk Education (MRE)
2. De-mining i.e. survey, mapping, marking and clearance
3. Victim Assistance including rehabilitation and reintegration
4. Stockpile Destruction

5. Advocacy against the use of anti-personal mine

In AMMAA, both sides should assist each other to mark landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary information within 30 days and to defuse and remove/lift and destroy them within 60 days. Nepal became landmine free country after 5/6 years on June 14, 2011 only.

Ceasefire Monitoring

Monitoring of non-military aspects of ceasefire arrangements (those not covered by OHCHR or by the technical advisory functions of the UNMIN electoral officers) are conducted by UNMIN's civil affairs officers. The aim of this work is to promote peace. Especially in the rural areas of Nepal where there has been a prolonged absence of the state. Civil affairs officers carry out four main activities that are common to UN civil affairs mandates: monitoring, reporting, liaison with State and non-State actors, and good offices functions where requested and appropriate.

Human Rights Monitoring

The office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) began work in Nepal in May 2005, during the armed conflict and when there were serious human rights violations, including of democratic rights. UNHCR-Nepal provided regular reports to the Government on human rights issues, with recommendations for action to ensure protection of human rights.

United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during various periods (January 23,2007 to January,15, 2011) Followings resolutions were passed by security council in differents time and dates UNMIN reports (2008).

Term	Security Council Resolution	From	To	Tenure
I	Resolution 1740	January 23, 2007	January 22, 2008	One year
II	Resolution 1796	January 23, 2008	July 23, 2008	Six months
III	Resolution 1825	July 24, 2008	January 23, 2009	Six months
IV	Resolution 1864	January 24, 2009	July 23, 2009	Six months
V	Resolution 1879	July 24, 2009	January 20, 2010	Six months
VI	Resolution 1909	January 21, 2010	May 15, 2010	Four months
VII	Resolution 1921	May16, 2010	September 15, 2010	Four months
VII	Resolution 1939	September16,2010	January23,2011	Three Months and three Weeks
Total				3 years 11 months & 3 weeks

Source: UN Report 2011, UN Building Kathmandu

Guiding Principles and Theories for Dealing with Conflict

This section deals with the guiding principles, techniques, and theories for dealing with conflict.

Guerilla Warfare Technique

Guerrilla means samll war, the diminutive of the Spanish word guerra (war). The Spanish word derives from the Old High German word Werra and from the middle .Dutch word

warre; adopted by the Visigoths in A.D.5th century (www.guerillawarfare.com). Human beings have invariably adopted guerilla warfare in its various forms and shapes even before the birth of Christ. In India, the manifestation of Guerilla warfare was evident from the very advent of civilization (Bihari, 1982). Guerilla warfare means irregular warfare, which indicates the time, place and occasion for resorting to the type of war. The occasion has been described as one when the enemy has a stronger armed force. Night has been recommended as the best time for launching a regular war. The places recommended for forests, hills etc. and sabotage has been included in the mode of warfare, all these compose guerilla warfare (Bihari, 1982).

In ancient China, Emperor Huang used guerilla warfare in 3600 BC against his enemy Tsi Yao. Later, in 500 BC Chinese General Sun Tzu advocated guerilla warfare. Throughout China's history, peasants in revolt have used guerilla warfare against the rulers. Similarly, the Holy Bible has depicted the concept of guerilla warfare in much the same way as it is waged today. (Sherstha, 2004)

In China, there was long history of guerilla warfare, the modern guerilla warfare started from 1927 to 1936; the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerilla tactics constantly. Many bases were established and the guerilla bands formed and the Reds were able to develop into regular armies and then they proceeded upon a ten-year period of resistance and participated in the Japanese war. The internal unification of China gained valuable experience in the struggle against Japanese imperialism (Bihari, 1982). The success of guerilla warfare largely depends upon powerful political leader, who must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy. From 18 September 1931, a strong anti Japanese guerilla campaign and activity opened and exploded in each

of the three northeast provinces (Shrestha.2004).Mao Zedong during the civil war, summarized the People's Liberation Army's principles of warfare following points for his troops . The enemy advances,we retreat. The enemy camps, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack . The enemy retreats, we pursue. On guerrilla warfare has been widely distributed and applied, successfully has been Vietnam under military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap . "People's war people's army closely follows the Maoist three stage approach.

In Europe, Spain first witnessed guerilla warfare during the Napoleonic campaigns from 1807 to 1883. Russia also waged guerrilla warfare against Napoleon's Army in 1812. In 1810,Venezuela revolted against Spanish rule, under the leadership of Simon Bolivar, from 1815 to 1824, he organized guerrilla armies under Paez and Santander and gained liberation for much of South America from Spanish rule,Maxican guerrila did the same aginst Scott's army in Mexico City . In 1861, guerrilla warfare was extensively used in the American Civil War . From 1902, the Boers waged guerrilla war against the British occupation army . Arab guerrila revolt took place against the Turkish army from 1916 to 1918 (Bihari, 1982).

In India alone has numerous liberation group . There are at lest 18 underground organizations (Shrestha,2004). Almost they use the guerilla strategy.The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has launched an " armed revolution for an independent Assam," the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur and the Revolutionary People's Front , Political wing of the People's Liberation Army,are fighting for an "independent Manipur". The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has been fighting for a " Sovereignty and independent " Nagaland . The Indo Burma Revolutionary Front's (IBRF) has been fighting to "liberate " the north –eastern region of

India and north-western part of Burma. The All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF), another extremist outfit in the region, is demanding a separate tribal land (Shrestha, 2004). The Communist Party of India – Marxist Leninist (People's War) of Andhra Pradesh, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of the Bihar plateau (Sharma, 2002) the revolutionary Communist Centre (RCC) of India, the Naxalite movement and the People's War Group (PWG) have intensified their attacks in Andhra Pradesh Bihar, West Bengal and Jharkhand (Shrestha, 2004).


In 1950, Nepali Congress had been started armed struggle on the basis of guerilla warfare. It formed the People's Liberation Army in 1948 for the armed struggle. Nepali Congress conference was held on 26 and 27 September 1950 at Bairgania in India to adopt the revolutionary line (Balchandra Sharma, (1976)). Bhola Chatterji a socialist leader from Bihar, India, trained new recruits in guerilla warfare and brought a plane-load of arms and ammunition from Burma. (Bhola Chatterji, (Calcutta, 1967)) The NC launched an armed revolution in 1950-51 which was successful to overthrow the century long Rana oligarchy. (Parmanand, (1982)). Same way inspired by the peasant movement in Naxalbari, West Bengal, the Jhapa district committee of the CPN (ML) organized the revolutionary youth peasants into All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committee (ANRCC) in 1970. ANRCC had launched armed movement in Jhapa district in 1971. It applied the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and practically adopted strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare of Mao-Zedong in first time in Nepal. CPN (Maoist) copied some past armed movements of Nepal. It followed and used the armed wing People's Liberation Army (PLA) against the monarchical system to establish the people's democracy in Nepal. Beyond this, it applied some international practices, which were

guided by communist ideology (Bishnu Pathak, (2004). Included Nepal 45 countries were successful guerilla campaigning in the history of world.

Human Needs Theory

Edward Azar and John Burton pleads that protracted social conflict springs from the lack of basic needs to the people. Their need-based theory holds that deep-rooted conflicts are caused by the denial of one or more basic needs, such as security, identity and recognition. Ralf Dahrendorf proves that it is not property relations, but the differential distribution of authority that underlies social and political conflict (Dahal, 2003). Burton distinguishes needs from values and interests. He defines values as the "norms, customs, and beliefs associated with particular social communities" and interests as the "vocational, political and economic aspirations of individuals or groups" primary difference in these three concepts lies in their degree of negotiability. Interests are negotiable: one can bargain over them and they can be exchanged against one another. However values and needs are generally not negotiable—they can not be traded or bargained away. Thus, where interest and to be transitory in nature, needs and values have a more permanent character, as needs constitute universal drives for the motivation and mobilization of people, and values are closely related to the identity of individuals or groups (Michelle, 2002, p.17).

Figure 2.4: Burton's Human Needs Theory



In the context of Nepal, Johan Burton's human needs theory could be very appropriate to analyze one of major root causes of armed conflict as social exclusion, where, identity (ethnic, cultural, religious, language) dignity, security, community and vitality the core needs of people are disrespected. Burton distinguishes three types of human motivation : needs, values and interests. Conflict deeply rooted in human needs. It involves issues that are not negotiable: human needs that cannot be compromised. It results in behavior that destroys, or has the potential to destroy, people, property and systems. Needs are those motivations that are "universal and primordial and perhaps genetic"; they are required for the development of the human species and will be pursued by all means available (Burrowes, 1996). Conflict is resolved only when the outcome fully meets the needs of the all parties. This frequently requires major policy changes and environment restructuring (Burrowes, 1996).

The Marxist Theory

Karl Heanry Marx (1818-1883) is undoubtedly the leading architect of conflict theory. He put forward an alternative perspective, class struggle, as a basic structural phenomenon of human society . Considering conflict as an inherent and integral part of human behavaior and social interaction, Marxisan theory states that human survaival is based upon contradictions. Though a dialectic process-thesis, antithesis and senthesis, conflict occurs in human mind and then in actions, such as discussion, polarization, segeration, and destruction. He put forward that there is constant conflict between the two

principles groups (economic classes) of owners and workers who alter property relations in society and effect social change (Pathak, 2004). The central concept of Marx is that "owners exploit workers" to control the means of production. Political power is exercised through the gains of economic power. Economic power controls society and social control is associated with the interests of particular groups or classes. Marx further says that dominant culture stems the dominant group in society. Class is one major factors of clash or conflict in society.

Structural Theory

Johan Galuting introduced the term structural violence to refer to situations where injustice, repression, and exploitation are built into the fundamental structures in society, and where individuals or groups are damaged due to differential access to social resources built into social system (Michelle, 2002).

Nepal is a multi –cultural, multi religious and a multi-lingual country. There are 61 ethnic groups and 125 different languages or dialects in the country (Bhattachan,2001). Nevertheless, the country's overall structure is highly dominated and influenced by Hinduism, caste sytem,feudalism, and Nepali language . This inbuilt system of suppression and oppression has continued for centuries .

This indirect oppression or violence is well emphasized by Robert Schreiter, in his book Reconciliation Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order, that violence can be direct as well as indirect. He says direct violence is physical violence, but there is often indirect violence, such as with holding resources to the extent of starvation.

Economic, oppression, then, is violence. But there are other forms of indirect violence that affects people's mental health, their self-esteem or view of themselves, when they are told over and over again that they are inferior, both directly and systemically by racism or

by the caste system (Schreiter, 1992). In the reference of Nepal, when discussed with indigenous and dalit organizations this direct and indirect violence or basic human rights are focused as the root causes of conflict. However, the Knee Jerk reaction to the root causes of conflict from most marginalized respondents from different districts of Nepal is reviewed are poverty and unemployment as the major causes for armed conflict.

Theory of Identity Oppression

Mark Adams and Mark Bradbury write in Conflict and Development (Adam & Bradbury, 1995) that poverty is not the only reason for armed conflict. Suppressing the culture and religion of people has the greatest cause for the protracted conflict. The desire for self-determination is the prime motivation for joining the Maoist Insurgency. A few years after the so-called democratic government was installed, people started to raise the issue of self identity. The question of the mother tongue for various groups was raised. They wanted to use it in local administration and in schools. People from various indigenous groups wanted to be identified with their culture and religion. There are many resurgent ethnic movements for identity. The demands of indigenous people include religious non-discrimination, equal language rights local and ethnic self rules is federal government or the right of self-determination and affirmative action. Despite these demands, many indigenous groups in Nepal are in crisis. Religious, linguistic and ethnic discrimination have resulted in the functional loss of identity for many indigenous people. They have resulted few in private and public life.

Some Alternative Views of Conflict Theories

Political science theories ferret out other factors: such as dysfunctional impact of adversarial politics, maladministration, corrupt leadership, excessive centralization of

power, systematic deprivation of people from participatory opportunities, marginalization, injustice, high inequality, discrimination, excessive exploitation, domination and supervision . Resistance against these factors constitutes a major source of political tensions and conflicts . " When the political system gives votes to the many, and economic system gives bread to the few, civics strife is almost inevitable "(Nyerere, 1997). In somalia and Nepal, the destruction of some state institutions, personal rule of incumbent party leadership and patronage-based politics helped fuel conflicts . The political system and the decision structure, even the style of decision-making, effect the nature of conflict . When political leaders deliberately instrumentalize the cultural differences of the society through a policy of divide and rule, political conflict becomes inevitable . Feminist theorists argue that "socialization " of gender roles generates aggressiveness in the behavior of males and develops a culture of domination and violence Dahal, 2003) .

Michael E. Brown examines four main groups of factors for the growth of conflicts : structural factors, political factors, economic /social factors, and cultural/perceptual factors . Among structural factors he identifies three major components: weak states, intra-state security concerns, and ethnic geography . To him, a weak state lacks political legitimacy, politically sensible borders, and strong political institutions capable of exercising control over its territory . The weakening of the state structures often leads to the eruption of violent political conflicts (Dahal, 2003) .

The nature of a state's political system also determines the scope and intensity of political conflicts . Authoritarian political systems are more likely to provoke dissent among the marginalized and discriminated groups than a democratic system, especially when some political groups have inadequate representation in the structure of political power . If a

state employs the policy of oppression and violence towards minorities, then conflict will almost inevitably occur (Dahal, 2003). The same is true for the nature of the national ideology. Countries where citizenship is based on ethnic, caste, creed, gender or race distinctions, rather than on the democratic equality of all people, are equally vulnerable to political conflicts. But walking the thin citizenship line is tricky, as a state cannot provide citizenship to everyone, especially those that are already overpopulated and competition for state resources is already intense. Equality of access to citizenship can equally mean demographic invasion by another overpopulated country. The prospect for political conflict is also great in countries where the ruling class projects unattainable objectives, holds a strong sense of sectoral identity and pursues confrontational strategies. A discriminatory political system with unequal access to power and resources for different members of the society can breed discontent and aggravate political conflicts. In divided societies, a system of proportional power sharing can resolve underlying root causes of violence and forestall the risk factors animating violent conflicts (Dahal, 2003).

Different Approaches for Dealing with Conflict

Generally, the term 'conflict' has been interpreted as the opposite of peace (Warner, 2001). Many people interpreted conflict as undesirable and destructive to society and that has to be avoided, contained, however, this is a narrow and one-dimensional interpretation of conflict. Such an interpretation does not distinguish among different levels and forms of conflict (Galtung, 2000) and their possible contribution to positive change. Conflict occurs in all society. It is manifested within an individual, between individuals, within family, between families, among community members and social groups, between community groups and external organizations, between castes and ethnic groups, between political parties, between countries, etc. Conflict is one indicator of a

changing society . Rapid changes due to new technologies, commercialization of common property resources, and privatization of public services, growing consumerism, and government policies –all contribute to conflict (Warner, 2001). It is merely impossible to stop these changes and the associated conflict. The only thing to be done is to acknowledge, manage and transform conflict in to a force for positive social change (Varynen, 1991) .

People in violent social settings interpret conflict as violence or bloody war. Conflict is an active stage of disagreement between people with opposing opinions, principles and practices manifested in different forms such as grievance, conflict, dispute and war (Buckles, 1999) .Grievance is an initial stage of conflict in which individuals or group are perceived to be unjust , and provides grounds for resentment or complaints. This conditions potentially erupts in to conflict (Varynen, 1991) . When clash of culture, political, social or economic interests between individuals and groups cause antagonism that leads to conflict, people make the matter public and opt for conformation (Caplan, 1995).

Two main schools of thought exist in conflict discourse (Upreti, 2007) . One school of thought views conflict as pathological and dysfunctional. In this perspective, conflict generally carries negative connotation and is interpreted as something irrational that needs to be suppressed because it is opposite to co-operation and peace. This is mechanistic its interpretation of conflict. (Martinell and Almedia ,1998) . Another school of thought considers that conflict can also be a functional means for social change. This perspective acknowledges prevalence of conflict and it could also be a constructive social process to establish group boundaries, strengthen group consensus, develop a sense of self-identity ,and contribute towards social integration and progressive economic and

social change (Dougherty and Pfaltgraff, 1990). According to this perspective, conflict is a continuous social process and has great influence in shaping and reshaping social relations and the power structure of society (Martinelli and Almeida, 1998) .Unlike the Mechanistic view, Galtung (2000), argues that conflicts encompass adaptation by a society to new innovations, policies and procedures, laws and regulations, local power relationships and privatization and globalization process determine the causes and intensity of a conflict (Upreti, 2007) .

When ever wanted or not, conflict is a part of social process and an outcome of social development and change. How to use conflict to serve a useful social function is to be the central concern (Upreti, 2007) . Durkheim argues that society is held together by the values that people in that society share; hence society is normally in a state of equilibrium based on moral consensus. Functionalist s theory also considers conflict as dysfunctional and abnormal condition of society (Vayrynen, 1991). An alternative perspective was put forward by Karl Marx citing a vivid case of conflict between two basic economic classes of people (Upreti, 2007) . Marx emphasizes that there is always constant conflict between the bourgeois who own the means of production and the proletariat who sell their labor. Dahrendorf further elaborates that social organizations typically contain two groups (those who rule and those who are ruled) with opposing interests, thus conflict is not only limited to class struggle over economic resources but also can be a power struggle between interest groups . Scimecca (1993) criticizes Marxian analysis of conflict on the ground that it emphasizes only on an economically determined system of social relationship and conflict than co-operation . Max Weber suggests that societies vary between conditions of equilibrium and conflict . In this perspective conflict is endemic in

social process but tends to operate in favor of powerful people of the society .Weber gives explanations of how power is legitimized and stabilized in society .

Political Approach

The political approach is one of the most appropriate and commonly used in the high intensity conflict and civil wars . To effectively resolve the conflict, all other approaches need to be guided, commanded and decided within the framework of political approach .the decision of use of force, ceasefires, negotiation, state restructuring and addressing root causes of the conflict has to come from within framework . other activities include political parties; promotion of civic organizations, establishing independent oversight bodies, strengthening political institutions, establishing, promoting and reforming anti-corruption commission ,election commission and human rights commission ;promoting roles of parliamentary committees and parliament ;power sharing mechanism (e.g., all party government, fair allocation of power and resource); promoting decentralization and strengthening and democratic governance peace talk etc. (Upreti 2007). This approach was used in a decade long CPN (Maoist) conflict resolving process .

Peace and conflict transformation theories are complex and multidisciplinary in nature and generated from different disciplines, such as anthropology, international law, psychology, philosophy, sociology, international relations, political science, economics etc. There is no one predominant discipline in peace studies . Peace studies focus on conflict and its management as a generic social phenomenon (BHCT, 2003).

Contemporary conflict transformation and peace research largely devotes to the analysis of causes and consequences of armed or violent conflicts (Upreti, 2007) .

Ontologically, peace studies are based on the subjectivist and objectivist approaches. The subjectivist approach mainly focuses on minimizing the perceived incompatibility of

goals of the conflicting parties. The objectivist approach basically focuses on searching compatibility of goals of the conflicting parties to achieve peace and minimise misinformation, misunderstanding, or misperceptions such as stereotypes, mistrust and emotional stress, structurally unfair or unjust relationships and structure of society (Uperti, 2007). However, in practice the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is difficult to demarcate in conflict transformation and peace study, as the 'objective' researcher could understand a social structure is violent as against to the perception of the conflicting parties, based on subjective values and criteria of the researcher (Uperti 2007).

Now a days, some scholars –practitioners have introduced the 'multi-track approach' to adequately capture the richness of peace building activities .

Legal Approach

Legal or judicial approach of conflict transformation is not much debate in Nepal .In international experiences have demonstrated that legal approach plays crucial role in resolving conflict and sustaining peace (Uperti, 2007) . Common areas involved in this approach are commissions of inquiry, war crime tribunals, strengthening and promotion of indigenous and customary legal institutions and practices, court reform, judicial and legal oversight of security sector, easy access to justice, punishment to wrong doers, constitutional commission, arbitration, and legal aid to poor (Uperti, 2007).

According to Michale Harbottle,"Peacemaking is the diplomatic resolution of the politics of conflict. Peacemaking is the military intervention and peaceful resolution of violence in a conflict, by non-enforcement means. Peacebuilding is a set of physical, social and structural initiatives which can help to prevent and resolve the consequences of conflict, and provide post-hostality structural reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Multi- Track Diplomacy Approach

A pioneer of this concept, the institute for multi-Track Diplomacy (2007) identified nine separate tracks that must work together in creating a peaceful society. They are:

Track 1: government

Track 2: conflict resolution professionals

Track 3: business

Track 4: private citizens

Track 5: research training and education

Track 6: activism

Track 7: religious

Track 8: funding

Track 9: public opinion/communication (media)

CPN (Maoist) armed conflict was resolved by this multi-track approaches, linking with domestic peace constituencies in an integrative and complementary way (Upreti, 2007).

Conceptual framework is important to analyze conflict and peace process in Nepal. We should understand the discourse of peace, one needs to understand some basic approaches of conflict. These approaches are following in box (Upreti, 2007).

Approaches to Conflict Management

Conflict resolution is a process of seeking a solution to the Hobbesian state of nature where legitimate public order becomes problematic. Since human nature manifests in several forms, any imaginative understanding to conflict resolution requires systematic, inclusive, inter-subjective and multi-level approach. Philosophers trace the

origin of conflict and conflict management to the writing of Buddha, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Gandhi, etc. To protect a stable civic life each society has devised its own means of containing, controlling and managing conflicts through judicial systems, coercion of bellicose parties into an agreement or imposition of settlement by a third party. Since each conflict holds the propensity of manifest uniquely, mechanical formulate or quick fixes offered by consultants with pecuniary interest in the perpetuation of conflict management projects simply do not work. Social learning about the root causes of conflict is necessary to link the scientific researchers and politicians to the conflict resolution process (Dahal, 2003). Political realities like Hans J. Morganthau and Kessinger prefer the primacy of order to justice and legitimize the state's monopoly on power to crush any that existing structures, institutions, laws and policies. Ho Won Jeong offers a state-centric deterrence model of conflict management. To him, a deterrence model suggests hierarchical way of controlling anti-social behavior of people through domestic enforcement of law and international strategic policies (Dahal, 2003).

The United Nations (UN) from its very inception has articulated a provision for the pacific of disputes. It says, "The parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other peaceful means of their own choice." It has also introduced preventive diplomacy as an approach to prevent deadly conflicts. The key components of this approach are: problem assessment, identification of tools for preventing action and description of the role of the state, non-state and international actors (Dahal, 2003). Similarly, in 1992, it introduced an "agenda for Peace". Some of these processes are applicable to domestic conflict as well. The

interest –based probleming-solving approach defines conflicts in terms of interests and works reconcile the interests of rival parties to seek a mutually acceptable solution . Clements vouches for " an interest – based approach, rights-based and a power-based approach, with each corresponding roughly to the organs of the United Nations-good offices of the Seceretary – General and his envoys representing the organizations' interest based approach ; the judicial functions of World Court representing the rights based approach;and the Security Council representing the power based approach. According to UN mandate Secretary –Genearl Kofi Annan offered good offices to help the Nepal's peace solutions of Nepal's conflict in September 2002(Thapa,2013).

Peace expert Johan Galtung offers an approach to peace by peaceful means akin to Buddhist and Gandhain conception of end-means compatibility. He argues that direct violence can be ended by changing conflict behaviors,structural violence by removing structural injustices and cultural violence by changing attitudes .High fidelity channels of communication help defuse perceptual conflicts . To him, the search for positive peace becomes possible with the development of human empathy,solidarity and community and transforming the structures of imperialism,colonialism,oppression and exploitation . Offering a critique on "conservative conflict resolution," accompanied by an avoidance of issues of necessary social and economic change ,Kevin Clements provides an alternative approach to conflict transformation by means of strengthening the spontaneous peace-building process at work within the civil society and the state structures at the local level (Galung,1996) . Johan Burton and Edward Azar apply the fundamental needs satisfaction approach arguing that subordinate groups' fundamental human needs must be met by restructuring the society and providing a sense of justice to all the people. They also developed the idea of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) which works closely with

the judiciary system but provides an alternative to adjudication . Advocates of ADR believe that institutionalization of the problem-solving approach requires a change in the judicial process (Dahal, 2003). Herbert C. Kelman developed the problem-solving approach to conflict resolution. He views that conflict can be solved by the mutual involvement of conflicting parties, rather than completely crushing the opponent . He and his colleagues organized a series of "para-negotiation" and "post-negotiation" workshops with socially influential persons including academics and transferred the conclusion of lessons into political arena to achieve a win-win outcome. To him, an effective conflict resolution must involve an opportunity for the parties involved " to penetrate each other's perspective and to engage in joint problem-solving designed to produce ideas for mutually satisfactory agreement between them(Dahal, 2003).

Adam Curle's approach to conflict resolution is based on human development . After studying the conflicts in Pakistan, Nigeria, and Croatia, he concluded that are the process of social change. He found the utility of Track II diplomacy by non-official citizens in conflict mediation . His assumptions are based on four factors: a) building, maintaining and improving communications between conflicting parties; b) providing information to them; c) befriending the conflicting parties; and d) encouraging active mediation so that a willingness to engage in cooperative negotiation emerges. It is for parties in conflict to have primary ownership of the problem so that they commit themselves to non-violent solutions. Ownership means their participation in the decisions and actions (social change, social responsibility, healing, building relationship, monitoring, warning and social learning) (Dahal, 2003).

Sri Lanka, Sudan and Nepal all are suffered from protracted and bloody conflict that had ended last few years before . There were well as similarities between the cases,

the conflict in Srilanka was ultimately resolved by military means, while the comprehensive peace agreement signed in Nepal and Sudan represent negotiated solution to the conflicts (Cambell, 2012). On the basis of conflict theory, Nepal and Sudan peace process were resolved by win-win theory. But most of armed conflicts were resolved by win-lose theory like Srilanka (LTTE) armed struggle had been resolved by military means or win-lose theory. Uperti (2007) said that Maoist insurgency in Nepal and people's war in India were intractable in nature. It refers to conflicts that go on for long time, resisting most attempts to resolve them. Typically, they involve fundamental value disagreements, high stakes distributional questions, and domination, and / or denied human needs—all of which are known-negotiable problems. They often involve unavoidable win-lose situations as well. Integration and rehabilitation process of armed force is really most important work in post-war conflict country. Integration and rehabilitation process of CPN (Maoist) combatant shows the, unique Nepali model given Nepal's political, economic, security and military context following basic internally acclaimed principles and practices (Wagle, 2013).

So, there is no single way of resolving conflict. Most of the conflict resolution techniques try to eliminate the causes of conflicts by satisfying the needs, concerns and interests of not only the conflicting parties but also all those affected by it. Conflict resolution by, according to Jürgen Habermas, "refers to the stabilization of behavioral expectations in the case of disagreement, collective will-formation to the choice and effective realization of consensual goals" through action coordination based on a code of conduct (Dahal, 2003). A new distribution of power in the state increased interdependence among hostile parties can induce substantial changes in the pattern of relationships among them. Interdependence, in conjunction with the parties' interest, might create different

patterns of conflict development. For Example, a high level of interdependence, but with opposite interests, is sign of political instability. The transformation of interests can be pursued as a way of improving the pattern of conflict structure (Dahal, 2003). .

Conflict transformation aimed towards peace can be a deliberative process which aims to devise mutually shared constitutional rules of the game and conduct activities within that framework . According to John Burton's problem-solving approach, the solution is not the final conduct . Every solution generates its own problem . This means sustainable solution requires "a new synthesis of knowledge or techniques and a change in theoretical structure"(Reimann, 2001). And this process contributes to effective restoration of peace (peacemaking), ending violence and preservation of peace (peacekeeping) and undertaking peace building projects –itself, construction and development for the consolidation of peace.ⁱⁱ Every post-violence transition requires addressing the question of reconciliation upon which the state moves from the divided past to a shared future and becomes capable of creating a just order as well as performs its basic state functions.

Nepal's indigenous peace process still stands out in many aspects and it cannot be compared with the peace process in any other post-conflict country. (Wagle, 2013) . Basically Nepal peace process was end by win-win theory.

Conflict Management Strategies

As Upreti (2007) Conflict management strategies can be of any of the following:

1. Forcing: Using formal authority or other power that you possess to satisfy your concerns without regard to the concerns of the party you are in conflict with .
2. Accommodating: Allowing the other party to satisfy their concerns while neglecting your own .

3. Avoiding: Not paying attention to the conflict and not taking any action to resolve it .
4. Collaborating: Cooperating with the other party to understand their concerns and expressing your own concerns in an effort to find mutually and completely satisfy solution (win-win).

Above the four strategies of conflict management, collaborating strategies had been used in Nepali Congress armed conflict and CPN (Maoist) armed conflict management . After the Delhi settlement respectively in 1950 and 2005 . Both parties armed groups (PLA) were integrated and rehabilitated in accordance to comprehensive peace accord .

Common Approaches used in Addressing Conflict

Normally conflict addressing or conflict transformation common approaches are follows, which were followed in CPN (Maoist) armed conflicts (1996 to 2006) in Nepal.

Negotiation: Negotiation is a voluntary process that deals with a conflict situation between the negotiating parties. Negotiation includes any instance which two or more people meet face to face and communicate with each other for the purpose of influencing each other's decision, to reach a mutually acceptable solution for the conflict issue .

Negotiation takes place between parties to resolve incompatible goals (Upreti 2007).

Although negotiation deals with diverse interests in conflict (Pruitt and Carnevale,1993).

Negotiation clarifies conflict situations. People have different and often conflicting interests and objectives .Therefore, negotiation has a part of the problem solving process.

Some recent conflict scholar and Upreti argue that the role of negotiation is increasingly widening and is not only limited to conflict management, but it is also becoming a wider methodological principle and basis of organizing broader participatory developments efforts. Gulliver (1979) explains that patterns of interactive behavior in negotiation are essential despite marked difference interests, ideas, values, rules and assumptions among negotiators of different societies.

Negotiation can be categorized in to two distinct forms i.e. distributive and integrative (Upreti 2007). Characteristics of distributive negotiation are to focus more on resource distribution (win-lose). The attitude of negotiating parties is form with attention given to their own a interests and a far-reaching consequence may be a lose-lose situation . Characteristics of integrative negotiation are to create resources (win-win situation) where negotiating parties are open to alternatives and also give attention to the interments by infests of others, through participatory problem solving . It leads to a collective decision and commitments by the collective solution he negotiations parties to achieve an optimally collective solution . More schalor are agree in it , because integrative negotiation is a voluntary process in which conflicting parties meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable solution .

Negotiations generally focus on the best alternative for a negotiated agreement, interest (issue, position and criteria), and process (they create a condition for effective problem solving). Existing power relationships play an important role in the negotiation process . Actor specific characteristics such as position, function and personality determine power relations in negotiation . The actual use of the power depends on the context (Upreti 2007).

Mediation: Mediation is the intervention in a conflict situation, of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no decision making authority, but who will assist contending parties to negotiate an acceptable settlement of issues in the dispute . Mediator played an impartial and neutral role as a facilitators involves assisting parties, privately and or collectively, to identify the issues in dispute and develop proposals to resolve them . Mediator's discussion with the parties to a dispute. In some cases mediation may be compulsory under the terms of laws or court rules. In other cases it may be voluntarily, by agreement of the parties . Some jurisdiction has rules requiring mediation of disputes at some point in the litigation process. Mediaation helps parties seek to resolve their disputes in a manner, which avoids hostility and preserves an ongoing relationship (Upreti, 2007).

In contrast to traditional problem-solving or ' settlement –oriented approaches to mediation, the goal of which is to identify,define and resolve problems through a mutually acceptable settlement, transformative mediation aims to empower the actors involved and enhance and encourage their recognition of the other parties to the conflict .Instead of viewing conflict as a short-term situation in need of a solution, transformative mediation assumes that conflict is a long-term process with numerous opportunities for intrevantion and transformation.

Mediation process takes a very important role to resolve the conflict. According to Bush and Folger (1994a), mediation has the potential change the people themselves who are in the very midst of conflict, giving them both a greater sense of their own efficacy and greater openness to others. Mediation has transformative potential for recogniation and empowerment .It makes agreement possible, which the disputants find satisfactory and improves their relationship (Upreti, 2006) . Mediation focuses on

reframing the process of changing how a person or party to a conflict conceptualizes his or hers or another's attitude, behaviour, issues and interests and how a situation is defined (Upreti, 2007). In the procedural context, mediation involves a third party who makes it possible for conflicting parties to reach an agreement. The role of mediators is important in discerning interests from positions, reframing issues, and questions, giving fair consideration to different opinions, assisting in finding mutual gain and solutions and writing up an agreement in conceptual language for its effective implementation (Upreti, 2007).

In Nepal, Nepali Congress's Mukti Sena and CPN (Maoist) PLA's armed struggle were resolved by the transformative process. In 1950, Nepali Congress's Mukti Sena were shutdown their arms by the facilitation and mediation of Indian leaders and government. Same ways, CPN (Maoist) PLA were shutdown their arms according to comprehensive peace accord signed by SPA leaders and CPN (Maoist) leaders in Delhi, 2006.

Review of Contemporary Research Studies

There is large amount of publications and documents available about the analysis of the causes of CPN (Maoist) armed conflict in Nepal. Among these publications some books and research articles are published by Nepalese scholar and some are published by foreign scholars. Many research papers have been published by various researchers and several armed conflict assessments are conducted by various development partners. However, there is hardly few researches carried out on the people's liberation army and its contribution of political transformation of Nepal. This is burning topics for every one. This section deals with the review of recent research documents.

Hutt (2004), one of the renowned political analysts in a conference organized by the School of Oriental and Africa Studies (SOAS) in London pointed out that Nepal's developments from a variety of angles as they seek to explain one of the most powerful rebellions in South Asia. The crucial aspects of Nepali politics and the general political context are thoroughly analyzed.

Thapa (2003) presents the historical dimensions and the developments of the radical political landscape which allowed the emergence of a strong Maoist party. Sudheer sharma traces the path of the internal evolution of the Maoist movements, the power relationships within the main components of the organization, i.e. the party (the leadership), the People's Army (the military wing, after 2001 renamed People's Liberation Army) and the United Front (political branch). Despite the apparent failure of the central government to provide security and services to remote areas, the people's governments installed by the rebels have also disappointed the expectations of the local populations which had welcomed the Maoist with great hopes.

Hachhethu (2007) describes the strategy of the Nepalese government in dealing with the crisis. His dichotomy "state withdrawal/state reinstatement" clearly demonstrates the ineffectiveness conflict and the shortcoming of the central government's approach to peace making. The book greatly benefits from the contributions of several anthropologists whose ethnographic studies of the Maoist conflict deal with different aspects of life in Maoist- controlled areas. Sara Shneiderman and Mark Turin illustrate the context and the local perception concerning the establishment of the people's government (Jan Sarkar) in the in Eastern district of Dolakha in 2001. Besides the real (actually modest) consequences of such move by the rebels, this event is remarkable for its symbolic value indicating the actual capability of the rebels to established their own governmental

structures in their base-areas. Judith Pettigrew provides an account of what people normally do in order to survive in an environment dominated by the violence while Marie Lecomte-Tilouine writes about the manipulation of ethnic demands and caste concerns by the Maoist rebel as a powerful means of mobilization and enhancement of their movement of armed opposition to the central state. The Maoist discourse often drawn from local grievances; at the local level the rebels have affiliated their movement with indigenous organization and national liberation movements, especially in Western Nepal (the Magars being the most relevant ethnic group affiliated to the Maoist struggle). On the other hand, Mandira Sharma and Dinesh Prasain deal with the gender dimension of the people's war, pointing out the fact that the large participation of women in the conflict has been a vehicle of disenfranchisement and social awareness.

Onta (2004) conceptualizes the idea of "duplicity" and transplants it in to the Nepalese political context after 1990. He argues that the Maoist and other mainstream political forces have been fighting about different "representations of Nepali realities". Duplicity at the political level (from left parties) has been matched by a similar behavior in the commercial sector (public vs. private schools, alcohol consumption), in the civil society context as well as in the media. Denouncing the rebels or remaining silent when rivals are targeted has thus allowed the rise and growth of the Maoist movement in every sector of Nepali society. The concept of "distributional coalitions" employed by Pfaff-Czarnecki is useful to explain the legacy of the political system at the local and national level. The scarce interest of the Kathmandu-centric elites in the periphery can also provide an explanation for the modest counter-insurgency efforts committed by the central government in the initial stage of the conflict. Moreover, the lack of established democratic institutions has facilitated the penetration of the Maoist message among the

frustrated population. Saubhagya Shah and Philippe Ramirez describe the geopolitical dynamics of the Maoist conflict. Shah argues that, although the socio-economic factor (greed and grievance) is an important element of the Maoist phenomenon, however the conflict in Nepal and its rapid growth can better be explained by other factors such as the "acute disunity within the ruling parliamentary parties; the ideological and structural weakness of Nepali state; the rapid ethnicisation of the Maoist movement; a long-standing culture of recruitment into foreign armies in the Maoist heartland; extra-territorial linkage; and most significantly, the general retreat of Nepali state during the initial phase of the conflict."

Ramirez is interested in comparing Nepali Maoism with its earlier manifestation in China, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Peru and the Philippines. Finally, Hari Roka writes on the state of emergency in 2001 and the polarization on the political landscape following the escalation of the conflict. His conclusion calls attention to the fact that the Maoist message is powerful and "highly political". In fact, it creates a dichotomy between "the people and the people's enemy" which is likely to deeply affect both the socio-political realities and cultural outlook at the local level.

