United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations in Troop Contributing Countries with Reference to Nepal

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By

Surendra Singh Rawal

Registration No 34/2064

Tribhuvan University

Kathmandu, Nepal

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LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

We hereby recommend that this dissertation entitled "**United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations in Troop Contributing Countries with Reference to Nepal"** presented by Mr. Surendra Singh Rawal under our supervision and guidance be accepted by the Research Committee for the final examination in the fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in political science.

Dissertation Committee

Dr. Rabindra Khanal, Ph.D.
Supervisor

Prof. Ram Kumar Dahal, Ph.D.
Expert

Date:

APPROVAL LETTER

This dissertation entitled "**United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations in Troop Contributing Countries with Reference to Nepal"** was submitted by Mr. Surendra Singh Rawal for final examination to the Research Committee of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuvan University, in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. I hereby certify that the Research Committee of this Faculty has found the dissertation satisfactory in scope and quality and has therefore accepted for the Degree.

Prof. Chinta Mani Pokharel, Ph.D
Dean and Chairman, Research Committee
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur, Nepal

Date:

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Ph.D. dissertation entitled "**United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations in Troop Contributing Countries with Reference to Nepal"** submitted by me to the Office of the Dean, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuvan University (TU), is an entirely original work prepared under the supervision of my supervisor. I have made due acknowledgements to all ideas and information borrowed from different sources in the course of writing this dissertation. The results presented in this dissertation have not ever been presented or submitted anywhere else for the award of any degree or for any other purposes. No part of contents of this dissertation has ever been published in the form or a part of any book. I am solely responsible if any evidence is found against my declaration.

Surendra Singh Rawal
Imadol-3, Lalitpur
Registration No 34/2064

Date:

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Abstract

This study focuses on Nepal's historical contribution to United Nations peacekeeping missions and identifies an empirical puzzle: Nepal suffered from unstable civil-military relations (CMR) at home, even as it supported UN peace efforts with large peacekeeping deployments during the period studied. This finding is counterintuitive because the conventional wisdom on CMR argues that participation in international peacekeeping operations promotes stable CMR by making young soldiers more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, and more resistant to calls for military "salvation" via coups in times of crisis. This work traces the policy-making process on peacekeeping issues, including the role of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the military establishment, and analyses the evolution of CMR in Nepal.

The study uses a qualitative analysis, as well as comparative methods. The two-step approach enables the author to find the correlation between political interests and the level of CMR in Nepalese peacekeeping participation and to compare it with other nations to test the validity of the hypothesis. The main objective of this research paper is to analyze the relational aspects and interdependence between United Nations peacekeeping participation and civil military relations in troops contributing countries. It also examines CMR during different periods of peacekeeping participation and political evolution in Nepal; and, compares it with Argentina and Mongolia.

The study finds that while peacekeeping had provided valuable international experiences to Nepal's armed forces, the benefits of such an engagement were withheld due to its weak political institutional framework and constant political crises.

The armed forces' focus was still dominated by the domestic context, while civilians paid little attention to foreign policy and peacekeeping matters. Both trends—a military focus on domestic stability and civilian apathy towards defense and foreign policy—help explain why CMR in Nepal were inherently unstable despite its military involvement in peacekeeping duties abroad.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BPOTC	Birendra Peace Operations Training Center
CA	Constitution Assembly
CAECOPAZ	Argentina's Joint Peace Operation Training Center
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
COAS	Chief of the Army Staff
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN(UML)	Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DUC	Democratic Union Coalition (Mongolia)
EIPCP	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Program
GON/GoN	Government of Nepal
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IISDP	Internal Security and Development Program
ITS	Integrated Training Service
JAG	Judge Advocate General
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MOD/MoD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
NA	Nepalese Army
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	National Defense College
NSC	National Security Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime Minister
PME	Professional Military Education
PSC	Private Security Company (Contractors)
PSOTC	Peace Support Operations Training Center
PMS	Principal Military Secretariat
RNA	Royal Nepalese Army
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SRSG	Special Representative of Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNHQ	United Nations' headquarters
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIG	United Nations Mission in Georgia
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIN	United Nations' Missions in Nepal
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSAS	United Nations' Standby Arrangement System

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Civil-military relations (CMR) focuses on the relation between civil society and military organizations in broad terms; specifically, it is the relations between the military and the civil authority of a country. CMR is categorized according to their nature, and differing environments and interactions between civilian authorities and the military result in differing outcomes.

The range of explanations available in CMR theory includes subjective, objective and democratic control of the armed forces. Analyzing various theories and modalities leads to the conclusion that 'one size does not fit all.' Professionalism and principal-agent paradigms offer appropriate models for explaining CMR in advanced democracies where sophisticated democratic institutions are in place. It is not easy to explain CMR in democratizing countries, where democratic institutions are in rudimentary state, with the same paradigm that is used for advanced democracies. In a way, CMR in authoritarian or non-democratic countries may be best described as subjective civilian control. However, this generalization is not sacrosanct.

Focusing on the missions and roles of the armed forces, scholars assert that an externally oriented military will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics. In the same way, international approaches to CMR suggest that peacekeeping is a tool to promote healthy CMR by providing externally oriented roles or missions for the armed forces (Desch, 2001). Indeed, while many countries have taken part in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions since their origin in 1948, the reality is that not all peacekeeping contributors enjoy good CMR. Peacekeeping has positively

affected the CMR of some countries, while other countries have yet to experience similar effects.

Likewise, peacekeeping missions serve the foreign policy goals of troop contributing nations. Although the ultimate aim of any peacekeeping mission is to establish international peace and order, the political leaders of troop contributing countries also seek to utilize international forums to achieve their countries' national interests. Therefore, peacekeeping is a foreign policy tool. Contributing troops to peacekeeping missions is an intrinsic element of any nation's foreign policy. Master strategist Carl Von Clausewitz argues that war is a means to achieve political ends. Similarly, troop contributors seek to achieve foreign policy goals through the deployment of blue helmet troops.

For this reason, it is necessary to investigate whether participation in UN peacekeeping missions contributes to improving CMR and achieving foreign policy goals among troop contributing nations. Observations from the field indicate that peacekeeping may have mixed results, with some but not all countries improving their CMR. This raises questions about causality for most CMR and international relations theories, which often assume a positive relationship between peacekeeping engagement and civilian control.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Identifying why and how peacekeeping participation contributes to improving CMR in authoritarian, democratic, and democratizing states provides insights to better understand civilian control and CMR. According to conventional wisdom, peacekeeping improves CMR by providing military personnel with civilian tasks, thus

closely integrating the armed forces with civilians in the field (Desch, 2001).[1] However, the Nepalese case is somewhat different. In addition to its major role of protecting the country from external and internal threats, the Nepalese Army (NA) has substantially contributed to UN peacekeeping missions for more than fifty years. Unfortunately, this long and profound contribution to UN peacekeeping missions has not paid off by improving CMR, nor has it contributed to advancing the nation's foreign policy agenda - especially since its graduation towards democracy.

Therefore, the research puzzle addressed in this study is to understand why a country, in this case Nepal, has unstable CMR when its military has an externally oriented mission, namely peacekeeping. The study focuses on explaining the key questions:

- Why Nepal deviates from the conventional wisdom in CMR theory?
- Why Nepal's CMR seemed so unstable (during the period studied) even though its armed forces have an externally oriented mission?

1.3 Objective of the Study

The main objective of this research paper is to analyze the relational aspects and interdependence between UN peacekeeping participation and CMR in troops contributing countries.

1.3.1 The specific objectives

(a) To examine and explore the political changes and CMR in Nepal in different time frames.

(b) To study Nepal's participation in UN peacekeeping missions.

[1] Conventional wisdom suggests that an externally oriented military, in this case international peacekeeping, will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics, thereby improving civil-military relations.

(c) To carry out comparative study between Nepal and other peacekeeping participating counties vis-a-vis CMR.

(d) To analyze why Nepal's CMR seemed so unstable (during the period studied) even though its armed forces had an externally oriented mission?

1.4 Justification of the Study

The subject matter of this study is important because one strand of the CMR literature argues that countries with externally oriented military institutions tend to have stable CMR, but Nepal does not seem to fit this model, leading to questions about both the theory and about Nepal as a case study. The Nepalese case is also relevant because it pinpoints the importance of roles and missions in CMR, especially vis-à-vis civilian control. This study is also justified because peacekeeping is supposed to be a foreign policy tool; yet, it seems to have had unintended consequences inside Nepal. Finally, the case provides information about how peacekeeping affects military institutions, especially among developing states. If, as Charles C. Moskos argues, the military is more integrated with civilians when it performs peacekeeping, then why do we see civil-military instability among developing countries that perform peacekeeping operations (Moskos, 2000)?