In doctoral research study, on the title of people's war and human rights in Nepal, Pathak (2006) analyzed the genesis and development of the Maoist people's war in Nepal with reference to both national and international human rights instruments; and assessed the human rights prospects of Nepal at the present time. Pathak, used explanatory research methods. In this process, he used qualitative research design. He used primary and secondary data in his study. Researcher involved as a participant's observer in collection of the information as a primary data collection method. He reviewed secondary data tools, like books, articles, journal etc.

Researcher explain in his study the role of Communist party in Nepal on fighting for socio-economic transformation to achieve equity, social justice, and dignity for the poorest of poor, marginalized and vulnerable communities since its very inception in 1950. The communist movement often worked as a latent armed conflict before 1990 and had surfaced periodically in the half decade between 1990 and 1995. It finally emerged as an open armed conflict in 1996. In Pathak's view peace has neither left nor right wing. It is in the interest of people – Nepali and others. In a country where Buddha – the apostle of peace – was born, the desire for peace among the people is greater than their obligatory support for those who have lust for power, chaos, and bloodshed. Neither side is going to win in the foreseeable future. And Nepali people and nation will have to bear irreparable losses.

Pathak (2004) dealt about people's war mobilization of security forces is not solution for the people's war. He suggested in research calling international community both material and moral support could not be tolerated for long time in a sovereign state of Nepal. The Integrated Security Development Program, including other humanitarian relief were not solution. He sketches the Maoist movement in abroad and India, but he didn't particularly explain the armed history and people's liberation army of Nepal.

Poudel (2006) in his masters degree thesis on the title of socio economic structure and conflict in Nepal, using empirical and analytical study methods and qualitative research methodology said that, there are two kinds of conflicts known as the with weapon and without weapon conflict. Without weapon conflict helps to gradual development of society but with weapon, conflict calls disagreement, violence, irruption and grievance in the society. He focused with weapon conflict helps to change politics and revolution. After the Second World War, conflict has been spreading by

modernization, education, economy and development .He described more about his thesis after the failure of USSR the world is suffering from the conflicts of economy, religious, regional more than political conflict. Before and after the unification by king Prithivi Narayan Shah,Nepal had to confront several wars with in and outside the country Nepal had several experiences of conflict with British India in the southern, eastern and western parts and Tibet in the North part. The border disputes in Rautahat, Siuraj and Butwal resulted in a hostile relationship between British India and Nepal. The Anglo -Nepal war terminated with the treaty of Sugauli, which enabled British, India to annex the Himalayan districts. Paudel further said that in period between 1951-1959 was marked by political instability, conflict and rapid succession of governments in Nepal . All the governments and parties indulged in corruption and were confined to their vested interests. The political scenario and government of that period was reflected by the 42 points letter of memorandum presented by Til Bahadur Lokshum (president of all Nepal Kirat League) comprising 15 castes of backward ethnic communities. All these demand are seen to be very relevant and valid till the present day context. Paudel concluded his thesis internal conflicts have occurred due to weakness of failure of political will, commitments, and weakness of planners, experts and state functionaries including security agencies. Soci-economic factors play the vital role to influence of conflicts.

Bhurtel & Ali (2003) The Green Roots of Red Rebellion: Environmental Degradation and the Rise of the Maoist Movement in Nepal have dealt about the rational of the present study is to provide an alternative outlook on the root causes of the conflict. Some scholars have argued that environmental degradation is the ultimate cause of civil strife in many regions, but they failed to provide empirical evidences. On the other side, political analysts concerned with Nepal in their studies have missed the link between

environment related issues and poverty in the hills. The author argue that environment deprivation (i.e. deforestation, soil erosion and degradation, flooding caused by over-cropping, over-extraction of maintain resources) “coupled with demographic changes widened socio-economic disparities especially in the form of access to sufficient food and land among peoples in the Mid- and Far- western development region of Nepal and indirectly led to the Maoist insurgency in these areas” . Study focused not with standing the rhetoric of Maoist leaders, the insurgency started in the district of Rolpa, Salyan, Jajarkot and Rukum because of these areas threatened by environmental devastation which has to be regarded as main cause leading to the “creation of the so-called ‘revolutionary objective situation’ in Far- and Mid western regions for the Maoist insurgents to grow and multiply”. Ecological degradation had several consequences for mountain and hill peoples: food production did not keep up with population growth, families have been forced to abandon their farm terraces because of soil erosion, and devastating floods in the monsoon period caused forced displacements and made several victims among rural population. In conclusion, the authors suggest that ecological distress in an already fragile environmental equilibrium “could be the hidden and hitherto unnoticed cause of the Maoist rebellion in Nepal”. Indeed, the progressive loss of livelihood rendered people vulnerable and prone to Maoist rhetoric and promise. One fundamental recommendation warns about investing in infrastructure development projects in the mountain areas since this would prove “economically expensive and environmentally hazardous”. More supportive actions should encompass the application of indigenous know-how and techniques to natural resources management.

Asain Reports (2005) on Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy provides a systematic overview of the goals, internal structure and politico-military

strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). After considering a wide range of issues pertaining to the rebels' organization, the report concludes that the CPN (M) is, in fact, a genuine political party. Their use of violence and terrorist tactics is instrumental to their political goals. According to the report, the political nature of the Maoist movement is confirmed by the fact that the military wing of the party is subordinated to the close political control of the leadership and all military campaigns are planned and coordinated by the political branch of the party. Internal unity, tactical flexibility and a pragmatic approach towards other stockholders have characterized the rise of the CPN (M) as a powerful and influential political force in Nepal's political scenario. The CPN (M) has capitalized on structural grievances and more proximate deficits; whereas their agenda has managed to mobilize a remarkable popular support- more or less open –especially in the rural areas. Civilian casualties have been limited and “indiscriminate attacks avoided” The rebels have also show a high degree of sensitivity to the international public opinion; despite their ideology and anti-imperialist rhetoric the Maoists have avoided targeting foreign nationals.

The report describes in detail the CPN (M)'s political program which is based on the ultimate goal of “new democracy” as well as its economic agenda as “a hybrid model incorporating capitalist elements on the strongly nationalist frame “but still motivated by communist principles. Report further analysis the organizational composition of the Maoists rebels the supremacy of the Party over the other structures, i.e. the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and United Front (UF). The primacy of politics is again clear when the leadership, command and control of the party is examined. The party supremo Prachanda is still the unconstructed figure of the CPN (M). Although the leadership's unity was in some shaken by the temporary demise from the party structure of the chief

ideology Baburam Bhattarai, the top leader seem to agree on the overall aims and strategy of the party. Report further highlight on its membership and support base of the Maoists cannot be accurately defined in quantitative items. However, the composition of the rebels' support base includes different sections of the society, primarily the poorest classes and deprived groups (ethnic minorities, women, low-caste and *Dalits*) and, to a lesser degree, elements from the petty and national bourgeoisie. The report also describes the sources of revenue which allow the sustenance and the continuation of the insurgency.

Whatever the assessment of their actual goals and means, the “Maoists have changed politics in Nepal irrevocably” Their major contribution has been the departure from the 1990 political compromise which had left large sections of society- especially women, ethnic groups and outcasts- disenfranchised.

Finally report concluded the Maoist political bottom-line of the Maoists for accepting a negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict. Land reform, caste and ethnic equality, regional devolution etc . The willingness by the rebels to enter the political mainstream own calculation for entering electoral politics”

Shrestha (2004), in his PhD research study on the title of Nepal coping with Maoist insurgency dealt about insurgency are not modern inventions. They mainly started during and after the first world war and subsequently spread all over the world after the Second World War . At present more than 100 countries are facing the problems of insurgency. He explained the Maoist conflict in differnt phase, causes contributing to conflict, impact of insurgency, and management of insurgency, security and political dimension and insurgency management through community approach are the main highlights of the research. The overall objectives of the study is to probe in to the

management of insurgency in Nepal and specific objectives are analyze the variables causing the origin and growth of insurgency, examine the impact of insurgency and make recommendations for effective management of insurgency in the days to come .

The study is based on analytical and empirical methods .Shertha used the primary and secondary data in his study research. In primary source researcher take a interview with stakeholder act and regulations of government publications, case studies research reports etc. In secondary resource, he followed the relevents books, news papers and articles . Research based on qualittative research methodology.

The core conflict transformation work is the building of sustainable peace for the peaceful resolution of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. This involves various process and principles to create an environment by which reconciliation, social justice and participative negotiation, fact finding, mediation and arbitration, an ombudsman for national minorities and special commissions are to be considered as focal points .He recommended in his research that principles of primacy of people in transforming conflicts, humanitarian concern, human rights and humanitarian law and principles, respect for gender and cultural diversity, impartiality, independence , accountability, confidentiality, partnerships, institutional learning are to be considered to manage the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and restoring permanent peace and prosperity to the country .

Wagle (2013) in his research article entitled the message of integration and rehabilitation process of Nepal. After the assingment of peace accord between Government and CPN (Maoist), integartion and rehabilitation of rebel combatants is really messy and contentious process for any post-conflict country, it is also time-consuming and looming with high risk of failure. But Nepal not only concluded the integration and rehabilitation process, it also established a unique Nepali model given

Nepal's political, economic, security and military context of following basic internally acclaimed principles and practices. Nonetheless, every conflict and peace process is unique in the political, social, economic and military context of different countries. But Nepal's domestic –actors initiated. Led and concluded indigenous and homegrown integration and rehabilitation process can't be compared with any other post-conflict country. Though, given the gross financial amount of the integration and rehabilitation process. It might be termed as an "expensive process" but the peace is less expensive than the war. He focused further political scenario of Nepal like this way Had Nepal promulgated a new constitution through the constituent assembly, it would have been an exemplary model of comprehensive peace process. But the very Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation has conveyed significantly positive message to conflict-ridden countries around the globe, albeit partial. Researcher used the secondary data published in books, bulletin, journal and using a international experiences of integration and rehabilitation process of rebels. He used explanatory and analytical research methods.

Raj (...) in his book represents a general account of the Maoist insurgency. According to the author, from a peaceful place known as the birth place of Lord Buddha Nepal become a war-torn country on the brink of self-destruction. The insurgency has caused a grave setback to the democratic process initiated in 1990. The author attempts to identify the root of the “turbulence” affecting the country since 1996. The legacy of neglect and backwardness in which the country was immersed for century's is regarded as one of the main causes of the Maoist conflict. At the same time, the ideological backdrop provide by Maoism and the peculiar and, in same way. “Wrong interpretation” given by the Maoist leader provided the ground for launching the people's war in

February 1996. Parkash Raj also examines the socio-political implication of the maoist movement, including the role of neighboring countries and their attitude regarding the conflict. In particular, the author believes that India did not take the Maoist uprising “as serious as it should have”, on the contrary, the US develop increasing interest to Nepal only after the 9/11 events and located the ongoing Himalayan conflict within the framework of their worldwide “war on Terror”, labeling the Maoist rebels as “terrorists”. On section of the book is developed to possible solutions to the conflict. The author regards institutional transformation, decentralization, right to self-determination, empowerment of women and other deprive people as the most pressing needs to be addressed in order to produce a positive change in Nepal. The book concludes with a provocative question: “Will the Maoists ever give up their arms of will Nepal turn into another Cambodia, Peru of Afghanistan?”

Thapa (2003), in his book, up-dated extensive account of the Maoist insurgency. The work is divided into six parts. The first part deals with the historical evolution of Nepalese politics from the unification of the country in the 18th century up to the outbreak of the People’s wan in 1996. The author's particular attention to the evolution of the Communist Party of Nepal. The evolution as such from its foundation in 1949 to the launching of the people’s war by the Maoist function in 1996 is a sequence of splits and mergers triggered by the dissident views among the party’s leaders. These divisions proved fundamental in determining the political direction taken by different and competing communist faction in the aftermath of the *Jana Andolan* (People’s Movement). The restoration of democracy following 30 years of autocratic Panchayat rule pushed some communist leaders toward accepting the principles of multiparty democracy. This trend resulted in the co-operation of the CPN (UML) into the new

democratic system. on the contrary, the function led by Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, reorganized as the CPN (M), and Opted for the radical political course dismissing any possibility of participation in a comparative democratic process. The second part stresses the sources of disenchantment that led to the insurgency. It is the author's opinion that a complex set of compelling factor can be found behind the conflict. Since the formation of a unitary state Nepal's rulers left a record of misrule indicating complete negligence of the people's need. The new rule of the democratic system established in the early in 1990's did not bring this negative trend to an end. Rather they carried on the corrupt and selfish practice of the past. Socio-economic discrimination, pervasive poverty, rugged geography, political incompetence and leadership's inability can be regarded as the main cause of the conflict in the Nepal. The early stage of the insurgency and the swift growth and success of the maoist movement are analyzed in the third part of the book. Political and *hoxism* was the main governmental response to the insurgency. The reason has to be found in the political instability that affects democratic Nepal. What is more, the government's strategy based on harsh and violent repression inflamed even more the rebellion. The operation *Kilo Sierra II* first and the interdiction of the "Terrorist and Destructive" (TADE) acts later proved unsuccessful since they failed to address the underlying causes of the conflict. On the contrary, such initiative pushed the local population toward the Maoists with many young people joining the rebels. Since 1998 the Maoists have started working on the establishment of a parallel state-like structure in areas under their control and launched many educational, development and economic programmes' at the grassroots level. The revolutionary structure set up by the Maoist originates from the "Three-in-One" principle: the overall framework consists of the party (40% of representative), the Army (20%) and so-called Front Organization (40%).

Following Mao's military approach the rebels initiated the People's War adopting the concept of "protracted war": after the phase of strategic defiance and strategic stalemate, the insurgency would have entered the fundamental phase of strategic offence paving the way to the establishment of a republic. The fourth part is devoted to the study of two "momentous years": 2001 and 2002. During this period the insurgency intensified pushing the country further into disarray. During the second National Conference of the CPN (M) in February 2001, the so-called *Parchand Path* became the guiding ideology of the movement vowing to continue the struggle until the end' and refusing any partial change through mere political reform. The military strategy underwent a similarly radical change: in 2001, for the first time, the capital Kathmandu became a target of the insurgents. The palace massacre worsened the situation creating a widespread environment of political instability. Notwithstanding the inflamed situation, popular loyalty to the institution of monarchy prevailed when Birendra's enigmatic brother, Gyanendra ascended to the throne. Deuba's Government approached the Maoists in a milder way than Koirala's and finally the two parties could agree on a ceasefire. This event gave the Maoists the opportunity to stop their underground activities and hold a public meeting providing them great political gains and transforming the CPN (M) from a tiny extra-parliamentary force into a strong political force. Yet, the development coinciding with the September 11 events and the increasing activities of the rebels against the population such as extortions and abductions undermined the consensus on the ceasefire. Formal negotiations got stalled because of the incompatibility of the political agendas of the parties. After four months without hostilities clashes restarted in late November 2001. A few days later, the Maoists announced the formation of the so-called People's Government led by Baburam Bhattarai, confirming the suspicions about the

strategic exploitation of the ceasefire by the Maoists in order to strengthen their political and military structures. The response of the government was the declaration of the state of emergency on November 26, 2001 and the deployment of the Royal Nepal Army against the insurgency. King Gyanendra's dismissal of Deuba from his post of prime minister almost one year later was the final act of a controversial relationship.

Apparently, the prime minister's incompetence to hold elections led the king to step in and assume practically direct power surprising; in January 2003 another ceasefire was announced. The fifth part consists of an assessment of the costs of the conflict from *macro* and *micro* perspective. Economic, social and human hardships related to the conflict have pushed the country in to a precarious situation. Indeed the Maoists, in the area under their control, have stopped many development programmes. The last part consists of an analysis of the compelling factors that led, for the second time, to a ceasefire and to the beginning of a new set of peace talks. From the Maoist side, the little progress achieved both on the ground and at the level of popular support during the last year was a major element that convinced the party's leaders to accept the dialogue. The urban areas are still under the tight control of the government and the military balance between the two parties does not allow speculation as to whether the situation will change in the foreseeable future. In fact, a full-scale attack by the rebels is very unlikely at the moment. Then there are rumours about differences between Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai within the Maoist party. From the government's side, pressure from the army and from a peace-loving population seem to have acted as important compelling factors. The authors also consider the "India factor" is one of the elements that led to the January 2003 ceasefire.

Shrestha and Upreti (2003) in their book represent a recent piece of scholarship on the conflict in Nepal. It is the result of two separate seminars held in September 2002 and April 2003 in Nepal. As a consequence, the book has been divided into two main parts: *Conflict Resolution in Nepal* and *Governance in Nepal*. In the first part of the work, Dev Raj Dahal deals with the theoretical dimension of conflict resolution. He analyzed different sources and types of conflict as well as the approaches to conflict resolution and responses to such crisis. In addition, he examines the steps towards the normalization of war-torn societies (conflict settlement, transformation, resolution). Meena Acharya (2005) is more concerned with conflict transformation and the recent peace dialogued. Among the sources of the current crisis, the prominent conflict seems to be political since it relates to the future political system of the country (monarchy vs. republican state). Yet, the author recognizes other causes of the conflict (ethnic, caste, religious and geographical discrimination, gender, inconsistent and ineffective socio-economic policies). The same paper includes a very interesting overview of the major political parties' approaches to conflict transformation. The analysis shows how positions differ on each issue relating to the conflict. At the same time, it emphasizes the common features which most of the political parties agree on . Krishna B. Bhattachan provides a sociological perspective, he presents compromise and referendum as tools for conflict resolution. The originality of the paper comes out in the identification of several internal conflicts within the territory of Nepal. This analysis of the fields of conflict can be compared to the assessment of the causes of the conflict made by many other scholars. The area of conflict are identified as ethnic, religious, caste, language, regional, gender and class-based political discrimination. Youbaraj Sangroula's essay offers a political stand point on the people's war. Among the cause of the conflict the author identify some

(the split of the “United Front”, the failure to recognize the Maoists as a political force by the government, the failure to develop integrative political-civil participation in governance, the influence of India, China, and the United State, the lack of governance and the failure to manage the insurgency. Among the causative factor, Sangroula distinguishes between *mediate and immediate dynamics*. Mediate dynamics are those factors which “provide a solid background for the emergence and the growth of the crisis” (p. 105)-e.g. imbalance of power sharing, permanence of societal feudal structure, inadequate education, inequitable taxation, etc. the immediate dynamics are factors acting as catalysts accelerating and intensifying the problems- political interference, corruption in the bureaucracy as well as in the political domain, economic hardship, unemployment, deteriorating security situation. Consolidate of the democratic process, people’s involvement in governance, political compromise and the involvement of an important third party-e.g. the UN-in the peace dialogue are some of the solution suggested. The second part focuses on the government issues. The analysis of public policy making in Nepal undertaken by Hiramani Ghimere reveals that there exists an extensive gap between the theoretical expression of the fundamental policy the objective included in the constitution and the actual implementation of those directives by the government. Scarce communication and cooperation between administrative and political intuition as well as between difference agencies is one of the main obstacles to effective policy –making. Moreover, many constitutional arrangements are neglected while the civil society has proved ineffective in its public approach. “Policy evaporation” is the consequence of a decade of contradictory policies and planning. Chakramehar Vajracharya examines the potential role of effective governance in managing regional disparity in development. Decentralization is one of the major challenges the country face. Empowerment of the

local governance units and the implementation of integrated development programmes are fundamental stapes in that direction. At the same time strengthening and supporting institutions like the Commission of Investigation of Abuse of Authority and the Office of the Auditor General can promote accountable governance. Bihari Krishna Shrestha analyzes another dimension of effective governance, i.e. its conflict resolution capacity. Spatial, economic and social tension intensified creating the condition for the outbreak of the Maoist insurgency. The author explains how two development programmes proved successful not withstanding the alleged adverse environment in which they took place. The *Community Frest Programme* and the *Small Farmer Cooperative Limited* have shown that only all-embracing and inclusive projects can succeed in fragmented societies. Donors' activities are critically analyzed and blamed for lack of transparicy, absence of a people-oriented approach and inconsistent long-term perspective. Finally, Raghab D. Pant's essay defines the three major political parties (NC, UML and NC-D) unreliable actors because of wrong economic policies they have implemented during their tenure of office. The core issues seem to be the role of the National Planning Commission. The author, in fact, questions the efficacy, the usefullnaces and the future of this controversial institution entrusted with the task of designing the economy strategy of the country.

Bhattarai (2003) in article mentioned that Nepal, a small and poor country sandwiched between two super state of India and China, is for some thime in constant focus of the international media. Great powers ranging from the United States, the European Union and neighboring India and China are seen expressing serious concerns at the developments inside this so far generally neglected country. What is the reason? At a time when people thought the era of communist revolution was over after the collapse of

the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, a powerful Marxist-Maoist movement has broken out since 1996 in this tiny Himalayan country. A small rebellion thought to have been initiated by a radical faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), christened as CPN (Maoist), has now engulfed the whole country and serious strategic observer are predicting that the rebellion might usher in the first revolution state of the twenty-first century. What is the objective and subjective basis of this epochal upheaval?" this monograph- the doctoral thesis written in the mid 1980s by one of the leading figures and ideologue of the Maoist movement in Nepal, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai- "provides for a historic-materialist perspective and substantiates with the load of statistical data why the country of Nepal caught in the quagmire of the underdevelopment generated by the interplay of a set of endogenous and exogenous factors, needs a revolutionary rupture from the past if it is to traverse the course of rapid progress and development in the twenty-first century." The "foreword" to the volume has been written by Comrade Parchanda, Chairman of CPN (Maoist) and Supreme Commander of the movement. He highlights the significance of the book which according to him represents first and complete Marxist interpretation of the Nepalese history and economy, accompanied by a wide-ranging survey of Marxist theory of development/ underdevelopment and spatial articulation.

Huftun, Raeper and Wepton (1999) account of the political and ideological developments that occurred in Nepal since the 1950s. This monograph does not directly analyze the Maoist conflict, but it provides a Gandhi's overview of the political conditions, opportunities and shortcomings created by the 1990s democratic movement in Nepal. Some of the causes of the eruption of the violent conflict are located in the inconsistencies rooted in the political set-up originated from compromise of the main

actors involved in the 1990 “revolution”, i.e. two highly divided and antagonistic political parties and a yielding monarchy. The new democratic system has been unable to deliver good governance to Nepalese and the reason can be found in some specific constraints and structural definition of political arena. Personalization of politics was the immediate result of highly hierarchical political parties, whose political performance was prevented by the burdensome legacy of the past (e.g. the UML government, but also the Nepali Congress executives). At the same time the constitutional framework that was laid after 1990 proved highly divisive and inconsistent with most of the socio-economic and political priorities that emerged as a result of the political liberalization brought about by democracy after more than two centuries of autocracy. Such a frail political architecture further deteriorated because of the strong influence of the foreign power. In particular India acted as a disruptive force in the country while China has considered Nepal as one “of the theatres of contention with rival India.

Gordon (2005) has explored his views on article Evaluating Integrated Nepal's “Security” and “Development” Policy: Development, Democracy and Counterinsurgency that the relation between development, democracy and security policies in the context of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. In the first part of the article, the author analyzes the causes leading to conflict and the government's counterinsurgency measures. It is argued that, although poverty is often identified as the main factor generating support for the Maoists, the conflict is “the product of a complicated convergence of regional, ethnic, and economic inequalities and deprivations”. These factors have been then reinforced by the consequences of “overpopulation, environmental damage, systematic corruption, political instability, social inequality and exclusion, uneven development, extreme poverty, and human rights abuses”. Elite politics and greed for power have further

escalated the conflict and initiated a power struggle between political parties and the monarchy. King Gyanendra has profited from the political vacuum created by intra-party and inter-party quarrels and has assumed direct powers first in October 2002 and then in February 2005. According to the author, the existing constitutional framework cannot lead to a genuine process of democratic reform. Only “general acceptance of limitations on the role of the monarchy and of the need to change the constitution” would make the resumption of peace negotiation and the start of state reform possible. Nevertheless, the erosion of accountability practice has been a landmark of the post-February 1 period. The media is under the tight control of the army whereas the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has not been put in the condition to work efficiently and independently.

He further said that government’s response to the Maoist insurgency has been discontinuous. The police was tasked to quell the insurgency in its initial stage. The RNA was only mobilized in November 2001. However, its coordination with the paramilitary crops- i.e. the Armed Police Force (APF)- has been inadequate and has produced tensions within the security forces. Therefore in 2003 the government has created the “unified command” of all security force (RNA, APF and police). Despite this effort, the security strategy is still deficient. The nature of the terrain, weather condition and the lack of efficient transport infrastructures have provide the security force to guarantee a 24-hour presence in many area of the country. This situation has induced the government to create civilian militias at the village level, a move that has been condemned by many donors and human rights organizations. The “Integrated Security and Development Program” (ISDP) is defined as “the centerpiece of the government’s security strategy”. It involves the integration of the army in the domestic development agenda. The program was started in

Gorkha district in 2001. According to the author, the ISDP is a response of the government to claims of increasing militarization of the country and is intended to “win the heart and minds” of the local population and re-gain popular support. The programme is also “a mechanism to undercut the governances that have enabled the Maoists to recruit members” however; the government had to discontinue the ISDP following severe criticism from international donors and NGOs regarding the lack of funds for the development activities. After the collapse of peace talks in 2001, the government resumed the programme but only “as a face-saving measure”. Despite some limited results, the author concludes that the ISDP cannot be considered the appropriate response to the insurgency and its underlying causes. This is because the programme was conceived and implemented with the clear political purpose of appeasing the donor community and “obscure[ing] the domination of the security agenda over any reform agenda”.

Kumar (2005) in his article on Impact of Security and Further: The Case of Nepal argues that to understand Nepal’s conflict and security requires an understanding of the political structure of the state. Moreover, social exclusion and the centralised control of state power by elites have exacerbated conflicts, particularly in underdeveloped regions of the world. The article illustrates two of the most noticeable trends for the future of security, stability and status of the Nepali state. The first is that the Maoists have discredited the state’s exclusive authority over the use of force and delegitimized its sovereign control of its territory. The second is that the growing sense of insecurity of the state led to the process of state militarization through the acquisition of a repressive capacity by legislative measures, such as the use of emergency powers, the anti-terrorist act and curfew. Integral to this trend is the state’s withdrawal of social welfare and

representation of the people. The paper concludes that effort in Nepal should focus on the need for judicial reform, since the extent of the conflict and how the military and the monarchy have responded has created wide and systematic human-rights abuses.

Gouverneur (2003) writing in his article on Au Nepali, la « Guerilla du Peuple.» des Nouveaux Maoist- Revolte de la faim dans l' Himalaya, the situation in the Maoist-affected areas of Nepal, the district of Rukum in particular. The journalist describes how the population lives *de facto* under two different regimes: the Maoist-controlled areas where 10 of 23 million of Nepalese live and the areas under the control of the government, mostly the district headquarters and the capital valley: one country two regimes, like China and Taiwan. The power elites are not really concerned: to them Nepal is Kathmandu and its valley. Although the capital is not under immediate threat, the situation is worsening day by day. The rebels are attacking shopkeepers and trekking agencies. In fact, the author argues that the city is not the fortress in many seem: the seizure of two main roads, of the airport and of a gasoline deposit would be enough to force the capitulation of the city and consequently, of the country. When dealing with some possible solution to the bloodshed, the author suggests that the political shift of the UML towards the centre (it is defined a neo-liberal party) has opened the left of the political spectrum to the Maoists.

Kumar (2003) article on The Consequences of the Militarizes Conflict and the Cost of Violence in Nepal deals about the assesses the economic cost of the ongoing violent conflict in Nepal and its consequences. The process of militarization initiated since the conflict escalated in 2001 proved extremely detrimental to the country's already bleak development. Resources have been drained by the military budget from other more promising sectors such as education and economic development as a whole. The anti-

terrorist legislation limited some of the liberties enshrined in the 1990 Constitution and the country is undergoing great distress in every economic and social sector. In addition, the army has become increasingly assertive and influential in decision-making. In measuring the actual cost of violence, the author considers both direct and indirect costs, with the former intended as the actual damage and physical loss produced by the conflict and latter as the cost in terms of loss of production, investment and income. Among the direct costs we find direct government security expenses, Maoists military expenses, loss in terms of infrastructures, extortion and bank robberies by the Maoists. The indirect costs cover the business loss due to the Maoists' activities and strikes. There we can also find costs due to reduced earnings due to the decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), reduced flow of tourism and cost owing to displacement of people all through the country. The overall figure (still very tentative and hardly complete) is close to 220 billion Nepalese Rupees of total costs due to the conflict. Of course, the human loss cannot be quantified exactly.

Padma Khatiwada (2003) article on the title of Role of International Community for Peace Initiation in Nepal, analyses the role of international donors in the peace building process in Nepal. The paper starts with the assessment of the performance of respective governments and then it moves on to the analysis of the contribution of international agencies and NGOs. The attitude of governments varies from country to country. While India is worried about any consequence that the Maoist insurgency could have on the regional balance of power, the United States regarded the conflict as a struggle between a legitimate government and terrorists. The EU took keen interest in conflict analysis and prevention efforts in order to make an effective assessment of the causes that have triggered civil strife. Norway, Germany and Switzerland are states that

have put Nepal in their “priority countries list” so that their involvement in the Himalayan kingdom is conspicuous both at the political and at the development cooperation levels. As for international agencies (UN, ICRC, Amnesty international and some regional human rights organizations) and INGOS, their performance has been effective in alleviating some of the problems related to the conflict. In conclusion, the international community as a whole has been effective “in mitigating the internal armed conflict in Nepal”. A greater commitment of the international community is needed, according to the author, as a pressure factor for effective peace.

Thapa (2003) entitled *Impact of Armed Conflict on Women in Nepal* in INSEC Quarterly Human Rights Journal has clearly underlined the current condition of Nepalese women who “are categorized as second-class citizens and deprived from [economic, social and educational] development”. What is more, the conflict has particularly targeted and affected them, violating their right to life and their freedom, besides making miserable their existence. During the conflict, the common and its impact on women are the following: use of women in the war (it is reported that approximately one third of the guerrilla is constituted of women), or as human shields, rape and sexual harassment, migration and displacement, increasing responsibility for providing food, deprivation of school education, traumas and other mental disturbances, killing, abduction and disappearances. The main recommendations include: conflict analysis from women’s perspective; appointment of women negotiator or facilitator during the peace talks; involvement of women in both peace and conflict transformation processes; “Forgive but not forget” during the peace process; protection of widows; and rehabilitation of traumatized subjects.

Kumar (2003) entitled on The Necessity of Choice: Demobilization, Demilitarization and Democratization in Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies

analysis the framework of a negotiated settlement, the integration of the Maoist People's Army in RNA leading to the creation of a National Army has been seen as the only valid response to the cooption of those who have been fighting each other for more than 8 years. This article offers an alternative remedy. Instead of promoting the integration of the armed forces and thus the quantitative extension of the military force of Nepal, the author puts forward a three-stage solution: demobilization, demilitarization and democratization. Interestingly, this approach avoids the cumbersome disadvantages of integration; first, demobilization does not involve a further drain of resources, both human and economic, in the socio-economic context of a poor country such as Nepal. Rather, it promotes the reintegration of combatants into normal life. In addition, a reduced and more qualified army would enhance the sense of attachment of national issues by the armed forces on both sides, beside allowing the country to benefit from the peace dividends arising from a less burdensome military budget. The integration of armed forces that have been fighting each other for years is far from an easy task while demobilization and consequently partial demilitarization involve a sort of passive attitude, certainly less costly and more practical. The attainment of this process of restoration of a peaceful order should go along with the promotion of a fresh and forward-looking political leadership. Indeed, "the Maoist insurgency has brutally exposed the failure of governance in Nepal" whereas the current leadership has lost all popular support after years of murky and corrupt politics that has virtually paralyzed the entire political system. Relying on military power, as both conflicting. They will rather have to address the root causes of the conflict and uphold "civil virtue".

Gill (2002) entitled on The People's War of Nepal: Not Terrorism but Desperation, Asian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Solidarity express their views the "terrorist" argument is ineffective if the long-term goal of the government is the establishment of a peaceful environment and sustainable economic development of Nepal. Poverty and discrimination are the root cause of the conflict and, even if monarchical and parliamentary legitimacy is a matter of political concern, it is "doubtful that anyone would be willing to go to war unless there was such a large degree of class and caste discrimination in Nepal. According to Gill, very little analysis of the reasons that led people to embrace violence against the governmental establishment has been done. The political leadership failed to achieve a more egalitarian society and introduce far-reaching economic reforms. Poverty and discrimination have not been addressed leaving dissatisfied the majority of the population and fuelling if not increasing inequality. Particular emphasis is put on the "Dalit issue". The Dalits are the low caste "untouchables" who have no access to education, commodities and public services. Any chance of social uplift is denied, condemning them to be a *de facto* apartheid. Government and international donors share a part of responsibility for the current situation. They continue to ignore the caste system "increasing the prospects of war and violence as current inequalities are only entrenched by such nearsighted efforts". The author concludes by recommending a caste analysis of Nepal's society to ensure an effecting to the crisis.


Bruce Van Voorhis (2001) entitled the article on Nepal: Government Fights War with Wrong Weapons discusses the governmental strategy for tackling the Maoist insurgency. The government of Nepal has managed to "sell" abroad the image of the Maoists as a terrorist group and has been able to gain financial support from some foreign

governments e.g. the US, the UK and Belgium which have provided Nepal with powerful arms to fight the “terrorists”. The author argues that the government should respond to the insurgents’ challenge by addressing the underlying causes that fuelled the armed conflict. The declaration of the state of emergency is regarded as a further misuse of enforcement measures. Even if the government is militarily successful against the Maoists, the issue that triggered the revolt will remain unaddressed. The real problem is that “Nepal, like many Asian countries, has only established a pseudo democracy where election are held but the outcome is determined by intimidation and bribery with the goal of politicians being to serve their own interests once they are elected rather than those of the people”.

Theoretical Framework

Based on the literature review, the conclusion about the theoretical drive for the study has been formulated to guide the study in principle. Figure 2.4 represents the central and schematic illustration of the theoretical framework of the study. The philosophical underpinning of the reform in existing feudal society was the Marxism and Leninism. The central aspect of the theoretical background of formation and mobilization of the people’s liberation army for the socio political transformation was the Maoism. The contemporary research studies have demonstrated that the reform process of the society was found guided by the developmental and socio political aspects. The socio-political drive was based on the structural and functional perspectives of the society where as development aspects were guided by human needs, the motivational aspects and conflict theories that applied to socio political transformation.

Figure 3.4: Theoretical Framework of the Study



The practice of sociopolitical transformation included the power struggle, federal restructuration of the state, defacto and dejure governance, establishment and practice of people's court, building up of social and developmental institutions and ultimately the practice of commune. The people's liberation army was the key and central phenomena to be around the all transformation practices during the people's war. The people's liberation army involved in all the levels and in all areas to maintain, and the institutional functional during the war.

Power struggles were among the kingship, parliamentary parties and CPN (Maoist) (tri-polar) during the initial phase of people's war. Kingship was not found in favor of the first people's movement for changes of multiparty system. Palace wanted to

restore its' power that was before the first people's movement through the increased conflict of Maoist party with parliamentary parties. Maoist also emerged as a powerful parties and made strategy to creat confrontation between parliamentary parties with king. From the very beginning, power sharing issues were raised as central phenomena among the Ranas, King and Nepali Congress since the Dehli agreement. It reflected differently during the time of people's war. The Maoists continued war with the government through guerilla war fare techniques. The movement was in the direction of tri polar to bipolar power centralization that was ended with the twelve points understanding between parliamentary parties and Maoist in New Delhi.

Federal structure formed during the war, demanded the transformation of centralized government in line with self determination ideology of Lenin and commitment of the Maoists from the start of the People's War was ensured. After forming its own government in rural area and developing power for a decisive attack on central level at any time, the Maoist party declared its' concept on autonomous states and their limitations in federal states. In 2001, the party prepared framework of nine autonomous states of federal Nepal which were divided on the basis of nationality and geopgraphical region. The autonomous states developed by the Maoists at that time were; Kirat, Magrat, Tamsaling, Tamuwan, Newa , Madhes,, Tharuwan , Bheri- Karnali and Seti Mahakali . Among them first seven were based on nationality whereas the remaining two were based on geographical region.

As a result of people's war, the state owned governance became defunct and existence of parallel governance of people's liberation army ultimately resulted dejure and defacto governance in the region. The exercise of 'new democratic state' was started after the fourth national extended meeting of CPN (Maoist) held in August 1998 that

forwarded the concept of base area. The objectives of the base areas were to prepare the base for the new democratic state by displacing the every presence of old state. Maoist came into the conclusion of its succession on developing its base areas in Nepal within three years of People's War and focused its every effort on that . it was necessary to develop a new process and new system to fulfill the absence after ending the presence of existing government .

Maoist controlled areas where 10-23 million of Nepalese live and the areas under the control of the government. Population lives defacto under two different regimes. Mostly the district headquarters and the capital valley; one country two regimes like China and Taiwan (Tilouine,2013).

When the 'old state' was driven-out, a vacuum was created, and the Maoists started to fill it up by new 'people's power' forming ward committee and village committees on their own. As an initiation of new state, people's district committee (later it was called people's district government) was declared first time in Rukum district in November 2000. Since of these periods Maoists have started working on the establishment of parallel state –like structure in areas under their control and launched many educational, development and economic programmers at the grass roots levels. NGOs /INGOs suspended their activities and small police stations were closed. It clearly showed that two governing powers come into exiastence in Nepal. After the decleration of the first district government, the Maoist party continued to form other district government in its pocket area . The representatives were selected through the election. Election for the village committees was being held when this scribe was in Rolpa district in 2001.

The Maoist district governments formed militia teams for the security of local governance, people's court to look after affairs related to justice and gave priority to the construction and development works at the local levels. The people's government requested the public to abide by the 'new state' by disobeying the old state and not paying any taxes and bills. The peoples' government promoted and encouraged various small and local industries in its planning and started to exercise as a complete state.

Their people's government at the village and district levels was active in reforming the economy by promoting the collectivization of labour in transforming the feudal culture and eradicating 'superstitions'.

Formation of local level government went on at the period of ceasefire and peace talks between August and November 2001 .Though the establishment declared emergency and mobilized the RNA from November, the process of formation of Maoist's district governments and declined of old state's bodies did not stop . The Maoists had declared district governments in around 90 percent of districts during the people's war.

An extensive national level assembly of the representatives o local governments, front leaders and representatives of Maoist Party was organized in September 2001 in Rolpa district with the aim of including peoples' state into one whole structure that were developed in various forms, parts and levels within Nepal. The Assembly fromed United People's Revolutionary Council (in brief people's council) as the governing body of united revolutionary fronts which was responsible for the conduction of central government. The Assembly also resolved 75- point draft as the minimum common policy and programme, and legislation of people's council. This assembly also formed central committee of peoples's council. This assembly also formed central committee of people's Council including the representatives of Maoist, PLA, various nationalities and

autonomous regional states and individuals. It also formed various departments under that Council.

Judiciary is an inevitable part of a government. The Maoist party, which exercised alternative governance in the region formulated the people's court, started to give justice to the people on its own at different levels including the village and the district. People's courts became popular because of their prompt hearing and justice delivery.

The failure of de jure government system, was that the common masses got attracted towards the people's courts. These courts were established at all levels such as Area, Regional and district courts in Maoist strongholds. A dissatisfied litigant could appeal to the higher level court for fair justice. All types of cases were filed in the people's courts such as those related to land disputes, loans, false bonds, bribery, quarrel between husband and wife and so on forth. Ever since the active initiation of the people's court (till 2003), cases have declined by 78 percent of public courts especially in the Maoist-affected districts – the Mao land.

When people want to buy and sell the land, they had to pay two percent tax to the Jana Samiti (people's committee) for the registration of the land, and they receive the certificate from the people's court. Some bails were also given by the people's court based on the nature of the offense.

Different researcher's research why do people go to people's courts instead of public courts and administration in the Maoist epicenters? The answer was

1. public courts and administration involve a very lengthy process and a lot of hassles;
2. public courts and administration take a couple of days to reach; iii) poor people could not afford the lawyer's fee for the cases;

3. public courts and administration favor graft and power instead of offering fair and impartial judgement;
4. people's courts were easily found in the countryside and
5. people's courts ensure the service free of cost . The people's court was very popular among the common masses.

The people's liberation army also paid attention towards the establishment of social developmental institutions to strengthen the transformation process and development of the region. In the fourth plan, the UPF set up a Public Cooperative Fund (PCF) in their areas of influence. This fund had been established mainly for the peasants to borrow money when in need or at times of difficulties. It was established through the deposits made by the people, for example the fines decided by the people's courts, taxes on registration of land and forest, regular and occasional donations, party membership fee etc. The interest rate was very low, between 10 to 15 percent in comparison to 36 to 96 percent charged by the moneylenders, users, feudals and landlords, etc. It was cheaper than the interest rates of the public commercial banks.

The Martyrs' Memory Fund (MMF) which donates to the martyrs' families had been established through people's donations with the financial contributions from local teachers, civil servants, and returns from cultural programmes. The people power had also established the Agricultural Cooperative Fund (ACF) to promote agriculture. Besides, the Maoists were involved in development infrastructure at local levels .

Onesto one of the foreign writer wrote " the masses, party members, and people's power committees and people's guerillas had built 510 small martyr platforms under trees, 65 bigger monuments of martyrs, 174 wooden bridges, 135 small and big roads, 75 wells and water taps, 115 schools and public toilets, and 15 play grounds . However, during the

State of Emergency (November 2001 to August 2002), the state security forces demolished almost all development infrastructure constructed by the Maoists.

According to party's fourth plan Maoist members were tried to improve the life standards of tailoring peasants by raising the slogan of "Land to the Tiller" as Nepal is an agriculture country where 85 percent of people depend upon traditional subsistence farming. Before the initiation of the People's war, the tillers would pay one-third of their harvested food grains to the landowners, although they should share only half of it legitimately. Instead of providing half of the harvested crop to the landowner in spite of their former slogan that land be owned by the tillers, giving away one-third of the crop to the landowner did not coincide with Maoist politico-ideology. But, some tillers were providing half of the crop to their respective landowners secretly against the Maoist's policy fearing the possible outcome if the Maoist did not succeed to capture the state power. On the other hand, the Maoists raided and seized land from landlords and distributed it to the landless peasants who then paid taxes to them.

Commune system of social structure and its practice was another strategy of transformation adopted by the people's liberation army. It was started and established in those countries where communist movement succeeded in the past. Generally, commune is a way of living in a group and to contribute labour together. Commune was started in Nepal after the initiation of the embryo of communist state or alternative state. But, for that it was necessary to have a strong mass base of the people who followed Maoist ideology and had readiness to accept commune system. Commune was formed in the mid-western region by the family members of the Maoists who were killed by government.

Various departments were formed within these commune for management; management department people's mobilization department, mess department and agriculture and livestock department, economic department, health and sanitation department etc.

Especially commune were formed in Nepal was started in 1999. The mass genocide of the 12 persons, the participants in a mirrgae ceremony at Jajrkot's Daha VDC in November 1998 by the police led the helpless family member of those killed to from commune in March 1999. Second commune was organized in Jelbang of Rolpa district on 2001. 150 members of 25 families were included in this commune during its formation.

Transformation of the feudal society towards people's democratic society mainly focused on Institutional transformation, decentralization, right to identity and self-determination, empowerment and inclusiveness of women and other deprived people, which were the most pressing needs to be addressed in order to produce a positive change in Nepal. The transformation was towards the reduction of gap between have and have nots, rural and urban, consciousness of the people and rise of their awareness. The hidden contradiction was aimed to lift up front of the society. The approach was geared up through active participation of all categories of people in all the areas of intervention backed up by people's liberation army.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research has been carried out in academic arena to find out logical answers of certain problems and it demands systematic process. The entire process should be based on the philosophies, principles and mechanisms of the research, through which we can solve the problems or search the answers the questions. All these process are collectively known as a research methodology .This chapter should describe the research methods used to collect the qualitative and quantitative data required for the purposed study. The study has adopted the general political science research approach or methods .The chapter should also discuss for the rational for the selection of the study area, research design, nature and sources of the data, universe and sampling , data collection techniques, interview schedule, interview with key informant, participant observation, reality and validity of the data, operational definition and measurement of selected concepts or variables, data processing and analysis and limitation of the study.

The researcher requires gathering relevant data from the specified sources to analyze the facts and arrive at a more complete conclusion. For this purpose, the instruments used to collect the data including methods to maintain their trustworthiness are also described here. It includes the methods used to determine the validity and reliability of data collection and analysis. Basically, this chapter highlights the implementation process of research methodology, which generates primary as well as secondary data. In addition, it also highlights process of analysis to determine the

conclusion and findings of the study. The chapter concludes with the limitations of the study and ethical considerations.

Philosophy of the Research Study

The entire process of research is based on the research philosophies, principles and mechanisms of research. Researcher attempts to solve problems or searchers answers of the questions based on research philosophies. Research philosophy guides the research journey by helping the researcher to adopt pertinent research methods and accomplish the study successfully (Dooley, 2007). Research philosophy is concerned with the nature of reality (ontology), the way of knowing the reality (epistemology) and the method through which the reality could be known (Creswell, 2009). Research, in common parlance, refers to search for knowledge. One can also define research as a scientific and systematic search for pertinent information on a specific topic. In fact, research is an art of scientific investigation (Kothari, 2004). Research is an organized investigation, exploration and study of particular problem to find out its truth reality. It is a systematic, controlled, empirical and critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the presumed relations among natural phenomena (Kerlinger, 2009). Research is procedure by which we attempt to find systematically, and with the support of demonstrable facts, the answer to a questions or the resolutions of a problem (Leedy, 1989). The word research can thus be legitimately applied to very many contexts, and can be used to refer to both a specialized pursuit of knowledge and to much more general, everyday problem-solving situation (Pant, 2009). Doing research is challenging and painstaking job. It needs great efforts to carry out systematic and planned activities relating to investigation, evaluation and reaffirm the results of previous works. A research needs to be well planned and well

designed before doing it .It has been noted that some writers use the term methodology and method interchangeably (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). They suggest that methodology refers to the overall approach taken, as to the theoretical basis from which data is collected and analyzed (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). The research philosophy is broad framework, which comprises perception, belief and understanding of several theories and practices that are used to carry out by a research. It can be characterized by a precise procedure. It involves various steps through which a research creates a relationship between the research objectives and questions.

The primary concern of this is to investigate the contribution and political transformation of people's liberation army. This research focuses on how People's Liberation Army transformed in the mainstream politics and society from feudal structure to people's democratic society. In this research, researcher used qualitative dominant quantitative research design. The survey questionnaires, Interviews and observations and secondary sources were used to collect the data and information. The secondary data were collected directly from books, journals, and websites. However, it can be kept in mind that any exact method is not the end (Creswell, 2009).

Research philosophy can be explained under research paradigm. The researcher believes that we interpret and discuss the realities by filtering them on the basis of experience of past event. But a researcher should examine at the event himself/ herself looking through the eyes of third person while applying a set of tools. As a researcher, in this research, it was need to recognize that we are part of the social worlds and we are studying as researchers with our own interpretative processes and authoritative position that need to be taken into account (Dangal, 2010). For this purpose, the researcher has developed a model as the study of the nature and extent of knowledge and truth on the

effective management of the study as it is the researcher's epistemological concern. The researcher has intended to follow questionnaire in-depth interview, and checklist of respondent approach. The analysis was based on Qualitative dominant quantitative techniques. The entire process of the study was guided by a set of beliefs and feeling of research participants taking primary respondents as PLAs.

Ontology

Ontology of the research is directly related to the matter to find the reality in the world. Ontology may be of single reality or multiple realities. It is the philosophical study of the nature of reality, it is a science of being, and it deals with the nature of reality (Sarantakos, 2005). A researcher needs to develop the ontology before starting research process.

Ontology should be developed because of the following reasons: to share common understanding of the structure of information among people or software agents, to enable the reuse of domain (scope) knowledge, to make domain assumptions explicit, to separate domain knowledge from the operational knowledge and to analyze domain knowledge (Noy & Guinness, 2001). The ontological assumption of this research is the multiple realities existing in the societies. The social phenomena are considered as the realities that are independent and observable while studying.

Epistemology

Epistemology covers the study of the grounds, nature and origin of knowledge and the limits of human understanding. It is the theoretical assumption about how knowledge is derived. It deals with issues such as how knowledge should be tested and validated in reality.

Epistemology is the investigation into the ground and nature of knowledge itself. The study of epistemology focuses on our means for acquiring knowledge and how we can differentiate between truth and falsehood (Cline, 2011). The epistemological assumption of this research is subjective and objective. As this qualitative and quantitative research data and information are collected and analyzed the data and information. The descriptions and exploration approaches were used to assess the findings. Although it is post-positivism study, it investigated the people and things by direct observation whenever it is needed. The research highlighted how the PLA transformed the society and mainstreamed politics. How the old beliefs changed in new perspectives. It is generalized as theoretical principles.

Methods of the Research Study

Research methods are the methods by which researchers conduct research into subject or topics. Research methods aim at finding solutions to research problems and it is a particular way of solving a specific problem. It involves the forms of data collection, analysis, and interpretation that researchers propose for their studies. As a nature of my study, I have used both qualitative and quantitative data based methods which are called mixed-methods theory.

Mixed Methods

Generally mixed methods means that, uses of both quantitative and qualitative data to answer a particular question or set of questions. This combination of methods "involve (s) the collection, analysis, and integration of quantitative and qualitative data in a single or multiphase study" (Hanson, Plano Clark, Petska, & Creswell, 2005). The term "Multimethods" refers to the mixing of methods by combining two or more qualitative

methods in a single research study (such as in-depth inter-viewing and participant observation) or by using two or more quantitative methods (such as survey and experimental in a single research study).

Historically, the idea using a theoretical lens in mixed methods research was mentioned by Greene and Caracelli in 1997 (Nagy & Biber, 2010). They identified the use of a transformative design as a distinct form of mixed research. This design gave primacy to value-based, action-oriented research, such as in participatory action research and empowerment approaches. In this design, they suggest mixing the value commitments of different traditions (e.g. bias-free from quantitative and bias-laden from qualitative), the use of diverse methods, and a focus on action solutions. The implementation of these ideas in the practice of mixed methods has been carried forward by other authors.

The way of getting knowledge in mixed methods research is diverse and I have applied it in this research. As writing in the field of mixed methods research (MMR) has become more sophisticated, several authors have labored to identify and define exactly what mixed methods research? As for the definition of MMR, Johnson et al.(2007), presented 19 alternative meanings from the leaders in the field. While these meanings had varying levels of specificity, the authors of this analysis settled upon the following “composite” definition- Mixed methods research is the type of research in which researchers combine elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration. (Johnson et al., 2007, p123).

Mixed methods research developed with the earliest social research projects among these are studies of poverty within families conducted in the 1800s in Europe by researchers such as Frederic Le Play (1855), Charles Booth (1892-1897), and Bohm Rowtree (1901). Their research practices include the incorporation of quantitative and qualitative techniques including the use of demographic analysis, participant survey and observations and social mapping techniques (Biber & Nagy, 2010).


The Combination of methods "involve(s) the collection, analysis and integration of quantitative and qualitative data in a single or multiple study" (Hanson, Creswell, Clark, Pettko, and Creswell, 2005). The term "Multimethods" refers to the mixing of methods by combining two or more quantitative methods in a single research study (such as in-depth interviewing and participants observation) or by using two or more quantitative methods (such as survey and experiment) (Biber & Nagy, 2010). Thus it is more than simply collecting and analyzing both kinds of data; it also involves the use of both approaches in tandem, so that the overall strength of a study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).

MMR refers to simply qualitative (QUAL) and quantitative (QUAN) methods to cancel out respective weakness. Eclectic, the root word of eclecticism, means "choosing what appears to be the best from diverse sources, systems, or styles. Methodological eclecticism involves selecting and then synergistically integrating the most appropriate techniques from a myriad of QUAL, QUAN, and mixed methods in order to more thoroughly investigate a phenomenon of interest. I am employing methodological eclecticism is a connoisseur of methods who knowledgeably select the best techniques available to answer research questions that frequently evolve during the course of an investigation (Eisner, 1979, p.11).

A researcher's worldview his or her standpoint and approach to research.

According to Giddings the importance of knowing one's standpoint in the research process, especially for novice mixed methods researchers. This is important, as one might unconsciously follow the dominant paradigm of his or her discipline without a critical dogmatic view. He further analyzed the relationship of theoretical framework to research, method, and data collection in mixed method as shows figure 3.1 below.

Fig: 3.1 Relationship of theoretical framework with research method



Source: Nagy & Biber (2010), Mixed Methods Research, Merging Theory with Practice.

Justification of the Mixed Method


Greene, Caracelli and Grahm (1989) list the specific reasons that researchers should consider using mixed methods. The first, triangulation, seems to be the most compulsory cited reason that mixed methods are incorporated in to research. Triangulation-or, more specifically, methods triangulation in the context of methods alone-refers to the use of more than one method while studying the same research question inorder to "examine the same dimension of research problem" (Jick, 1979).

The second, reason to consider incorporating a mixed methods design is complementarity. Complementarity allows the researcher to gain a fuller understanding of the research problem and / or to clarify a given research result. Third reason is that, mixed methods assist the researcher's total understanding of the research problem. Fourth reason is that using of mixed method is initiation; a study's findings may raise or contradictions that will require clarification, thus initiating a new study. The desired effect of the new insights to existing theories on the phenomenon is under examination (Green, 1989).

Last and fifth reason is that doing mixed methods reaserach; expansion. Expansion is intended to "extend the breadth and range of the inquiry (Green, 1989). Some of the scholar simplified the mixed methods theory as a "cart before the horse".

Methodology (theory) is isolated from the rest of the research model and appears as the last in the design sequence. It is not clear how theory is linked to a specific methods design, but it appears as if the mixed method model selected drives the type of theory chosen. In their review of trends and issues in mixed methods evaluation, Miller and Fredericks (2006) suggested that this misplacement of theory in a mixed methods projects is a "problem of logic" that often plagues the choice of mixed methods approaches, especially in evaluation. They noted:


Fig:3. 2 Methods –centric approach to mixed methods research



Source: Nagy's. & Biber (2010), Mixed Methods Research, Merging Theory with Practice.

Qualitative driven research might want to use mixed methods. I advocate this iterative approach to mixed methods design given that the nature of a qualitative approach to research is often subject change as the research project proceeds and alters its course in response to new research findings, which in turn may prompt new research questions along the way (Nagy, Biber, 2010). In mixed methods research, there are two types of mixed methods design- parallel mixed methods design and sequential mixed method design. As my research topic, objectives and research question, I have used sequential mixed method design. This quan sequential exploratory design connctet to quantitative data results and assist in the interpretation of qualitative findings. The following figure shows the relationship among the research question, mixed methods research design and qual-quant and findings.

Figure 3.3



Followed by
Findings


Source: Nagy's. & Biber (2010), Mixed Methods Research, Merging Theory with Practice.

Research Design

Research designs illustrate plans and procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2009). My proposed study is based on qualitative and quantitative research design in which the qualitative approach is dominating over the quantitative. The researcher has chosen the social constructivists world view and will comprise observation, brain storming, focused group discussion, open-ended questions. (Crotty, 1998, cited by Creswell) Data collection tools are adopted to find out the contribution and transformation process of people's liberation army along with fostering and hindering factors people's liberation army.

Figure: 3.4 Mixed Methods Research Design

Paradigmatic Viewpoints



Ontology

Epistemology

Methodology

Stakeholder interest

Review of Literature

Research Problem

Economic Factors

Serendipity

Mixed Methods Design


Source: Nagy's. & Biber (2010), Mixed Methods Research, Merging Theory with Practice.

Use methodologies that hold up the importance of the studying the "lived experiences" of individuals (interpretative methodologies), those that privilege hypothesis testing and causality as the most important goals of social inquiry (positivist and post positivist methodologies), or methodologies that stress issues of power, control, and social justice (transformative and critical methodologies).

Methodologies that hold perspective is not inherently quantitative or qualitative in terms of its use of method. For example, those who practice more positivistic methodology -traditionally seen as quantitative –can use qualitative as well as

quantitative methods. In fact, qualitative and quantitative methods are carried out within a range of methodologies – (theoretical perspectives) . Those espousing feminist methodologies –traditionally viewed as qualitative researchers –can use quantitative methods, including surveys and experiments, in their research. The comprehensive perspective on mixed methods a trouble dualism between qualitative and quantitative methods when we remember that methods lie in the service of methodologies. The question- making process interacts in mixed-methods research is follows:

Figure: 3 Interaction between methods and data in formulating research questions.



Source: Nagy's. & Biber (2010), Mixed Methods Research: Integrating Theory with Practice.

Selection of the Research Site

Ex- PLA are scattered in the different parts of the country. But for the research purpose I considered three types of ex-PLAs namely the integrated in army personnel, voluntarily retired and the third failed in verification criteria by UNMIN. I have considered integrated PLAs in army camps. Voluntarily retired PLAs were taken from the diifernt

parts of the country. Mostly in this process, I chose previously established cantonment areas, and the place where they are involved in their business enterprises. I tracked unverified PLAs in Pyuthan, Rolpa, Sindhupalchowk, Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur districts. Further, I selected respondents from ex-PLA commanders, Nepal Army, party leaders, scholars, UNMIN representatives, and conflict management scholars for in-depth interviews.

Ethical Principles

All ethical principles are based on esteem for human beings and their experiences which reduce harmful research (Hosteler, 2005). As a researcher, I was careful on the ethical principles, the ethical principles that serves to keep the pride rights, wellbeing and safety of every respondent and that shows the behavior of high quality research are based on esteem for human beings and their experiences to reduce harmful research (Creswell, 2003, Hosteller, 2005, Stephen 2003, cited by Dangal, 2011).

This study's formal research protocol was agreed by Singhania University, School of Education and Social Science. An information sheet was given to respondents through the different interviews. They were given with an information sheet in either in English or Nepali and then request to make contact with researcher after reading and allow for the content of the information sheet.

Nature and Sources of Data

This study is based on primary and secondary sources of information. In order to fulfill the specific objectives of the study, the analysis is mainly based upon the primary data which is acquired from field survey by administering interview schedule interview with

key informant and observation. The secondary datas were collected from different published researches reports, different books, journals published by different publishers and various seminar reports consulted for the relevant information, different web sites, etc.

Data Collection Tools and Techniques

The following tools and techniques of the data collection from the study area were adopted. The open- end questions was developed for the interview schedule and with the help of that structured guidelines .The respondents were asked to give their responses regarding the questions supplied.

Interview with Key Informants

An informal interview with some key informants were conducted .The informal interview was mainly focused to get information on the ex PLA discourse. Most of data and information has been taken by key informants. In the questionnaires method it was most important. The key informants were ex- Muki Sena and ex- PLA commander, commissar, political leaders, intellectuals, journalists and social leaders.

Focus Group Discussion

Focus group discussion was organized in this research study to share the issues that have emerged during the in-depth interview to dig up reality. I had manged the group on the basis of gender equality.

Questionnaire Schedule

A questionnaire is a self –report data collection instrument that is filled by research participants (Dangal, 2010) and its preparation is one of the most challenging and

important parts in the research methodology. In fact, good questionnaires only can get the answer to the research questions taking all the important cautions carefully in mind,

1. A standard questionnaire was prepared that assist to conduct the attitude survey and help understand the perceptions of the respondents.
2. The medium was in Nepali. But to the respondents questions were asked after translating in their comfortable language.
3. The questions tried to comprise all the aspect and expected to be able to collect all possible answer in optimum level.

Data Presentation and Analysis

All the data was gathered by different tolls and then it was classified on Quantitative and Qualitative basis. The data was analyzed in the descriptive and statistical way. The researcher checked and analyzed through quantitative analysis, chart, bar diagram, interpretation and presentation. Where as qualitative data or information was analyzed in descriptive ways.

The Validity of Quantitative Data

The reason for combining the quantitative and qualitative approaches using multiple data collection strategies was to improve the validity of the study. This is in fact a form of triangulation that enhances the validity of one's study (Merriam, 1988).

The validity of this research was enhanced by the extensive and participatory nature of the investigations. Reigeluth and Frick (1999) emphasized the importance of construct validity, thoroughness, accuracy (internal validity), and external validity (the extent, to which results could be generalized).

It is assumed that PLA in the same stream have similar socio cultural background.

To further guarantee validity, the same instruments, persons and procedure were used for data collection in all groups. This measure was taken to ensure that the model produces the effect for which it was designed. The pre-test and piloting of the instrument provided the opportunity to check and revise of the instruments. Training sessions, briefings and debriefings were organized for the science teachers and research assistants who participated in the implementation and evaluation of the devised model.

Internal Validity

Internal validity refers to the extent to which the research findings are due to the mechanisms suggested (Cardwell, Clark and Meldrum, 2004).

For this study internal validity refers to the extent to which the findings of the research are due to the advantage the study of PLA has over social transformation. It is assumed that PLAs in the same group have similar academic background. To further guarantee validity, the same instruments, persons and procedure were used for data collection in all groups. The design of this study also enabled for the identification and isolation of intervening variables such as class, academic ability, and prior experience, whose presence would have altered the effect if unchecked. This was achieved by ensuring that classes selected were as homogenous as possible. Prior to evaluation, the research tools were subject to pre-test. This measure was taken to ensure that the model produces the effect for which it was designed.

Another measure to enhance the validity of the study was adopting the mixed methods approach which integrates the qualitative and quantitative methods. This integration enabled to investigate the effect of transformation of PLAs in the society through a model using different categories of participants as well as multiple tools and

strategies for data collection. Training sessions, briefings and debriefings were organized for the respondents and independent persons who participated in the implementation and evaluation of the tools. These measures were taken to ensure that the effect of the tools was not overshadowed by factor errors.

External Validity

External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a research can be generalized to other settings beyond that where the study was conducted. The external validity of this study was determined from two perspectives: population validity and ecological validity.

From the selected three categories of different background all the PLAs were considered as participants. The PLAs from respective categories were also taken for the study. It can be inferred that this study has population validity as such its findings can be generalized to the other liberation armies having similar conditions and circumstances.

Ecological validity is a measure of the extent to which the findings of a research can be interpreted to be true in settings different from the one in which it was conducted. This empirical study was conducted under normal political transition conditions. All lessons were conducted during normal time as the PLAs had scheduled. All PLAs in the sample area used in evaluating the effect of the transformation model were exposed to the same ecological conditions irrespective of whether they were in the experimental or control groups. It is expected that other liberation armies have similar ecological conditions as the sample camps. Therefore the findings can be generalized to all the PLA settlements as they have similar settings and conditions as those that were selected and used for this research.

The Reliability of the Findings

The reliability of the study was ensured through the use of multiple source of evidence, which leads to triangulation of data, the detailed, rich and thick descriptions of the researcher's own assumptions and position in the study, data collection, category derivation, decision making procedures and ultimate conclusions. These may lead the accuracy and credibility of the data. For the reliability and validity, designed instruments were tested and feed- backs were collected from experts providing proposal of research. The researcher reworked to modify the tools for further modification of research design.

The Trustworthiness of the Research Findings

It is significant that qualitative methods ensure the quality of the research findings. It is referred as trustworthiness of the research (Krefting, 1991). According to him, one way to control for inherent measurement problems and increase the validity of the performance measure is to standardize the procedure for collecting data. To obtain, analyze, and provide information for making a decision on the behavior of the PLAs, there must be a consistent procedure used across all instruments that result in accurate sound decisions. The tool designed for data collection provides the researcher with five steps to ensure a valid performance using a standardized procedure for data collection.

1. observing the data source;
2. recording objective and accurate data;
3. retrieving the performance using some form of record;
4. analyzing/scoring the observation by comparing the record from the data source to a specific criterion (criteria); and

5. evaluating the observed performance using the information from the analysis completed in step four.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that the criteria for trustworthiness include: credibility, applicability, dependability and confirmability, and are constructed parallel to the conventional criteria of internal and external validity, reliability and neutrality. Thus, rigor in research can also be based on Krefting's model comprising four aspects of trustworthiness relevant to both quantitative and qualitative studies, namely truth value, applicability, consistency and neutrality. Table 3.6 summarizes the comparative discussion of criteria by research approach.

Table 3.6

Comparison of Criteria by Research Approach adapted from Krefting, 1991

Criterion	Qualitative Approach	Quantitative Approach
Truth Value	Credibility	Internal Validity
Applicability	Transferability	External Validity
Consistency	Dependability	Reliability
Neutrality	Confirmability	Objectivity

The trustworthiness of this research was established through credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability and includes triangulation.

The Credibility of the Research Findings

Credibility in qualitative research is defined as the extent to which the data and data analysis are believable and trustworthy. In this research study, the credibility of the research findings was maintained through referential adequacy, a process whereby various documents, official records, pictures and transcripts of interviews and focus group discussions as well as field notes collected during the study. They were made

available for future reference and thus establish referential adequacy for this research project. Triangulation was used to improve the credibility of the study by comparing multiple sources of data used to assess the same variables. Prolonged engagement enhanced credibility by providing the researcher the opportunity to develop a trusting relationship with the research participants. Peer debriefing enhanced the credibility by soliciting additional data collection and analysis. Member checks also enhanced credibility of the findings by subjecting them to the additional interpretations and opinions of the study participants. Interpretations were reported back to the participants to see if these interpretations made sense to them. This process enhanced credibility and provided another opportunity to incorporate the teacher's perspective and experience into the analysis process.

The Transferability of the Findings

Research findings are transferable when they fit into contexts outside the study situation. Lincoln and Guba (1985) define transferability as the extent to which the research findings from one research study can be applied into other contexts or to other participants. In this study, the participants were PLAs whose management styles in armed movement were similar to other settings. They all face the same national socio political criteria for liberation movements. The extent to which the sample PLAs represented all armed people enrolled in PLAs was considerable.

The Dependability of the Findings

Dependability refers to whether the findings of the research would be consistent if the studies are repeated with the similar subjects in a similar context (Krefting, 1991). Seale (1999) maintains that dependability can be achieved through auditing, which consist of the researcher's documentation of data, methods and decision made during a thesis as well as its end products. In this research, replicability was confirmed when the saturation

point of the data had been reached. It can be said with the certain degree of certainty that if the same study was conducted several times, there would be a greater possibility that the same results would be achieved. Prolonged engagement also enhanced dependability.

The Confirmability of the Findings

Confirmability is the degree to which the research findings can be confirmed by another researcher (Krefting, 1991). De Vos (1998) asserts that confirmability refers to the degree to which the findings are a function solely of the informants and conditions of research and not of other biases, motivation and perspectives. In qualitative research the value of findings increases when the distance between the researcher and the informants decrease. In the context of this study, transcription of raw data, that is, questionnaires were used. The narratives, interviews, analysis of and integrated design framework based on the theoretical framework were given to the external, independent research specialist to determine whether the findings were in accordance with the raw data of the research.

Triangulation

One of the most important ways to improve the trustworthiness of the research findings is by triangulation (Tellis, 1997). In view of this, Fielding and Schreier (2001) distinguished three meaning to triangulation:

1. Triangulation as the mutual validation of results obtained on the basis of different methods (the validity model),
2. Triangulation as a means toward obtaining a larger, more complete picture of the phenomenon under study (the complementary model), and

3. Triangulation indicating a combination of methods which is necessary in order to gain any picture of the relevant phenomenon at all (the trigonometry model).

Multiple sources of data and data collection strategies were used to triangulate the findings of this study. Multiple sources of data included the science teachers, students, headteachers, and the researcher. The multiple data collection strategies used in this study included: observational evidence including field notes, plans, and other materials, interviews of the key informants, inventories completed by PLAs; and samples work and other achievements of student learning. This process of triangulation ensured that all patterns and trends were supported by multiple sources collected through multiple strategies enhancing the credibility of the findings.

During the interview process with the PLAs, the researcher asked the same set of questions, in the same order, using the same words to all interviewees. The structured interviews were convenient for triangulating different interviewees' answers to the same questions. The researcher used different types of interview questions for the PLAs, leaders, and the other stakeholders. Interviewing different individuals in this exploratory study was important because the data collected used different methods to show the same pattern. This process enhanced the credibility of the patterns that emerged and became a useful tool for this exploratory study.

Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Data

Skillfully integrating quantitative and qualitative data can greatly increase the richness of information by providing credible estimates of data as well as an explanation of the processes and interventions that yielded research outcomes. Although quantitative and qualitative evaluations can proceed in parallel with findings compared and combined

during analysis, the greatest value-added from using the two methods is realized through an iterative approach where preliminary results from one type of data collection are explicitly intended to inform the design of a future round of data collection.

Using both forms of data allows researchers to simultaneously generalize results from a sample to a population, as well as to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of interest. Using mixed methods in research and evaluation offers methodological and practical advantages. From the practical perspective, mixed methods research yield context rich data valued by the teacher and, at the same time, allow aggregating and summarizing data. High quality research, which command respect and attention from broad audiences, requires multiple methods (Wilson, Floden, & Ferrini-Mundy, 2002). Researchers can also test theoretical models and modify them based on participant feedback.

This research was designed to study the same phenomenon (triangulation), the elaboration of quantitative results with qualitative results (complementarity) and the using of qualitative findings to help inform the quantitative method (development). In this case focus group discussions and constructivist interviews provided a better understanding of the PLAs' perceptions of their experiences.

The Role of the Self

The researcher plays an important role in the production and interpretation of qualitative data and the identity, values and beliefs of the researcher can not be entirely removed from the research process. As a student of political science and author of text books, the researcher took a frame of reference that was based in political movements. The researcher spent more than 15 years in the conflict areas and having experience of taking

lectures in University in the relevant field. The researcher also played the role of journalists and human right activist in the past during conflict in the country. From this point of departure, the researcher planned a theoretical framework for the design and managed the development of tools from political perspectives, in order to accommodate the transformation of PLAs who were the participants of this study. In this frame of reference, the researcher's self played an important role in the analysis of the data.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has included the basic fundamentals of research methodology adopted on the study. All sampling strategies, data collection techniques, instruments, and techniques of data analysis and reduction were discussed in this chapter. The strategies for minimizing errors had also been elaborated along with the validity and reliability of the research. This inquiry employed an analytical framework for gaining insight into the way political transformation design use when designing PLAs settlement.

The next chapter presents the findings of the research in detail.

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN SOCIO-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

This chapter presents the existing status of the people's liberation army, its growth, people's war conflict resolution through peaceful integration and role of PLAs in socio-political transformation in Nepal. The inquiry covered demographic figures of the

localities and practices of people's war. This chapter has illustrated the result of the data produced from the field under demographic projection, status of the destruction made during war, consequences of insurgency, conflict resolution and peace processes, the functions of the PLAs and achievements of the people's war.

Management of the People's Liberation Army

Recruitment process of PLA was vital in people's war. The recruitment literature had two primary focal points. The first examined the motivation of individuals and why they opt to join rebellion. Maoists recruited young people, who were willing to fight for the abolishment of the feudal system, against poverty as well as against the discrimination and exclusion of marginalized groups. Many people joined in to the Maoist insurgency as there was a recruitment policy of "one house, one person" in the people's liberation army. Maoists enlisted both boys and girls as soldiers either voluntarily or forcibly as combatants, scouts, spies, porters, cooks and as part of cultural troops. State forces used them as informants, spies and cooks.

People from all different groups, ethnicity and gender participated in the armed conflict. Women too participated in large numbers including PLA. Some participated willingly and others forcefully recruited. They participated as militia, party cadres and supporters. Most of the participants were Dalit, Janjati, marginalized and disadvantaged groups. However, the dominance of a particular group differed with the geographical location. When the armed conflict started from Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot, there was a dominance of Kham Magar.

Objectives of People's War

People's war was began with the main aim of ending discriminatory legal provisions, participation of excluded in policy making, socio economic transformation with social justice and finally to complete people's revolution towards the shift of feudal society into capitalist society. The socio political transformation was the main objective of the people's war.

The respondents were asked to distinguish about their knowledge of people's war.

The table 4.2 shows the objectives of people's war rated by the respondents in the study.

Table 4.2


Objectives of People's War

Objectives	Respondents	Percentage
Ending discriminatory legal provisions	14	5
Participation of excluded in Policy Making	33	12
Political Transformation	67	24
Access in Government Structure	23	8
Socio economic transformation with social justice	65	23
All of the above	80	28
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, Majority of the participants 24% believe that the main aim of the people's war was for political transformation and 23% believed on socio economic transformation with social justice. However, 28% believed that the objectives of the people's war was for all the listed objected in the questionnaire.

Figure 4.1 shows that there is highest in frequency of believing all the listed objectives and second majority of people believed that the war was mainly for political transformation. Some people also responded socio economic transformation with social justice was one of the major objectives of the people's war.



On the other hand, the number of people ending discriminatory legal provision and access in government structure were rated low in comparison to others.

Reason for Joining in PLA

Most of the youths including female in major chunk involved in people's war. The various factors were in the ground to attract them in the war. The respondents responded various factors including political transformation, social transformation and financial transformation.

The table 4.2 shows the rating of respondents on social, political and financial transformations that they most believe on.

Table 4.2

Reason for Joining in PLAs

Reason	Respondents	Percentage
Political Transformation	104	37
Financial Transformation	70	25
Social Transformation	108	38
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that majority of respondents 38% believe on the social transformation of joining in the people's liberation army and 37% believed on political transformation.

Only 25% responded on financial transformation. The response demonstrated that the main reason of joining in PLA is socio political transformation in Nepalese society.

Environment in Favor of Exponential Growth of PLA

People from all different age groups, ethnicity and gender participated in the PLA. As reported by PLAs, women had encouraging participation (above 40%) in PLA. Some participated willingly and others with peer pressures recruited. Same ways people from Dalit, Janajati, Marginalized and disadvantaged groups have recruited in PLA large numbers. But the questions raised that why and how they participated in arms groups? Different researchers have been carried out research in these fields. Majority of the respondents rated that structural injustice and social exclusion of lower castes (Dalits), ethnic minorities and women, feudal system along with exploitation, exclusion and rural areas from development measures, limited access to public services, particularly in rural areas, enormous poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities for the youth compulsion factor to join the PLA. Respondents also pointed out that particular type of recruitment practice, ethnic mobilization, is associated with higher levels of violence and results show that, when rebels groups mobilize along ethnic lines, there is a high risk for intensified violence. Most of involvement in PLA were found from indigenous group. CPN (Maoist) armed struggle had highly intensified remote to urban areas in short period. Same way, government tried to control and measures the PLA by different strategies, such as operation Kilo Sierra II first and the "Terrorist and Destructive Activities (TADA) Acts had legally opened the door for extra judicial killing. It gave them to initiatives pushed the local population towards the many young people joining the PLA. But it failed to address the underlying causes of the conflict. On the contrary such

initiative pushed the local population towards the Maoists with many young peoples joining the rebels. Ex-wounded PLAs expressed their views that in operations (Romeo and Kilo Sera II) people were brutally tortured and inhumanly treated; girls and women were raped and sexually abused. Besides this police took away people's livestock and food from their home and gave nothing in return. The respondents further said that people's houses were looted; women's gold ornaments were seized along with others property was looted by police. As a result of the excessive use of force, there were gross human rights violations by the Police and they severely suppressed the innocent Nepali people on the pretext of controlling the Maoist's violent activities. Caused Youth and others' peoples motivated and recruited in PLA. Concerns over personal security rather than economic and social incentives, best explained participation. Taken together, this study indicates that there was analytical leverage to be reviewed by examining not only the individual's decision to participate, but also the rebel group's recruitment strategy, and that these rebel strategies were flexible and contingent on conflict dynamics. It shows that, not only one factor was not vital to PLA recruitment and participation reasons were various and some of them were forcefully recruited, inspired by the ideology, listening to stories of good times in Maoists movement.