This study focuses on the relationship between the armed forces' roles and democratic stability in Nepal, especially in relation to the military's involvement in peacekeeping. Nepal has taken part in UN peacekeeping missions since 1958. The NA has contributed peacekeepers to different missions spanning a wide spectrum of peacekeeping operations all over the world.[2] Yet Nepal continues to be unstable in

[2] Nepalese Army in UNPKO, Nepalese Army Web site, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na_un.php, (accessed August 27, 2013) and information acquired from the Birendra Peace Operation Training Centre, Panchkhal, Nepal.

terms of CMR. Instability here refers to instances in which the military has not followed civilian preferences, either neglecting civilian orders or imposing their own policy preferences on their principals or the civilians intervening unnecessarily in pure military matters.

1.5 Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that any improvement in CMR as a result of peacekeeping participation is conditional on the existence of political will, interests, and active involvement for overarching peacekeeping issues, without which the CMR of troop lending countries less likely to improve.

1.6 Literature Review

This literature review focuses on different approaches to CMR: Huntington's approach to professionalism, Janowitz's approach to civilianizing the military, Peter D. Feaver's approach to monitoring and supervision, Desch's approach to military roles, Moskos' analysis of the post-modern military, and Huntington's approach to political parties in changing societies.

Huntington in *The Soldier and the States* asserts that military professionalism leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which ultimately leads to civilian control of the military. He maintains that 'a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state (Huntington, 1957).

Desch, following Huntington's argument on civilian control, focuses on missions and roles. He asserts, "An externally oriented military will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics" (Desch, 2001, p.14), because all of the state power, including the military, will have to be focused externally. International security threats are likely to provide more power and support to knowledgeable and

experienced civilian leadership because civilian institutions tend to be more cohesive and the military is more likely to unify from potential or actual factions when the source of threat is external. Under such circumstances, civilian leaders are more likely to exercise objective civilian control, relying on military competency to fight a war against an external enemy.

Desch argues that there are many causes for stable or unstable CMR. First, the individual personalities, character and experience of civilian and military leaders affect CMR. Second, the level of civilian control depends on institutional changes in the military, such as changes in the level of unity, organizational culture, or professionalism. Third, the level of civilian control of the military also depends on the changes in the civilian institutions of the government. Fourth, weak state institutions are less effective in exerting civilian control. Fifth, the level of civilian control depends on the method of civilian control. For instance, according to Huntington, objective control is more conducive to effective civilian control than is subjective control. Sixth, civilian control of the military is likely to be weak when there are sharp differences in opinion and culture between the military and the civilian sphere. Lastly, changes in the international environment are likely to affect the CMR, but how they affect the domestic order is subject to dispute (Desch, 2001, pp. 8-10).

Desch (2001) considers the aforementioned individual, military, state and societal variables as intervening variables that respond to domestic and international threats, thus determining the level of civilian control. He argues, "the strength of civilian control of the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by structural factors, especially threats, which affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and society" (Desch, 2001, p.122). He classifies threats, his independent variable, as internal and external.

It is extremely difficult to reorient the military of new democratic states, thus making improvement in their CMR less likely. However, external powers such as the U.S. can play an important role in improving the CMR of newly democratic states by providing military assistance to focus the attention of the armed forces on external missions (Desch, 2001).

Morris Janowitz asserts that the technological and organizational revolutions have narrowed the gap between the military and civilians. As a result, civilians have heavily influenced the military profession. He puts forward the constabulary model, which eliminates the concept of peacetime and wartime military. Drawing on the police concept, the constabulary model advocates subjective control because of integration with civilian values and self-imposed professional standards.

Janowitz (1960) maintains, "The constabulary concept provides continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force" (p. 418). During the post-war period, the British forces used this concept to maintain the political stability of the members of the British Commonwealth and associate states. While not disagreeing on Huntington's argument for military professionalism, he believes reducing the gap between the military and the civilian and making the military mirror image of the society enhances civilian control of the military.

Moskos, following Janowitz (1960), argues in favour of an integration approach, and believes the line separating the military and civilians is slowly disappearing. He notes, "Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have come to occupy a more central position in military doctrine than ever before" (Moskos, 2000, p.3). He recognizes that since the end of the Cold War there has been increased permeability between civil and military structures, eroding traditional military values.

This leads to major changes in military institutions and CMR (Moskos, 2000, p. 6). For instance, in analyzing Canada through this lens, Moskos asserts:

> The [Canadian] armed forces themselves have been increasingly democratized, liberalized, and civilianized...A high value is placed on military integration with the larger society and transparency of the civil-military interface....The dominant professional roles in the Canadian military are becoming the soldier-diplomat and corporate manager (2001, p. 9).

In *Peace Soldiers,* Moskos explores the sociological aspects of peacekeepers vis-à-vis their military organization and professionalism, dignity and loyalty. He writes, "To the degree that a peacekeeping force deemphasizes the application of violence in order to attain viable political compromises, such a peacekeeping force approaches the constabulary model of military forces proposed by Janowitz" (1976, p. 9). The constabulary model advocates the measured and minimum use of force to achieve political solutions. From this perspective, peacekeepers seek to use force only in self-defence. In this sense, peace soldiers can be viewed as a strict version of the constabulary model.

Moskos claims that the constabulary ethic demonstrated by peacekeepers is directly proportional to the internationalism that they display. He says,

> Conventional military professionalism entails loyalty to the nation-state, expert command of lethal weaponry, and a willingness to employ that weaponry for chauvinistic purposes; peacekeeping professionalism requires internationalist identification, proficiency in non-coercive measures, and performance of mission in an impartial cause. Where

> military professionals are expert warriors serving national interest, peacekeeping professionals are an impartial and internationally legitimated constabulary (1976, pp. 9-10).

Regular armed forces focus on the achievement of victory even if it requires the maximum use of violence, and pay less attention to non-military considerations. In contrast, peacekeepers are determined to achieve peace, even relinquishing some military principles and procedures. Peace soldiers are the extreme manifestation of the constabulary ethic that favours persuasion, compromise and capitulation over punishment, perseverance and conquest. Moskos further asserts:

> Even peacekeeping service itself, moreover, was typically interpreted as serving national military purposes: the opportunity for operational deployment in an overseas environment, the acquisition of experience in multinational military cooperation, and a rationale for an armed forces establishment to counter antimilitary domestic opinion (1976, p. 138).

Today, the UN peacekeeping operations no longer remained military's private domain. Multiple actors such as the military, police, civilian and others work together intricately to achieve a common goal. Explaining core business of UN peacekeeping operations, UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines mentions:

> The transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new generation of “multi-dimensional” UN peacekeeping operations. These operations are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police

and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement (2008, p. 22).

This has created ample opportunities for interactions among these entities compared to previous missions. The military, especially the officers, is prone to civilianizing through such continual contacts. Some countries send their military personnel multiple times in different mission areas that are even more prone to civilianizing. As argued by Janowiz (1960), this civilianizing should contribute to civilian control in the troops contributing countries. Other structural changes in peacekeeping mission organization also create conducing environment for civilian control in mission areas. Instead of headed by the military General, as used to be with previous missions, new multidimensional missions are headed by civilian by ensuring civilian supremacy over the military.

Huntington's emphasis on political parties and their role in facilitating political order and civilian control of the armed forces provides a third theoretical perspective. Huntington argues, "The most important cause of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society" (1968, p. 194).

From this third perspective, the problem of civilian control in chaotic political situations does not rest primarily on the military. Military intervention in politics is thus one of the various forms of social interactions that takes place among praetorian societies and cannot be readily explained by narrow military explanations. Huntington emphasizes how weak political institutions attract military intervention in underdeveloped societies.

> In all societies specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes such groups seem more "politicized" in a praetorian society is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict (1968, p. 192).

According to Huntington (1968), in a praetorian society, power is divided into various forms and small numbers because of the lack of effective political institutions. For instance, the power may take the form of oligarchy, popular demagogue, or small political parties or factions ready to 'sell out.' The level of politicization of military institutions and individuals depends upon the weaknesses of political institutions and the inability of the political leaders to address the primary problems of the country (pp. 196-221). Huntington argues:

> As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world, he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon, he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order (1968, p. 221).

Feaver's 'agency theory' is an alternative to Huntington's CMR theory, and uses deduction to specify the "conditions under which we would expect the military to work or shirk" (2003, p. 3). He begins with mind-warming questions, such as: "how much autonomy can the military enjoy without violating the principle of civilian control?...how much control can civilians wield without interfering disastrously in the conduct of the military mission" (2003, p. 2)? These questions are vital, considering

the ‘civil-military problematique’, which is a dilemma whereby “the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.” But given the premise that in a democracy, ‘the governed should govern,’ what happens when military leaders are convinced that civilian directives or opinions are wrong? Feaver answers by stating that professional military soldiers should internalize the idea of “civilians have a right to be wrong.” His ‘agency theory’ goes to the heart of the relationship in day-to-day CMR, acknowledging that it only addresses the internal relationship between civilians and military officers, and not the implications of this relationship on national security (2003, pp. 4-6).

Feaver draws on rationalist and institutional analyses to formulate his argument (2003, pp. 9-10). This is a sound approach, since CMR involve institutions that seek rational choices. His theory incorporates a model used by economists called ‘principal-agent framework.’ The players include the ‘principal,’ which is the hiring authority (the government), and the ‘agent,’ which is the hired worker (the military). The variables range from ‘working,’ which is what the principal expects the agent to do, to ‘shirking,’ which is not what the principal wants the agent to do, but is what the agent wants to do. Feaver provides a detailed explanation of shirking and explains different ways that the civilian leadership can monitor and punish military shirkers.

The degree of monitoring and the chances of detection determine whether or not the military agent will work or shirk. In general terms, the military would prefer working without punishment over shirking with punishment. Meanwhile, civilian leaders will consider the degree of monitoring in accordance with the relative payoff from military work. If shirking in a specific issue is not as costly for the civilians as monitoring and punishing, then it will reduce monitoring. But if shirking is costlier than monitoring and punishing, then the civilians will ratchet up the monitoring. Feaver mentions that shirking is not an option in Huntington’s model (2003, p. 105).

In the end, this game between the military and civilian leadership, in Feaver's theory, keeps the military 'safely' under civilian control. Feaver's (2003) main argument is that agency theory explains the cost of monitoring, which in his view is a strategic calculus of the actors, which is not mentioned in Huntington's and Janowitz's model.

Bruneau and Goetz advocate for 'new-institutionalism' and assert that control of the military by democratic institutions, as well as effectiveness and efficiency, is necessary for stable CMR. Indeed, an effective peacekeeping contribution requires an equally active defence ministry (2006, p. 81). The absence of a capable Ministry of Defence (MOD) explains the weakness in institutionalizing civilian control in Nepal. The four core areas where a MOD should be efficient are budget, personnel, acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions (2006, p. 83). Since the civilian leadership at the MOD continues to be weak, peacekeeping in Nepal is largely a military operation, with little or no diplomatic feedback. Consequently, there is no support for the military by the political leadership, allowing the military to preserve its traditional institutional autonomy. Given that there is no diplomatic feedback, Nepal has little diplomatic leeway negotiating with the UN and other major peacekeeping actors, such as the EU.

The study also relies on the literature on peacekeeping and CMR. It is widely believed that participation in peacekeeping operations will have a positive impact on the CMR of troop contributing countries. A good number of studies suggest that peacekeeping participation has in fact helped to improve CMR. For instance, Deborah L. Norden believes that the military faces serious challenges when a country transitions from an authoritarian rule to democracy. By taking part in UN missions, peacekeeping not only contributes to normalizing CMR at home, but also plays a significant role in the government's foreign policy. Norden asserts, "The military's participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in

the government's foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously found disdain" (1995, p. 347). Following this line of logic, Desch suggests that new democracies adopt an externally oriented defensive doctrine to achieve civilian control of military at home. He argues, "The Argentine government, in an effort to keep the country's once internally oriented military externally focused, has recently been having the military participate in international peacekeeping missions. This is a realist and beneficial post-Cold War military missions" (Desch, 2001, p.122).

Drawing heavily from Janowitz's (1960) constabulary concept, Moskos (2000) explores a sociological aspect of peacekeeping vis-à-vis their military organization, and claims that the extreme ramification of the constabulary ethic inculcates persuasion, compromise, and perseverance rather than use of force and conquest in military. As Moskos argues, "In contrast with standard armed forces, the constabulary and peace soldiers are concerned with the attainment of viable political compromises rather than with the resolution of conflict through force" (2000, p. 130).

However, Sotomayor (2007) believes that the level of military prerogatives at home and the nature of social interactions in missions can negatively affect the CMR of troop contributing countries. He argues that "domestic factors (such as different types of military prerogatives and divergent forms of bureaucratic decision-making process) and external variables (such as dissimilar forms of social interaction in peace operations) can influence the potential effects of participation in peace operations on civilian control of the military" (Sotomayor, 2007, p. 172).

This study primarily focuses on three sets of arguments. The first argument is that peacekeeping provides an external role for the armed forces, which ultimately allows civilians to exercise control by keeping the forces away from domestic politics

(Desch, 2001). This argument, drawn from diversionary theories, is based on the assumption that roles and mission determine outcomes in defence policy.

The second argument claims that peacekeeping allows for increased levels of integration between civilian and military components, thus allowing for the civilianization of the armed forces themselves (Moskos, 2000, p. 9). This argument is drawn from the field of military sociology and is based on the assumption that socialization often shapes policy preferences and even identities.

Finally, the third argument is drawn from Huntington's argument in *Political Order in Changing Society*. It argues that CMR tend to be weak among states lacking strong political institutions, such as parties and military organizations (Huntington, 1968, p. 8). Moreover, the absence of a strong political institution affects military loyalties and leadership, leading to political instability and military coups.

1.7 Methodology and Structure

This study seeks to demonstrate that Nepalese CMR has not improved despite the armed forces' externally oriented missions, specifically UN peacekeeping missions. This outcome is the result of a lack of political interests in Nepalese peacekeeping efforts. The argument is tested using a qualitative analysis, as well as comparative methods. The two-step approach enables the author to find the correlation between political interests and the level of CMR in Nepalese peacekeeping participation and to compare it with other nations to test the validity of the hypothesis.

The methodology adopted for this study is a qualitative analytical approach focused on Nepal as a deviant case that does not fully adjust to the existing or conventional literature. It focuses on multiple observations of a single case with divergent outcomes in CMR. The study analyzes Nepal in different political periods,

allowing examination multiple observations across time and thus encompassing some internal variations. The study uses qualitative analysis to determine the nature of the CMR during four critical periods: the first democratic period, from 1950 through 1960; the authoritarian *Panchyat* period, from 1961 through 1989; the second democratic period, from 1990 through 2006; and the third democratic period, from 2006 through April 2009. The four periods are determined by the nature of Nepal's political system at each time. This approach offers a number of methodological advantages. Dividing a single case into multiple periods increases the number of observations within the study.

Although Nepal began participating in UN peacekeeping missions in 1958, the entire first democratic period, 1950-1960, is analyzed because during this time, Nepalese political leaders sought an internationalist approach by involving the military in the UN. Although this is a relatively a short period, it gives an idea of military leadership, peacekeeping participation and the state of CMR at the initial stage. During the *Panchayat* period from 1961 through 1989, Nepal had a stable CMR. However, the political system was authoritarian and the king subjugated the military to his own political preferences. During the democratic period from 1990 through 2005, the NA remained under the dual command of the king and the prime minister, and the king and the political parties tried to subjugate the military for their own political ends. CMR gradually went from bad to worse when the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), hereafter referred to as the Maoists, entered the political mainstream and tried to force the military to submit to their own political goals. By the end of the Maoist government, CMR had reached its lowest point.

The study then seeks to explain the correlation between civilian interests in military matters and CMR using a comparative case study method. It compares and contrasts the Nepalese case with Argentina and Mongolia, the cases in which

peacekeeping participation by the Argentinean and Mongolian militaries greatly improved CMR. Argentina was chosen because there are many similarities between Nepal and Argentina, especially in regard to their political history and peacekeeping participation. Both countries started taking part in UN peacekeeping missions in 1958 and both increased their peacekeeping participation after the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Mongolia was chosen because geographical constraints and geostrategy are similar – both are landlocked countries surrounded by two giant major powers. Also, both countries' democratic development and the nature of peacekeeping participation are similar.

This research relies mostly on secondary sources. The major secondary resources include books, journals, and scholarly articles on CMR and peacekeeping. It also relies on some other secondary sources, such as local newspapers, archives, seminar reports, speeches and official documents from the government. Some of the tertiary sources for the research are encyclopaedias and related web sites.