Nepal's poverty, its pronounced hierarchical social order and its multiple forms of marginalization and exclusion clearly from the background if not to the movement's coming to life, then certainly at least to its initial attractiveness for many people. The diverse attempts of the Maoists at social reform were important incentives for the local population to turn to the movement. In the same vein, the Maoist movement seemed to be a young people's movement. With the very slow pace of development many young people had little hope of being incorporated into the labor market. Literacy rates had

increased over the preceeding decades. For growing number of young men and women engagement in the Maoist's PLA seemed an alternative, given the scarcity of governmental and industrial jobs.

The PLA leaders were seen to have addressed many burning issues. The leaders had repeatedly stated their commitment to reducing rural disparities and had denounced bonded labor, untouchability, and irregular housing. On several occasions, the PLAs have attacked caste inequalities as well as women's operation. Equal access to education and to health is particularly prominent objectives. Ethnic oppression and ethnicity –based disparities likewise have a prominent place in PLA mobilization. The leaders had endorsed many of the objectives formulated by ethnic organizations, being particularly supportive of the plan to establish eight ethnic autonomous regions of Nepalese territory. Furthermore, the PLA had adopted nationalist discourses, seeking to reduce the Indian influence on Nepal's economy, politics, and society.

There were variants on actual data of ex-PLA. It was also estimated that about 100,000 youths in the age group of 15-18 failed the high school examination every year were indirectly participated in armed movements. But PLA sources claimed its' combatants were as decribed in table 4.1.

Table 4.1

The Maoist Military Formation

A. People's Liberation Army (PLA)		
1.19 Battalions	19×750	=14250+10 Battalions (September, 2004)
2.07 Brigades	$\times 2250$	= 15750+02 Brigades (September, 2004)
3. 02 Divisions	02×6750	= 13500+01 Divisions (September, 2004)

B. People's Militia	= 10,0000
143500 +18750 = 162250	

Source: Maoist Information Bulletin, Vol.4, 2003

The Additional figures of 10 Battalions, 2 Brigades and 1 Division was disclosed after extended plenum of the Central Committee Meeting of the CPN (Maoist) in September 2004. The Number of personnel constituting the force structure was however; tentative that may vary according to recruit.

There were various arguments about the estimation of PLA numbers. One of militia expert and retired national army lieutenant general put their strength at 4,000 armed guerrillas, 5,000 militia who received guerrilla training and 20,000 armed militia. National Army has offered a similar estimate some 9500 guerrillas and 25000 militia. UNMIN-registered and verified PLA during the verification were 32,250. Finally UNMIN verified PLA were 19,602 of which male-15,756 (80.37 percent) and female-3846 (19.63 percent).

The CPN (Maoist) armed wings PLA ,started armed activities from the Hill districts (i.e. Gorkha, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Sindhuli, Jajarkot etc.) by attacking local police posts and cadres of political opponents. Aftermath of the Maoist's armed attacks to the security agency and the people; the government led by late Girija Prasad Koirala decided to mobilize the Nepal Police (NP) to control the armed, illegal and unconstitutional activities of PLA. The Nepal Police started 'Romeo' and 'Kilo-Sera II' operation in those districts to control the Maoist's and it's militant activities by following aggressive and coercive security Strategy. As a result of the excessive use of force, there were gross human rights violations by the Police and they severely suppressed the innocent Nepali people on the pretext of controlling the PLA's violent activities. But

Nepal Police became unsuccessful to control the PLA's activities despite the oppression of the people. Instead, the local people and opposition political parties heavily criticized the extra-judicial killings, arbitrarily arrest, torture and gross human rights violations. Consequently, the government and the Police became unpopular and the PLA got the support from the local people, to some extent, in the given context. In this way armed conflict emerged as one of the major challenge to the government in Nepal and the PLA succeeded in drawing attention of the opposition parties, media, civil society including international communities. The PLA also followed counter military strategy to restrain the government's coercive operation. In this way counter– violence caused irreparable human and socio-economic loss in Nepal. The exponential growth of PLA was due to promotive and counter productive factors from Maoist party and from government side.

Relation of PLAs with People

The people's war was the major historic event taken over in ten years and was possible with the support of people in the country. The respondents believed that there were different activities occurred in favor and in against the people from the side of PLA and National Army.

Table 4.2 demonstrates that rating of respondents about the relation of PLA with the people in the territory.

Table 4.2

Relation of PLAs with People

Reason	Respondents	Percentage
Good	135	48
Satisfactory	135	48
Unhealthy	12	4
Total	282	100


Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, 48% of the respondents believed that the success of the people's war was due to the good relation with the people and from their support. Similarly another 48% also believed that the relation was satisfactory. Only 4% responded that the relation was unhealthy as they faced counter productive activities in the society during the people's war.

PLAs in Building Relationship with People

The respondents of the study resulted that most of the PLAs gave priority to build the healthy relationship with people from deprived communities. The respondents believed that only the healthy relationship could be the ultimate tool for them to succeed in the revolutionary changes in practice.

Figure 4.1 shows that the relationship was mainly focused on involvement in social activities by PLAs in majority with the response of 35%, and involvement in cultural program with 31%. About 21% responded that they believed that the involvement



in the labor camps along with the people also contributed to build healthy relationship. 14% believed that public speech with the motivation examples also contributed to undersatand the PLA's movment.

Priority Activities of PLA

People's war was not only the war in general. It was the integrated approach of different strategic actions taken out in different strata. Some involved in warfare, some in organizational activities and rest in production. Table 4.2 demonstrates the different activities rated by the respondents focusing on the major three activities namely warfare, organizational activities and production including other related activities within the same framework of people's war.

Table 4.2

Priority Activities of PLA

Activities	Respondents	Percentage
Warfare	104	37
Organizational Activities	100	35
Production	78	28
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, Majority of the people 37% believed that the prioritized activity of the PLA was warfare, 35% also emphasized that organizational activities were also given priority. Rest 28% believed that the another prioritized activity was production to support PLA themselves as well as poor people who provide shelter for PLAs.

Violence, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency

Maoist violence met with the state violence particularly from 1998 onward, when the government launched its counter insurgency police operation called "Romeo and Kilo Sera II". The government declared state emergency across the country and deployed its police force in full scale against the Maoist.

PLA and Nepal Police reached a new height in November 2001, when the PLA withdrew from a several –months –long ceasefire and initiated a series of attacks across the country including ones targeted at the Nepal Army. During the armed struggle, violence and counter-violence caused irreparable human and socio-economic loss to Nepal. Table 4.2 shows the incidents and casualties of one decade long armed struggle.

Table 4.2


Violence Incidents in Nepal, 1996-2006

Year	Violent Incidents	Police Stations / Army Camps Attacked	Banks Looted
1996-2000	26	8	4
2001	11	8	0
2002	109	9	7
2003	163	7	3
2004	193	4	0
2005	178	10	1
2006 (upto April)	86	7	1

Source: www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20, retrieved in 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, violent incidents during the periods of 1996-2006, total number of violent incidents were 746. Among these incidents police and army attacked by PLA were 53 and banks looted were 19.

Figure 4.1 shows that there is increase in frequency of violence incidence from 1996 to 2006. The number of incidence in 2005 has been 178 and is highest during the last five years. In the same way the attacks in the army camps were increased even in maximum number in 2005.



On the other hand, the number of people killed by security forces and Maoists were also increased in number enormously. The table 4.3 demonstrates the deaths record and have proved that, most of PLAs were indigenous and from the caste of Chhetri/Thakuri.

Table 4.3

People Killed by the Security Forces and Maoists (Feb, 1996-2003)

Group	Total	Total %	Gon%	Maoist%
Indigenous Group	1763	21.33	13.78	07.55
Chhetri/ Thakuri	1551	18.76	08.19	10.57

Brahamin	305	10.75	05.20	05.75
Dalit	400	04.84	03.53	01.31
Other indigenous groups from Terai	186	02.25	00.83	01.42
Others	90	01.09	00.57	00.52
Unidentified	3370	40.78	33.88	06.90
Total	8265	100	65.98	34.02

Source: INSEC: Nepal Human Rights Year book, 2004

Table 4.3 shows the loss of people and property during the periods of 1996 to 2006, before the assigned of comprehensive peace accord made by the government and CPN (Maoist). According to the report of Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (2014) a total of 17886 were killed by the government and PLAs during the insurgency.

Table 4.4

Loss of People and Property during the Periods of 1996 to 2006


S.N.	Description	Number
1	Death	17886
2	Disapeared	1530
3	Wounded	8191
4	Property lost (nos)	17484
5	Kidnaping	3142
6	Urphan children	620
7	Punishment and Custody	2094
8	Internaly Displacement	79571

Source: www.peace.gov.np retrieved at 2014

The report shows that 1530 were disapired, 8191 were wounded, 17784 number of property were lost, 3142 were kidnapped, 620 childern lost their parents, 2094 were

punished and took in custody and 79571 people were displacement during the insurgency. Table 4.2 shows the number of killings each year during the ten years of conflict. The number of deaths reached its peak during 2002 to 2004 after the declaration of a state of emergency on 26 November 2001. A total of 13,347 people were killed during the insurgency (INSEC, 2006). According to the INSEC report 8,393 people were killed by the security agencies and 4,954 people including security personnel were killed by the PLA.

Figure 4.2 Numbers of Killings Every Year From 1996 to 2006



Source: Informal Sector (INSEC) report, 2006

When the government declared the state of emergency against the CPN (Maoist) and mobilized the army, the conflict turned more violent which led to irreversible loss of human lives and rise in casualties. Extra-judicial killings, arrest, torture, disappearance, gross human right violations were regular activities by both security agencies and the CPN (Maoist) during the emergency.

Table No. 4.5

Regionwise Death of People by the State and PLA (1996 to 2004)

S.N.	Region	By state	%	By Maoist	%	Both	%	State share
A.	Mountain	935	13.4	448	14.8	1,383	12.9	67.6

1	West	615	8.8	257	7.0	872	8.2	70.5
2	Central	23	0.3	3	0.1	26	0.2	88.5
3	East	297	4.2	188	5.1	485	4.5	61.2
B.	Hill	3,861	55.2	1,813	49.1	5,674	53.1	68.0
4	West	2,049	29.3	867	23.5	2,916	27.3	70.3
5	Central	1,127	16.1	501	13.6	1,628	15.2	69.2
6	Kathmandu valley	46	0.7	85	2.3	131	1.2	35.1
7	East	639	9.1	360	9.8	99	9.4	64.0
C.	Inner Terai	847	12.1	503	13.6	1350	12.6	62.7
8	West	606	8.7	202	8.2	908	8.5	66.7
9	Central	84	1.2	95	2.6	179	1.7	46.9
10.	East	157	2.2	106	2.9	263	2.5	59.7
D.	Terai	1,348	19.3	926	25.1	2,274	21.3	59.3
11	West	653	9.3	335	9.1	988	9.3	66.1
12	Central	110	1.6	144	3.9	254	2.4	43.0
13	East	585	8.4	447	12.1	1,032	9.7	56.7
	Total	6,991	100.0	3,690	100.0	10,681	100.0	65.6
	West	3,923	56.1	1,761	47.7	5,684	53.2	69.0
	Central	1,390	19.9	828	22.4	2,218	20.8	62.7
	East	1,678	24.0	1101	29.8	2,779	26.0	60.4

Source: DFID Report, 2004

According to DFID report, number of people killed by state and PLA varied in Terai, mountain and hills .The number of people killed by state in mountain were 935 (13.4%),West 615(8.8%), central 3 (0.1%),Kathmandu valley 46(0.7%) .Same way Maoist, the number of killed by the Maoist in mountain were 448 (14.8%), West 615(8.8%), central 3 (0.1%), Kathmandu valley 85 (2.3%).

Table No: 4.7

Marital Status, Handicapped, Unknown and Killed

Marital status	Handicapped	Unknown	Killed	Total
Unmarried	173	407	5427	6007
Married	582	577	7262	8421
Widow	0	1	4	5
Widower	0	0	3	3
Single	9	5	44	58
Unidentified	21	16	496	533

Total	785	1006	13236	15027
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Source: INSEC, Conflict Victim Profile, 2010.

Table 4.7 shows that total number of 15027 people were directly affected during the periods of armed struggle. According to the INSEC, victim profile-2010; unmarried 8421, widow 5, widower 3, single 58 and unidentified 533, were victimized during the periods of 1996-2006.

Table No. 4.8

Victims Distribution by Ecological Zones (1996 to 2006)

S.N.	Ecological Zone	By State		By Maoist		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1	Mountain	1211	14.52	713	14.48	1924	14.51
2	Hill	4842	58.05	2424	49.25	7265	54.80
3	Terai	2286	27.41	1784	36.25	4070	30.69
Total		8338	100.00	4921	100.00	13259	100.00

Source: INSEC Report, 2006

Table 4.8 shows that highest proportion of victims killed by the state (58.05%) as well as by the state (4841) is nearly double of the Maoist killed (2424). The overall analysis shows that 54.80% of people were killed in the hill zone and followed by the Terai zone (30.69%) and in the Mountain zone, it is the lowest (14.51%). In terms of killing people, hill zone is four times greater than the Mountains zone and three times greater than Terai zone.

Table 4.9

Human Cost during the Armed Conflict

S.N.	Title	Number
1.	Deceased persons	17,886
2.	Disappeared persons	1,530
3.	Displaced persons	79,571
4.	Abducted persons	3,142
5.	Disabled persons	8,935

6.	Widows	9,000
7.	Individual property – damaged	17,484
8.	Family of martyrs’ of the Peoples Movement	26
9.	Those injured during People’s Movement	4,014
10.	Orphans	620

Source: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 2013

According to the data of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR), a total of 17,886 people lost their lives during the armed conflict. However, according to the INSEC, only 13,347 people died in the course of armed conflict from 1996 to 2006. The contradiction in numbers between the official reports of the MoPR and INSEC further adds to the dilemma in establishing actual number of victims of the armed conflict. According to another report of INSEC, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), 551 people were killed in 2007 and 541 in 2008.

Table 4.10

Destruction of infrastructure during the armed conflict

S.N.	Categories	Total destroyed
1.	Schools	2,149
2.	Village Development Committee offices	2,072
3.	Government offices at district Head Quarters	986
4.	Government offices at local level	1,047
5.	District Development Committees, Municipalities	130
6.	Suspension bridges	101
	Others	2,032

Source: Nepal Institute for Policy Studies policy paper, 2013

The data in Table 4.10 shows that 8,517 public structures were destroyed during the armed conflict. School buildings and public Properties destroyed during the insurgency with 2,149 units, followed by Village Development Committee (VDC) offices which numbers 2,072. Similarly, 941 police posts and District Development Committee (DDC) offices including other development infrastructures were destroyed during the conflict. The loss has not only troubled the lives of people but also added an economic burden on the government with regards to its reconstruction.

The first in October 2000 at a district police office and a district jail in Dang, the second in Ghorahi, the third in Syanja and fourth in November 2001 in Salleri. In the course of movement, PLA abducted thousands of mostly young men and women .Many of them were incorporated in to the ranks of PLA after having undergone ideological and materials training .

The armed conflict escalated significantly declaration of State of Emergency by the government of Nepal in November 2001, with extensive deployment of the Nepal Army (RNA) and larger scale People's Liberation Army reprisals. Many areas of the country came under Maoist and it's armed wing PLA's influence after the government decided not ot extended the terms in office of elected District Development Committees (DDC) in mid-2002. In Feburary 2005, ex- king Gynendra reinstated monarchical power through a royal coup, prompting the political parties to come together to against the takeover in a Seven-Party Alliance. This alliance iniated negotiations with the Maoist and reached a 12-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreeing to mutually fight against the monarchical autocratic rule.

Integration and Rehabilitation of People's Liberation Army

Integration and Rehabilitation was the major event that happened during the peace process in the country to resolve conflict. The successful overcome of the people's movement in 2006 led to move ahead the peace process to be the fore most agenda in the political arean in Nepal. This section tries to explain the reason for integration of PLA in national army, entrepreneurial capacity development demand of those voluntarily retired ones, role of different stakeholders during peace process including the post conflict activities.

Reason for Integrating PLA in National Army

One of the difficult tasks of peace process was to integrate the PLA in national army. Despite of having different culture, rules and regulations, different philosophical background and socio-political transformatin, there were different beliefs on PLAs to choose for integration in national army.

Table 4.2 shows the rating of PLAs who joined in national army under the categories of overseeing opportunities, permanency of service, and party policy.

Table 4.2

Reason for Integrating PLA in National Army

Reason	Respondents	Percentage
Overseeing opportunities	64	23
Permanency of Service	70	25
According to Party Politics	148	52
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, majority of the PLA 52% who joined on the national army responded that it was the party politics to send the armies to integrate, 25% also saw

opportunities of permanency in service, and 23% oversaw the opportunities from the national army.

Expected Need to PLA Retired

The voluntarily retired PLA were found in critical condition when the present researcher visited their dwellings. The PLAs, majority of them chose the voluntary retirement in different round of opportunities provided to them rated different expectations they were seeking during the time of peace process.

Table 4.2 shows rating of different needs expected by voluntarily retired PLAs..

Table 4.2

Expected Need to PLA Retired

Types of Need	Respondents	Percentage
Self employment generating training	106	38
Loan facilities for entrepreneurial activities	120	43
Employment	56	20
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, out of 282 voluntarily retired PLAs, 43% expected that they wished loan facilities for entrepreneurial activities, 38% responded for self employment generating training and 20% for employment.

Expected Need to PLA Unverified

The group of unverified PLAs by UNMIN, expected different aspects of resettlement process in the society. The present researcher found the critical condition of livelihood at present.

Table 4.2 shows the demand of unverified PLAs showing their dissatisfaction expressed their view under financial support, employment training and employment opportunities.

Table 4.2


Expected Need to PLA Unverified

Types of Need	Respondents	Percentage
Financial support	106	38
Employment training	140	50
Employment	36	13
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, 38% of the unverified PLAs rated financial support as the expected support during peace process, 50% rated employment training as their intended demand and only 13% expected employment guarantee.

Figure 4.1 shows that there is huge demand in employment training that was provided by different organizations including UNDP, GIZ, and other I/NGOs .



Most of the respondents agreed that the employment training would be the ultimate.

Entrepreneurial Activities: Demand Driven Training

The voluntarily retired and unverified PLAs were keen on seeking the capacity building of their vocational and technical skills so that they could sustain their family life in changed context with entrepreneurial skills and improved livelihood.

The PLAs responded that most of them demanded the ways of self employment. The table 4.2 represents the categories of their response based on self employment need, ensuring employment after training and training that utilizes local resources.

Table 4.2


Training Need to PLA Retired

Types of Need	Respondents	Percentage
Self employment generating	106	38
Ensuring employment after training	56	20
Training that utilize local resources	120	43
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, 43% demonstrated their need as training that can utilize the local resources, 38% responded to self employment and only 20% demanded the ensuring of employment after the delivery of training.

Figure 4.1 shows that 120 respondents showed the affiliation with training categories that utilizes the local resources.



On the other hand, 56 respondents from the retired PLAs demonstrated that they demanded the guarantee of employment after the training.

Different organizations including UNDP, I/NGOs and other bilateral agencies offered different packages of training to the ex-PLAs for their reintegration in the society for their normality of life. The training providers made the need assessment and made available of different options for the choice of vocational training. Some of the PLAs are doing successful job in the trained area. Table 4.2 shows level of vocational training as perceived by voluntarily retired PLAs.

Table 4.2

Level of Vocational Training to PLA Retired

Level	Respondents	Percentage
According as their need	65	23
Not according to their need	150	53
Just time pass	67	24
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, majority of the PLAs about 53% rated that the training was not in line with their need and they also blamed that the training did not supported for running enterprises. 24% expressed their view as the training was just for time pass and was for tolerating the PLA and diverting the attention in other areas than the conflict issues. Only 23% said that the training was helpful for them and still today they were found running their enterprises.

Reason for Not Integrating PLA in National Army

Many people made different arguments against the unwillingness of PLAs to integrate in the National Army. The attractive golden handshake retirement packages, traditional norms and regulations of National Army recruitment that the PLA needed to attend, fear of past anti fighting team and also the seeking of freedom in new situation may be the different factors the PLAs in large number in different round chose the voluntary retirement rather to join in National Army.

Table 4.2 shows the response of the retired PLAs under the categories of overseeing opportunities outside, unfavored organizational structure of national army and willing to take free life in new situation as the different categories of reason for not integrating PLAs in National Army.

Table 4.2

Reason for Not Integrating PLAs in National Army

Reason	Respondents	Percentage
Overseeing opportunities outside	54	19
Unfavored organizational structure	100	35
Willing to take free life	128	45
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, 40% responded the willing to take free life whereas 35% realized unfavored organizational structure of National Army as the cause of not integrating with them. Only 19% realized that they oversaw opportunities outside rather than joining in National Army in changing context of the political scenarios of the country.

UNMIN's Role

Upon the request of Maoist party and then government of Nepal UNMIN played the liason role and facilitate to come across the country situation to resolve the conflict with

peaceful solution. The role of UNMIN is appreciated by different sectors including the PLAs themselves.

The role of UNMIN was rated as justifiable, satisfactory or biased based the PLAs' perception. Table 4.2 shows the rating level of PLAs towards the role of UNMIN.

Table 4.2


Role of UNMIN in Peace Process

Role	Respondents	Percentage
Justifiable	90	32
Biased Role	42	15
Satisfactory	150	53
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, during peace process 53% the majority of PLAs believe that the role of UNMIN was vital and satisfactory. Out of 282 respondents, only 15% rated the role of UNMIN as biased role as they moved away quickly without the complete resolution of the conflict in the country.

Figure 4.1 shows that the majority response in favor of UNMIN proved that the status was satisfactory. UNMIN has played satisfactory role and it could be the lesson



learned in the similar situation of other countries. On the other hand, the number of people involved in UNMIN was huge about 600 and their tenure was very short as compared to peace processes handled by UN in other countries. .

Role of Political Parties in PLA Integration

The most of the political parties included seven party alliance who believed on parliamentary system in socio political movement. The parties played a crucial role on settling the issues, setting agendas for further movement and creating the environment of peaceful safelanding of the country's political movement. They were also found to create the safe guarding the situation.

Table 4.2 shows the respondents' views towards the role of different political parties specially focusing on parliamentary parties.

Table 4.2

Role of Political Parties in PLA Integration

Role	Respondents	Percentage
Justifiable	77	27
Biased Role	155	55

Satisfactory	50	18
Total	282	100


Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, majority of the respondents (55%) believed that the parliamentary parties played the biased role against the welfare of PLAs. About 27% rated that the role of parliamentary party was justifiable as they were taking pivotal and liason role during the different critical situation of the country after people's movement 2006. Only 18% rated the satisfactory role of political parties in peace process.

Diplomatic Role of Neighbourhood Countries

Nepal has a historic relationship with neighborhood countries in case of favored role towards the people in critical situation during conflict. India and China were evidenced the major diplomatic play makers. The European union, US diplomatic mission and other diplomats also played their role in different parts showing constructive activity supports and multilateral consensus was made to lead through UN mission UNMIN.

Figure 4.2 shows the rating of role of diplomatic missions to facilitate peace process and conflict resolution in Nepal. 44% of the respondents pointed out that the role of diplomatic mission in Nepal was justifiable and 30% rated satisfactory. Only 26% realized that the role of diplomatic mission was in favor to parliamentarian parties and government and making less favor to PLA welfare.



On the other hand, during focus group discussion, they pointed out that there were some controversial roles of some diplomats and people working in UNMIN that helped to derail the situation, lengthening of the peace process and delay in constitution formulation.

Government's Role

The role of government was seen visible through the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Peace Committee and local level peace committee formation. The Truth and Reconciliation commission was another mile stone of peace process initiative by government. The revision of National Army rules and regulations, use of Public Service Commission and inclusion of excluded ones in National Army as Security Sector Reform (SSR). Table 4.2 represents the overall rating of government role in conflict resolution as perceived by the respondents.

Table 4.2

Government's Role on PLA Integration

Role	Respondents	Percentage
Justifiable	40	14
Biased Role	152	54
Satisfactory	90	32
Total	282	100


Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, 54% believed that the overall role of the government was biased in the sense of discrimination between National Army and PLAs. Out of 282 respondents only 32% rated the role of government on integration process as satisfactory and only 14% rated as justifiable role for peace process.

I/ NGOs' Role in PLA Integration

The integration and conflict resolution was facilitated by different agencies working in Nepal which were found crucial for settling the peace process. The I/ NGOs in coordination with government agencies and local governing bodies played vital role in media campaign, advocacy, lobbying in favor of human rights and inclusive policies in the development agendas. The I/NGOs also supported to conduct the vocational training and for the entrepreneurial development to the voluntarily retired PLAs, unverified ones and those who selected rehabilitation packages. They involved in model building and complementing the peace processes for sustainability of the programs.

Figure 4.1 shows that respondents rated the overall role of I/NGOs were not in favored to PLA integration with 50% and 35% rated as satisfactory role of them. Only 15% suggested that their role was in line with the peace process and helped in conflict resolution.



On the other hand, in the interview and interaction with the PLA retired and integrated ones, pointed out the delay of constitution, functioning of truth and reconciliation commission and human rights commission were encroached by I/NGOs.

Role of Maoist Party

Maoist party with its manifesto came into the ground to exercise in parliamentary exercise and also led the government. During the peace process, the role of the party came into existence of one party against seven parties in alliance. After the handling of governance the roles were changed. During the time, party was divided and unified maoist party continued the sharing role of PLA integration. Table 4.2 shows the overall rating of participants towards the role of Maoist Party led movement.

Table 4.2

Role of Maoist Party in PLA Integration

Role	Respondents	Percentage
Justifiable	55	20
Unsatisfactory	160	57
Satisfactory	67	24
Total	282	100

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 4.2 shows that, Majority (57%) PLAs and other respondents rated the role of Maoist party as unsatisfactory, 24% rated satisfactory and only 20% recognized justifiable in peace process.

Integration and Demobilization Process of PLA

Following the signing of the Seven-Point Agreement, the integration and demobilization process had started in the given context despite some level of reservation from the ex-PLA. The NA carried out the entire integration process, the Secretariat of the SC carried out the voluntary retirement, and the MoPR took the responsibility of rehabilitation process. The much-awaited integration and demobilization process started from 16 November 2011 and concluded 12 April 2013 by dissolving the SC following the completion of the process. As Table 4.11 illustrates, a total of 1,422 of 17,052 (13,494 males and 3,558 females) ex-PLA integrated into the NA while 15,624 opted for voluntary retirement of which 3,454 (22.11%) were female. Only six PLA chose for rehabilitation. It was expected that most of the ex-PLA chose rehabilitation packages but surprisingly they chose voluntary retirement. According to the Seven-Point Agreement, maximum of 6,500 ex-PLA would be integrated into the NA but only 1,422 ex-PLA integrated. Out of 1,422 ex-PLA only 104 female ex-PLA (4 officer level and 100 non officer levels) were integrated into the NA. Given the contribution and participation of female PLA during conflict (out of 19,602, 15,756 (80.37 percent) were male and 3,846 (19.63 percent) were female), it was fairly low. A total of 2,456 PLA did not take part in the categorization process and 94 PLA were earlier declared as dead, suspended and deserters. 32,250 PLA were initially registered and cantoned in 28

cantonments of which 4,008 were discharged as disqualified PLA given their date of birth and date of recruitments.

Table 4.11

Facts and Figures Regarding the Registration, Verification, Categorization Process

S.N.	Registration and verification process	Total	Male	Female
1.	Total number of registered PLA	32,250		
2.	Total number of PLA verified by UNMIN	19,602	15756 (80.37%)	3846 (19.63%)
3	Total No. of weapons registered and stored in the containers	34,75		
4.	Absentees, automatically considered as disqualified PLA, during the verification process	8,640		

	Disqualified combatants			
5.	Under the age of 18 as of 25 May 2006 (considered minors)	2,973	1,987 (66.85%)	986 (33.16%)
6.	Late recruits	1,035	804 (77.069%)	231 (22.31%)
7.	(Total disqualified (minors + late recruits)	4,008		

	Outcome of the Regrouping process			
8.	Number of PLA absent in the regrouping process	2,456		
9.	Total number of PLA present in the regrouping process	17,052	13,494 (79.13%)	3,558 (20.87%)
10	Dead, suspended and desertters	94		
11	Total No. of PLA selected for integration	1422	1318 (92.69%)	104 (7.31%)
12	Total No of PLA opting for voluntary retirement	15,624	12,170 (77.89%)	3,454 (22.11%)
	Total Number of PLA opting for rehabilitation	6	6	0

Source: Messages of Integration and Rehabilitation Process of Nepal, 2013

The table 4.11 showed that total number of initially registered PLA were 32250. Among these 15756 (80.37%) were male and 3846 (19.63%) female were verified by UNMIN.

There was not equal representation of male and female. Absentees, automatically

considered as experiences PLA, during the verification process were 8640. Finally number of PLA in regrouping process were 17052, male-13494 (79.13%), female – 3588 (20.87%). UNMIN had verified 17052 Ex- PLA among the 19602 in two steps verification process. 1 PLA was dead after the verification process. Following table shows the final status of ex PLA integration and rehabilitation process.

Table 4.12

Detail of Voluntary Retirement, Integration and Rehabilitation Phase I & II

Name and no. of Division	Number verified by Government Secretariat	Phase I (Nov. 12-19, 2011)		Phase II (Apr. 12-19, 2012) (a)		Final Recruitment into NA(b)
		Integration (a)	Voluntary Retirement	Integration (b)	Voluntary Retirement	
Chulachuli – I	1,517	796	711	248	548	125
Dudhauli – II	1,296	805	493	357	448	195
Shaktikhor – III	3,347	2,214	1,115	626	1,588	218
Jhyaltung Danda – IV	2,622	1,282	1,335	484	798	270
Dahavan – V	2,181	1,287	952	523	764	195
Dasarathpu – VI	2,958	1,559	1,378	571	988	238
Masuria – VII	3,131	1,762	1,363	314	1,448	219
Total	17,052(100 %)	9,705 (56.9%)	7,347(43.1 %)	3,123 (32.2%)	6,582 (67.8%)	1,460 (46.7%)

Source: Transformative Harmony and Inharmony: A Case of Former Maoist Army in Nepal, Madras University, 2014

On the course to updating the records of the Maoist Army in the main and satellite cantonments, there had been a lot of disturbance initiated by the commanders, deputy commanders, and others. The regrouping process intended to complete within five-day, but it took seven additional days than the scheduled date Prime Minister led Special

Committee for SIR of the Maoist gave an order to Nepal Army and Armed Police Force (APF) to control Cantonments, arms and containers, and the MA along with physical properties of the cantonments on April 10th, 2012 unilaterally. The dramatic decision came while Prachanda faction-led division commander and two deputies at the Chalachuli cantonments in Ilam fled the cantonment fearing of their lives on April 9th, 2012. A total of 9,705 (57%) PLA showed their interest for integration into Nepal Army. Maoist Chairperson Prachanda and its favored commanders had a fear of that the integration number could be less than 6,500. Mohan Baidya led faction urged PLA to boycott the regrouping process stating the agreement is against the peace process and it disrespects to the PLA.

The CPN (Maoist) failed to increase the assured PLA integration number from 6,500 to 9,705 in which the Maoists-led government compelled to reinitiate regrouping phase process to reduce the number of PLA. In phase II regrouping process (from April 12-19, 2012) a small number 3,123 (32%) PLA agreed to integrate into the Nepal Army and most of the prominent commanders chose the option of Voluntary retirement. Following table shows the final of PLA positions.

Table 4.13

Integrated, Rehabilitated, and Voluntarily Retired PLAs

S.N.	Description	Number
1	Integration in Army	1460
2	Voluntarily retired	15585
3	Rehabilitation	6
4	Death after rehabilitation	1
Total		17,052

Source: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Annual Report, 2014

According to Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Annual Report (2014) shows above in table 4.13 that among the 19602 ex- PLA (verified by UNMIN), only 17052 PLA were qualified in in two levels verifying and catagoring process . Verification process was conducted by UNMIN. Among these ex-PLA, only 1460 were integrated in Neapl army and rest, 15585 were voluntarily retired, 6 were rehabilitated and,1 ex-PLA were dead after the verification. According to Nepal Army source 13 PLA were left the job during the training period.

Priminister led Special Committee gave an order to Nepal Army and Armed Police Force (APF) to control of all PLA Cantonments and other belongings on April,10, 2012. That significiantly gave an impact where large 68 percent (6,576) PLA choosed voluntary retirement weakling Prachand and strengthening to the dissident Baidya faction .A couples of hours, a company (roughly 150) led by a Neapl Army Major was reached at each main cantonment while a platoon (50 Nepal Army) under a command of /captain or APF under an inspector controlled at each satellite cantonment.

The decision came while Prachanda favored commander and two deputies at division I in Ilam fled the cantonment fearing of possible physical action on April 9th 2012. The situation was also explosive at all Sindhuli, Saktikhor, Nawalparasi, Surkhet and Kailali divisions. The PLA irate burnt vechiles and vandalized the quarters of their commanders keeping the commanders hostage for a couple of days, like Sindhuli and Shaktikhor division. After four days later, the cantonments handover to Nepal Army and APF, the regrouping phase II started on april 14 th, 2012. The Special Committee also agreed to a Lieutenant General to lead the General Directorate and appoint a Brigadier General to head each of directorate, namely infrastructure development, industrial security, forest and environment security and disaster management .Nine- month basic

training to those selected in officer ranks and seven-month basic training to those in junior ranks.

On April 15th, 2012, the Special Committee enforced a 12-point Code of Conduct to former PLA "what to do and what not to do" in particular and Nepal Army in general to apply similar military disciplines to both. It finally annulled all political PLA relations with the mother Maoist party. The Code of Conduct finally ended the identity of two legal armies with two distinct in a nation Nepal.

The intra-party rift in the Maoist party brewed after the Dhobighat meeting in June 2011 where two distinct identity based leaders Mohan Baidya and Baburam Bhattarai united against Prachanda's Shaky-centrist politics. It was to be remarkable that Bhattarai was cared by Indian power and politics whereas Baidya believes on Chinese politics.

Table 4.14

Expenditure of ex-PLA and Cantonment Management

S.N.	Description	Total Cost Rs.
1	Cantonment Mangement	19,600108
2	Special Committee Office Mgmt. and Voluntarily retired PLA incentives	11,34,1695000.00
Total cost Rs.		8,258413000.00

Source: Ministry of Peace and Recontraction, Annual report 2014

Table 4.14 shows that Rs.8, 258413000.00 were expenditure for the ex-PLA cantonment management and volutarly retired ex-PLA and special committee office management.

This is the huge money like our poor country.Nepal's peace process resume its indigenious modality. It had gave new and original message to international

communities. According to ex- Nepali army senior officer and military experts, they had highlighted some feature of Nepal peace process and integration and rehabilitation process of PLA as:

First, Nepal's peace process was a domestic actors-led process. It was the political parties that initiated, led and concluded the entire peace process. There had been involvement of third party (i.e. the UN, the US, the UK, European countries, and neighboring countries) in most post- conflict countries to support and complete the peace process. However in Nepal, the government and political parties sought solidarity and support in technical issues as per the requirements (i.e. during the demobilizing the PLA in the cantonments, during the registration and verification of the PLA and arms, during the monitoring of the arms containers and cantonments etc.) from the international community. But it was the government and the political parties that led and concluded the entire peace process. The political parties themselves envisaged the contents of the peace process and concluded the processes according to the past agreements. Therefore, unlike other post-conflict countries, it was a great success of the government and political parties would be able to complete the process by themselves without the involvement of third parties.

Second, Nepal's armed conflict came to an end through sustained dialogue amongst the political parties. Then the PLA mother party — the CPN (Maoist) which had waged an armed struggle to establish 'people's democracy through the People's War' gave up the decade-long armed struggle by renouncing violence and embracing the fundamental tenets of peaceful democratic process through the CPA. The CPN (Maoist) not only joined the political mainstream, but transformed itself into a civilian party by dissolving the army and handing over their arms to the government. The message was a

violent conflict can be resolved through peaceful dialogue process following substantial political, social and economic change.

Third, the SPA and the PLA mother party — the CPN (Maoist) decided to fight jointly against the king's despotic regime and establish democracy by signing the Twelve-Point Agreement in 2005. Ultimately, they succeeded in establishing Nepal as a democratic and republic nation in 2006. It proved that an armed party which waged an armed struggle and un-armed civilian parties that believe in peace and democracy could fight together for democracy and peace through peaceful and non-violent process, and can achieve success.

Fourth, despite divergence of views and to some extent disagreement and objection on various contentious issues and processes, major political parties did not close the door of dialogue. Because of the continued and perpetual dialogue process, they shared their contradictory views, debated on the issues, and this helped them in understanding each-other's perspectives and ultimately they came to an agreement at the end. Therefore, despite the differences among themselves, by keeping the negotiation and dialogue alive, they were able to deliver a positive outcome. The Twelve-Point Agreement, the Interim Constitution 2007, the CPA, the AMMAA and the Seven-Point Agreement were the palpable outcomes of such dialogues. Political parties followed the principle of 'consensus through dialogue' which was a positive and also a unique lesson from Nepal's peace process. Therefore, by keeping the negotiation and dialogue process alive despite disagreements, they were ultimately able to concluded it with a positive outcome. This was a key message of the peace process of Nepal. Nonetheless, political parties were highly criticized at times because of their never ending and perpetual

dialogue series, but they often successfully reached agreements on major contentious issues.

The fifth point was, although Nepal learnt many lessons from other countries' practices on peace process – including integration and rehabilitation, Nepal did not import or replicate any of the models. Instead, Nepal developed a 'Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation' according to the Interim Constitution 2007, the CPA, the AMMAA and subsequent political agreements among the political parties. Nepal did not follow the technical process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) applied by many countries in their peace building and peacemaking processes. Nepal did not even use the term – DDR, nevertheless, the ex-PLA were demobilized and disarmed in 2006. Instead, Nepal used the term management of arms and armies. Nepal also did not use the term security sector reform (SSR), but it had been following the principles of SSR during the peace process. In fact, Nepal has contextualized every content according to the Nepali context. According to PLA supreme commander, in an interview with the researcher, Nepal used both models: DDR and SSR .

Sixth, according to the prevalent international practice, there were two options for ex-combatants — integration into security agencies or reintegration into society. But Nepal introduced a new concept of voluntary retirement as part of the reintegration process in society. Unlike international practices, it was worth noting that out of the 19,602 ex-PLA, 15,624 chose voluntary retirement rather than integration or rehabilitation. Likewise, 1,422 ex-PLA integrated into the NA. Only six ex-combatants opted for rehabilitation. In fact, Nepal's integration and rehabilitation process had been successful because of a generous cash package ranging from Rs 0.5 to Rs 0.8 million. In fact, the voluntary retirement was a new and highly risky option and experiment but

relatively it was been a experience in the given context. Infact it was a Nepali concept and could be applicable to other conflict-ridden countries.

Seventh point was that, most of the post-conflict countries asked for monetary assistance to support the integration and rehabilitation process with donor and international community. But Nepal did not follow that trend and instead mobilized Nepali tax payers money for integration and voluntary retirement process. Nepal might be the first-ever post-conflict developing country in the world to complete the integration and rehabilitation process by mobilizing its internal resource.

Eighth, according to the article 146 of the Interim Constitution, the government constituted the cross party SC comprising representative from the major political parties, especially PLA mother party (Maoist), the NC, the CPN-UML ad the Madhesi Parties) entrusting them to complete the peace process. The SC constituted a Secretariat comprising representative from the political parties (the UCPN (Maoist), the NC, the CPN-UML and Madhesi Parties) security agencies (the NA, the Nepal Police and the Armed Police force) and a representative from the combatants to execute its policy decisions. Even after the exit of UNMTN on 15 January 2011, the SC and its Secretariat undertook a very sensitive responsibility of supervision, integration and rehabilitation of the ex-PLA and also the monitoring of the arms and cantonments. It would be worth noting that in a highly politically polarized society and fractured political process, the cross party political mechanism and its secretariat did not consist any expertise on peace process not only took all the decisions based on consensus, but also completed. There process establishing a Nepali model by following some basic international norms.

Ninth, the NA played an exemplary, constructive and instrumental role in integrating its former enemy against whom it had fought a bloody war. Even when political parties had

contradictory opinions and adamant stands in the given political context that resulted in widening and deepening their differences, the Nepal Army gave momentum to the process by proposing integration of the ex-PLA into a National Security and Development Directorate under it. The political parties agreed to the concept of the NA. The NA at times, seemed more flexible and liberal than the opposition parties on integration issues. When the NA proposed to integrate ex-combatants into a new directorate, the major political parties supported the Army's concept. It was the breakthrough from the NA on integration and rehabilitation, which assisted the process to move forward. The NA not only gave the much-needed motion to the integration and rehabilitation process, but also carried out the entire responsibilities of integration process without any controversy and complaints during the integration process and training period of the integrated combatants. It would be worth noting that the Army followed relatively flexible approach even for rank determination by accepting to integrate a rank of Colonel into the new Directorate. Likewise, the Army themselves provided bridging course to the integrated PLA. Publically some questions were raised had the Nepal Army positive to the integration of PLA. It would have been difficult and complex. Even the decisions of the SC and the government would not have been implemented if the Army had opposed the decisions. Analyzing the role of the Army in the post-conflict countries across the world on integration process, no army has played such constructive and exemplary role so far. Therefore, the NA played an instrumental and exemplary role in the process.

Tenth, it took more than six years to complete the peace process. By and large, all stakeholders including the NA and the PLA abided by the CPA, the AMMAA and subsequent political agreements. Unlike other post-conflict countries, there were no major events in breaking the ceasefire and violating the code of conduct agreed earlier.

The vibrant civil society and the media played constructive role in making and shaping public opinion in favor of completion of the peace process and a new constitution ever since the signing of the Twelve-Point Agreement in 2005. They played an exemplary role like a ‘watchdog’ and exerted pressure to the government and political parties. For the success of peace process and constitution drafting, Nepal's peace process was completed as a unique model and it gave a message to the other post-war experience. Some negative message pointed out by the respondents were:

First, though the integration and rehabilitation process had been completed which was positive, but it cost more than 23.10 billion. Spending 23.10 billion in the peace process was really expensive given the Nepali economy which had per capita income about \$717. According to the financial document of the MoPR, Rs. 8.15 billion was spent for voluntary discharge, Rs 5.82 billion was spent for monthly allowances to the ex-PLA, Rs 2.77 billion was spent for food and daily necessities of the combatants and Rs 68.2 billion was spent for physical infrastructure of the 28 cantonments. According to the MoPR, the Peace Fund spent Rs 0.743 billion for building roads, Rs 0.341 billion for drinking water and Rs 0.411 billion for other infrastructure. The expenditure details show Rs 0.325 billion spent for health and Rs 25.33 million spent for electricity supply at the cantonments. Likewise, other donor communities — the US, the UK, German, Norway, Switzerland; Denmark, World Bank also spent significant amount of money for the peace process, but those expenditure has not been public so far. Likewise, lack of transparency and misappropriation of money during the voluntary discharge and distribution of monthly allowance to the ex-combatants are also serious issues among political parties. Some political parties have blamed the UCPN (Maoist) leaderships and PLA commanders for the misuse of funds of the PLA. It was a serious issue even within the UCPN (Maoist) regarding the lack of transparency and misappropriation of money, therefore, the UCPN (Maoist) constituted an investigation commission within the party regarding the misappropriation of funds, but the report has not been made public so far. The Commission of Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) had also started investigation regarding the misappropriation of funds during the voluntary discharge and


distribution of monthly allowance to the ex-PLA. The total cost of the entire period has been summarized in the following table.

Table 4.14

The Cost of the Peace Process

S.N.	Title	Total Cost (NPR)
1.	Cantonment's Infrastructure	68,20,38,017
2.	Ration for ex-combatants	2,76,56,14,962
3.	Monthly Allowance for the ex-combatants	6,34,97,40,946
4.	Administrative cost	13,68,10,804
5.	Road	74,31,54,000
6.	Water	3,41,46,000
7.	Health	33,11,50,000
8.	Electricity	2,53,30,000
9.	Voluntary discharge	8,15,55,44,000
10.	Total cost from the Secretariat of the SC excluding voluntary discharge	21,0,29,096
11.	Total Relief fund provided to the victims and their family by MoPR	3,39,21,15,800
12.	Miscellaneous	27,37,10,567
	Total	23,10,73,84,192

Source: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 2013



Second, Nepal's peace process was heavily focused on integration and rehabilitation of the ex-PLA . But the government and political parties did not pay much-needed attention to conflict victims and internally displaced persons by the decade-long conflict.

According to the data of the MoPR, there are 89,571 persons displaced due to the decade-long conflict. But the government had not a comprehensive strategy to address those conflict victims' problems. The major issues were, returning to their homes, returning of their property, relief package etc. Though the MoPR distributed some relief package to conflict victims, the bulk of the amount distributed landed in the hands of the cadres of ruling and influential political parties instead of real conflict victims. As a result, conflict

victims and internally displaced persons are still living in a miserable condition and had been fighting with the government for their rights. Therefore, Nepal's peace process has charged on a PLA focused process instead of conflict victims. Due to this reason, the people has dissatisfied with the government and political parties.

Third, Nepal's peace process concluded in the positive note because of reconciliatory approach of the government, political parties and PLA mother party, the CPN (Maoist). Reconciliation among political parties and concerned stakeholders was fundamental basis of peace process but the government and political parties did not even constitute the much-debated Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and Commission on Forced Disappearance (CFD) which were integral part of the constitution and the CPA even within seven years. The government and political parties should have brought those perpetrators who had committed serious crime, during the conflict under the law by putting an end of pervasive impunity and should have ensured justice to conflict victims. But the government and political parties neither constituted the TRC, and the CFD; nor took any sincere initiative to ensure transitional justice by putting an end to impunity. The situation was so pathetic that according to the data of the MoPR, 1,530 enforced disappearances are still unaccounted. Despite the Supreme Court's directives and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) recommendations, the government has not constituted the TRC and the CFD so far. Some political parties, the NHRC and national human rights institutions have been raising those human rights violations, transitional justice and impunity issues. But none of the governments have paid attention to them. Therefore, it can be said that successive governments have not been accountable and answerable to the people and they have not followed the very tenets of the rule of law, democratic practice and transparency.

Fourth, the government and political parties offered attractive cash package for 15,624 verified ex-PLA for whom they as pay off Rs. 8.11 billion. But the government and political parties did not pay much-needed attention to 4,008 disqualified PLA. The government offered a small package to disqualified combatants, but they did not accept the offer because of the dissatisfaction with their 'disqualified' tag and poor package. Their mother party – the UCPN (Maoist) also provoked them against accepting these rehabilitation packages. Special priority should have been given to female combatants and their children but the government and the SC did not take into consideration these serious issues. Nepal has set yet another milestone by successfully concluding the integration and rehabilitation process of the ex-PLA in the given context. Even though there were a number of considerable messages of Nepal's peace process in the given context. In his research article entitled- Message of integration and rehabilitation process of Nepal, highlights some of the key messages of PLA integration and rehabilitation have been summarized as following: Unique political, socio-economic and security context; unique conflict; unique and indigenous peace process .Domestic political-actors initiated, led and concluded the process without third party involvement. Conflict resolution through peaceful dialogue process following the establishment of Democratic Republic in 2006. Collaboration between the armed & unarmed parties for establishing democracy and peace.

Nepal government and its' stakeholders had played a constructive and instrumental role on integration, setting unique precedence across the world. Relatively long and expensive but successful completion of the peace process adopting a Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation notion, in particular, the voluntary retirement. Voluntary retirement was a risky decision and 'experiment' but relatively it

has been a success in the given context. If we analyze 42 post-conflict countries, Nepal's PLA integration was unique. The countries where (re)integration succeeded in South Africa, Uganda, Angola, Aceh, Mozambique etc, they gave attention on identity, respect and professional integrity (IRI) keeping the equal footing of all state- and –rebel armies . The (re) integration failed and violence resumed in most of the post-conflict countries including Afghanistan who tried to humiliate rebel neglecting IRI.

Nepal did not ask for financial assistance for the voluntary retirement with the donor and international community. No violation from either party and abided by the peace agreement.

Focused on integration and voluntary retirement but did not pay attention on rehabilitation and conflict victims. Though, given the gross financial amount of the peace process, it might be termed as an 'expensive process' but the peace is less expensive than the war. Without experiences of international communities Nepal's peace process had presented a Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation process . It had significant positive messages to conflict-ridden countries around the globe, albeit partial.

Alternative Measures of Integration and Rehabilitation

The PLAs and other respondents involved in the focus group discussion and in interview pointed out the alternative measures to be taken for the win win situation of conflict resolution. The reform of national army and complete integration of the PLA would be one of the possibilities with the expansion in the role of National Army focusing in industrial security, border security and involvement in infrastructure development. One of the respondents expressed her view as:

"Maoist party should revive production brigade and all the PLAs retired or unverified should be organized again for long lasting solution. It creates pressure and adds weight in bargaining for reform with conflicting parities."

Another group of the PLAs retired urged that there should be immediate action for party unification and retirement of leaders. Collective leadership approach was their direction to reform within party. Creation of commune, safe shelter to wounded ones and continuous attachment with people of base area would be another demand as alternative measure in coming days.

Status of Integrated PLA

The integrated PLAs were recruited based on the minimum bottom line of National Army. The status was one less than their designation and they were found unhappy due to degradation. Along with the peace process, those who joined later in PLA were happier than the one who contributed in People's war from the very beginning. The PLA leaders were confused for long time whether to reintegrate or retire. Still there are discriminatory provisions on facilities including provident fund, treatment and loan facilities. They were also unsatisfied on 65% and 35% provision of integration and are in camp as reserve force without major responsibilities.

Career Development of Children of PLA

During the time of people's war, Party led formal schools were run for educating the children of PLA and martyr's family. The schools were functional in line with the socio political transformation and also popular as " people's education". However, the peace process led to discontinue the education system and they were forced to attend the general curriculum of the country. Under the Martyr's Academy, five schools have been

running under the support of government to educate the children of Martyrs of People's war, Terai movement and other movements of the time. During the interaction, children of the PLAs were not found satisfied to get education facilities.

Status of PLA Unverified by UNMIN

The unverified PLAs got trainings from the different partner organizations during peace processes. The trainings were mainly on vocational trainings including plumbing, tailoring, house wiring, agricultural and veterinary related based on supply rather on demand. The PLAs unverified interviewed expressed the insufficient training package, lack of fund support and felt difficulty in starting business. They were found living with hardship of life in the family and confused to decide what to do further. They also complained about the tag of "disqualified" used by the authorities and protested to remove the tag. They are mostly involved in different profession and mainly in labor works.

Status of PLA Voluntarily Retired

The voluntarily retired PLAs were found in different status of livelihood. They got one time support of five to eight lakhs of Nepalese Rupees as relief fund for new startups. Some of the PLAs were found mis use of fund and some utilized in entrepreneurial activities. One of the PLAs unemployed indicated that the increase in crime and violation of rules and regulations has been increase due to PLAs misuse of resource and being unemployed at present. The wounded have got survival allowance regularly though the amount is small. They demanded the increase in the support and support for family welfare.

Rehabilitation Package, Compensation, and Meditation

Only six PLAs chose the rehabilitation package and this was not the interest of majority PLAs during integration. The ones who chose the package, attended vocational and technical education from CTEVT and other technical institutes under peace and reconstruction program of MOPR. They are few in number and are doing business and employed in the relevant areas of their expertise. In an interview, one of the PLA rehabilitated demanded that they need career development and business support packages for further sustaining their life.

Formation of YCL and Urban Revolt

Party led policy of using the PLAs in different roles also created the use of then urban revolt. During the focus group discussion, most of them agreed that around 3000 PLAs after first round of verification, came out and involved in urban revolt. Some of the PLAs involved in an interview said that they were not carried on verification process and could not get formal identity and even party didnot supported financially as committed. Mean time the Young Communist League was formed by the Maoist Party thinking to mobilize unorganized youths in line with party politics. Most of the leaders were from PLAs and they also recruited the cadres and educated them. The people involved in YCL strongly demanded that it was the best alternative to recruit the young ones for preparing further movment. The YCL movement also created demand, increased bargaining power and was useful in constitutional assembly election. Some of them also pointed out that other parliamentary parties also imitated the similar force for counter action.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission


Truth and Reconciliation was mandatory provisioned to form in interim constitution for the long lasting reconciliation of conflict affected people and to reintegrate the society.

The conflict to its modality and functioning were in debate and continuously derailed for long time. It made a crucial issue of violating human rights and problems on justice as well as increased immunities to people involved in criminal activities. In an interaction, people demanded the prompt action to be taken by truth and reconciliation commission for the reintegration in the society. The two commissions formed have not yet been functional to the date.

Constitution Assembly

The formation of constitution through constitution assembly was the main agenda of peace process as one of the visible transformation of the society through political and social scenario. During the time of first constitution assembly, 38% PLAs were elected out of total seats owned by CPN (Maoist). The failure of first constitution assembly and loss of people's mandate in second round made the bargaining power decline for addressing the issues of state restructure and inclusion. Figure 4.2 shows the ratings of PLAs' involvement in constitution assembly.

Figure 4.2 : Role of PLA in Making Constitution



Source: Field Survey, 2014

Figure 4.2 shows that, 35% of the respondents agreed on the role of PLAs as careful involvement in peace process by the parties, 28% rated creation of pressure using PLAs, 25% for demanding inclusive participation, and only 12% rated spreading political awareness in the society. On the other hand, the number of people killed by security forces and Maoists were also increased in number enormously. The table 4.3 demonstrates the deaths record and have proved that, most of PLAs were indigenous and from the caste of Chhetri/ Thakuri.

Achievements and Constributions of People's War

From the above results analyzed, the people interviewed regarding mukti sena can be summarized as the achievements and contributions towards the transformations of the society as the formation of interim Constitution, the establishment of the Public Service Commission, establishment of Pardhan Nayalaya (Supreme Court), establishment of Radio Nepal, the Advisory Assembly, abolition of the Birta (Rent-free land), System, economic welfare measures, reform in education and culture and national integration.

In the same way, PLA contributed for transformation and development of the society and political resolution as end of the monarchy, beginning of republic, change in power equation, state restructuring and federalism, addressing women's issues, identity for dalit and marginalised groups, discussion on nationality and national security, change in political-ideological thinking and cultural transformation. Similarly, the respondents also pointed out that the maoist movement in the country also contributed in the areas of institutional transformation, decentralization, right of self-determination and affirmative Action. The table 4.11 summarizes the achievements and contributions of the people's war in general.

Table 4.11:

Understanding Basic Approaches of Dealing with Conflict and Peace Building

Approaches	Conceptual focus	Dominant conflict behaviour
Conflict Management	Power	Contain conflict and maintain peace by containing aggressions and violence by alliances, balance of power, coercive conflict behaviors, collective security, border sealing .
	Values	Encourage and promote execution of ethical and legal norms and provisions such as Geneva convention and other international human rights laws and social justice, principled or moral conflict behavior, etc.
Dispute settlement	Interests	Focus on win-win solution by encouraging parties in dispute. Disconnect interests from positions, problem solving approach from co-operative behavior
Conflict resolution	Needs	Encourage to respect for other party's needs seek

		to identify and acknowledge, the legitimacy and relevance of needs, explore alternatives .
Conflict transformation	Relationships	Develop empathy for other party's needs by transforming stereotypes and perceptions about self and other party .Empathetic and transformative conflict behavior .
Conflict transformation	Toxic memories	Transforming stereotypically based memories of responses to conflict build upon negative memories,emotions ,fear,anger,resentment and agony,etc.
Conflict prevention	Human dimension	Looks on phenomenon of conflict and its human dimensions. Not merely the conditions that create an environment of conflict and the structural changes required removing it, but more importantly, the promotion of conditions that create cooperative relationships.

Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the overall picture of the research milieu and the report on the data collected during the research study to determine whether the first research question had been answered. Data analysis through conceptual framework established three main categories: growth and development of PLAs; people's war, and socio political transformation of the feudal society. The socio political transformation of the Nepalese society was described through four broad categories of data: observations of condition of PLAs and interactions including their experience and views; interviews related to socio political transformation; inventories of cantonment management; and achievements of people's war. These data were analyzed to identify how people's war approach was being used in the transformation of Nepalese society, and how PLAs helped people understand social transformation. Findings from both the observation and field notes indicated that to some extent, the PLA approach was implemented successfully. The next Chapter focuses on the discussion over the themes generated from the results presented so far, perceiving people's war, and impact of the war from the results presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS: SETTINGS FROM THE GROUND

In previous chapters, the first hand data were presented based on the evidences collected from the field. This chapter deals with the discussion of the results presented in previous chapter. The general objectives of this study are to explore the role of people's liberation army in the political transformation of Nepal, to analyze the hindering and fostering factors of management of the people's liberation army and to assess the problems and corrective measures of integration and rehabilitation of the people's liberation army. The following themes arouse from the results discussed so far.

Assessing the Problems of Integration of People's Liberation Army

The rural communities in sample areas, Rolpa, Dailekh, Gorkha, Sindhuli, Nawalparasi and Bardiya, were found with lack of feeling dignity and identity in national scenario. Geographical conditions of Bara and Rautahat were found difficult of state assimilation. The integration policy was realized more favored to state army. The quick withdrawal of UNMIN was another huddle for loosing the ground of facilitating agent. The changing role of JMCC was not found with coherent replacement of UNMIN. The financial benefit made available to voluntary retired ones, wounded ones, and for those unverified ones was rated insufficient to restore minimal life activities in the community. The question of unverification was more technical and it led to them in the form of psychological discriminatory tag in the society. The vocational training was supply based and rated as

marginal and nominal not sufficient even to start small enterprise in the community.

Provision of demand based training and business ideas and market mapping were not found in the process of integration. Integration of PLAs in National Army was under the rules and criteria of Nepalese state army slightly amended in their regulations. The PLAs integrated were found discriminated in their status, roles and responsibilities. The 35% PLA and 65% National Armies made very strong feeling of minority in the batalion. The major problem of integration was found in the team of negotiators where the PLAs who integrated had no chance to bargain for themselves. Political leaders who were not the part of integration played pessimistic role rather making it optimistic.

Safety and Protection of the Environment and Territory

The protected areas by PLAs previously reared through the commune, grooming of social and financial institution and people's court were not considered for integration. The community safe guard policies were not implemented to ensure socio political transformation and legitimization of activities carried out during the dejure and defacto governance. The possibility of occurrence of conflict is more and the PLA protected areas were found conflict prone. PLA during people's war handed over the lands to the community which people thought their right for themselves for farming and other business purposes. Similarly, most of the lands captured from landlords were forced to return back and peasants felt loss of their rights and being insulted by the mother party led governments during the conflict resolution and peace process. The issues were felt needed to be properly managed and justice to be given through truth and reconciliation commission to make them harmonized. The safety measures and protection strategies felt still needed to be intervened in the territories.

Hindering and Fostering Factors of the Management of PLA

The PLA realized that one of the hindering factors of affecting people's war was technical know how about the different geographical diversities and obstacles. The influence of NGOs/ INGOs made it difficult to expand the territory and move against the opponents. The state policy was another hurdle for carrying out the rules and regulations in the base areas and for the legitimization of people's court established. The bilateral and multilateral diplomatic pressures, their influence on raising issues of humanitarian activities, human rights preservation were found more crucial. The lack of financial, physical and human resources in the rural areas to cope with the problems of management was another obstacle to fight against the state during people's war. The researcher felt that the influence of media, and effective use of latest communication technology in warfare was worthy achievements of PLAs success.

In comparison to the buffer zone districts, the villagers of the districts where the communes were established like Rolpa, Rukum and Dolpa districts were found to be more favorable to practice the new people's society. People of this region were more aware of social justice, and collective welfare activities. The socio political training modules based on Marxist philosophy, people's education system were reported effective and useful to groom the young ones for the future leadership.

The rural setting of the Nepalese landscape, geographical diversity, open boundaries with the Indian border and old defunct local government made the suitable environment for guerilla warfare in Nepal. The state policy of uni language, suppress of indigenous people, gender discrimination, caste based discrimination, and regional imbalance of development activities made the situation more favorable to participate in

the PLAs to restore their rights. The war strategy adopted by the PLAs was backed up by the trainings provided by ex- armies and their involvement in war. The lessons learned from the past armed conflict of Nepal by different parliamentary parties inspired them to move ahead.

Rise of Consciousness: Learning by Doing

The ex PLAs in sample districts were found not agreed for returning back to normal life without the fulfillment of objectives of people's war. The PLAs in Rolpa, Jajarkot and Dolakha were with more economic deprivation in comparison to other sample districts. The PLA members reported that they were aware about the protection of local people and the economically poor ones through socio economic activities making exercise of the new people's democracy. They raised the awareness level of people and approach was learning by doing. The rules and regulations were developed in some PLA territories but most of the lands were used for the agro production. The government agencies and NGOs have not addressed the groups that were prioritized by the PLAs. They included participation of women and suppressed castes; inter caste marriage, and protection of the families tortured by the state armed forces.

Move towards Commune

With the cohesive ties among the diversity, people do not have differences in their social phenomenon if the commune system is established. PLA members helped each other during the people's war as well as during conflict situation. Among the diversity there is uniformity in socio-economic activities. The perception towards commune and collaborative works among different ethnicity, found more effective in poor and Dalit

communities. The multi sectoral intervention on the improvement of commune practices was felt needed in the sample districts. The socio-cultural, economic and education interventions were reported more complementary for the improvement of living standard in the society for the newly formed practice of new people's democracy.

Nurturing and Cultivation of New People's Democracy

The initiatives for the practice of new people's democracy were found safe in case of growing social institutions, people's court for justice, de jure and de facto governance in the localities where PLAs provided securities to nurture and groom them. The community people were trained to cope with the situation. They were found mostly in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot and Dailekh. The possibility of expansion of the democratic activities relied on the success of expansion of the buffer zones from where the state rules declined to function. They had prepared their constitution for handling social activities to cultivate and nurture new people's democracy. The PLAs were involved to intervene for the maintenance and management of governance principles in the community through the drill and simulation of activities.

Without, Within and Beyond Integration of PLA

The ex-PLAs and leaders from different regions agreed that the sudden fall of the PLAs integrated demonstrated that there could be another alternative of peaceful settlement of the conflict without the integration of them in the National Armies. More number of PLAs chose the voluntary retirement. If the retirement package was attractive all would be in line to take voluntary retirement. The vocational and entrepreneurial skill for the settlement in the society would be one of the alternative offers in this regard. The

disarmament was considerable in their experience but the unequal treatment between two armies made them psychologically harassed to be integrated with the National Army.

The PLAs integrated in the national army pointed out that if all PLAs were integrated in the national army, sole integration would National Army be strong and there could be expansion of service areas like industrial security, development of infrastructure, forest conservation and border securities. There could be reduction in crime, justifiable resolution in conflict, low cost in recruitment and increase in national unity.

Different issues remained unanswered beyond the integration of PLAs in the National Army. The community people who involved in commune and who got justice through people's court responded that there is still unanswered verdict of people's court and collapse of commune. The cooperatives and other social institutions remained questioned to move ahead. Truth and reconciliation has not yet been practically and effectively conducted that has created a number of problems in the families of war victims.

Increased Institutional Delivery

The Behavioral Change Communication practices in economic improvement have been implemented since the beginning of people's war through social institutions in PLA led territories. During this study, one FGD was conducted with people of the commune that demonstrated high recall of the delays in decision about future strategies to them, its management and management of the fund. The voluntarily retired PLA members knew all the ways of handling different institution including schools, health institutions, financial institutions, social institutions and did not hesitate to complain against political

leaders for their irresponsible behavior towards the settlement of the issues to continue the social institutions. During the field visit, observation tours found that even members from the community expressed their dissatisfaction with discriminatory behavior in practice. Overall, the qualitative data suggested that the awareness of community members has been increased but the existing local leaders were not ready to provide services at present. There is considerable improvement in political consciousness with much frustration from the political leaders, created demand of services, more hopes and the expectation of long term planning of social transformation and restructuring.

Exchange of Ideas on Cross Ground Learning

The PLAs from Sindhupalchok and Baglung pointed out that during people's war they shared ideas from people of different areas, different professions and expert's views for collective decision making but the PLA leaders were not considered as key people for deciding the alternative options in peaceful resolution. If mass integration was made for PLAs, their war led guerilla warfare experience would be another step for learning to National Army. The voluntary retired PLAs annoyed with the leaders that they could not get any options of using their skills that they learned during the people's war. In Chitwan, Khara and Gorkha people were forced to leave with lack of security and protection during people's war. They learned the ideas of coping with hardship life with fewer facilities of resources for livelihood improvement. The PLA members reported that the leaders made the strategy to divide the group into many mini groups and neglected responsibilities in managing their resettlement for derailing the settlement process for long time.

Measures Taken against the Integration and Rehabilitation

The different approaches of integration and rehabilitation were found practiced in different countries in the past for the similar situation of conflict resolution. The Disarmament Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) model and Security Sector Reform (SSR) were more practiced with the facilitating role of UN agencies and other international agencies in armed conflict resolution. However, the participants claimed that Nepal adopted different strategy than the strategies used in other countries. They further claimed that it was partly DDR and partly SSR along with additional dimensions for peaceful resolution. The establishment of Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction was vital in this regard for state ownership. Regular Compensation has been managed for war victims focusing on severity of effects of war. The arms stored in the container were equally shared by PLAs and National Army. Some exemplary entrepreneur developed with the support of vocational training set another mile stone of lesson learned. The formation of truth and reconciliation commission has created a little hope for addressing remaining issues of the resolution. Martyr's Foundation established has been a tool for caring and rearing the children for their health and education.

Harassment in Integration

Most of the PLAs who first selected the option for integration but later chose voluntarily retirement, expressed that they were continuously harassed for integrating in National Army. The criteria for recruitment and training dominated by National Army were not in favor of their age, physical condition and justice in line agreement made previously. The delay in the process of integration with poor management of PLA camps made them go for voluntary retirement. The financial compensation was felt insufficient to resettle in

the community with their family. The respondents believed that the mother parties and state actors continuously created psychosocial adverse environment for the timely settlement of the issues regarding integration. The PLA members also pointed out that they were given less space in Party Politics. The poor management of cantonment was another hurdle for the PLAs to move out of the camp. The lack of fulfilling commitments made in the past made it more frustrating for the respectful integration of PLAs.

Entrepreneurial Development of Youths

UNMIN involved in the peaceful resolution of the conflict, offered the vocational training and entrepreneurial support through UNDP. Under the UNDP programme, UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRIP) was launched focused for Ex- PLA who was known as tagged 'Unverified' from being regular army members of the PLA. At the request of Government of Nepal, UNRIP was established in 2010 to provide support through counseling, training and education to facilitate their return to civilian life with improved sustainable livelihood options. It provided support through counseling, training and education to facilitate their return to civilian life with improved sustainable livelihood options. UNIRIP its five regional offices and a board network of implementing partners offered innovative support, responsive to the emerging needs.

Although the support offered was very few in numbers but the exemplary youth PLAs from Nawalparasi, Pyuthan, and Bhaktapur demonstrated that they have run successful enterprises.

Vocational Training

Tailoring, Off- Seasonal vegetables, Dhaka weaving, community live-stock, Building

electrician, cook, mobile repairer, light vehicles driver, carpentry, solar PV, plumber etc. By different 295 service providers, the training was launched 3 months with 390 hrs trainings. The rehabilitation programme through voluntary in nature, faced a series of challenges especially during the initial one and half years. Many of the unverified PLAs came with unrealistically, high expectations, and psychosocial distress due to war-time experience and showed frustration and anger towards UNIRP staff, however, as the participants began to see positive changes in their lives through UNIRP interventions their attitudes and aptitudes significantly improved. The changes of the political dynamics and an emerging conducive environment through peace building activities also upheld through rehabilitation. With collaboration and led by UNDP, UNIRP, UNICEF, UNFPA, ILO coming together for rehabilitation of unverified PLAs for various programme aiming to discharged PLAs from military to civilian life by providing them with training and education to access employment and livelihood opportunities. Training programmes were related to individual career counseling, psycho-social support, business, mentoring, health support, socio-economic support, gender specific support and peace building activities. The programme was funded by the UN Peace fund for Nepal a Multi-donor Trust Fund supported by the government of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. The entire programme was categories in four fields: Vocational Skills Training, Micro enterprises, Education and Health related training. About 69% trainees were found self-employed.

Achievements and Pit falls of Integration

The integration of the PLAs based on their will power were given chance to integration based on their qualification and experiences in different ranks in Nepalese Army. The

integrated PLAs realized that despite of culture and ideological differences, though in few numbers, the integration became successful. The activities now going on towards the harmonization of armies from both sides in 35% (PLAs) and 65% (National Army) ratio. The PLAs integrated were successful in training and assessment courses set by Nepal Army. However, the PLAs integrated with frustration said that responsibilities and roles were not clearly delegated to them in general. PLAs also commented that they were discriminated for getting long term benefits from being integrated such as they were not given pension, provident fund and other benefits based on the the duration they joined in PLA or from the day they were identified by UNMIN.

Influence of Political Wing of PLA in Integration

The PLA members in Dolakha and in Lalitpur pointed out that the political wing of PLA, the party leaders, the commissars could not get position and part of integration. The less involvement of PLA leaders themselves missed opportunity of bargaining and demanding of more benefits. The political leaders detached themselves from the PLAs and remained unaware about derail of peace process and its negative consequences over PLAs in camps. The voluntary retired ones reported that they have been more aware for negative consequences of delay in integration. The truth and reconciliation has not been yet in action because of loss of PLA status after the integration. However, the PLA leaders gave the political leaders for at least they became successful in integration process and establishment of truth and reconciliation commission.

Quick Loss of Bargaining Power in Negotiation

The PLA members of all sample study without hesitation reported that their quick loss of bargaining power was due to quick withdrawal of UNMIN influence. Disarmament was another part of losing the ground of demanding from the state actors. The segregation of the PLAs as unverified, voluntary retired and integration divided the strength of PLAs for demanding from equality perspective. The victims of people's war in Bara and in Rautahat were not found supported by the political leaders in the locality for managing livelihoods and basic facilities for their family members. They have established one cooperative to manage the financial resources in war victim's common welfare. The ex PLAs who selected voluntary retirement, one who were unverified, and those woulded ones were found with financial crisis. The lack of experience of State ruling in party cadres made the loss of bargaining power and decisions were not in favor of PLAs. The diplomatic pressure was suspected as another factor that was not in favor of PLAs' long term welfare solution.

Question of Identity/ Dignity of Suppressed People

People of the region where conflict was in extreme state during the people's war believe that the objective of the conflict was to establish the identity of the suppressed group of the country in constitution. However, it has not yet been settled and ensured. The scheduled castes still feel discrimination in practice. The awareness has been raised but the demand has not yet been fulfilled. The state restructuration and involvement of all minorities in different level of state power exercise has remained questioned.

The ex-PLA expressed their views that the major objective of the war has not been fulfilled and the conflict resolution activities are not completely settled, it is only temporary solution and needs to be readdressed. Otherwise, the conflict may regenerate in different form in future. The indigenusness, identity of language, dress, rituals, race, geographical occupancy and resource mobilization were demanded to set the identity of the communities. Self determination in local governance, participation in state structure and inclusiveness were other dimensions demanded by participants for establishing identity.

Emersion of YCL

The younger the age of people, more knowledge, practice and positive thinking, behaviour can be found. The statement about the by product or outgrowth of integration was formation of Young Communist League (YCL), others perceived that these are the problems to transfer from bullet to ballot, majority of people disagreed with these statements. The respondents of this research, most of them agreed with the YCL's contribution on maintaining the bargaining power with the parliamentary parties. Only the YCL became useful tool in crisis. The YCL played as vital tool for enhancing peacefull political movements and creating demands from the street. In focus group discussion, ex-PLAs pointed out that YCL would be the useful platform for grooming young leaders and for party schooling in changing scenario of the politics.

Besides the contribution on peacefull resolution of conflict, transformation of the war led activities to non-voilence movements, YCL were also found effective on controlling crime, corruption and facilitiating on quick social justice in the rural settings. The changing role of socio-political transformation demanded the role of YCL for

supporting urban revolt as one of the agenda and increasing the power of bargaining in strategy.

Derail in Making Constitution

Most of the participants agreed that the agenda of forming new constitution is the sole agenda of New People's Movement at present but parliamentary parties did not take ownership in practice. The derail in making constitution has made shed back on state autonomy and state restructuration towards federalism. The issues of identity, unilateral language policies, cultural discrimination and secularism have remained unaddressed properly. The lack of consensus on different issues led to dissolve the first constitution assembly and ex-PLA mother political party loss its vote of support in second constitutional assembly election. The new composition of the second constitution assembly has derailed the voices raised during the people's war and agenda for constitution design.

Chapter Summary

The researcher discussed in main themes focusing on socio-political transformation of feudal society to democratic people's society based on the diversity in different communities from the findings of the knowledge, practice and behavior (attitude) among different variables. The guerilla warfare and socio economic development activities related the experience of the research participants. Having the knowledge, it could not claim that they have good practice, all the data were primary and pointed from the experienced participants who were practicing for many years by observation, helping, participating different orientation meetings, discussing with informers in their own life

time. The researcher also spent many years on educating and managing activist, planners and implementer, monitor, and researcher. The experience of the researcher added the value to write this thesis.

The next chapter deals with the presentation of the summary, conclusion and implications of the study.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

Introduction

This is the final chapter that begins with the drawing of summary followed by conclusion of the research study. As the final part of the study report, this chapter provides a synopsis of the study. Chapter four, and five offered an explicit account of the outcomes of the research. It also results with the conclusion and implications of the research findings and recommendations for further research.

Summary

The researcher has considered that the central point of launching any reform activities in socio political sector demands strong philosophical belief, strategic options of socio political transformation and development interventions as a unit of reform. People's Liberation Army in Political Transformation as a Nepalese Perspective of Conflict Resolution is the theme of the present study focusing on socio political and development perspectives of transformation from feudal society to people's democratic society. A single statement of the problem was devised to govern the total research study. The statement was stated as – “To What Extent People's Liberation Army Contributed in the Political Transformation of Nepal for Resolving Conflict?”