1.8 Limitation of the Study

The study is limited to analyzing conventional wisdom of perceived positive impacts of UN peacekeeping on CMR, especially through the Nepalese case. Apart from peacekeeping, there are various other factors that impact CMR of any country which is not the scope and focus of this study. This study also does not deal with degree of achievement and contribution of the Nepalese peacekeeping vis-a-vis other countries. To avoid unnecessary digression from the topic, the research does not go into details on political dynamics and regional and international strategic environments as well. Certainly, the role of political leader in various military affairs is crucial in CMR of any country. But in this study, attention has been paid on only

one aspect -the interest and role of political leadership in military's UN peacekeeping participation.

1.9 Chapter Plan

The plan of this study is as follows. Chapter II gives an account of different periods in Nepalese politics from 1950 to 2009, and the situation of CMR. This chapter divides Nepalese politics into four major periods based on major political changes and the system of governance. Chapter III presents important aspects of Nepalese peacekeeping participation from 1958 to 2009. Although the nature of peacekeeping participation did not depend much on the political system of governance in Nepal, peacekeeping participation is divided into the four periods used to categorize political development for ease of analysis and understanding. Chapter III also includes a brief account of the strengths and challenges of Nepalese peacekeeping participation to facilitate a detailed understanding of Nepalese peacekeeping efforts. The chapter mentions the foreign policy implications of Nepalese peacekeeping participation, which is one of the founding objectives of Nepalese peacekeeping. Chapter IV compares the case of Nepalese peacekeeping and CMR with the case of Argentina and Mongolia. Despite their differences, the political developments and peacekeeping participation is common to Argentina and Nepal. However, Argentina is a successful case of improving CMR by peacekeeping participation, and Nepal is not a successful case. It also explains the causes of success in Argentina that are lacking in Nepal. Chapter IV again compares the case of Nepalese peacekeeping and CMR with the case of Mongolia. Despite their differences in size and the socio-economic aspects, the geopolitics, geostrategy, political development and peacekeeping participation are common to both countries. Both

countries have been emphasizing on taking part in UN peacekeeping missions. And both countries endeavour to make peacekeeping participation a political tool of foreign policy objective. However, Mongolia is a successful case of improving CMR and civilian control, and Nepal is not. Chapter IV explains the causes of success in Mongolia that are lacking in Nepal. Chapter V presents summary, findings and conclusion of the peacekeeping participation and CMR, by analyzing the conditions and mechanisms contributing to good CMR. This Chapter also provides recommendations based on the study.

CHAPTER – II

POLITICS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NEPAL

2.1 Introduction

Nepal has undergone an enormous political change within a relatively short span of time. However, the political problem of governance persists with the similar intensity, introducing new dimensions and challenges. The civil-military problem had surpassed and overshadowed other major issues, creating severe political pathologies in the country during the time when the Maoist was in the helm of power after the first Constituent Assembly election in 2008.

The United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the then largest political party in Nepal, was protesting and rallying every day for what they call the need 'to establish civilian supremacy in the country.' The Maoists had been protesting continuously in the last few months since their government fell and the relationship between the government and the NA turned bad. This civil-military problem was the most severe in the recent history of Nepal. It had its roots in the decade long Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) in which the NA was employed at the most crucial stage.

Generally, when there is a civil-military problem, the military institutions are considered relatively more responsible for the causes of the crisis than the civilian components. In some cases, however, lack of political competency, apathy or antipathies are also seen as prime factors in the pathology. Other factors can play a prominent role in exacerbating those problems. Therefore, it is imperative to dissect civil-military problems in order to understand them in a holistic manner. A correct diagnosis of a problem is likely to suggest the correct treatment and prognosis. Thus

the question arises, what are the dynamics of the civil-military problem in Nepal? The answer to this question is important to understanding the nature of the problem as well as identifying a correct solution. This chapter explains the civil-military problems in Nepal from a historical perspective, providing a historical account of Nepal's politics as the background conditions of its CMR problem.

2.2 Historical Setting

The concept of the nation-state in Nepal began in 1768–69, after the conquest of the Kathmandu valley by Prithivi Narayan Shah, the King of Gorkha (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003, p. 13). It was the final conquest that integrated the country after a series of unification battles. Prior to unification, Nepal had been divided into many tiny principalities and kingdoms. Some believe, even prior to unification a stable CMR existed in Nepal. The king was both supreme military commander and civilian head of the state who could be approached by common people. Because of this direct access to king, the common people could have their say on country affairs and military matters such as military campaign. King's dual leadership and easy access to general populace enabled stable CMR (Bhandari, 2012, p. 63). During his reign, King Prithivi Narayan Shah conquered and extended the kingdom towards the east up to half of the size of present day Nepal. Although the military played a crucial role in his most ambitious unification process, he always tried to strike a balance between military autonomy and control. He even sought consent from the general populace to make decisions regarding military matters. A kind of practice of conscription existed then which established a belief that every soldier is a citizen and every citizen a soldier. King Prithivi Narayan Shah's maxims demonstrate how cautious he was about civilian military relations at that time. He said, "If the king is wise, he will keep the soldiers and the peasants on his side"(Acharya & Naraharinath, 2005, p.53). He also

emphasized the professionalism of the soldiers, and said, “Soldiers should be always honed” (Acharya & Naraharinath, 2005, p.54).

The period after King Prithivi Narayan Shah, between 1774 to 1846, remained an era of struggle for political power in Nepal. Many military commanders were actively involved in politics. During this period, the state's powers were centralized and the military was modernized. The unification campaign was continued by King Prithivi Narayan Shah’s successors. His descendants expanded Nepal to twice the size of its present-day territory, from the Teesta River in the east, up to the Sutlej River in the west. At the latter stage of the ongoing campaign, the Nepalese encountered another expansionist power, the British East India Company. The two powers clashed, and the British declared war against Nepal in 1814.

After the war with the British, a series of political crises sprang up in Nepal and ultimately empowered Jang Bahadur Rana to usurp absolute power over the country, making the king a mere figurehead. From 1846 to 1950 was a period of oligarchy and agnate regime in Nepalese history. While ruling the country, the Ranas kept the king as the ceremonial head of the state. All the executive, judicial, and legislative powers were centralized and exercised exclusively by the Ranas and their family members. CMR was nebulous. Bhandari maintains, “A culture of family Generals and public soldier; and nepotism, favouritism, and Chakari Pratha [sycophancy] became the norm of those days. CMR in real terms did not exist and what existed was in the form of relation between the military master and public in general, and it was at its worst” (2012, p. 64). The country ran without a constitution and essential state institutions.

Ironically, the process of creating a nation state was not completed even during nearly 200 years of transition because of political upheavals and intrigues among the various forces. Joshi and Rose state,

> After the emergence of Nepal as a nation-state in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the primary goal of the Nepali political system became the maintenance of the status quo, which meant the continuation of the delicate balance of power among the various elite families composing the court. The transfer of the capital from Gorkha to Kathmandu in 1769 gave added emphasis to the nationwide scope of the new political system, but did not result in any significant changes in the political process itself (1966, p. 485).

This political legacy would have important impacts on political development and CMR in Nepal.

2.3 Modern Nepalese Political Evolution and the Military

2.3.1 The First Democratic Period (1950–1960)

Until 1951, Nepal was under the oligarchic Rana rule, and the NA was loyal to the Rana rulers. The first tide of democracy ended this oligarchy. The fall of the Rana regime created a power vacuum, so the process of establishing a new political order was hindered by the critical task of re-establishing central authority in the vacuum created by the abolition of the old order. Agreement among four major forces—the monarchy, the political parties, the Ranas, and the Indian government in Delhi—created the first post-Rana government in Nepal. With the shift of the state's power to the king, the army ultimately shifted its loyalty to the king. Kumar asserts, "With the transfer of the Bijuli Garad (the elite armed guard), guns and ammunition from Singha Darbar (the residence of the Rana prime minister) to Narayanhiti Darbar (the residence of the king), the armed forces also shifted their loyalty back to the Supreme-Commander-in-Chief in April 1952" (2008, p. 140). The ministries were weak, and

rapid succession in power by various political forces made the new system further dysfunctional. The political parties competed with one another, particularly the Nepali Congress and the Gorkha Parishad, and created their own police forces to protect their leaders and to manage political rallies (Rose & Scholz, 1980, p.42). In many instances, these private police forces were out of the control of their party leaders. Rose and Scholz note, “One regional party leader's attempted coup in 1952 almost succeeded in overthrowing the first Nepali Congress cabinet by using the Congress party's own police force” (1980, p. 42). They also mention that the country faced numerous security challenges. Political unrest in the eastern hills and the Terai, low lands, further worsened the general disorder facing the government (1980, p. 43). The Rana-Congress coalition government formed on 18 February 1951 was not stable enough to exert control over any ministries, including Defence. The government fell in nine months. Tilouine maintains:

> Following the April 1951 arrest of the Gorkha Dal's leader, his followers not only stormed the jail to release him but also attacked B.P. Koirala's house, only withdrawing when B. P. shot dead one of the attackers. An important legacy of the affair was the transfer of the army units previously at Singha Darbar to the Royal Palace, thus, helping to ensure that the army looked to the palace rather than the government of the day (2013, p. 55).

Meanwhile, the king remained influential with the military because of his crucial position of power. The king became more powerful when the cabinet's effectiveness dwindled as the opposition political parties constantly discredited ministers. The inability of the new government to quell the growing security problems brought the king to the forefront of the state's power by amending constitutional

provisions several times. Rose and Scholz pointed out that the king strengthened the military in order to check political disorder and counter the armed threats from private police groups (1980, p.43). Technical experts from India were active in reorganizing the Nepalese administration and the army. The Indian mission restructured the army significantly. However, Koirala questions its objectives, and maintains that in the absence of any national objective and national role, the Indian missions tried to restructure the NA giving it a role of a buffer military, and Nepal a buffer state as a part of security umbrella of India. He further asserts that, although the NA was restructured in 1952 along Indian model, this neither brought any changes in its perception nor in its objectives. This restructuring made the NA even more efficient repressive tool of the king. The coercive capability of the NA increased tremendously. Consequently, after the Indian mission, the NA became a de-facto buffer force for India, at least in the Indian perception, and private army of the king (Koirala, 2010, pp. 118-119).

Others also view Indian security support to Nepal as just focused on the perceived Chinese threat to India from the north, not interested by strengthening Nepalese security system. India hardly has any motivation to make the Nepalese military professional. Jha maintains, “for Delhi, the NA was an extension of its own security architecture” (p. 79). He further argues:

> While unstated, the close ties with the Nepali state's strongest institution is also important for Delhi to ensure that they have a position of strategic advantage vis-a-vis China south of the Himalayas....All of this meant that India took a close interest in Nepal's military. It sought predictability and prior information in its operations and acquisitions. It was keen to maintain excellent relations with those

> in NA's higher echelons. And it was wary of an uncertain shuffling of personnel that could adversely impact its comfort level with the institution (2014, p. 80).

Many power-sharing governments were formed before an elected government could take office. The king played a key role in choosing the members of the cabinet. In the power sharing governments, most of the time the prime minister assumed the portfolio of the defence ministry, but whenever this portfolio was given to others, the king chose the defence minister carefully to retain the loyalty of the military (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 291). He then made the defence ministry less effective by giving it little influence in military matters.

In 1959, a new constitution was promulgated in which the king was made the source of all powers. Its various clauses severely diluted the powers of the Cabinet of Ministries, and the country swayed away from the principles of democracy. However, B.P. Koirala accepted the constitution. Jha maintains, "In 1959, the veteran democratic leader, B.P. Koirala, chose to accept the king's constitution in order to get to elections rather than insist on a CA which would have prolonged the almost decade-long transition" (2014, p. 295). Following the first general election in February 1959, Nepal's first democratically elected government took office in May with B. P. Koirala as the prime minister, the leader of the Nepali Congress. Advocating democratic socialism, the Nepali Congress advanced free education and healthcare as the government's top agenda. Although the government started to achieve a "record of accomplishment unparalleled by that of any previous government in Nepal," it failed to provide even essential services on the ground (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 291). The powerful landlords, and personality clashes between King

Mahendra and Prime Minister Koirala became a major impediment to the working of the government.

Koirala not only became unable to look after security issues, but also could not take political leadership of the NA. There were two major causes for this failure. First was the constitution itself, which created two parallel power centres. Although the constitution envisioned two power centres, the king and the prime minister, in reality the king remained more powerful and influential than the prime minister. Second, Koirala seemed over reliant on India and did not pay much attention to security problems in Nepal. He did not succeed in bringing the NA into the democratic fold and taking control of it. The Nepali Congress Cabinet had an opportunity to hold the position of the MOD, but it was unable to pay much attention to defence affairs or to take control of the military. This allowed the king to take control of the military even when the Nepali Congress was in power. As the Koirala government was trying to establish itself, the king removed the Nepali Congress from power after just eighteen months. Some assert, "a royal coup had abruptly ended the country's brief experiment with democracy in 1960" (Jha, 2014, p. xxi). The king banned all political parties and took control of the government.

King Mahendra's political move would have been very difficult without tangible support from the military. Knowing that one of the main reasons for the downfall of the Rana regime was the military, King Mahendra quickly took leadership of the military. According to Rose and Scholz, the Ranas could not address the problem of the overcrowded facilities for the 25,000-man contingent that returned to Nepal after World War II (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 56). It was a clear example of the lack of concern and failing to take political leadership of the military and it thereby eroding their control. Realizing these weaknesses of the Ranas, King Mahendra took a keen interest in the army. Nepali and Subba maintain, "King Mahendra carefully

weeded out overly ambitious officers and cultivated loyalty by taking a personal interest in the careers of those in the senior ranks" (2005, p. 85). He carried out reform in the army by broadening the ethnic and social bases of the officer corps in 1952. Along with the restructuring, he gave the army the right to use the 'Royal' prefix before its designation in order to show his appreciation and concern for the army. This was one of the examples of the king taking political ownership of the army, although the use of the 'Royal' prefix may have a different interpretation in the present context. The king established the Principal Military Secretariat (PMS) in the palace to secure total control of the military and at the same time to discourage any possible military alliances or independent power base. This mechanism also enabled him to cut off the military from any political affinity; thus, it focused on professionalism.

The nature of CMR during the first democratic period can be characterized as very unstable. This was the period of political transition and modernization of the NA. Since the Ranas were no longer in power, the army was trying to shift its loyalty to another political leader, either the king or the democratically elected prime minister. During a ten year period, many governments were formed; however, none of them could work properly. The political leaders did not pay attention to the military, as they had other political priorities. This led to the king, rather than the democratic leaders, becoming the political leader of the military. Adhikari writes, "When democracy was established in 1951, the military was also reorganized. But the leaders did not understand the importance of the security forces and the king was able to convince the NA to be loyal to him instead" (Adhiraki, 2006, 02-08 June).[3] After the first democratic election in 1959, the Nepali Congress party arose as a dominant political

[3] People's Army. *Himal Khabarpatrika*, Issue 300 (02-08 June 2006).

force, but the king's coup overthrew the Nepali Congress party from government just in eighteen months.

In the new political system, the purpose of the military was primarily to protect the king's own interest. Political parties viewed the NA as a private army whose allegiance had shifted from Rana family to the king's family. For instance, BP Koirala said that for 104 years, Ranas treated the military as their private army and ruled the country. After the first democratic revolution of 1950, there was a change of guard and the Shahs took control over the military and again used as their tool to rule over the country (Koirala, 2010, p. 109). Since the NA was not made national army but king's private army, it did not have any national objectives. B. P. Koirala asserts, "Our army does not have genuine objective relating to national interests" (2010, p. 118).

This made CMR unstable. The political leaders' apathy toward the military, their lack of knowledge about the military's functioning, and their perception of the military as a threat was additional reasons for the unstable CMR.

2. 3.2 Panchayat Period (1961–1989)

Nepal remained under absolute monarchy for three decades after the takeover by King Mahendra. All political parties were banned in the *Panchayat* system, which most affected the Nepali Congress. Many of its political leaders were incarcerated or went into exile in India. However, some political leaders were able to escape and regrouped in India to launch attacks against the king. The Nepali Congress launched rebel attacks with the covert support of India, but the attacks were not very successful compared to the pre-1950 attacks (Rose & Scholz, 1980, p. 50). In the meantime, the India-China War broke out in 1962. India stopped providing support to the rebels, as it wanted to maintain good relations with Nepal, a buffer state between India and China.