The main aim of the study was to analyze the current thinking in communist ideology, different associated theories and effective practices, so as to explore existing

environments, operational modalities and events of PLAs; suggest a conflict management design framework relevant to the present context of the societal transformation of the feudal society into the people's democratic society in Nepal; and derive the implications of PLAs' strategic design approach, and sustainability of integration and rehabilitation of the PLAs. A set of four research questions was formulated to make the study more specific and to carry out the analysis and drawing conclusion in more precise manner.

1. What were the major roles of people's liberation army for the political transformation of Nepal?
2. What were the hindering and fostering factors of the people's liberation army?
3. What were the problems faced during integration and rehabilitation of the liberation army after political resolution?
4. What could be the possible measures to overcome the problems of integration and rehabilitation of the liberation army?

The researcher performed in depth theoretical reviews followed by a series of literature reviews from the related research papers, articles, books and other sources. Unaddressed issues were identified and an integrated framework was designed as a theoretical framework to guide the study.

The researcher used exploratory cum descriptive mixed methods study design to explore the practice of the PLAs for the socio political transformation of the feudal society into the people's democratic society, and to explore how the tactics and strategies adopted by the PLAs influenced the transformation processes. The data collection strategies that provided the researcher evidence of PLAs roles on socio political transformation were: observational evidence, interviews with the key informants, leaders, and activists, and community leaders. Similarly, the data collection strategies that

provided the researcher evidence of PLAs' roles were: observational evidence; interviews, and inventories. The good practices were identified on the basis of questionnaire and other research tools.

During analysis and presentation, the data analysis framework was used. The qualitative data were transcribed and coded accordingly. The discussion was focused on congruencies of the Marxist, Leninist and Maoist Ideologies, socio political and development interventions, and practices of PLAs interventions for transformation. The findings were illustrated on the basis of research questions and specific objectives. The research results were categorized under the social and developmental theories, people's war strategies and good practices of PLAs in socio political transformation. The themes were generated during the discussion that may contribute to the Nepalese socio political practitioners in the community level and their leaders who are aspiring for new people's democratic revolution.

Conclusion

An exploratory cum descriptive mixed methods research study was employed for the purpose of this study as a way of conducting research for testing and refining system of socio political transformation through PLAs, existing problems, solutions and methods. The research was not, however, aimed simply at refining practice, but also at refining both theory and practice. Conclusions were derived based on the findings and discussions of the research presented in chapter four, and five which include the following considerations.

A PLA leader as a strategic leader and facilitator demonstrated the potentiality to perform successful interventions of conflict transformation in the direction of theoretical

underpinning of Marxism and Leninism backed up by Maoism to move from feudal society to new people's democratic society. PLAs played socio political reform strategies backed up by warfare movements including development interventions, power exercise, rule of law, ensuring practice environment, decentralization, and de jure and de facto governance failures. Guerilla strategies developed on the basis of maoist ideology enhanced the PLA's ability to manage social transformation.

Categories were generated from the PLAs' experiences and their individual and collective input after settlement of the PLA issues through reintegration, rehabilitation and management of unverified PLAs in the society. The generation of the categories was guided by the socio political and development theories. The PLAs indicated that the warfare practices were friendly and helpful for social cohesion which helped them to intervene development activities much better and with understanding. Furthermore, in their interaction with the tools, they were able to collaborate and cooperate in the function of institutions and people's court, helping them to support the needy people as well. Both the PLA members and their leaders, political leaders accepted that the questions on the tools were thought-provoking and they had to motivate when choosing a particular answer. However, a few members indicated that they would prefer to reintegration of PLAs, entrepreneurial training support in voluntary retirement through the government mechanism or those they should be supported primarily by the local government bodies and thereafter using the settlement of PLA issues in long run. Despite the fact that a few preferred to receive the financial resources from the government to resettle in the normal life along with hand to mouth supplement, the majority of the members' reflections on the tools demonstrated that they were in extra modes in helping them transfer their ways to their authentic working environment, that is, to their day to

day works.

The role of UNMIN was rated effective and in the same time political parties missed opportunities in bargaining, and for quick settlement of PLAs it was rated as partial success. The integration of the PLAs was ended successfully but data illustrated that the integration process was more technical and not according to the ways that the unverified, voluntarily retired and integrated demanded. Most of the respondents expressed the views of delay on settling related problems like respectful management of war victims, their families, families of martyrs, justice for suppressed people, career development plan of their family members. The identity issue remained questioned.

The incorporation of different practice models together with the exercise of power offered community people the opportunity to consider the ways from different points of view for improving social justice and development. The findings authenticated that PLA members acknowledged the value of the tools and helped them to reason in demonstrating practical problems in the adverse environment.

Practices of the social transformation strategies through the PLAs gave the political leaders and activists ideas (theoretical knowledge) for solving practical domestic day to day problems in maintenance of livelihood and justice. One PLA member pointed out that in order to solve practical problems one needs theoretical knowledge: the combination of theory and practice is indispensable in the real life situation. The findings affirmed that the PLA modality presented through the better understanding in solving practical problem of warfare strategies. This was borne out by the reflection of one PLA member that working with war victims is a concrete experience and accessing the support helped in solving practical problems. It was evident from the members' experiences of the guerilla warfare strategies that the design and use resulted in their quality

improvement. Observation showed that PLA members confidently interacted and engaged with the content of the tools. Furthermore, they said that they were motivated to learn the practical skills using modern information and technology. Reflecting on the field notes, PLA members were also motivated because the modern technology is the 'in' thing, and the participatory management practice of PLAs allowed them to revisit parts of the system that they had had difficulty in adjustment.

Most significantly, several congruencies emerged between those themes and others, that is, communist ideology, social and development perspectives and conflict resolution principles respectively. Both the PLA members and the political leaders mentioned that they realized the lost opportunities of conflict resolution mechanism adopted in Nepal and its ultimate results. In general, the PLA members expressed the opinion that the practice of socio political transformation through the guerilla strategies was excellent and they were in control of the territory, even if one was not familiar with the system, that is, it was 'user-friendly'.

The practice of sociopolitical transformation were found as the power struggle, federal restructuration of the state, defacto and de jure governance, establishment and practice of people's court, building up of social and developmental institutions and ultimately the practice of commune. The people's liberation army seemed the key and central phenomena to be around the all transformation practices during the people's war. The people's liberation army were found involved in all the levels and in all areas to maintain, and the institution functional during the war.

Within the context of management perspectives, commune system of social structure and its practice was another strategy of transformation adopted by the people's liberation army. Various departments were found existed within the commune for

management; people's mobilization, mess department and agriculture and livestock department, economic department, health and sanitation department etc. The mass genocide of the 12 persons, the participants in a mirrgae ceremony at Jajrkot's Daha VDC in 1998 by the police led the helpless family member of those killed to form commune for the first time. It was realized by the majority of the respondents as the effective tool for social transformation of the community.

Transformation of the feudal society towards people's democratic society mainly focused on Institutional transformation, decentralization, right to identity and self-determination, empowerment and inclusiveness of women and other deprived people, which were found the most pressing needs to be addressed in order to produce a positive change in Nepal. The transformation was towards the reduction of gap between haves and have nots, rural and urban, consciousness of the people and rise of their awareness. The approach was geared up through active participation of all categories of people in all the areas of intervention backed up by people's liberation army.

From the above conclusion, the three integrated principles (Marxist Philosophy backed up by Maoist ideology, socio political and development theories and practice of people's war strategies) determined the extent to which the PLA concept was (un) successful. It was found that, to a large extent, the implementations of the community empowerment strategies were in line with the guerilla warfare techniques derived from the principles generated in the theoretical framework.

The field notes recorded from the participants' interpretation of the existing situation demonstrated that PLA members wished that all their strengths were on the integrated practice and for it was a motivating and interesting way of transforming social pattern. However, not all the members preferred the mechanism as a method of social

welfare: some preferred to use the constructive strategies rather than the destructive strategies for transforming the social structures.

Contributions of the Research

The study has made a contribution to the field of socio political transformation of the feudal society towards the new people's democratic revolution through People's war strategies. The study confirmed pointing out that the articulation between people's war by the PLAs and development principles are in line with the guerilla warfare strategies. A set of revolutionary principles was extracted in the course of the research which may be used as a framework for the design of new people's democratic society in Nepalese context. The design framework was generated by the mixed method research methodology. The second contribution of the study is in the field of management of the PLAs through voluntary retirement, reintegration in national army and resolution of the socio political conflict. The design and use of PLAs and the assessment of the role of the them in socio political transformation through people's war strategy was, indeed, meaningful.

The main aim of the study was to explore the people's warfare strategies, based on maoist perspective that accommodates the suppressed people of the feudal society for the establishment of their identity, dignity and right to rule the society. Furthermore, the research was denoted to construct a theoretical knowledge framework for the design and use of the people's war strategies by identifying congruencies between the components of Marxist perspectives on socio political transformation, the socio economic and development interventions and people's war strategies. This aim was achieved by generating a framework for the design and use of PLA concepts in line with new people's

democratic revolution. This framework can be used as a baseline for similar purpose in the future. The design framework addressed issues of management, community mobilization, and the accommodation of PLA members' roles and responsibilities. No such design framework clustering the dimensions of socio political transformation of the feudal society to the people's democratic society, found in the relevant literature.

After the analysis of the three dimensions, it became evident that several congruencies exist between them as illustrated in theoretical framework. In spite of that, a relationship was apparent between the conflict resolution principles that were derived from livelihood empowerment perspective and those from participatory approach. Further, the PLA mobilization and leadership management were congruent with both the participation and decentralization principles. Theoretical principles were derived to guide the practice and to inform future designs. The mixed method study research is regarded as an intervention and was followed to conduct the research work with respect to testing and refining a socio political transformation design. This method provided a valuable window to see through what happens when PLA involvement and participation innovations are brought into guerilla warfare settings. This research, therefore, made a practical, scientific and management contribution and ensured a more productive inquiry.

From the PLA members' perceptions and experiences it can be inferred that the research was carried out successfully. Those particular aspects of the integrated framework that were engineered into people's empowerment were experienced positively by the PLA members.

Implications of the Study Results

The focus of the study was on socio political transformation of the feudal society into the people's democratic society and its enabling influence in new people's democratic revolution. The researcher came to this study with a background in PLA participation, a belief in the livelihood enhancement and an understanding for the need of social integration in the society today. The concise integrated model is helpful to document the successful experiences to construct their understanding of concepts to be implemented for new people's movement.

Philosophical Implications

The massive construction of knowledge in the world has created a problem that we can no longer attempt to anticipate future information requirements. If people are to keep pace with the rapid increase of knowledge, we cannot continue to organize PLAs in ritual principles as we have known them, no longer exist. They are being replaced by human inquiry that draws upon generalized trans-disciplinary bodies of knowledge and relationships.

In order to claim that one is a PLA leader, there are certain philosophical implications to the way one entertains socio political transformation. These philosophical implications do indeed lead to best practices in the people's war and guerilla techniques. Some of the practices that were common amongst all the models were a greater understanding of maoist ideology and socio political empowerment models, group involvement using economic development strategies, active involvement (hands-on - heads-on), personal input from PLA members regarding relevant information, sustainable

environments, integration of livelihood component, interaction, discussion and reflection, and flexibility of the members in both learning and management strategies.

Implications for Political parties, Political diplomats and Freedom Fighters

People's war model of conflict resolution has important implications for political parties, political diplomats and freedom fighters. Political leaders sometimes confuse leadership theory and management theory believing that leaders should avoid setting clear goals, guiding instruction, or correcting followers' misconceptions. PLA practice approach supports none of these practices. The practice emphasizes high-quality examples and representations of suppressed people, high levels of members' interaction, and leader connected to the real world. Managers who ground their role in PLA realized that dictatorship and top down approach of planning often failed to promote deep understanding in members.

If PLA members must apply their current understandings in new situations in order to build new knowledge, political parties must engage members in planning, bringing their current understandings to the forefront. PLA members can ensure that their active involvement incorporate problems that are important to them, not those that are primarily important to others and the political system. Leaders can also encourage group interaction, where the interplay among participants helps individual members become explicit about their own understanding by comparing it to that of their peers. If new knowledge is actively built, then time is needed to build it. Ample time facilitates member's reflection about new experiences, how those experiences line up against current understandings, and how a different understanding might provide them with an improved (not 'correct') view of the world.

The political diplomats who share the cross country cohesion of harmonized

bilateral and multilateral relationships get knowledge from the peaceful settlement of the conflicts led by people's war strategies. The socio political transformation of the Nepalese society through the people's war strategies has set a miracle to the other countries and peace and development as well as humanitarian activists to learn a lesson for replicating similar events in other countries. The freedom fighters of other countries who are engaged on prolonged ever ending civil war can learn from the Nepalese perspective of conflict resolution and socio-political transformation of the society.

Implications to the UN & Humanitarian Agencies, and Development Activists

Another implication of the findings is to include more empowerment strategies to give facilitators and development activists an intense opportunity to examine local situation of ex-PLAs. The data indicated that the key informants demonstrated a higher level of understanding of the importance of ex-PLA mobilization. Giving the PLA members more opportunities in the group performing can enhance conceptual understanding of the concepts being applied. Enhanced management investigations can actively involve ex-PLA members in carrying out the processes of restoring development infrastructures, management of rehabilitation and economic activities by moving from observing and participating to demonstrating entrepreneurial activities. The expectations were higher in the community people. Influence of facilitation practice is extremely needed for the skill development, and innovation in the socio-economic development sector.

Implications for the Government agencies

The peaceful resolution of the conflict among the political parties involves communication, motivation, involvement techniques and methods, physical environment and discipline and evaluation. Ex-PLA members' engagement, leaders asking questions

rather than giving directions, and hearing members' voices are implied to participatory socio political activities. There is no punishment, no prize but there is intrinsic motivation in ex PLAs. Members are motivated by their livelihood improvement and benefits themselves. The techniques and methods involve encouragement of members' direct involvement through discussion, group-work, members' presentation, debates, simulations, brainstorming and individual study. Political Leader and bureaucratic leaders accepts individual differences, and encourages for higher level thinking and planning for future.

The government agencies should involve on better policy options for state restructuration, autonomy and inclusiveness in all sectors of the state. Learned lessons and good practices should be evaluated and replicated.

Implication to the Practitioners for Truth and Reconciliation

Another implication of this study is to apply different Truth and Reconciliation practices. From the findings, it can be seen that not all the ex-PLA members were successful in improving livelihood. Even though the ex-PLA leader was identified as transformative cum innovative leader, one male leader demonstrated in the 'bitter experience' range. The practitioners of Truth and Reconciliation can learn from the views of war victims, family members of the disappeared ones, martyr's families, and the wounded ex-PLAs for their respectful justice, closing the gap between the two anti groups so formed during the civil war. Additional research is needed to further explore this relationship between gender, assessment strategies, participatory planning, and the resource use of the country.

Implications for the Welfare of War Victims and Veterans

This approach of peaceful resolution of the people's war is a guideline for the vocational and technical educators to adapt the skills and technology based on the available resources and localization of technology through war victims, veterans and wounded PLA members. The levels of participation in the adaptation of profession are linked to their chance of getting the resources in their own pace. If technical and vocational educators are to make the necessary changes in moving towards training the ex-PLA members, they need to be aware with the type of resource, amount and quality of resource available in the territory. Minor changes in technical and vocational educators' practices, as described above, can effectively convey to war victims and Veterans that what they think and say.

Implications for the Integrated, Unverified and Voluntarily retired PLAs

PLA members taking responsibility of involving in a group, led by own ideas, informed by ideas of others, participate in maintaining the social cohesion, listen to others, prepares individual constructed act in a milieu of social interaction/ negotiation. These people allows members to interact with real-life experiences and construct mental structures that provide an understanding of their surroundings. In order for members to develop these mental structures, they must refine the skills needed to solve the problems they encounter in practicing their livelihood. The unverified or voluntarily retired PLAs rather than the integrated ones, are responsible for organizing information, exploring workable environments, conducting entrepreneurial activities and monitoring their own involvement. The integrated PLAs needed to learn about the culture of state armies, integration and demonstrate role model among the state led structural opportunities.

As such settlement of PLAs in the state structures can be implemented in different situations of urban and rural settings of all ages and levels of ability, and this is effective management of conflict resolution.

Implications for Political Actors

The local political actors can play the important role in developing a suitable environment for ex-PLA amalgamation. The local political actors have to consider the facilitation of party policies and programs in line with ex-PLA's involvement preferences so as to increase the role of them and prepare the module for the socio-political transformation in the ground level.

The principles of knowledge acquisition should be particularly well-suited for this purpose because they have implications for what and how people are taught, how they progress toward expertise in handling politics is conceptualized, and how people are empowered. Critical analysis and structured reflection on formal practice and everyday practical experience are necessary to incorporate in timely amendment of policies and programmes.

Implication for New People's Revolution

The political leaders along with ex-PLAs must understand the commitment level necessary for the creation of participatory environment and show willingness for its practice.

The PLA leaders interviewed in the study recognized the demands and tensions of the leadership role. Their comments ranged from critical insights of leadership in action, to perceptions of leadership as 'learned behavior'. There is a good deal of evidence from studies elsewhere that is compatible with this view of 'learned' leadership capacity.

Leaders are stimulators (who get things started). They are story-tellers (to encourage dialogue and add understanding). They are net-workers and problem-solvers too. They care deeply about PLA members, community people, resource mobilization, inclusive participation and livelihood improvement. In such settings leadership provides a context for professional learning focusing on helping community members to confront, making sense of and interpreting the emerging circumstances of the rural setting.

The effective leaders tend to be viewed as facilitators who delegate and empower others. Such leaders provide a clear vision for the community they lead based upon certain fundamental values and beliefs. It would also appear that where leadership is both learned and shared, there is more possibility of organizational development and change. Within the accounts of PLA movement in this study it was clear that they were both aware of and involved in the process of leadership. They were both contributors to and recipients of effective leadership practice. It involves leading communities of enquiry in which the agenda is owned by that community and is constantly evolving, developing and being constructed through questioning and dialogue. “Making, not copying” and “Learning together” indicate the ability to respond to change and dream for new people’s revolution.

Implications for Policy Makers

Policy makers must realize the impact of policy decisions on successful implementation of flexible contextualized model of peaceful settlement of armed conflict, well balanced political environment and improvement of livelihood in the community. Policy-making participants develop and sustain with other network actors outside the boundary provided by the state. The research has indicated that a significant proportion of policy-making participants have changed their beliefs. Learning, this analysis has suggested, is most

frequent among actors who belong to wide scope networks and who have a trusting attitude.

Recommendations for Further Research

A research can contribute to a theoretical understanding of socio political transformation of Nepalese society and lead to a refinement of the good practices and the design. It would be valuable to be able to make a claim about acceptance and efficiency of the findings of the research if further researches produce evidence of the value of the design framework in similar situations. There needs to be more research conducted in the field of cultural assimilation, intercaste marriage within PLAs and its impact on People's Democratic Society in Nepal.

This research was an exploratory study to examine socio political transformation of feudal society through PLA led people's war. This exploration has indicated that PLA approach is an appropriate strategy to help rural people understand their rights, creating demand for autonomy and identity. Further research is needed to determine if these findings are transferable to a larger audience, or if they are unique to them. It is possible that other management variables might be equally influential in helping the community members understand their rights and roles in state structures. Further research should involve gender perspective of PLA movement, impact of PLAs' integration over social crime diversity, and post conflict situation and entrepreneurial role models of ex-PLAs in socio economic development of the community.

This additional research might further help to answer the question, "how can a concise framework of peaceful resolution of the war led conflict be designed and developed that accommodates truth and reconciliation, entrepreneurial innovations,

maintenance of political balance, improvement of livelihood and sustainable development of rural areas of the country?” in different contexts.

Further research might also explore the leadership development in the political community for the new people’s revolution who has endorsements in both rural and urban areas and in other areas of political movement. That might lead to new discoveries explaining how the people understand about new people’s democratic movement. This additional research may increase our understandings of the significant relationships between political strategies, incorporation of cadre mobilization skills, and team leadership practice in the organization in future.

Chapter Summary

This chapter provided about the over view of the research work as a summary, the conclusion of the research findings, contribution of the research and implications of this study in different sectors of socio political transformation of feudal society to the people’s democratic society in Nepal. The purpose of this study was to explore livelihood of ex-PLAs and role of them and examine how People’s war led conflict influences the people and their understanding of autonomy and identity in the structure of the state. This exploratory study was constructed through multiple lenses of political leaders, planners, PLA stakeholders, and the researcher. This study revealed the ex-PLA members, as a team leader who has a passion of involving in a profession based on guerilla war strategies and someone who helps community empowerment through participatory approach of people’s movement.

These results provide insights and guidance, for preparing new people’s revolution at current contexts as well as suggestions for future strategies. As socio

political activists, it is our goal to prepare people to become responsible member of socio political transformation of the society and ensure that our nation's suppressed people reach their potential.

The critical view is grounded in the notion of subjective reality characterized by individual's thoughts, experiences, perceptions and abilities. Individuals construct their own reality from their observations, reflections, and logical thought. This is an epistemology, a theory of knowledge used to explain how we know and what we know.

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ANNEXES –1

1. The Upper Structure of the "People's Liberation Army"

General Headquarters

Supreme Commander

Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda)

Western division

Mid division

Eastern division

Commissar

Commissar

Commissar

Dev Gurung (Kanchha Bahadur)Post Bahadur Bogoti (Diwaakr)Ram Bdr Thapa (Badal)

Commander

Commander

Commander

Janardan Sharma (Pravhakar) Brashman Pun (Ananta) Nanada Kishor Pun (Passang)

Vice Commander

Vice commander(unknown)

Vice Commander Rajesh

Barun

Brigades

Brigades Brigades

1. Ghorahi- Satbariya Second Brigade

1.Mangalsen first Brigade

1.Bethan

Memorial Fifth Brigade

Commissar

Commissar

Commissar

Uddhav

Kim Bdr Thapa (sunil)

Ganga Bdr Karki

Commander

Commander

Commander

Jit (killed in action in Bardiya,March -2005)

Vivek Hari Sherstha (Parmod)

2. Lisne-Gam Third Brigade 2.Basu Memorial Fourth Brigade 2.Solu- Salleri Sixth Brigade

Commissar

Commissar

Commissar

Top Bahadur Rayamajhi (Jivan)
(Santosh)

Hit Raj Pandya (Uttam)

Dhurba Parajuli

Commander

Commander

Commander

Sanjaya

Yam Bahadur Adhikari (Partikshya) Paval

3. Bahubir –Yodha Eight Brigade

3.Parivartan Memorial Ninth Brigade

3.Mechi-Koshi Seventh Brigade

Commissar

Commissar

Commissar

Tej Prasad Oli (Partik)

Ganesh man Pun (Rashmi)

Santu Darai (Parvana)

Commander

Commander

Commander

Kuber

Madan Sanjiv

ANNEXES –2

2. Successful Guerrilla Campaigns in the World

Name of the War	Periods	
	Since	To
American Revolutionary War	1775	1783
Peninsular War in Spain	1808	1814
Frist Boer War	1880	1881
Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire	1821	1830
Algerian War	1954	1962
Afghani Mujahideen against the USSR	1980	1989
Burma Campaign	1942	1945
Cuban Revolution	1956	1959
East Timor	1999	
Kosovo Liberation Army	1992	1999
Eritrean War of Independence	1961	1991
Turkish Revolutionaries at Turkish War of Independence against partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies		
Arab Revolt	1916	1918
Haitian Revolution		
Independence War in Latin America		
Indonesian National Revolution		
Hezbollah in Southren Lebanon	1982	2000
Phillippines' during the Japanese occupation of the World WarII		
Rhodesian Bush War	1972	1980
Portions of the Wars of Scottish Independence		
Irish War of Independence	1919	1921
First Indochina War	1946	1954
Vietnam War	1959	1975
Combodian Civil War	1967	1975
Bangaladesh Liberation War	1971	
People'sWar In Nepal	1996	2006
The Partisans of Yugoslavia		
China (Communists vs. Nationalists)	1946	1949
Nicaragua	1977	1979

Source: [www.guerrilla warfare.com](http://www.guerrilla-warfare.com)

ANNEXES –3

Armed Conflict and Conflict Location 1989-2009

Level of conflict	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	1989-2009
Minor	30	34	38	41	33	36	35	32	33	26	26	26	26	25	24	25	27	28	31	32	30	84
War	13	16	13	12	11	11	7	8	7	13	13	11	10	7	5	7	5	5	4	5	6	47
All conflict	43	50	51	53	44	47	42	40	40	39	39	37	36	32	29	32	32	33	35	37	36	131
All dyads	61	67	66	64	56	57	48	50	55	53	51	49	48	46	40	44	38	46	44	48	45	263
All location	36	37	38	39	31	34	31	30	29	32	31	28	29	24	23	24	23	24	25	27	27	80

*At the highest level recorded.

Source-www.prio.no/cscw/ArmedConflict

ANNEXES –4

Armed conflicts by Region,1989-2009

Region	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Europe	2	3	7	8	9	5	5	1	0	2	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	23
Middle East	4	7	8	7	7	6	6	7	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	5	5	4	4	5	13
Asia	16	21	15	20	15	16	16	18	19	16	1	17	14	12	16	14	16	15	14	15	1	39
Africa	12	13	16	14	10	16	11	11	15	16	1	15	1	15	9	10	7	10	1	1	1	41
Americas	9	6	5	4	3	4	4	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	15
All conflict	43	50	51	53	44	47	42	40	40	39	39	37	36	32	29	32	32	33	35	37	36	131

*For data back to 1946, www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data

and_publications/datasets.htm or www.prio.no/cscw/ArmedConflict

ANNEXES –5

Major Battles and Responsibilities of Mukti Sena (11 Nov. 1950 to 16 Jan 1951)

Main Commandar	Date	Location	Remarks
Thir Bam Malla	11 Nov, 1950	Birgunj	First attack of Mukti Sena.
Gyan Bdr Subbha	23 Nov. 1950	Upardangadi,Chitwan	
KehavParsad Koirala	11Nov 1950	Biratnagar	
G.B.Yakthumba	Last Dec.1950	Koshi River Bank	
P.V. Basnet		Janakpur	
Santosh Kumar Rai and Dilip S. Ale	11 Nov 1950	Dhankuta,Chainpur, Terthum and Taplejung	
Narad Muni	Dec last 1950	Bhojpur	
Mugha Dhan Rai	Dec last 1950	Okhaldhunga	
Ram Pd. Rai	Dec last	Ramechhap	
Bishow B.Thapa	11 Nov. 1950	Jhapa	
Narendra N. Bastola	11 Nov 1950	Ilam	
C.B.Sing	Nov 29,1950	Kailali Karanipur police post	
C.B.Sing	3 Dec.1950	Bhajani,Kailali	
Rajeshwori Pd. Upadhya	10 Jan 1950	Rajapur,Bardiay	
Padam Bdr Khatri	29 Jan 1951	Nepalganj,Gothidanda	This attack ended after Delhi agreement
Nirmala Lama	Jan first,1951	Surkhet	
Rupsing Sijapati	19 Dec.1950	Dadeldhura	
Bhakta Narayan and Parsu Narayan	-----	Dang Deukhuri	
Khadak Bdr and Bharat Mani Sharma	-----	Pyuthan	
Khadak Bdr and Dharma Bdr Rana	-----	Salyan	
Kashi nath Gautam	-----	Gulmi	
Khada Nanda	-----	Pokhara	
Sri Bhadra Sharma	-----	Bandipur	
Rajeswore Devkota and Ganesh Raj	-----	Gorkha	
Dr . K I Sing	11 Nov 1950	Bhairahawa	

Source: Tamang, S.(2000). Janmukti Sena Yuta Nalekhiyako Itihas.

Major Action Accomplished by People's Liberation Army (1996 to 2005)

Name of Action	Date	Location
Holeri Attack	1996	Rolpa
Sindhuligadi	1996	Sindhuli
Chiraghat	1998	Dang
Jhimp Raid	1999	Rolpa
Bhingri	1999	Pyuthan
Jelbang Raid	1999	Rolpa
Lahn Raid	1999	Jajarkot
Mahat Raid	1999	Rukum
Ghartigaun Raid	2000	Rolpa
Taksera Raid	2000	Rukum
Panchkatiya Raid	2000	Jajarkot
Dunai Raid	2000	Dolpa
Jarayotar	2000	Sindhuli
Rukumkot Raaid	2001	Rukum
Holeri Raid	2001	Rolpa
Ghorahi Raid	2001	Dang
Pandusen	2001	Achham
Mangalsen Raid	2002	Achham
Lisne Encounter	2002	Rolpa
Gam Raid	2002	Rolpa
Sandhikharka Raid	2002	Arghakhanchi
Jumla Raid	2002	Jumla
Khara Base camp	2004	Rukum
Beni Raid	2005	Maygdi

Source: Pasang (2008), Chalune (2009) 'Red Strides of the History' and People's war and People's Liberation Army.

Comprehensive Peace Accord

Signed between Nepal Government and the communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

22 November 2006

Preamble

Respecting the people's mandate expressed in favour of democracy, peace and progressive movement by the Nepali people since prior to 2007 from time to time through historical struggles and people's movements;

Reaffirming and full commitment towards the twelve-point agreement reached between the seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist); the eight-point understanding; the twenty-five point code of conduct agreed between Nepal Government and CPN (Maoist); the decision made in the meeting held between senior leaders of the seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) held on Nov.8, 2006, as well as all agreements, understandings, code of conducts reached between Nepal Government and CPN (Maoist); and correspondence of similar intent sent to United Nations,

Expressing determination to carry out a progressive restructuring of the state to resolve existing class-based, ethnic, regional and gender problems, Reiterating full of commitment towards democratic norms and values including competitive multiparty democratic governance, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, full press freedom and the concept of the rule of law,

Remaining committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and international humanitarian laws and fundamental principles and values related to human rights,

Guaranteeing the fundamental right of Nepali people to take part in the constituent assembly elections in a free, fair and fear-less environment,

Keeping democracy, peace, prosperity, progressive socio-economic change and the independence, integrity, sovereignty, and self-respect of the country at the centre,

Expressing the determination to implement the commitment to carry out the constituent assembly election in a free and fair manner by the end of the month of Jestha 2064 BS,

Declaring the beginning of a new chapter of peaceful collaboration by ending the armed conflict being practiced in the country from 2052 BS based on the political understanding among the two parties in order to accomplish, through the constituent assembly, certainty of sovereignty of Nepali people, progressive political outlet, democratic restructuring of the state, and social-economic cultural transformation,

This comprehensive peace agreement has been reached between the Nepal Government and the CPN (Maoist) with a commitment to transform the ceasefire between the Nepal Government and the CPN (Maoist) into long-term peace.

1. Preliminary

- 1.1. The name of this agreement is Comprehensive Peace Accord. In short, the agreement shall be called Peace Accord
- 1.2. The agreement shall come in to effect today after a public declaration by the government and Maoist parties.
- 1.3. Both the parties shall issue necessary directives to all the agencies under them to immediately implement and abide by the agreement and implement/ensure implementation.
- 1.4. All the agreements, understandings code of conducts and the decision reached between the seven political parties, the government and the Maoist that are attached in the addendum shall constitute an integral part of the accord.
- 1.5. All the understandings and agreement to be reached later as necessary to implement this agreement shall also be considered an integral part of this agreement.

2. Definitions:

Unless the subject and context mean otherwise, in this agreement:

- (a) "Ceasefire" refers to the act of prohibiting all forms of attack, kidnapping, disappearance, obstruction, carried out between Nepal Government and CPN (Maoist) by aiming at each other, mobilization of armed forces, strengthening, aggressive and violent activities, and activities spreading destruction, incitement and instigation through whatever means.
- (b) "Interim Constitution" refers to the "Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063" to be promulgated for the period until a new constitution is prepared and issued by the constituent assembly.
- (c) "Interim Council of Ministers" refers to the "Interim Council of Ministers" to be formed according to the Interim Constitution.
- (d) "Both the Parties" refers to the party of Government of Nepal and party of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
- (e) "Prevailing Law" refers to the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 and the prevailing Nepal Laws that are not in conflict with it. But this definition will not obstruct legal provisions before the promulgation of Interim Constitution 2063.
- (f) "Verification" refers to the subject of preparing authentic record after verification of army, combatants and arms by the United Nations.

3. Political- Economic-Social Transformation and Conflict Management

Both the parties are in agreement to adopt the following policies and programs for political economic-social transformation and to creatively manage conflict existing in the country.

- 3.1. To ensure progressive political, economic and social transformation on the basis of the decisions reached at the meeting of senior leaders of seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) on Nov. 8, 2006 (Addendum)
- 3.2. To form an Interim legislature-parliament on the basis of Interim Constitution, and hold elections to the constituent assembly in a free and fair manner by the month of Jestha, 2064 BS and practically ensure sovereignty inherent in the Nepali people.
- 3.3. None of the authorities related to the country's rule to remain with the King. To use the properties of late King Birendra, Late queen Aishworay and their family for national interest by bringing the properties under the Nepal Government and forming a trust. To nationalize all properties (like palaces situated in different places, forest and reserves, heritages with historical and archaeological importance) obtained by King Gyanendra in his capacity as the King. To decided whether or not to retain the monarchy by a simple majority in the first meeting of the constituent assembly.
- 3.4. To adopt a political system that fully abides by the universally accepted principles of fundamental human rights, multiparty competitive democratic system, sovereignty of the people and supremacy of the people, periodic elections, monitoring by civil society, complete press freedom, people's right to information, transparency and accountability in the activities of political parties, people's participation, impartial, competent, and clean bureaucracy.
- 3.5. To carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the state by ending the current centralized and unitary form of the state in order to address the problems related to women, Dalit, Indigenous people, Janajatis, Madheshi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and backward regions by ending discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture, religion, and region.
- 3.6. To gradually implement by deciding through mutual agreement a minimum common program for the economic and social transformation to end all forms of feudalism.
- 3.7. To adopt a policy of implementing a scientific land reforms program by ending feudal land ownership.
- 3.8. To follow a policy of protecting and promoting national industries and resources.
- 3.9. To adopt policy of establishing the rights of all citizens to education, health, housing, employment and food security.
- 3.10. To adopt policy of providing land and other economic protection to socially and economically backward classes including land less squatters, bounded labourers and pastoral farmers.

- 3.11. To adopt policy of severely punishing people amassing limitless wealth through corruption while remaining in a government position.
- 3.12. To form a common development concept for economic and social transformation and justice as well as to quickly make the country developed and economically prosperous.
- 3.13. To follow a policy of massive increase in employment and income generation opportunities by increasing investment in industries, trade and export promotion etc. While insuring the professional rights of the labourers.

4. Management of Army and Armament

To carry out the following tasks in accordance with 12- point understanding, eight-point agreement, 25-point code of conduct, the five point latter sent to the United Nations and the decisions of the meeting of senior leaders held on November 8 taken in the past in order to hold the constituent assembly election in a peaceful, fair and fear-less environment and to carry out democratization and restructuring of the army:

Concerning the Maoist Army-

- 4.1. As per the commitment expressed in the latter sent on behalf of the Nepal government and the CPN (Maoist) to the United nation on August 9, 2006, the Maoists 'Army combatants to remain within the following temporary cantonments in the following places. The UN to verify and monitor them.

The main cantonments shall remain in the following locations:

1. Kailali
2. Surkhet
3. Rolpa
4. Nawalparasi
5. Chitwan
6. Sindhuli
7. Ilam

Sub- cantonments will remain at the rate of 3 each around the main cantonments.

- 4.2. After placing the Maoist Cantonments, all the arms and ammunition except those required for the security of the cantonments to be securely stored in the cantonment and the keys to remain with the party concerned after putting a single lock. In the process of installing the lock, to assemble mechanism including its record, siren for the monitoring by the UN. While carrying out

the necessary examination of the stored arms, the UN to do under the presence of the concerned party. To prepare other technical details related to this along with camera monitoring through agreement of the UN, CPN (Maoist) and the Nepal Government.

- 4.3. After the Maoist combatants stay in the temporary cantonments, Nepal Government to provide for food supplies and other necessary arrangements.
- 4.4. The Interim council of Ministers to work by forming a special committee to supervise integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist combatants.
- 4.5. To make security provisions for the Maoist leaders through understanding with the government.

Concerning the Nepali Army

- 4.6. The Nepali army to be confined within the barracks as per the commitment expressed in the letter sent to the UN. To ensure that their arms are not used for or against any party. The Nepali Army to store the arms in equal numbers to that of the Maoists, to seal it with a single- lock and give the key to the concerned party. In the process of installing the lock, to assemble a mechanism including its record, siren for the monitoring by the UN. While carrying out the necessary examination of the stored arms, the UN to do so under the presence of the concerned party. To prepare other technical details related to this along with camera monitoring through agreement of the UN, CPN (Maoist) and the Nepal government.
- 4.7. The council of Ministers to control mobilize and manage the Nepali Army as per the new Military act. The Interim Council of Ministers to prepare and implement the detailed action plan of the Nepali Army's democratization by taking suggestions from the concerned committee of the Interim Parliament. Under this to carry out activities like the appropriate number of the Nepali Army, to train the army through democratic and human rights values while developing democratic structure, national and inclusive character.
- 4.8. To give continuity to functions of the Nepali Army like border security, security of the conservation areas, protected areas, banks, airports, power houses, telephone towers, central secretariat and security of VIPs.