Nearly two years after his takeover, King Mahendra proclaimed a new constitution for Nepal, establishing a pseudo-democratic *Panchayat* system on 16 December 1962. In this partyless *Panchayat* system, a so-called guided democracy, the ultimate source of power was the king. He wielded all state power, making the separation of power among executive, legislative, and judiciary nebulous. Although the new constitution tried to address the aspirations of the Nepalese, it was hastily drafted and faced problems creating and establishing state institutions (Rose & Scholz, 1980, p. 42). The constitution had a provision giving the king exclusive power to control the military. He was the supreme commander of the military with discretionary power "to raise and maintain armed forces; to grant commissions in such forces; to appoint Commanders in Chief and to determine their powers, duties and remunerations" (Art. 64.1, 64.2). There was also a constitutional provision (Art. 64.3) that clearly spelled out that "no bill or amendment relating to the armed forces shall be introduced in either House of Parliament without the recommendations of His Majesty" (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 291).

With the support of the military, the king wielded enormous power. This became particularly crucial following the 'royal coup.' He could utilize this power to monopolize various government affairs, such as appointing favourable persons to administrative positions. Although the king monopolized the use of military power to fulfil his political ambitions, he always put maximum emphasis on keeping the army out of politics because he was aware of the army's past involvement in politics and interference in state affairs. Joshi and Rose write, "Fully cognizant of the role played by the army in the mid-nineteenth century developments which deprived the ruling dynasty of all but nominal sovereign powers, King Mahendra has taken care to emasculate the military as a potent political force and with considerable success" (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 390). While keeping the military out of politics and bringing

it under his direct command, the king assumed the post of the Supreme Commander in Chief.

After assuming the throne, the king carefully managed the composition of the officer corps. The army's force level was increased and it was given a modest budget, but it was barred from other political influence and was made loyal to the king and the *Panchayat* political system. Keeping the military above exogenous political processes throughout the *Panchayat* era made it relatively politically sterile. In many instances, the king barred promotions of politically motivated or ambitious officers. Joshi and Rose maintain, "Whether intentionally or not, the officer corps has been remarkably apolitical since 1956, when the king nipped a potentially dangerous plot in which several lower-level officers were involved (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 391)." To make sure the subjugation of the military to the king was preserved, its members were not allowed to cast votes in elections. The subjugation of the military to the king effectively helped to keep the military out of the state's affairs, and at the same time gave him a powerful political tool to use in the event of political crisis.

In 2017, the king used army to apprehend the then prime minister BP Koirala, other ministers, and senior political leaders (Adhikari, 2010). Following the 'royal coup,' BP Koirala doubted the purpose and role of the NA in the Panchayat era because it was treated as a private army by the ruler, and it was never under the civilian control (Koirala, 2010, p. 109). He maintained that there was no doubt that the NA could not fight against two neighbouring countries. If that was the case, then what should have been the role of the NA? He further explained, since the beginning of nineteenth century, after it finished the job of Nepal's unification, the NA did not get a job according to its profession. The political master could not give out another 'national objective' or new role as an alternative. Therefore, it became a personal tool of state capture (Koirala, 2010, pp. 109-112). B.P. Koirala said,

> In the struggle of power, the military became a puppet. The military became a tool that was used to reach to the states power by the people expert in conspiracies and cunningness. Such use of the Nepalese Army for individual vested interest made it corrupt (Koirala, 2010, p. 116). After all the coercive force, the military should get some sort of job. It is well and good if the military gets good and salutary job. Otherwise, it functions badly and deleteriously. Since the military was an illegal foundation of politics and authority, joining it became beneficial. Because the army did not have to fight a war, there was no risk associated in the profession. Military personnel were appointed to the high civilian positions. For example, district chiefs and chief of the branches were appointed from the military (Koirala, 2010, p. 117).

By the end of the second wave of democracy in 1974, many independent third world countries experienced military rules or coups. Nepal did not face such problems, mainly because the NA was kept under the control of the king and remained politically inactive. Other plausible reasons, such as foreign training, exposure to peacekeeping missions, and the change in the composition of the officer corps to make it more inclusive also helped to avert such possibilities. Bhandari asserts, "Army got exposure to outside world through foreign training and peacekeeping operation. Composition of the officer corps increased from people in general and a group of officers graduated from Military Academy of Nepal" (2010, p. 91).

From 1972 to 2001, throughout the reign of King Birendra, there were continuous political movements against the Panchayat system. King frequently used the army as a political tool to suppress such movements. One of the examples of the

king using military as a tool to protect his reign and autocratic Panchayat system was repression in Chintang in 1979. Tilouine claims:

> This was the background to the security forces' operation in Chintang, in which 14 suspected leftists were seized in their homes and summarily executed and, also, the shooting by police of Thangmi tenant farmers at Piskar in Dolkha district in 1984 during a 'cultural performance' mocking local landowners....Some 63 persons died over the two months of the agitation, normally the result of the police and, at a later stage, the army, firing to bring crowds under control (Tilouine, 2013, p. 63). On 2 November 1979, armed security forces tried to enter Chintang to curb the leftist activists....Of course, about 400 were uniformed armed policemen, 400 were armed policemen in civilian dress, and 150 were from the Royal Nepal Army (Tilouine, 2013, p. 104).

Facing extreme pressure from political unrest, King Birendra conducted a plebiscite in 1980 that offered a choice between a multiparty democratic system and a 'reformed *Panchayat* system.' The result, which some political parties believed was rigged, favoured the reformed *Panchayat* system. Some people viewed that the King Birendra used military in favour of Panchayat system in the plebiscite (Adhikari, 2010). The political parties did not give up their political movements. In 1985, the leading political party, the Nepali Congress, launched a political protest, *Satyagraha*, also supported by communist parties. However, it was aborted when the pro-republican leader Ramraja Prashad Singh, demanding a republic system in the country, exploded bombs in the capital. Ultimately, a mass protest organized by the

political parties in 1990 forced the king to lift the ban on political parties and establish a multiparty democracy.

Immediate after the revolution of 1950, there was a common perception among the government, King Tribhuvan, and political parties that the NA was Rana's private army. So, the military was downsized, and for some years, the military was neglected. King Mahendra had understood the importance of taking control and assuming political ownership of the military and did the same once he became the king. Getting lessons from the past, king Mahendra as well as king Birendra paid utmost attention to control and taking ownership of the military. For instance, king Mahendra affixed 'Royal' title to the NA and devised new military Act in 1959. He had ordered the then Maj Gen Padam Bahadur Khatri to make Military Act 2016 (Adhikari, 2010).

Similarly, King Birendra conceived and implemented ten year military master plan with a view to make army's strength sixty four thousand from twenty-three thousand. As per the plan, many brigades, directorates and special brigades were raised (Adhikari, 2010, p. 151). During Panchayat system there was no uncomfortable situation in CMR because both the civil and military entities were led by the king. Military did not have a direct political role in Panchayat system but it provided all the support to keep the Panchayat thriving (Shah, 2010, p. 127).

Although the king's intention was nationalist and broad in external approaches; domestically, he was focused on protecting his own regime rather than accommodating all the political forces and moving forward. This made civilian control relatively parochial and subjective. In addition to the narrow goal of controlling the army, the king also transgressed from democratic norms and made the political system authoritarian. During this period, the NA was not only viewed as the king's Private Guard, but also its high ranking positions were predominantly occupied

by a small number of elite groups in the country. For example, members of the Rana, Shah and a few other families with close ties to the king occupied the higher military positions.

The king had created two armies within the NA. Royal guard in the palace was an elite force directly under control of the king and the PMS. This elite force was given sophisticated weapons, equipment and other perk and privileges, whereas rest of the military did not enjoy that, and were made weak compare to the Royal Guard (Koirala, 2010, p. 117). This is how the king controlled the military and also how he used military as his political tool to eradicate his political obstacles (Koirala, 2010, p. 109). This confirms the argument that subjective civilian control of the military also can be achieved by creating division within it (Huntington, 1957, p82).

However, the king made every effort to remain in close contact with the military and to maintain the military's allegiance to him. He periodically visited the army headquarters and various military installations throughout country. He listened to problems within the military and provided support, guidance and direction, giving due consideration to the logistical, welfare, budgetary and other requirements of the military. Rose and Scholz assert, "From the beginning of his reign, Mahendra [the king] took an active interest in the army (1980, p. 56)." Through continuous interaction with the military, the king acquired considerable knowledge about the military's capability, functioning and limitations. Realizing that the military can be a formidable political strength, the king always relied on the military for reigning the country and warding off political mobilization against him. However, he was very careful to prevent the military from becoming involved in politics. Rose and Scholz say that Mahendra "kept active military officers strictly out of politics. Thus the army remained an important but isolated institution (1980, p. 57)."

2.3.3 The Second Democratic Period (1990–2005)

Albeit a little late, the Third Wave of democratization affected Nepal too. This global phenomenon swept through various authoritarian regimes and decimated dictatorships. Huntington notes, "By 1990 democratic rumblings were occurring in Nepal, Albania, and other countries whose previous experience with democracy had been modest or nonexistent" (Huntington, 1991, p. 25). In Nepal, the popular uprisings commonly known as the People's Movements ended in a negotiated settlement with the king establishing a multiparty democracy with a constitutional monarchy. This movement did not democratize the country by completely overthrowing the authoritarian regime, but rather transplanted democracy into the old system. According to Huntington, "in transplacements, democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition. Within the government the balance between standpatters and reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime—unlike the situation of standpatter dominance that leads to replacement—but it is unwilling to initiate a change of regime" (Huntington, 1991, p. 151). The king, because of international pressure and rising expectations from the people of Nepal, announced the lifting of the ban on political parties in April 1990.

After the king's announcement, a constitution writing commission was formed. The commission found it difficult to revise the roles and powers of the monarchy in the constitution. The king wanted to maintain his sovereignty and was unwilling to give up control of the military. After some negotiation, a compromise was reached in which the political parties agreed to give the king the ultimate authority to control the military. Thapa and Sijapati write, "The issue of control over the army was resolved by providing the king with the authority to mobilize the army,

but on the recommendation of a Security Council, comprising the prime minister, the defence minister, and the army chief" (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003, p. 35).

Throughout the decade of multiparty democratic practices, the democratic forces, and especially the Nepali Congress, did not have a cordial relationship with the army. The NA was not a government priority and appeared to remain an institution outside of the government system. Sharma argues that political parties including Nepali Congress which considered the military as king's private force took steps that enabled police forces to be a parallel force to the military. The government did not increase the strength and budget of the military, whereas the police got rise in strength as well as budget (2010, p. 43). The NA's restructuring initiated by King Birendra had halted once Girija Prasad Koirala became the prime minister after the general election in 1992. This also marks the start of decade of deprivation for NA in which the military was neglected and abandoned. During its very short period in the helm, CPN (UML) government paid some attention and tried to improve relation with the army, and Madhav Nepal was made Minister of Defence (Adhikari, 2010, p. 154).

The neglect was evident from its meagre budget allocation and disinterest in making the National Security Council (NSC) functional. Since the institutionalization of civilian control was ignored, the NA remained apart from the democratic process. Because of its origin, history, tradition, and role in the creation of the nation, the NA sees itself as the ultimate defender of the country. This outlook was not commensurate with the major political parties whose approaches were anti-monarchist since King Mahendra dismantled the first democratic system in the 1960's. The political parties' late arrival on the political scene and antipathy towards the monarchy forced them to show a lack of interest in the history of the creation of the country. On the other hand, the military was not only forced to remain aloof from political activities and interaction with other institutions, it was taught to be loyal to the king and the country

rather than to the people and the democratic system. At the end of the *Panchayat*, the gap between the political parties and the military was wide. Yet the ability of the political parties to fill the vacuum was not very encouraging. The NA was also cautious to maintain its institutional sanctity and non-political nature. For the most part, civilian political leaders could not understand the military institution and the concept of national security. The main reason of increasing gap between government and the military was the unwillingness of the past governments to understand about the military. The government did not know working procedure, capability and job nature of the military (Shah, 2010, p. 132). Even today, this lack of knowledge on military affairs persists as an important aspect of civil-military problems in Nepal.

The new constitution of 1991 provided a democratic system with a constitutional monarchy but kept the army under ambiguous control. Although leeway in exercising control over the army was given to civilian leaders through the MOD and the NSC, the ultimate authority to mobilize and control the army was vested in the king.[4] Because of this constitutional provision, the political parties in the government sought to control the military through indirect means. For this purpose, political leaders tried to minimize the role of the army in the internal security of the country. For instance, before 1990, the army was represented in Security Committees at the district, zonal and national levels; after 1990, it was kept as only an invitee member in these committees. The government tried to reprioritize the roles of the army by mobilizing it in national development projects. The army, to protect its institutional interests, accepted this role to demonstrate its importance and relevance in the changed political context.

[4] Clause 118(2) of Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 says, "His Majesty shall mobilize and use the Royal Nepalese Army on the recommendation of the National Defence Council."

Despite all the changes in policies, the political parties did not succeed in influencing the army by manipulating key leadership positions. The resistance from within the organization came in order to maintain its non-political nature in the face of a highly politicized and dysfunctional police organization. The politicians' attempt to manipulate the army forced it to seek protection from the king, thus maintaining its traditional loyalty. This also placed the army in a dichotomous position; in one respect it wanted to remain in the democratic fold, in another, it wanted protection from the king. At this crucial period, political leaders could not assume the political leadership of the national army. Meanwhile, the officer corps raised with the *Panchayat* era mindset became resistant when the vacuum created by the political upheaval was not filled by a democratic control mechanism.

The dual prerogatives inscribed in the constitution did not allow absolute control over the army by the politicians or the king. The finance ministry had tightened the defence budget, forcing the army to be compliant with politicians. This was one of the mechanisms for the democratic control of the army, but it did not work as it should. The frequent changes in the government, rapid formation of unholy alliances, and political compromises to grab power made the NA skeptical of loyalty to political leaders. The lack of political stability, schism, and extreme individualism in the political culture were some of the major factors that ended the institutionalization of civilian control. In such political turmoil, national security issues and the army as an institution remained at the periphery of the core political problems. The MOD had never become a ministry of choice for any political party due to its stretched budgets and because the king's patronage devised in the constitution left little room for manipulation (Nepali & Subba, 2005, p. 92).

Mistrust between the military and political institutions was such that some even suspected that the NA and the king did not want to resolve the insurgency

problem in order to weaken the government. Nepali and Subba write, “At the same time, some elements close to the palace and in the army, at least in the early days of the insurgency, had also been ambivalent about the Maoist threat and saw some benefit in the weakening of the civil government and the police force (2005, p. 92).” When the army submitted a plan to mobilize the troops along with development packages with the estimated cost of 6.3 to 6.5 million rupees, the government did not approve it. Instead, the government said that the plan was too costly and continued seeking police action rather than employing the army. The government wanted to avoid the NA since it had apathy towards it. The civilian bureaucracy also did not have much enthusiasm implementing Internal Security and Development Program (IISDP). Possible reasons for not approving the operational plan were government suspicions about the loyalty of the army (Nepali & Subba, 2005, p. 93). Mehta notes the army's position and king's ambivalence:

> The army has consistently denied the charge that it was unwilling or untrained to deal with the Maoists. General Dharmapal Thapa has said he was alive to the developing Maoist threat. He claimed he had sent a team to Surkhet under Brigadier Chitra Gurung to monitor the insurgency soon after it started and proposed the IISDP in tandem with use of force. An operational plan to deploy three brigades in Rukum and Rolpa under Major General Prajwalla Rana (who later became chief) was ready in 1997, which had the political approval of Prime Minister Chand and Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Bamdev Gautam. However, King Birendra was in two minds (Mehta, 2010, p. 190).

Amidst such trust and mistrust between the government and the military, Maoist attacked on Dunai on 29 September 2000, destroying police station and looting weapons and ammunitions. Following Dunai incident, Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi resigned, in which he had a strong disagreement with the army for not providing support to the police against the Maoists' attack. He also blamed the military interfering on the government's effort to contain the Maoists problem, and not supplying weapons to police even after receiving 170 million rupees. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) Achyut Krishna Kharel, who was critical to the army following the incident, also resigned under the pressure from the military and the palace (Sharma, 2010, pp. 52-53). Some people argue that in order to counter the military, the government gave the police excessive leverage, and consequently it became insolent and unnecessarily powerful. The position and power of the police at that time can be fathomed by IGP's stand on his resignation. He gave his resignation to the Prime Minister only on the condition that he would be made Nepalese Ambassador to any one country (Shah, 2010, p. 132). Later, the government decided to form Armed Police Force that would be loyal to the government. The government's aim appeared to be counterbalancing the military and the palace.

After the Dunai incident, the government did not consider the Maoist problem as a law and order problem that could be dealt with by a police force. Intending to mobilize the army to counter the Maoist attacks, the government tried to secure more control of the army by nominating a dedicated defence minister for the first time. Before this, during a whole decade of democratic practices, there was no separate defence minister; the prime ministers also looked after the MOD. The MOD was weak, it did not have dedicated minister most of the time; even the defence secretaries were among the ones that the palace wanted. Therefore, the morale of MOD personnel was never high. In so far as, defence secretary delegated his authority, over

the budget allocated to the MOD, to the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), which was principally inconsistent (Shah, 2010, p.129).