5. Ceasefire

- 5.1. Termination of military action and armed mobilization:
 - 5.1.1. Both sides express commitment to not to carry out the following activities:
 - a. Use of any type of arms and weapons targeted against each other in direct way or an act of attack,
 - b. An act, with or without weapons, of searching or confiscating weapons belonging to other at the place where the arms have been stored as per the understanding reached between the two sides.
 - c. To harm any person, or exert mental pressure.

- d. Set up ambush targeting each other.
 - e. Murder and violent operations.
 - f. Activity of kidnapping/ detention/ imprisonment/ disappearance
 - g. Damaging public/ private/ government or military property.
 - h. Aerial attack or bombardment.
 - i. Mining and sabotage.
- 5.1.2. Both sides shall not recruit additional armed forces or conduct military activities against each other, including transporting weapons, ammunitions and explosives. However, the security forces deployed by the interim government shall have authority to conduct routine patrol, explore in order to prevent illegal trafficking of the weapons, explosive or raw materials used in assembling weapons at the international border or custom points and seize them.
- 5.1.3. No individual or group shall travel with illegal weapons, ammunition or explosives.
- 5.1.4. Both sides shall assist each other to mark landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary information within 30 days and defuse and excavate it within 60 days.
- 5.1.5. Armies of both sides shall not bear arms or show their presence wearing combat fatigue during any public program, political meeting or civil assembly.
- 5.1.6. Nepal Police and Armed Police Force shall continue the task of maintaining legal system and law and order and criminal investigation as per the spirit and sentiment of the Jana Andolan and peace accord as well as prevailing law.
- 5.1.7. Both sides shall issue circulars to their respective armed agencies or personnel to stop an armed person of one side to address an armed person of the opposite side by the term 'enemy' or behave in similar manner.
- 5.1.8. Both sides express an understanding to create a record of government, public and private buildings, land and other properties and return them immediately.

5.2. Situation Normalization Measure

- 5.2.1. It is not allowed to collect cash or kind and levy tax against one's wishes and against the existing law.
- 5.2.2. Both sides agree to make public the status of the people in their custody and release them within 15 days.
- 5.2.3. Both sides agree to make public within 60 days of signing of the agreement information about the real name, cast, and address of the people 'disappeared' or killed during war and to inform the family about it.
- 5.2.4. Both sides agree to form a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission to establish peace in the society by normalizing adverse situation

generated by armed conflict and to carry out relief for and rehabilitate people victimized and displaced by war, and to carry forward the tasks related to this through the commission.

- 5.2.5. Both sides agree to set up a High-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission through mutual agreement in order to investigate truth about people seriously violating human rights and involved in crimes against humanity, and to create an environment of reconciliations in the society.
- 5.2.6. Both sides pledge to abandon all types of war, attack, counter-attack, violence and counter violence in the country with a commitment to ensure democracy, peace and progressive change in the Nepali society. There is an agreement between both sides in the matter of assisting one another in peace building and maintaining law and order.
- 5.2.7. Both sides guarantee to withdraw accusation, claim, complaints, and cases under consideration levelled against various individuals due to political reasons and immediately make public the state of those imprisoned and immediately release them,
- 5.2.8. Both sides express the commitment to allow without any political prejudice the people displaced due to the armed conflict to return back voluntarily to their respective ancestral or former residence, reconstruct the infrastructure destroyed as a result of the conflict and rehabilitate and reintegrate the displaced in the society.
- 5.2.9. Both sides agree to solve problems created in the above context on the basis of mutual agreement and to take responsibility at the individual and collective manner in the task of creative environment for normalizing relations and reconciliation and ensure implementation with the help of all political parties, civil society and local organization.
- 5.2.10. Both sides express commitment not to discrimination against or exert any kind of pressure on other members of the family if a member of family is associated with one or other side.
- 5.2.11. Both sides agree to employees of Nepal Government and public agencies to travel freely to any part of the country, to fulfil their duties and not to create any obstacle while executing their work or not to let obstruction to arise and to facilitate their work.
- 5.2.12. Both parties agree to allow the United Nations, International Donors Agencies and Diplomatic Mission based in Nepal, National and International Non-Government Organizations, press, Human Rights Activities, Election Observers and foreign tourists to travel unrestricted according to law in the state of Nepal.
- 5.2.13. Both parties are committed to operation of publicity programs in a decent and respectable manner.

6. End of War

- 6.1. Giving permanent from to the ongoing ceasefire between the government and the Maoist on the basic of the historic agreement reached between the seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) on November 8, 2006 we declare that the armed war going on since 1995 has ended.
- 6.2. The decisions taken by the meeting of senior leaders of the seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) on November 8, 2006 will be the main policy basic for long term peace.
- 6.3. After the placement of the Nepali Army in the barracks and the Maoist combatants in temporary camps, carrying arms in violation of the law, display, intimidation and any type of use of violence and use of arms will become legally punishable.
- 6.4. Army of the both parties will not be allowed to publicize for or against any party and to take sides. But they shall not be deprived from their voting rights.

7. Human Rights, Fundamental Rights and Adherence to Humanitarian Law

By remaining committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, International Humanitarian law and fundamental principles and values, both sides express their agreement to the following issues:

7.1. Human Rights:

- 7.1.1. Both sides reconfirm their commitment to the respect and protection to human rights and commitment to international humanitarian law and accept that nobody should be discriminated on the basis of colour, gender, race, national and social origin, wealth disability, birth or other standing, ideology or faith.
- 7.1.2. Both side agree to create an atmosphere for the Nepali people to enjoy their civil , political, economic social and cultural rights and are committed to creating an atmosphere where such rights are not violated in the future under any condition.
- 7.1.3. Both side express the commitment that impartial investigation and action would be carried according to law against people responsible creating obstruction to the exercise of the rights envisaged in the letter of agreement and ensure that impunity will not be tolerated. Apart from this, they also ensure the right of the victims of conflict and torture and the family of disappeared to obtain relief.
- 7.1.4. Both sides will not carry out acts of torture, kidnapping and forced labour and will take necessary action to discourage such acts.
- 7.1.5. On the basis of norms and values of secularism, both sides shall respect social, cultural, religious sensitive, religious sites and the religious faith individual.

7.2. Right of live:

- 7.2.1. Both sides respect and protect an individual's fundamental right to life. Nobody shall be depriving of this fundamental right and no law shall be formulated to award death penalty.

7.3. Right to Individual Dignity, Freedom and Mobility.

- 7.3.1. Both parties respect and protect the right to individual dignity. In this connection, no person including those deprived of their freedom according to the law would be subjected to torture or any other cruel, inhuman or degrading behaviour or punishment. The citizen's right to confidentiality shall be respected.
- 7.3.2. Both sides, fully respecting the individual's right to freedom and security, will not keep anyone under arbitrary or illegal detention, commit kidnapping or hold captive. Both sides agree to make public the status of every individual 'disappeared' and held captive and inform about this o their family members, legal advisors and other authorized people.
- 7.3.3. Both side shall respect and protect the citizen ' right to free mobility and the free mobility and the freedom to choose within legal norms the location of one's residence and express the commitment to respect the right of the people displaced by the conflict and their families to return back to their homes or to settle in any other location of their choice.

7.4. Civil and Political Rights

- 7.4.1. Both parties are committed to respecting and protecting every individual's right to ideology, expression, open organization and gather peacefully as well as right against exploitation.
- 7.4.2. Both sides respect the right of every citizen to take part directly or through one have selected representative in issues of public concern, to vote, to be elected and to enjoy the right to equality of entering public service.
- 7.4.3. Both sides are committed to respect the individual's right to be informed.

7.5. Economic-Social Rights

- 7.5.1. Both parties are committed to respect and protect the individual's right to livelihood through freely chosen or accepted employment.
- 7.5.2. Both parties are committed to respecting and guaranteeing the rights of food security to all the people. They guarantee that there would be no interference in the transportation, use and distribution of food, food products and food grains.
- 7.5.3. Both parties acknowledge that the citizen' right to health should be respected and protected. Both parties will not obstruct the supply of medicine, assistance and health related campaigns, and express commitment to treatment and rehabilitation of the people injured in course of the conflict.

- 7.5.4. Acknowledging that the citizen' right to education should be ensured and respected; both parties are commitment to maintaining appropriate academic environment in educational institutions. Both sides agree to guarantee that the right to education will not be impeded. They agree to put to an end, on an immediate basic, to activities like taking the educational institutions under control and using them, abducting teachers and student, taking them under control and disappearing them, and to not to establish barracks in a way that it would impede them.
- 7.5.5. Both sides agree that the private property of any individual will not be seized or usurped, except when permitted by law.
- 7.5.6 Both sides believe in giving continuity to production by not disturbing the industrial climate in the country, respecting the right of collective bargaining and social security in industrial institutions, encouraging industrial institutions and labourers to solve the problem in peaceful manner if any problem arises between them and respect the right to work determined by the International Labour Organization.

7.6. Women and Child Rights

- 7.6.1. Both parties fully agree to provide special protection to the rights of women and children, to immediately stop all types of violence against women and children, including child labour, as well as sexual exploitation and abuse, and not to include or use children who are 18 years old and below in the armed force. Children thus affected would be immediately rescued and necessary and appropriate assistance will be provided for their rehabilitation.

7.7. Right of Personal Liberty

- 7.7.1. Both parties fully agree to freedom of opinion and expression; freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms; freedom of movement; freedom of practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, industry or trade; press and publication rights; the freedom to take part in peaceful political activities; the right of equality before the law, and to implement and have a tolerant system of justice.

8. Dispute Settlement and Implementation Mechanism

- 8.1. Both sides express the understanding to be individually and collectively accountable, by not repeating mistake committed in the past and to gradually correct them.
- 8.2. The national Peace and Rehabilitation Commission can create mechanisms as necessary to make the peace campaign successful. The formation and terms of reference of the commission will be as determinate by the interim Council of Ministers.

- 8.3. Both parties are committed to resolving all types of current or possible future mutual differences or problems through mutual dialogue, understanding, agreement and negotiation.
- 8.4. Both parties express commitment to the fact that the interim Council of ministers can constitute and determine the working procedures of the National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the High-level State Restructuring Recommendation Commission and other mechanism as necessary to implement this agreement, the Interim Constitution and all the decisions, agreement and understanding reached between the seven parties, the Nepal Government and the CPN (Maoist).

9. Implementation and follow-up

Both parties have agreed to make the following arrangements for the implementation of the understanding mentioned in this agreement and for their follow-up.

- 9.1. Both parties agree to give continuity to the task of monitoring provisions related to human rights mentioned in this agreement by the United Nations office of the high commissioner for human rights, Nepal.
- 9.2. Both parties agree to the monitoring of the management of arms and the armies by united nation mission in Nepal as mentioned in the five –point letter send to the UN earlier and in the present agreement.
- 9.3. Both sides agree to carry out supervision of the constituent assembly elections through the United Nations.
- 9.4. The national human rights commission will also carry out works related to the monitoring of human rights as mentioned in this agreement in addition to its duties as determined by law. In the course of implementing its duties, the Commission can receive the help of national and international human rights organization after carrying out necessary coordination with them.
- 9.5. Both parties agree not to receive the reports submitted by the above-mentioned bodies, to provide information requested by them, and to implement the suggestion and recommendations provided by them on the basis of agreement and discussion.

10. Miscellaneous

- 10.1. Both parties agree not to operate parallel or other forms of mechanism in any areas of the state or state machinery as per the spirit of the decisions of November 8 and the essence of the peace agreement.
- 10.2. Both parties consent to sign any complementary understandings, as necessary, for the implementation of the present accords.
- 10.3. This accord can be revised at any time with the consent of both parties. Both parties agree to provide to each other prior written information if they wish to make any change. The amendments can be made to the accord with the

consent of both sides after receiving the information. The provisions to be made by such an amendment will not fall below the minimum standards of accepted international human rights and humanitarian laws.

- 10.4. If any dispute arises in the interpretation of this agreement, a joint mechanism consisting of both parties shall make the interpretation on the basis of the preamble and the documents included in the addendum of this agreement, and this interpretation will be final.
- 10.5. The concept of 'two parties as mentioned in this agreement would automatically cease to exist after the constitution of the Interim Legislature-Parliament. Thereafter, all the responsibility of implementing the obligations states in this agreement will be as per the arrangements made by the interim Council of Ministers. It will be the duty and responsibility of all the political parties to extend cooperation in the compliance and implementation of the agreement.
- 10.6. At the time when the entire country is cantered on the main campaign of constituent assembly elections, we heartily appeal to all to end their problems and demands through dialogue and negotiations and to help constituent assembly elections and law and order situation.
- 10.7. We heartily appeal to the civil society, professional groups, class organizations, media intellectual community and all Nepali people to actively participate in this historic campaign to build a new Nepal and to establish lasting peace through the constituent assembly elections by ending the armed conflict.
- 10.8. We heartily urge all the friendly countries and the United Nations, as well as the international community to extend support to Nepal in this campaign of establishing full democracy and lasting peace.
Cognizing the responsibility to the future of the country and people, and being fully committed to this comprehensive peace accord, we sign the peace accord on behalf of the Nepal Government, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), and hereby make this Comprehensive Peace Accord public.

Prachand
President
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
Signed on November 21, 2006

Girja Prasad Koirala
Prime Minister
Government of Nepal

The Second Understanding between the Seven Political Parties and the CPN (Maoist)

It is well known to all that the historic 12-point understanding for the democracy, peace, prosperity, progress and national independence has been reached between the seven political parties fighting for the end of absolute monarchy and establishment of full democracy and the CPN (Maoist) on 22 November 2005. There is no more doubt that the understanding has already been approved by the people since the so called election of municipalities on 8 February 2006 sponsored by the dictatorial authority is completely failed as a result of the rapid wave of nationwide peoples movement that occurred after the 12- point understanding. Moreover, it has become clear by the international community that this understanding is only the real foundation stone of the solution of the ongoing conflict in the nation. In this situation, we again express our firm commitment for the implementation of this understanding from all parties with a strong determination. Here, we again recall that, "the agitating seven political parties are fully committed to the fact that the existing conflict in the country can be resolved and the sovereignty and the state powers can completely be established in people only through establishing full democracy by restoring the parliament through the force of agitation and forming a powerful all-party government by its decision, negotiating with the Maoists, and on the basis of agreement, holding the election of constituent assembly. The CPN (Maoists) is of the view and commitment that the aforesaid goal may be achieved by holding a national political conference of the agitating democratic forces, and through its decision, forming an interim government assembly. On the matter of this procedural agenda, an understanding has been made to continue dialogue and seek for a common agreement

between the agitating seven political parties and the CPN (Maoists). It has been agreed that the force of people's movement is only the alternative to achieve this goal."

We call a cordial appeal to all the democratic political forces, civil society, professional groups, public class organizations, the people from suppressed castes and areas, media workers and the common people to make the ongoing movement success by an active participation to established full democracy with the sovereignty and the state power of the country completely in people through the election of a constituent assembly on the basis of the determined process.

Similarly, we also call a special appeal to the international community to extend strongly their support in this initiation of the political parties for restoring the peace in Nepal to established full democracy in the country and the end of the absolute monarchy and to resolve the armed conflict that is ongoing for the last ten years through a progressive political outlet.

On behalf of the Government of Nepal

- Girja Prasad Koirala, President Nepali Congress
- Amrit Kumar Bohara, Acting General Secretary, CPN(UML)
- Sher Bahadur Deuwa, President Nepali Congress(Democratic)
- Lila Mani Pokhrel, Vice-Chairman Janamorchha Nepal
- Narayan Man Bijukshe, Chairman Nepal Peasant and Worker's Party
- Rajendra Mahato, general secretary Nepal Sadbhawana Party
- Narendra Kumar Prasai, Chairman, United Leftist Front

On behalf of the CPN (Maoist)

- Prachanda, Chairperson, CPN (Maoist)

The Code of Conduct for Ceasefire agreed between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist)

Preamble Respecting the popular mandate expressed through the historic people's movement in favour of full democracy, progress and peace;

Remaining committed towards the Universal Declaration of human Right 1948, and the basic principles and norms concerning international humanitarian law and human right;

Expressing commitment to fully comply with the 12 points understanding reached between the seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist)

Expressing commitment towards democratic values and norms, including a competitive multi-party system of governance, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, press freedom and the concept of the rule of law

Guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the Nepali people to participate in the process of forming a constitution through participating in the election of constitution assembly without being influenced by any fear, threats, or violence; and

Placing in centre the democracy, peace prosperity and progressive social change, and the independence, sovereignty, and dignity of the country;

Code of conduct as follow has been issued as per the desire of the Nepali people in order to transform the ceasefire between the Government and the CPN (Maoist) into permanent peace and resolve the problem peacefully through negotiation.

Ensuring a fearless civic life

1. Not to make any public statement or do any other activities which may provoke each other.
2. Both the parties shall not mobilize, demonstrate or use their armed forces in a manner that may spread amongst the people -in- general.
3. Not to attack or commit disruptive acts in each other's military or security units, not to carry out actions like laying down land mines or setting up ambushes, not to recruit new people in their respective armies and not to spy.
4. Extend mutual cooperation from both parties in order to maintain peace and order.
5. Regarding the issue of management of arms and armies, the discussion and understanding will be continued on the basis of mutual consent.

Creating an environment of trust among the people

6. Both the parties will not participate in public meeting, conference or any other political activities in combat dresses or in possession of arms.
7. Not to make any hindrance and give any mental and physical pressure from either side to the workers of political parties and members of social organization or individual to disseminate their opinion, to conduct the act of extending organizations through movement around any part of the country.

On basic services to the people, the development and construction

8. No program like general strike and transport shall be organized during the period of ceasefire. However, peaceful assemblies and procession may be organized.
9. To allow the essential services and facilities to the people to be operated without any restriction.

10. Not to create any hindrance in peacefully carrying out the regular development works and other works for the interest of the people.

11. No restriction imposed nor hindrance created transport food, medicines, development and construction materials and goods for daily consumption.

Operation of educational institutions, Hospitals and industrial enterprises

12. To create an environment for the smooth operation of schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, health canter and industrial enterprises from both the sides.

Support from media for the peace talks

13. To circulate information in favour of ceasefire, code of conduct, and while conducting to peace process and political dissemination use cultured and dignified language.

14. No one shall express one's statement through media in a manner of having adverse impact to the negotiations and the peace process.

Not to collect donation and financial support forcefully

15. Not to collect or mobilize donation or financial support, in cash or in kinds or services against one's will.

Release and rehabilitation

16. To withdraw the accusation, prosecution and cases induced against various individuals by both the parties and release the detainees gradually.

17. To disclose, as soon as possible, the whereabouts of the citizens who have been disappeared thereof.

18. To assist to the displaced persons to return to their respective houses and on the act of peaceful, comfortable and dignified rehabilitation thereof.

19. To return the properties that are seized, locked up or prohibited to use during the conflict, of the leaders and the workers of the concerned persons or families and to allow them to consume. To resolve the problems through the mutual agreement, this may arise while returning the properties.

Facilitating in the Negotiations

20. No hurdle or of any obstruction shall be created in the movement and activities of individuals of both the parties involving in the negotiations. Monitoring
21. Monitor or ceasefire by national and international monitoring terms shall be caused to be done on the basis of mutual agreement between both parties.

Miscellaneous

22. If any dispute arises in the interpretation of this code of conduct, the problems shall be resolved through the agreement of both parties.
23. Alteration or amendments in the code of conduct may be made through the agreement of both the parties in accordance with the spirit of the preamble.
24. This code of conduct shall commence immediately after its signature.
25. This code of conduct shall be made in public after its signature.

On behalf of the Govt. Of Nepal

Coordinator: Krishna Prasad Sitaula

On behalf of the CPN (Maoist)

Coordinator: Krishna Bahadur Mahara

26 May 2006

Four-point Agreement between the GoN and CPN (Maoist) at kupodole

The following decision has been made in the second talk held between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist) on the 15 June 2006:-

1. Negotiation shall be organized between the government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist) in the participation of the top leaders of the seven political parties and the CPN-Maoist as soon as possible.
2. A National monitoring committee on Code of Conduct for ceasefire shall be has formed as follow to monitor the implementation of the 12-points understanding reached between the seven Political Parties and the CPN (Maoist) and the Code of Conduct for Ceasefire agreed on 26 May 2006:-

1. Coordinator	Prof.Dr. Birendra Mishra
2. Member	Dr Arjun Karki
3. Member	Dr Om Gurung
4. Member	Prof. Kapil Shrestha
5. Member	Dr K.B. Rokaya
6. Member	Keshav Bhattarai
7. Member	Krishna Pahadi
8. Member	Gauri Pardhan
9. Member	Chandi Raj Dhakal
10. Member	Charan Prasain
11. Member	Taranath Dahal
12. Member	Nilamber Acharya
13. Member	Padma Lal B.K.
14. Member	Prof.Dr. Bhupati Dhakal
15. Member	Malla K. Sunder
16. Member	Dr. Mahesh Maske
17. Member	Madhav Banskota
18. Member	Raman Shrestha
19. Member	Dr. Raman Shrestha
20. Member	Wangchhe Sherpa
21. Member	Bishnu Nisthuri
22. Member	Bishnu Pukar Shrestha
23. Member	Shanta Shresthe
24. Member	Shyam Shrestha
25. Member	Shiva Gaunle

- | | |
|------------|-----------------------|
| 26. Member | Sushil Pyakurel |
| 27. Member | Engr. Saroj Devkota |
| 28. Member | Dr. Sudha Sharma |
| 29. Member | Subodh Pyakurel |
| 30. Member | Sushil Chandra Amatya |
3. A request shall be made to the UN Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal to provide assistance in monitoring the issues related to human rights to the National Monitoring Committee constituted to monitor the Code of Conduct for Ceasefire, and to monitor the human rights.
4. The following eminent personalities shall be the observers in the negotiations to be held between the Government and the Maoists:-
1. Laxman Prasad Aryal
 2. Devendra Raj Pandey
 3. Padma Ratna Tuladhar
 4. Daman Nath Dhungana
 5. Mathura Prasad Shrestha

On behalf of the Govt. Of Nepal

Coordinator: Krishna Prasad Sitaula

On behalf of the CPN (Maoist)

Coordinator: Krishna Bahadur Mahara

15 June 2006

(*) Earlier the above mentioned committee was formed on June 15, 2006 under the Coordinator ship of Dr Devendra Raj Pandey and pursuant to an agreement concluded on June 26, 2006 Dr. Birendra Mishra was designated as coordinator.

**Eight-point Agreement between the seven Political Parties and the CPN (Maoist)
(Press Statement)**

Meeting of the top leaders of Seven Political Parties and CPN (Maoist) has been held in the Prime Minister's residence at Baluwatar today, on 16 June 2006 on the auspicious organization of the Government-Maoist Negotiating Team. The points reached in agreement in the meeting are as follow.

1. To implement effectively and honestly the 12-points understanding reached between the seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) on November 23, 2005 and the 25-points Code of Conduct on Ceasefire reached in agreement between the Government of Nepal and CPN (Maoist) and make public by the Government Maoist Negotiating team on 26, May 2006.
2. To express commitment to democratic norms and values including competitive multi-party governance system, civic liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, press freedom, and the concept of rule of law, and carry out each other's activities accordingly in a peaceful manner.
3. To request the United Nations to assist in the management of the armies and the arms of both the parties and to monitor them for a free and fair election of the Constituent Assembly.
4. To frame an interim constitution to form an interim government accordingly; announce the date of the election for constituent assembly to dissolve the House of Representatives by making another alternative arrangement through consensus and to dissolve the People's Government formed by the CPN (Maoist), by ensuring the democratic rights achieved through the Peoples Movement, and by making base to

- the commitment expressed in the 12-points understanding and the spirit of the preamble of the Code of Conduct on Ceasefire;
5. To decide on the matters national interests having long-term effect on the basis of consensus.
 - 6 . To guarantee the fundamental right of Nepali people to participate in the constitution making process without any fear, influence, threat and violence in the election of constituent assembly. To make a provision for international observation and monitoring during the elections as per the need.
 7. To make forward-looking restructuring of the state so as to resolve the class-based, racial, regional and gender-based problems through the election of constituent assembly. To transform the ceasefire held between the Government of Nepal and CPN (Maoist) into a permanent peace by keeping in the centre the democracy, peace, prosperity, progress and independence, sovereignty and dignity of the country, and to express commitment to resolve the problem through negotiations.
 8. The government-Maoist negotiating teams have been directed to accomplish all the tasks related to the above-mentioned points without any delay.

On behalf of the Seven Political Parties

Shree Girja Prasad Koirala

Prime Minister and President, Nepali Congress

Shree Madhav Kumar Nepal General Secretare, CPN (UML)

Shree Sher Bahadur Deuba President, Nepali Congress (Democratic)

Shree Amik Sherchan Deputy Prime Minister and Chairperson, Janamorcha Nepal

Shree Narayan man Bijhuckchhe President, Nepal Majdur Kisan Party

Shree Bharat Bimal Yadav Vice President, Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi)

Shree Prabhu Narayan Chaudary Minister and Chairperson Bammorcha, Nepal

On behalf of CPN (Maoist)

Prachanda Chairman CPN (Maoist)

Five Point Letter sent to UN by the CPN (Maoist)

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated July 24, 2006 requesting the cooperation of the United Nations in the ongoing peace process in Nepal. In this context, I am happy to acquaint you that United Nations team, which left Kathmandu a week ago, held extensive yet fruitful consultations with all concerned stake holders of peace process here in Nepal. The UN team, as understand, is likely to submit its report to you on Nepal.

In the mean time, Excellency, I wish to inform you that further to the Eight-Point Understanding between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party Nepal (Maoist) of June 16, 2006 and the commitment expressed by the government of Nepal (GON) to the Agreement, the GON and CPN-M hereby request the United Nations to provide its assistance as follows with a view to creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election of a constituent assembly and the entire peace process.

Continue its human rights monitoring through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OSCHR-NEPAL)

Assist the monitoring of the Code of Conduct during the Ceasefire.

On the basis of the agreement to seek UN assistance in the "the management of arms and armed personnel of both the sides", deploy qualified civilian personnel to monitor and verify the confinement of CPN (Maoist) combatants and their weapons within designated cantonment areas. Later the modalities for all arrangements, including of arms and ammunitions, will be worked out among the parties and the UN.

Monitor the Nepal Army to ensure that it remains in its barracks and its weapons are not used for or against any side. The modalities will be worked out among the parties and the UN.

Provide election observation for the election of the Constituent Assembly in consultation with the parties.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Excellency Kofi A. Annan Prachanda

Secretary General,	Chairman,
United Nations, NY	Central Committee
United States of America	CPN (Maoist)

Latter to UN Secretary-General by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

I have the honour to refer to the identical letters of 9 August 2006 addressed to you by the Prime Minister of Nepal and the Chairman of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) requesting the United Nations to assist in the following areas with a view to creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election of the Constituent Assembly.

1. Continue its human rights monitoring through the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal.
2. Assist the monitoring of the code of conduct during the ceasefire;
3. On the basis of agreement to seek United Nations assistance in "the management of arms and armed personnel to monitor and verify the confinement of Community Party of Nepal (Maoist) combatants and their weapons within designated cantonment area. Later the modalities for all agreements, including arms and munitions, would be worked out among the parties and the United Nations.
4. Monitor the Nepal Army to ensure that it remains in its barracks and its weapons are not used for or against any side. The modalities will be worked out among the parties and the United Nations;
5. Provide election observation for the election of the Constituent Assembly in consultation with parties.

The Government of Nepal sincerely appreciates the appointment of your Personal Representative in response to these requests. Since then, the Government of Nepal and the Communist of Nepal (Maoist) have been working with your Personal Representative on these issues. I have further the honour to inform you that in accordance with the agreement reached between the Seven Party Alliance and Communist party of Nepal (Maoist) on 8 November 2006, and subsequently endorsed by the Government of Nepal, the assistance of the United Nations is required in the following specific areas in addition to the five points mentioned in the identical letters of 9 August 2006:

1. As per the commitments expressed in the letters sent to the United Nations by the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) on 9 August 2006, the Maoist combatants shall be sent to cantonments located in the following districts; Kailali, Surkhet, Rolpa, Palpa, Kabhre, Sindhuli, and Ilam. There shall be three smaller camps located in the periphery of each of these main cantonments. The Unites Nations shall do the necessary verification and monitoring of them;
2. All the arms and ammunition held by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) shall be securely stored in the camps except those needed for providing security to the camps after the Maoist combatants are sent to the cantonments. The arms and ammunition shall be locked with a single padlock and the side concerned shall keep the key to it. For the United Nations to monitor it, a device with a siren as

well as recording facility shall be installed. The United Nations shall make necessary inspections of the stored arms in the presence of the side concerned. The details of the technology including cameras for monitoring as per the agreement shall be prepared among the Government of Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the United Nations;

3. The Nepal Army shall be confined to the barracks as per the commitments of the letter sent to the United Nations. It will be guaranteed that its arms shall not be used for or against any side. An equal number of arms of the Nepal Army shall be kept in the store under a single-lock system and the key shall be kept by the side of concerned. For the United Nations to monitor it, a device with a siren as well as a recording facility shall be installed. The United Nations shall make necessary inspections of the stored arms in the presence of the side concerned. The details of technology, including cameras for monitoring as per the agreement shall be prepared among the Government of Nepal, the communist party of Nepal (Maoist) and the United Nations.
4. Monitoring of the election of the Constituent Assembly, to be held by mid June 2007, shall be done by the United Nations. I also have the honour to requested assistance as quickly as possible to meet the sequence of events leading up to the election of the Constituent Assembly. Details of the scope of the activities of the United Nations support, including for the electoral assistance, are being worked out among the Government of Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the United Nations, which will be communicated to you shortly. As per the agreed time schedules, the verification and monitoring of the cantonments and combatants of the Maoist by the United Nations would begin once they are confined to the camps by 21 November 2006.

By that time, the Nepal Army will also be confined to the barracks, keeping the specified number of arms in the store for United Nations Monitoring. It also scheduled that the interim constitution would be promulgated an interim legislature would be in place by 26 November, which would be followed by formation of an interim cabinet by 1 December 2006. On behalf of the Government of Nepal, I take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation for your personal support for the assistance provided by the United Nations through the secretariat and your Personal Representative to Nepal in the process.

(Signed) K.P. Sharma Oli
November 16, 2006

Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies

Preamble

In keeping with the letters to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General of 9 August and the Comprehensive Peace Accord of 21 November 2006; Guaranteeing the fundamental rights of Nepali people to take part in the constituent assembly elections in a free and fair environment without fear; Declaring the beginning of a new chapter of peaceful democratic interaction by ending the armed conflict taking place in the country since 1996, based on the Comprehensive Peace Accord between two parties in order to accomplish, through the constituent assembly, certainty of sovereignty of Nepali people, progressive political outlet, democratic restructuring of the state, and social economic-cultural transformation; and affirming the will to fully observe the terms of this bilateral agreement witnessed by the United nations: The parties agree to seek UN assistance in monitoring the management of the arms and armies of both sides by the deployment of qualified UN civilian personnel to monitor, according to international norms, the confinement of Maoist army combatants and their weapons within designate cantonment areas and monitor the Nepal Army (NA) to ensure that it remains in its barracks and its weapons are not used against any side.

1. Modalities of the Agreement

1.1 principles

Neither of the parties shall engage in movement or redeployment of forces resulting in tactical or strategic advantage. Any claims or reports of violations of this agreement will be reported to UN monitors, substantiated or not substantiated, and subsequently reported to the parties through the appropriate representative of the UN Mission in Nepal.

The security forces deployed by the interim government shall have authority to conduct routine patrol, explore in order to prevent illegal trafficking of the weapons, explosive or raw materials used in assembling weapons at the international border or custom points and seize them.

Both parties agree to allow the United Nations international donor agencies and diplomatic missions based in Nepal, national and international nongovernmental organization, press, human rights activists, election observers and foreign tourists to travel unrestricted according to law in the state of Nepal. The parties will ensure the safety, security, freedom of movement and well -being of UN Mission and associated personnel, goods and services in all parts of Nepal.

The party shall immediately take all necessary measure to cooperate with efforts aimed at controlling illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups.

Both parties fully agree to not include or use children who are 18 years old and under in the armed forces. Children thus affected would be immediately

rescued and necessary and appropriate assistance will be provided for their rehabilitation.

1.2 Definitions

The following definitions are accepted:

- (1) *Cantonment* (Maoist army) is temporarily designated and clearly defined geographical area for encampment and provision of services for the Maoist combatant units including weapons, ammunitions and equipment. The cantonments are provided for all echelons of the Maoist army.
- (2) *Barracking* (NA) is the deployment of Nepal Army units to barracks, including weapons, ammunition and equipment. No units below a company level will be independently deployed unless for activities specified elsewhere in this agreement or otherwise mutually agreed by the parties.
- (3) *Secure arms storage areas* are either military barracks with regular armoury stores used for weapons, munitions and explosives, or storage containers establish in special perimeters at cantonment sites controlled and guarded by the responsible unit.
- (4) *"The parties"* refers to the party of Government of Nepal (including the Nepal Army) and party of Communist party of Nepal (Maoist), (Including the Maoist Army.)
- (5) *UN Monitoring* refers to all efforts by the United Nations Mission to determine relative compliance with the term spelled out in this agreement and to report to all the parties and others concerned its findings.
- (6) *The Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee* (JMCC) is the monitoring, reporting and coordinating body chaired by the UN with membership of the parties. The JMCC is responsible for supervising compliance by the parties with this agreement in the accordance with provision 6.1 of this agreement.
- (7) *Joint Monitoring Team* (JMTs) are the bodies which will assist in monitoring the cessation of hostilities. The Joint Monitoring Teams will be active at the regional and local level and in mobile teams. Each team will be comprised of one UN monitoring serving as team leader, one monitor from Nepal Army and one Monitor from the Maoist Army. Joint Monitoring Teams will not be used for weapons storage inspections. Inspections at Maoist army cantonments will take place with a UN monitoring team and a representative of the Maoist army.

Inspection at Nepal Army barracks will take place with a UN monitoring team and a Nepal Army representative.

- (8) *Maoist army combatants*: For purpose of this agreement this will include regular active duty members of the Maoist army who joined services before 25 May 2006, who are not minors and who are able to demonstrate their service, including by CPN (M) identity card and other means agreed by the parties,

1.3 Promotion

The parties shall promote awareness of this agreement, and adherence to its provisions, among their commanders, members and affiliated groups.

The parties, Government of Nepal, Nepal Army (NA), CPN (M) and the Maoist army, shall design, in cooperation with the UN Mission, an awareness programme to ensure that local communities and the parties' commanders, members and affiliated groups understand the mandate of the UN Mission and all of the obligations of the parties spelled out in this agreement.

The information programmes shall include the use of meetings and print and electronic media in local languages.

1.4 Phases

This agreement shall come into force upon signing. Thereafter it shall be implemented in phases, as follow:

- (1) Reporting and verification;
- (2) Redeployment and concentration of forces;
- (3) Maoist army cantonment, NA barracking and control; and
- (4) Full compliance with the agreement.

A full and practical timeline will be established by the parties for all of these activities to take place in consultation with the UN.

2. Reporting and verification

The parties will report detailed information about their troops and this information will be treated with appropriate confidentiality by the United Nation. The parties will provide maps and sketches showing current dispositions, including:

- (1) Order of battle/military structure, organisation, deployment and number of troops;
- (2) Minefields, landmines, unexploded ordnance, standard explosives, improvised explosive devices and exact location of such items;
- (3) All necessary information about roads, tracks, trails and passages related to encampments;
- (4) Information regarding armed or unarmed groups working along with the parties, the Nepal Army (NA) and the Maoist army, including their responsibilities; and,
- (5) Other information required by the UN Mission for proper monitoring of the disposition of arms and armed.

The UN mission shall check this information immediately after monitors are deployed.

3. Redeployment and concentration of forces

Comprehensive plans, timelines and routes for the redeployment and concentration of forces will be provided by both the NA and Maoist army to the UN Mission.

The redeployment and concentration of all combatants in Nepal—with the NA in barracks and the Maoist army moving in to cantonment sites—shall be carried out in consultation with the UN. The redeployment and cantonment of forces will be monitored after they are deployed.

Both sides express an understanding to create a record of government, public and private buildings, land and other properties and return them immediately.

The parties will withdraw all military and paramilitary checkpoints (unless explicitly permitted in this agreement) to promote and guarantee free movement and create an environment free from fear and intimidation.

The Nepal Police and Armed Police Force shall continue the task of maintaining law and order and conduct criminal investigations as per the spirit and sentiment of the Jana Andolan and peace accord as well as the prevailing law. Both parties agree not to operate parallel or other forms of mechanism in any areas of the state or state machinery as per the spirit of the decisions of November 8, 2006 and the essence of the peace accord. All sides agree to let employees of Nepal Government and public agencies travel freely to any part of the country, to fully fill their duties and not to create any obstacle or obstruction while executing their work or not to let obstructions arise and to facilitate their work.

4. Maoist Army cantonment, barracking of the NA and arms control

4.1. Maoist army cantonment

In accordance with the commitment expressed in the letter sent to the United Nations, Maoist army combatants and their weapons shall be confined within designated cantonment areas. The cantonment shall be based on comprehensive planning and preparation before implementation.

After the Maoist army combatants stay in the temporary cantonments, the Government of Nepal will provide food supplies and other necessary arrangements. When implemented, the comprehensive concept shall ensure good communication and proper logistics. UN monitors will have access to any and all cantonment sites for the purpose of monitoring.

4.1.1. Commanders' responsibilities

The normal Maoist army chain of command, control, communication and information will be utilized to control the Maoist army cantonment, using the normal Maoist army structure in administration of the sites. There will be seven main cantonment sites and 21 satellite cantonment sites of three per main cantonment site. The satellite sites will be clustered no more than two hours driving distance from the main site unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

The designated seven main sites will be under command, control, communication and information of the Maoist site commander and the satellite sites by the designated satellite commanders.

The site commanders shall provide the following information in detail for each site to the UN Mission:

- (1) Command structure for the unit and sub units plotted on a map;
- (2) Names of commanders down to company level;
- (3) Communication system;
- (4) Complete list of personnel;
- (5) Complete list of weapons; i.e. types, number, serial number and calibre under storage at the main cantonment sites;
- (6) Ammunition inventory type, lot number and amount; and,
- (7) List of names for the site security guards detachment and complete list of weapons and ammunitions for the detachment (main and satellite cantonment levels).

Site commanders' responsibilities include:

- (1) Camp security, including access control to the site;
- (2) Ensuring the security, freedom of movement and well-being of UN Mission and associated personnel, goods and services;
- (3) Providing information in cooperation with the UN Mission in accordance with section 2;
- (4) Maintenance of discipline, moral and normal training in the spirit of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, excluding live fire exercises;
- (5) Daily routines and control of troops; and,
- (6) Logistics and camp services (in cooperation with the Government of Nepal and other assisting agencies).

4.1.2 Weapons storage and control

The parties agree upon the safe storage of all Maoist army weapons and ammunition, in the seven main cantonment areas under UN monitoring, except as provided below for perimeter security purpose. Both sides shall assist each other to mark landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary information within 30 days and to defuse and remove /lift and destroy them within 60 days. All improvised explosive devices will be collected at the designated sites a safe distance from the main cantonment areas. These sites shall be agreed by the parties in consultation with the UN Mission. Unsuitable devices will be destroyed immediately. Stable devices will be stored safely and under 24-hour armed guard provided for by the guard arrangements cited below. The parties, in consultation with the UN, will determine a timeline and process for the later destruction of all improvised explosive devices. To ensure the safety of both monitors and Maoist army personnel, no improvised explosive devices or crude bombs will be brought inside the cantonment sites.

In the main cantonment sites the weapons and ammunition storage area will be secured by the following system:

- (1) A solid fence will surround the specified area, including a gate with a lock. There will be signs on the fence clearly identifying the restricted area.
- (2) The weapons storage depot will be composed of storage containers painted white and furnished with shelves for safe weapons storage and easy control, and with complete.
- (3) Inventory (weapon type, calibre and serial number).
- (4) A single lock provide by the UN will secure each storage container. The key will be held by the designated main cantonment site commander. A 24-hour surveillance camera provided by UN Mission will cover the storage site and will be monitored from the UN office in the cantonment site. Floodlights will be switched on automatically during hours of darkness.
- (5) The UN Mission will provide an inspection registration device mounted on each container door indicating when the storage container has been opened.
- (6) An alarm system provided by the UN Mission will be connected to sirens in both the UN office and the camp commander's office. The system will be activated if the container door is opened without a "safe button" having been switched off in connection with regular inspections.
- (7) UN monitors will carry out the inspections of the arms storage area and containers in the presence of a Maoist army representative.
Each main cantonment site will be allowed 30 weapons of the same make and model to be used only for clearly defined perimeter security by designated guards, with each satellite allowed 15 such weapons under the same conditions. These weapons will all be properly registered with make and serial number and locked in a guard house when not in use. The parties, in consultation wit UN,

Will periodically review the number of weapons needed for perimeter security purpose on the basis of a shared threat assessment.

Security provisions will be made for CPN (Maoist) leaders through understanding with the government.

The UN Mission shall monitor these commitments with a full-time presence at the Maoist army main cantonment sites and through field visits and regular inspections. These inspections will be carried out randomly and without warning.

4.1.2. Registration of Maoist army combatants at cantonment sites

All Maoist army combatants will be registered at the main cantonment sites. This registration will include the provision of age, name, rank, responsibilities within unit/formation, date of entry into service and will provide the basis for a complete list of personnel. Maoist will be combatants registered regardless if they are in possession of weapons or not. If with weapon, the type and condition of weapons will be specified. The total number of weapons will be categorized by unit formation. Only those individuals who were members of the Maoist army before 25 May 2006 will be eligible for cantonment. The parties will agree as to how this pre-existing service is to be confirmed in consultation with the UN.

As part of this registration, all Maoist army combatants will present their Maoist army identity card to be marked by the UN. The process for marking the cards will be determined. This registration card will be the basis for any assistance received by Maoist army members. Unregistered persons will not be eligible for the assistance or permitted to remain in cantonments.

Only those Maoist army combatants who have been properly registered at cantonment sites will be eligible for possible integration in to the security forces fulfilling the standard norms. Any discharged personnel will be ineligible for possible integration. Those who are eligible for integration in to the security forces will be determined by a special committee as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Accord. This integration process will be determined in subsequent agreement with the parties.

Upon registration Maoist army combatants, if found to be born after 25 May 1988, will be honourably and automatically discharged

Discharged Maoist army combatants must: release all weapons, uniforms and other military gear; and, agree not to return to cantonment sites unless mutually agreed by UN monitors in consultation with the parties. The assistance packages to be provided to voluntarily discharged personnel will be agreed by the parties in advance of cantonment. The Interim Council of Ministers will form a special committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist army combatants.

4.2 Barracking of the Nepal Army

4.2.2 General regulation

In accordance with the commitment expressed in the later sent to the United Nations, and Nepal Army shall remain in its barracks and its arms are not to be used in favour of or against any side.

UN monitors will have access to any and all NA barracks for purpose of monitoring whether Nepal Army forces or weapons are being used for or against any party. Upon visiting any Nepal Army barracks for inspection, the site commander will be duly notified, and UN inspection will relate only to matters regarding the disposition of forces and weapons.

The Council of Ministers will control, mobilise and manage the Nepali Army as per the Army Act of 2006 (*sainik Ain 2063*) or its successor legislation. The Interim Council of

Ministers of prepare and implement the detailed action plan of Nepal Army's democratization by taking suggestions from the concerned committee of the Interim parliament/ Legislature. Under this to carry out activities like assessing the appropriate number of the Nepal Army, to train the army in democratic and human rights values while developing democratic structure, national and inclusive character.

4.2.3 Commander Responsibilities

The normal NA chain of command, control, communication and information will be utilised to monitor the NA deployment to barracks. The commanders shall provide the following information in detailed to the UN Mission:

- (1) Command structure for the unit and subunits plotted on a map;
- (2) Names of commander down to company level;
- (3) Communication system;
- (4) Order of battle/military structure, organisation, deployment and number of troops;
- (5) Minefields, landmines, unexploded ordnance, standard explosives, improvised explosive device and exact location of such items, and,
- (6) Other information required by the UN Mission for proper monitoring of the disposition of arms and armies.

The NA will ensure the safety, security, freedom of UN Mission and associated personnel, goods and services, and provide information in cooperation with the UN Mission according to Section 2.

The UN Mission shall monitor these commitments through daily presence in selected NA barracks, field visits and regular inspection.

4.2.3 Weapons storage and control

The Nepal Army will remain within the barracks as per the commitment expressed in the letter sent to the UN to ensure that their arms are not used for or against any party. The Nepal Army to store arms in equal numbers to that of the Maoist army, to steal it with single lock, to assemble a mechanism including a siren and register for the monitoring by the UN . While carrying out the necessary examination of the stored arms, the UN will do so under the presence of Nepal Army representative. The barracks/ barracks where NA arms will be monitored under the conditions spelled out in section 4.1.2 will be identified and agreed by the parties. The arms will be stored in storage containers.

4.2.4 Deployment and concentration of forces- NA permitted activities

In accordance with the spirit of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, continuity will be given to functions of the Nepal Army including border security, security of the conservation areas, banks, airports, power houses, telephone towers, central secretariat and security of VIPs. A detailed list of these institutions and installation will be kept by the Secretary Minister Defence, along with number and types of forces assigned to such duties. The list of such institution and installation will be kept by the NA under seal, and this list will be made available

to UN monitors when they deem necessary on a case-by-case basis. Permitted NA activities are as follows:

1. Routine military activities within the barracks and regular training in barracks and camps. The JMCC will be notified 48 hours in advance before undertaking limited live fire exercise at designated live firing ranges.
2. Participation in official ceremonies, parades, etc as directed by the Government.
3. Provision of Boarder Security as directed by the Government.
4. Relief of troops on a one-to-one basis, including transport as mentioned.
5. Regular maintenance and replacement of non-lethal equipment, including transport as mentioned. Maintenance and replacement of lethal weapons will take place only with the determination of the interim government or agreement by both parties.
6. Execution of development and construction tasks as directed by the civilian authorities, on central, regional and local levels.
7. Provision of support in relief work in times of natural and other disasters as directed by the government.
8. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations called for by the United Nations, and all preparations, transport, training, transfer f equipment, etc. Connected to this.
9. Provision of security for VVIPs and VIPs.
10. Provision of security of vital installations as directed by the government.
11. Provision of security of transportation of Nepal Rastra bank funds.

For all of the above activities the rules regarding notification of troop, air movements and exercises spelled out in the section 5.2 apply.

5 Compliance with the agreement

5.1 Prohibited activities

In the spirit of the comprehensive peace Accord, and in light of this agreement, after the placement of the Nepali Army in the barracks and the Maoist Army combatants in cantonment, the parties shall scrupulously refrain from the following activities:

1. Holding and carrying arms is in violation of the law. Displaying arms, intimidation and any type of use of violence is prohibited and use of arms is legally punishable.
2. Any types of arms and weapons targeted against each other in a direct or indirect way or any act of attack.
3. Harming or intimidating any person, including internally displaced persons, humanitarian and development workers and other non combatants, and any seizure of their equipment and property.
4. Ambushes, murder or violent operations.
5. Kidnapping, unlawful detention or imprisonment, disappearances;
6. All offensive military flights in and over Nepal.

7. Damaging or seizing public/private/government, military or UN property and all attacks on UN and associated personnel.
8. Planting mines or improvised explosive devices, conducting sabotage or military espionage.
9. Recruiting additional armed forces or conducting military activities against each other, including transporting weapons, ammunitions and explosives (unless mutually agreed by the parties and notified in advance according to the terms of this agreement.)
10. Collecting cash or goods and services or levying tax against one's wishes and against the existing law.
11. Any actions that impede or delay the provision of humanitarian assistance or protection to civilians.
12. Any restriction on the safe, free and unimpeded movement of humanitarian or development agencies undertaking activities approved by the interim government or its successor.
13. All acts and forms of gender-based violence.
14. Any restriction on the free movements of people and goods,
15. All activities that obstruct the efforts of the UN mission and amount to a failure to cooperate with the UN Mission, including the prohibition of the UN Mission patrols and flights over locations.
16. Any attempt by a party to disguise its equipments, personnel or activities as those of the UN Mission, other United Nations agencies, the international committee of the Red Cross/Crescent or any other similar organisation.
17. Any attempt to redeploy military forces and equipment or occupation of any positions out of their respective deployment positions without the consent of the Joint Monitoring Coordination committee.
18. The use of children who are 18 years old and under in the armed forces.
19. All hostile propaganda and incitement to military action. The parties shall also refrain from all activities that are prohibited elsewhere in this agreement.

5.1 Permitted Activities

The key principle that shall underpin permitted activities for both sides shall be to alleviate the effect of the armed conflict on civilians and the war-affected areas and to galvanise popular support for peace. Permitted activities for both sides will be conducted as per the decisions of the interim government. Troop, air movements and exercise have to be properly notified and approved by the Jointly notified and approved by the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee at least 48-hours in advance. Permitted activities include:

1. De-mining and decommissioning of military hazards;

2. Development activities to include improvement and opening of roads, rehabilitation of bridge and passages and airstrips according to the decisions of the interim government; Humanitarian relief;

3. Socio economic activities such as assisting free movement of people, goods and services;

4. Free movement of unarmed soldiers in plain civilian clothes who are on granted leave, medical referrals or visiting families no more than 12 percent of the total retained force at given cantonment or barracks will be on authorised leave at any given time unless mutually agreed by the parties;

(1) Supply of non-lethal items to military units, food, water, medicine, petrol, oil, and lubricants, stationary, uniforms etc; and,

(2) Medical evacuation.

5.1. The following acts shall constitute violation of the agreement:

(1) Any act that contravenes this agreement:

(2) Unauthorised troop movements;

(3) Unauthorised recruitment, conscription or mobilisation;

(4) Unauthorised replacement of military equipment ;

(5) Violation of human rights, humanitarian law or obstruction of freedom of movement of people, goods and services;

(6) Espionage, sabotage, air surveillance and acts of subversion; and

(7) Military fighters, or military flights utilizing civilian aircraft, over cantonment sites without 48- hour notification to the parties and the UN mission, except in emergency situation of medical evacuations .

6. The United Nations Mission

Monitoring of compliance with this agreement will be carried out :

1. By UN Monitoring; or,

2. By joint monitoring terms ,if so decided by the JMCC and in keeping with other provisions of this agreement ,

The UN mission will submit reports to the parties on compliance with this agreement .

It will do so either directly or through the JMCC.

6.1 The Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee.

The nine -members joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) will have a chairman appointed by the UN mission. There will be two Vice-Chairman, one each from the Maoist Army and the NA. The remaining six members will be two Maoist army, all as selected by the parties respectively.

The JMCC shall reach its decisions by consensus. In the event of deadlock, the representative of the UN Secretary –General shall have final authority for reporting on the compliance of the parties with this agreement to the Secretary – General and to the interim government for resolution . The Chairman shall report

regularly to the representative of the Secretary- General and the designated representative's of the parties regarding the activities of the JMCC .

The JMCC shall serve three main functions:

1. To assist the parties in implementing this agreement. The JMCC shall be the central coordinating body for monitoring arms and armies in accordance with the terms of this agreement and to approve, where appropriate those activities specified in section 5.2.
2. To serve as a dispute resolution mechanism. The JMCC shall resolve and all disputes military or operational difficulties, complaints, questions or problems regarding implementation of this agreement.
3. To assist in confidence building. The JMCC shall work to gain the trust and confidence of the parties and promote the overall goals of this agreement among the people of Nepal .

In order to achieve th, these goals, the JMCC shall operate according to the following basic principle:

1. Resolve all problems and disputes at the lowest level possible, i.e. delegation of authority of the JMTs;
2. Promote joint problem-solving and build trust and confidence through active efforts to appropriately investigate and report on all incidents of concern to the parties; and,
3. Build on lessons learned in the process.

The Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee at the local level and through site visits. The JMTs will comprise one international monitor as the team leader and one monitor from Nepal Army and one monitor from the Maoist Army . The Number of JMTs and their deployment will be determined by the chairman of the JMCC in consultations with that body .

The tasks of the JMTs will include :

1. Village and community visits and liaison with the civilian community;
2. Cooperation with other UN-agencies, and liaison with international organizations and non-governmental organizations;
3. Assistance to the parties in creating a favorable operational environment for the conduct of the ceasefire by information sharing and defusing local tensions;
4. A pro-active concept for initiation of conflict management at the local levels; and,
5. Investigation of complaints linked to possible alleged violations of the agreement, reference paragraph 5.1, and to recommended measures to ensure compliance

Joint Monitoring Teams will not be used for designated weapons storage inspections.

7. Miscellaneous

This agreement can be revised at any time with the consent of both parties. Both parties agree to provide to each other prior written information if they wish to make any change. The amendments can be made to the agreement with the consent of both parties after receiving the information. The provisions to be made by such an amendment will not fall below the minimum standard of accepted international human rights and humanitarian laws.

Both parties consent to sign any complementary understandings, as necessary, for the implementation of the present agreement.

This agreement will be signed by both parties in English and Nepali. The United Nations will witness the English language versions of this agreement and, accordingly, the English- Language versions of this agreement will be considered as authoritative in matters of dispute.

The spirit of the Comprehensive Peace Accord shall guide the interpretation and implementation of this agreement by the parties. This agreement shall come into force upon signature, and it supersedes the agreement of the same name done on the 28th day of November 2006. Done in Kathmandu, Nepal on the 8th day of December 2006.

Krishna Bdr Mahara

Coordinator

Negotiating team

CPN (Maoist)

Krishna Pd Sitoula


Coordinator

Negotiating team

Government of Nepal

Witnessed by Ian Martin Personal Representative of the Secretary –General
United Nations, Dec.2006

MAP-1.



प्रश्नावली -१
(समायोजन भएकाहरूका लागि)

नाम:.....वर्ष:.....ठेगाना.....उमेर.....
लिङ्ग:.....जात/जाति.....शैक्षिक योग्यता.....पेसा.....धर्म.....वर्ग.....

प्रश्नावली:

- १) माओवादी सेनामा कहिले सहभागी हुनु भएको थियो ?
वि.सं..... साल
- २) माओवादी सेनाको कुन हैसियतमा हुनु हुन्थ्यो ?
क) सपोर्ट ग्रुप ख) रेगुलर आर्मी
- ३) जनमुक्ति सेनामा किन आवद्ध हुनु भएको थियो ?
क) राजनैतिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ख) आर्थिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ग) सामाजिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ड) माथिका सबै
- ४) जनमुक्ति सेनाले राखेको उद्देश्य पूरा भएको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) आंशिक पूरा भयो ख) भएन ग) थाहा भएन
- ५) राजनैतिक परिवर्तन गर्दा जनमुक्ति सेनाको नागरिकसंगको सम्बन्ध कस्तो थियो ?
क) राम्रो ख) सन्तोषजनक ग) नराम्रो
- ६) जनमुक्ति सेनाले नागरिकहरूसंगको सम्बन्ध कसरी विस्तार गरेको थियो ?
क) आमसभाहरु संचालन गरेर ख) श्रम शिविरहरु संचालन गरेर ग) सांस्कृतिक कार्यक्रमहरु संचालन गरेर
घ) सामाजिक कार्यहरुमा सहभागि भएर ड) माथिका सबै ।
- ७) अग्रगामी राजनैतिक परिवर्तन गर्दा जनमुक्ति सेनाको नागरिक सम्बन्ध कस्तो थियो ?
क) राम्रो ख) सन्तोषजनक ग) ठिक ठिकै
- ८) तपाइको सैनिक जीवनमा कुन कामलाई बढ्ता प्राथमिकता दिनु भएको थियो ?
क) लडाइको मोर्चा ख) सांगठानिक काम ग) उत्पादन
- ९) राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा कसको भूमिका महत्वपूर्ण ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) जनमुक्ति सेनाख) सात राजनैतिक दल ग) नागरिक समाज
- १०) पार्टीले जनयुद्धको सुरुवात गर्नुको उद्देश्य के थियो जस्तो लाग्दछ ?
क) विभेदपूर्ण कानूनको अन्त्यका लागि ख) नीति निर्माण तहमा पछाडि पारिएका वर्गको समान सहभागिताका लागि ग) अग्रगामी राजनैतिक रुपान्तरणका लागि घ) राज्यसत्तामा समान पहुँचका लागि
ड) सामाजिक न्याय सहित आर्थिक सामाजिक रुपान्तरणका लागि च) माथिका सबै
- ११) राजनैतिक परिवर्तन शान्तिपूर्ण अभियानबाट संभव थियो ?
क) संभव थियो ख) संभव थिएन ग) थाहा भएन
- १२) संविधान निर्माण प्रकृत्यामा जनमुक्ति सेनाको भूमिकालाई कसरी हेर्नु हुन्छ ?
क) राजनैतिक चेतना फैलाएर ख) समानुपातिक सहभागितामा जोड दिएर ग) दबाव सिर्जना गरेर घ)
शान्ति प्रकृत्यामा सचेतापूर्वक सहभागि भएर ।
- १३) ने.क.पा. माओवादीले राखेको राजनैतिक उद्देश्य पूरा भएको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) ठान्छु ख) ठान्दै ग) आंशिक पूरा भयो
- १४) नेपाली सेनामा किन समायोजन रोज्नु भयो ?
क) अवसर देखेर ख) जागिरको स्थायित्वका लागि ग) पार्टीको नीति अनुसार
- १५) सेना समायोजन तथा व्यवस्थापनमा के कस्ता समस्याहरु भोग्नु पर्यो ?

- क) नीतिगत समस्या ख) दलहरु विचको असमझदारी ग) आर्थिक कारण घ) अन्य
- १६) सेना समायोजनबाट तपाईं कतिको सन्तुष्ट हुनु हुन्छ ?
- क) सन्तुष्ट ख) असन्तुष्ट ग) भन्न चाहान्छु
- १७) समायोजन प्रकृयाको मापदण्ड सन्तोषजनक थियो ?
- क) सन्तुष्ट ख) असन्तुष्ट
- १८) अनमिनको भूमिका कस्तो पाउनु भयो ?
- क) निष्पक्ष ख) पूर्वाग्रही ग) सन्तोषजनक घ) अन्य.....
- १९) जनमुक्ति सेनाका राम्रा पक्षहरु के के थिए ?
- क)
ख)
ग)
- २०) जनमुक्ति सेनाका कमजोरी पक्षहरु के के थिए ?
- क) ख) ग)
- २१) प्रमाणिकरण प्रकृत्यामा परेका सबै लडाकुहरु समायोजनमा नपर्दा अन्यायमा परेको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
- क) ठान्छु ख) ठान्दैन ग) थाहा छैन
- २२) समायोजन प्रकृत्यामा छनौटमा नपरेका लडाकुहरुलाई दिएको रकम प्रयाप्त थियो ?
- क) थियो ख) थिएन ग) ठिकैठिकै
- २३) स्वेच्छिक अवकास लिएका लडाकुहरुलाई दिएको तालिमहरु आवश्यकतानुसारको थियो ?
- क) आवश्यकता अनुसारको थियो ख) आवश्यकता अनुसारको थिएन ग) भुलाउने प्रकृया मात्रै
- २४) आवश्यकतानुसारको थिएन भने कस्तो तालिम दिएको भए उचित हुन्थ्यो त ?
- क) स्वरोजगार सिर्जना गर्ने ख) तालिम पछि रोजगारको ग्यारेन्टी ग) स्थानीय स्रोत साधनको सदुपयोग हुने खालको ।
- २५) अनमिनको प्रमाणिकरणमा परेका तर अयोग्य भनिएका लडाकुहरुलाई के कस्तो सुविधा वा अवसर दिएको भए न्याय हुन्थ्यो ?
- क) उचित रकम ख) स्वरोजगारमूलक तालिम दिएर ग) जागिरको ग्यारेन्टी
- २६) जनयुद्धबाट तपाईंले के पाउनु भयो र के गुमाउनु भयो ?

पाएको	गुमाएको

- २७) अन्तमा जनमुक्ति सेनाको अग्रगामी राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा खेलेको भूमिकाका बारेमा थप केही भन्न चाँकि छ कि ?

१.
२.
३.

सहयोगका लागि धन्यवाद ।

प्रश्नावली -२

(स्वेच्छिक अवकास लिएकाहरुका लागि)

नाम:.....वर्ष:.....ठेगाना..... उमेर.....
लिङ्ग:.....जात/जाति.....शैक्षिक योग्यता.....पेसा.....धर्म.....
वर्ग.....

प्रश्नावली:

- १) माओवादी सेनामा कहिले सहभागि हुनु भएको थियो ?
वि.सं..... साल
- २) माओवादी सेनाको कुन हैसियतमा हुनु हुन्थ्यो ?
क) सपोर्ट ग्रुप ख) रेगुलर आर्मी
- ३) जनमुक्ति सेनामा किन आवद्ध हुनु भएको थियो ?
क) राजनैतिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ख) आर्थिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ग) सामाजिक रुपान्तरण गर्न
घ) माथिका सवै
- ४) जनमुक्ति सेनाले राखेको उद्देश्य पूरा भएको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) आसिक पूरा भयो ख) भएको छैन ग) थाहा भएन
- ५) तपाइको सैनिक जीवनमा कुन कामलाई बढता प्राथमिकता दिनु भएको थियो ?
क) लडाइको मोर्चा ख) सांगठानिक काम ग) उत्पादन
- ६) राजनैतिक परिवर्तनका लागि जनमुक्ति सेनाको नागरिक सम्बन्धको विस्तार कसरी गरेको थियो ?
क) आमसभाहरु संचालन गरेर ख) श्रम शिविरहरु संचालन गरेर ग) सांस्कृतिक कार्यक्रमहरु संचालन गरेर
घ) सामाजिक तथा धार्मिक कार्यहरुमा सहभागि भएर ड) माथिका सवै ।
- ७) अग्रगामी राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा कसको भूमिका महत्वपूर्ण ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) जनमुक्ति सेनाख) सात राजनैतिक दल ग) नामगरिक समाज
- ८) पार्टीले जनयुद्धको सुरुवात गर्नुको उद्देश्य के थियो ?
क) विभेदपूर्ण कानूनको अन्त्य ख) नीति निर्माण तहमा पछाडि पारिएका वर्गको समान सहभागिता
ग) अग्रगामी राजनैतिक परिवर्तन लागि घ) राज्यसत्तामा समानुपातिक सहभागिता
- ९) राजनैतिक परिवर्तन शान्तिपूर्ण प्रकृयाबाट संभव थियो जस्तो लाग्दछ ?
क) संभव थियो ख) संभव थिएन ग) थाहा भएन
- १०) संविधान निर्माण प्रकृयामा जनमुक्ति सेनाको भूमिकालाई कसरी हेर्नु हुन्छ ?
क) राजनैतिक चेतना फैलाएर ख) समानुपातिक प्रतिनिधित्वमा जोड दिएर ग) दबाव सिर्जना गरेर घ)
शान्ति प्रकृयामा सचेतापूर्वक सहभागि भएर ।
- ११) ने.क.पा. माओवादीले राखेको राजनैतिक उद्देश्य पूरा भएको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) ठान्छु ख) ठान्दैन ग) आसिक पूरा भयो घ) अन्य.....
- १२) नेपाली सेनामा किन समायोजन रोज्नु भएन ?
क) सांगठानिक संरचना मन नपरेर ख) स्वतन्त्र जीवन विताउन मन लागेर ग) अन्य रोजगारीका लागि ।
- १३) समायोजन प्रकृयाको मापदण्ड सन्तोषजनक थियो ?
क) सन्तुष्ट ख) असन्तुष्ट ग) ठिक ठिकै
- १४) अनमिनको भूमिका कस्तो पाउनु भयो ?
क) निष्पक्ष ख) पूर्वाग्रही ग) सन्तोषजनक घ) अन्य.....
- १५) जनमुक्ति सेनाका राम्रा पक्षहरु के के थिए ?

क)

ख).....

ग).....

घ).....

१६) जनमुक्ति सेनाका कमजोरी पक्षहरु के के थिए ?

क).....

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१७) स्वेच्छिक अवकास लिएका लडाकुहरुलाई दिएको रकम प्रयाप्त थियो ?

क) थियो ख) थिएन ग) ठिकैठिकै

१८) स्वेच्छिक अवकास रोजेका लडाकुहरुलाई आर्थिक सहयोग वाहेक अन्य के सुविधा वा अवसर दिएको भए राम्रो हुन्थ्यो ।

क) स्वरोजगार तालिम ख) सहुलियतपूर्ण ऋण सुविधा ग) रोजगारी घ) अन्य.....

१९) पुनर्स्थापनामा रोजेका लडाकुहरुलाई दिएको तालिमहरु आवश्यकतानुसारको थियो ?

क) आवश्यकता अनुसारको थियो ख) आवश्यकता अनुसारको थिएन ग) भुलाउने प्रकृया मात्रै

२०) आवश्यकतानुसारको थिएन भने कस्तो तालिम दिएको भए उचित हुन्थ्यो त ?

क) स्वरोजगार सिर्जना गर्ने ख) तालिम पछि रोजगारको ग्यारेन्टी ग) स्थानीय स्रोत साधनको सदुपयोग

२१) प्रमाणिकरणमा परेका तर अयोग्यताको सूचिमा परेका लडाकुहरुलाई के कस्तो सुविधा वा अवसर दिएको भए उचित हुन्थ्यो ?

क) उचित रकम ख) स्वरोजगारमूलक तालिम ग) जागिरको व्यवस्था

२२) अब नेपालमा निकट भविष्यमा शसस्त्र क्रान्तिको संभवना देख्नु हुन्छ ?

क) देख्दछु ख) तत्काल संभव छैन ग) भविष्यमा हुन सक्दछ ।

२२) जनयुद्धबाट तपाईंले के पाउनु भयो र के गुमाउनु भयो ?

पाएको	गुमाएको

२३) अन्तमा जनमुक्ति सेनाको राजनैतिक परिवर्तनका सवालमा खेलेको भूमिकाका बारेमा केही भन्नु छ, कि ?

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२.

प्रश्नावली -३

(समायोजनमा नपरेकाको लागि)

नाम:.....वर्ष:.....ठेगाना..... उमेर.....
लिङ्ग:.....जात/जाति.....शैक्षिक योग्यता.....पेसा.....धर्म.....
वर्ग:.....

प्रश्नावली:

- १) माओवादी सेनामा कहिले सहभागी हुनु भएको थियो ?
वि.सं..... साल
- २) माओवादी सेनाको कुन हैसियतमा हुनु हुन्थ्यो ?
क) सर्पोट गुप ख) रेगुलर आर्मी
- ३) जनमुक्ति सेनामा किन आवद्ध हुनु भएको थियो ?
क) राजनैतिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ख) आर्थिक रुपान्तरण गर्न ग) सामाजिक रुपान्तरण गर्न घ) माथिका सबै
- ४) तपाइको सैनिक जीवनमा कुन कामलाई बढता प्राथमिकता दिनु भएको थियो ?
क) लडाइको मोर्चा ख) सांगठानिक काम ग) उत्पादन
- ५) जनमुक्ति सेनाले राखेको उद्देश्य पूरा भएको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) आसिक पूरा भयो ख) पूरा भएन ग) यसै भन्न सकिएन
- ६) राजनैतिक परिवर्तनका लागि जनमुक्ति सेनाको नागरिक सम्बन्ध कस्तो थियो ?
क) सन्तोषजनक ख) राम्रो ग) नराम्रो
- ७) जनमुक्ति सेनाले नागरिक सम्बन्धको विस्तार कसरी गरेको थियो ?
क) आमसभाहरु संचालन गरेर ख) श्रम शिविरहरु संचालन गरेर ग) सांस्कृतिक कार्यक्रमहरु संचालन गरेर घ) सामाजिक तथा धार्मिक कार्यहरुमा सहभागी भएर ड) माथिका सबै ।
- ८) अग्रगामी राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा कसको भूमिका महत्वपूर्ण ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) जनमुक्ति सेनाख) सात राजनैतिक दल ग) नागरिक समाज
- ९) पार्टीले जनयुद्धको सुरुवात गर्नुको उद्देश्य के थियो जस्तो लाग्दछ ?
क) विभेदपूर्ण कानूनको अन्त्य ख) नीति निर्माण तहमा पछाडि पारिएका वर्गको समान सहभागिता ग) राजनैतिक रुपान्तरण घ) राज्यसत्तामा समान पहुँचका लागि ड) सामाजिक न्याय सहित आर्थिक रुपान्तरण ।
- १०) राजनैतिक परिवर्तन शान्तिपूर्ण अभियानबाट संभव थियो जस्तो लाग्दछ ?
क) संभव थियो ख) संभव थिएन ग) थाहा भएन
- ११) संविधान निर्माण प्रकृत्यामा जनमुक्ति सेनाको भूमिकालाई कसरी हेर्नु हुन्छ ?
क) राजनैतिक चेतना फैलाएर ख) समानुपातिक प्रतिनिधित्वमा जोड दिएर ग) दबाव सिर्जना गरेर घ) शान्ति प्रकृत्यामा सचेतापूर्वक सहभागी भएर ।
- १२) ने.क.पा. माओवादीले राखेको राजनैतिक उद्देश्य पूरा भएको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?
क) ठान्छु ख) ठान्दैन ग) आसिक पूरा भयो घ) अन्य.....
- १३) अमिनको प्रमाणिकरण प्रकृत्यामा पर्नु भयो तर कुनै प्रकारको अवसर र सुविधा नलिइकन किन बाहिरिनु भयो त ?
क) अयोग्य भनी नामाकरण गरेकोले ख) सुविधा प्रयाप्त नभएकोले ग) मापदण्ड प्रकृत्या पारदर्शी नभएकोले ।
- १४) समायोजन र स्वेच्छिक अवकास दुवैमा नपरेका लडाकुको समस्या कसरी संवोधन गर्नु पर्ने थियो ?

क) उचित रकम ख) समयानुसारको तालिम दिएर ग) जागिरको व्यवस्था गरेर

१५) समायोजन प्रकृत्यामा पार्टीको भूमिका कस्तो लाग्यो ?

क) असहयोगी ख) सहयोगी ग) सन्तोषजनक

१६) समायोजन प्रकृत्याको मापदण्ड सन्तोषजनक थियो ?

क) सन्तुष्ट ख) असन्तुष्ट ग) ठिक ठिकै

१७) अनमिनको भूमिका कस्तो पाउनु भयो ?

क) निष्पक्ष ख) पूर्वाग्रही ग) सन्तोषजनक घ) अन्य.....

१८) जनमुक्ति सेनाका राम्रा पक्षहरु के के थिए ?

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१९) जनमुक्ति सेनाका कमजोरी पक्षहरु के के थिए ?

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ख)

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२०) प्रमाणिकरण प्रकृत्यामा परेका सबै लडाकुहरु समायोजनमा नपर्दा अन्यायमा परेको ठान्नु हुन्छ ?

क) ठान्छु ख) ठान्दैन ग) थाहा छैन

२१) प्रमाणिकरणमा परेका तर समायोजनमा नपरेकाहरुलाई के कस्तो सुविधा वा अवसर दिएको भए उचित हुन्थ्यो ?

क) उचित रकम ख) स्वरोजगारमूलक तालिम ग) जागिरको व्यवस्था ।

२२) जनयुद्धबाट तपाईंले के पाउनु भयो र के गुमाउनु भयो ?

पाएको	गुमाएको

१९) अन्तमा जनमुक्ति सेनाको अग्रगामी राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा खेलेको भूमिकाका बारेमा केही भन्नु छ कि ?

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३.

सहयोगका लागि धन्यवाद ।

खुल्ला प्रश्न
(राजनैतिक दल, राजनैतिक विश्लेषक, घाइते, सहिद परिवार, अनमिन प्रतिनिधि र अन्य सरोकारवाला)

आन्तार्वार्ताका लागि प्रश्नहरू

१. नेपालको राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा जनमुक्ति सेनाले कस्तो भूमिका खेलेको छ ?

क संबिधान निर्माणमा

ख चुनावमा

ग कुटनैतिक, राजनैतिक र पार्टीगत सम्बन्ध स्थापना

घ जना अपेक्षा पुरा गर्ने

ड राजनैतिक सम्झौतामा

च सरकार संचालन

२. जनमुक्ति सेना स्थापना, ब्यबस्थापन र परिचालनमा के कस्ता समस्याहरू थिए ?

क स्थापना

ख व्यवस्थापन

ग परिचालन

घ आर्थिक भौतिक व्यवस्थापन

३. जनमुक्ति सेना परिचालनका अनुकूल आधारहरू के के थिए?

a. भूराजनैतिक अवस्था

b. कमजोर सरकारी संयन्त्र

c. गरिबी तथा बेरोजगारी

d. राजनैतिक चेतना

e. श्रोत व्यपस्थापन

- f. तालिम र प्रशिक्षण
४. जनमुक्ति सेना ब्यबस्थापन र पुनस्थापनमा के के समस्या थिए ?
- राजनैतिक
 - कानुनी
 - कार्यशैली
 - बैदेशिक प्रभाव
 - पुनर्स्थापना मोडेल
५. जनमुक्ति सेना ब्यबस्थापन र पुनस्थापनमा देखापरेका समस्या कसरि समाधान गर्न सकिन्छ ?
- मोडालिटी परिवर्तन गरेर
 - राजनैतिक सहमति बाट
 - कुतैतिक माध्यमबाट
 - आर्थिक तथा विकास निर्माणबाट रोजगारी सिर्जना गरेर
६. राजनैतिक परिवर्तनमा जनमुक्ति सेनाको भूमिका लाई कसरि लिनु हुन्छ?
- अनिवार्य आवश्यकता
 - सहयोगी
 - अनावश्यक
७. सेना समायोजन वा पुनर्स्थापना कुन ठिक ? अन्य विकल्प पनि छन् कि ?
- राजनीतिमा सहभागिता
 - नागरिक सम्मान
 - बिकाश निर्माणमा सहभागिता
८. फेरी अर्को जनमुक्ति सेना निर्माण हुने सम्भावना देख्नु हुन्छ ? किन ?
- क्रान्तिको उद्देश्य पुरा नभएर
 - पुनस्थापना को कमजोर मोडालिटी
 - हालको जनमुक्ति अवस्था
 - राजनैतिक बिभाजन
 - महत्वाकांक्षा

अब्जरभेसन चेकलिस्ट

१. हालको सरिरिक अवस्था
२. विचार
३. बोलीचाली, भेष भुषा, खवाई
४. स्वास्थ्य अवस्था
५. पारिवारिक अवस्था
६. व्यवसाय
७. आर्थिक अवस्था
८. संलग्नता
९. खानपिन
१०. परिवारका अन्य सदस्यको अवस्था
११. भौतिक सम्पत्ति (जग्गा घर, सम्पत्ति फर्निचर)
१२. प्राप्त सहयोग को उपयोगको अवस्था
१३. सामाजिक कार्यमा संलग्नता