Although the government could achieve a majority in the three-member NSC with the appointment of the new defence minister, the plan to mobilize the army could not have materialized without the final approval by the king. Despite the situation, the government tried to mobilize the military through the IISDP program. This seemed to improve relation between the civilian and the military, however, some apathetic behaviour from other government agencies and the palace massacre again changed the political situation (Shah, 2010, p.133).

Following year, Holeri incident happened in which the government wanted to mobilize the army. After a decade of complete negation and isolation, when Prime Minister Girija Prashad Koirala ordered the NA to mobilize against the Maoists who had besieged a group of police personnel in Holeri in July 2001, the army showed reluctance to mobilize (Bhandari, 2010, p. 94). The army did not show insubordination; however, it set many prerequisites for mobilizing the army in counterinsurgency, such as declaration of an emergency, consensus from all political parties, and labelling the Maoists as terrorists (Nepali & Subba, 2005, p. 93). Following this incident, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala resigned citing military's insubordination. However, Shah (2010, p. 135) claims that the resignation of the prime minister after the Holeri incident was just a pretext. He further argues, the political situation due to the intra-party rift had already tense and in the verge of collapse. Not only the Nepali Congress' dissatisfied faction but also CPN (UML) wanted to oust the prime minister from the state power. The Holeri incident became an immediate cause. Despite NA's request, Prime Minister Koirala was reluctant to sanction the mobilization of the military against the Maoists because of some undisclosed reasons. Shah further asserts that Prime Minister Koirala did not resign

merely because of the NA or the palace's uncooperative attitude in Holeri incident (Shah, 2010b, pp. 99-104).

Until the Maoists intensified their armed rebellion and the security situation went beyond the control of the police force, the government did not feel the necessity of the NA. Previously, after completion of all the preparation to mobilize the NA under the IISDP program, the Prime Minister abruptly decided to mobilize the police under the code name of 'Kilo-Sera II.' This indicates Prime Minister's apathy towards the military and overconfidence over the police (Sharma, 2013, pp. 40-41). The political leaders had so little interest in or awareness of controlling the army that the constitutionally mandated NSC did not take shape for a decade. This was partly because of the political leadership's lack of strategic culture and partly because of the dual authority specified in the constitution.[5] The most important factor was the mutual mistrust between the military and the Nepali Congress, which remained in the government most of the time. This created confusion and difficulties when the government needed to mobilize the army. The perceived defiance of the executive order of the prime minister, to mobilize the military in Dunai and Holeri, by the Royal Nepalese Army was due to the mistrust and gap between the two institutions (Kumar, 2008b).

The public reverence and allegiance for the monarchy decreased after the revolution of 1990, and further dissipated after the palace massacre of King Birendra and his family in 2001 that led to various conspiracy theories.[6] The then COAS made

[5] According to Clause 119(1), the King is the Supreme Commander of the army. Clause 119(2) of Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 says, "His Majesty shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepalese Army on the recommendation of the Prime Minister."

[6] The Nepalese royal massacre occurred in 2001 in the Nepalese royal palace, when the Crown Prince, angry over disputes about his marriage, allegedly shot and killed several members of his family.

a statement that the responsibility of the security of the palace was not of the NA. This created a severe criticism and confusion in media and other sectors. Many argued that the military which did not protect its own supreme commander was incapable performing its duties. However, it should not be forgotten that COAS's remarks was based on the ground reality. The Royal Guard that looked after the king was like army within the army. It was not operationally under control of the COAS but palace itself. Except the logistics and administrative aspects, the army headquarters and the COAS hardly had any say in the functioning of the Royal Guard.

As mentioned earlier, ever since the establishment of the authoritarian *Panchayat* system, the NA was kept away from societal influences and hence was shielded from public criticism. Most of the political parties, media, and academic circles had an attitude of indifference about the army before the revolution in 1990, but they started taking an interest and commenting on military affairs after that. Many questioned the necessity for an army in Nepal, arguing that the country faced no tangible external threats. Some felt that it was unwise to keep an unproductive standing army in the face of the two giant armies of India and China surrounding its borders. During its involvement in the counterinsurgency campaign, the NA had been under scrutiny from various sectors.

With the NA having a reserved domain and the political leaders' failure to take an interest in military affairs, the army was forced to shield itself from exogenous threats to the institution and thereby to function as an autonomous organization. Lacking active participation in the new democratic system, the army was still considered the king's private army and was criticized by many political parties and others. The political parties tried to switch the military’s loyalty from the king to the parties, exerting subjective civilian control. The army had fear and mistrust of political parties and the new political system, and it was unwilling to give up its

prerogatives. The frequent changes in government and parochial alliances among the political parties further exacerbated the situation. A speech by the army chief gave some clue to the country's hopeless political situation. In the RNA Command and Staff College on 27 March 2002, the COAS asked, "Who is responsible for the present state of the country? Was it mal-governance (kushasan) or was it the army? How just is it to burden the army with this difficult situation created for political reasons" (Nepali and Subba, 102)? General Dharmapal also criticized political parties for political turmoil and not being able to address Maoists problem (Sharma, 2013, p. 45).

The king's desire to take advantage of the political chaos greatly worsened the situation. Ultimately, the situation dragged the military to the central stage of politics and compelled it to defend its own interests. For instance, at the climax of the Maoist armed rebellion, the political parties were so fragmented and enervated that it took many months to form a coalition government, and the coalition fell apart within a few months. Even the monarchy, Girija Prasad Koirala and Krishna Prasad Bhattrai factions of Nepali congress were active in making and breaking alliances between each other to take credit of solving Maoists problem not letting other to take political advantages by solving it (Sharma, 2013, p. 49). There was chaos and anarchy in the country. Indeed, it was not the military but the political situation that forced the military to intervene in politics. Huntington states, "The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but political and institutional structure of society (1968, p. 194)."

In 2001, the government decided to establish a new security organization, an armed police force, to combat the growing Maoist insurgency. Some people believed that the new force was raised as a countervailing force to the NA. A small section of

the army was also suspicious of this development. Subsequently, the relationship between the army and the government worsened with the Holeri incident; and as a result, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala resigned from the government. The mutual mistrust and prejudice between the military and the political leadership played a crucial role in further deterioration of CMR. The army was neglected and forced to remain in austerity for ten years simply because of this mistrust and lack of confidence (Bhandari, 2009, Sep, Keshar's Blog). In turn, the army cultivated negative images of the political parties due to the aversion towards political parties indoctrinated during the *Panchayat* system and the politician's antipathy and parochial politics. Because of the political parties' uncooperative and antagonistic nature, NA's equidistant posture slowly polarized towards the king, to whom it was loyal for 30 years. Although the marriage of convenience between the military and the king seemed beneficial in the short run, ultimately it put the military in a dilemma.

The NA received no political backing, nor did the political leaders think it necessary to give any recognition to the sacrifices made by the NA and its members during their mobilization in counterinsurgency operations. Ironically, some democratic forces rhetorically suggested that the NA and the Maoists renounce the violence and come to the negotiation table, presuming that the political parties were the outsiders, unaffected by the violence.

The Maoists declared another ceasefire in January 2003, but the ceasefire broke in the latter half of 2003. By the end of the second ceasefire, the Maoists had a strong presence in several districts in western and eastern Nepal and had extended their influence to cities and various urban areas. In February 2005, King Gyanendra took power using military and police forces, placing the political parties in the background. "After RNA's active support for the King, the mistrust between the RNA and the parliamentary political parties peaked, and the military option [for solving

Maoist problem] was no longer seen as viable by the parliamentary parties" (Mehta, 2010, p. 191). In September 2005, realizing there was no possibility of military victory, the Maoists also declared a unilateral ceasefire and concluded a twelve-point agreement with the Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) with a view to presenting a common political front against the monarchy. The military remained isolated without support from its friends and allies. The king's diminishing popularity also weakened NA's popular support despite its active contribution to the counterinsurgency campaign. In the face of growing pressures and citizen protests in the capital, popularly known in Nepal as the "Peoples Movement-II," King Gyanendra gave up power in April 2006.

CMR remained somewhat stable during the first decade of democratization, but became unstable after that. While the democratic framework allowed democratic control of the military by the civilian, the constitutionally structured dual authority over the military put the NA in an autonomous position. The democratic forces had broad national intentions as opposed to king's parochial intentions in the *Panchayat* era, but there was skepticism among democratic forces over taking control of the military. However, the democratic system did create an environment to manage and employ the army in a more democratic manner. It emphasized the inclusion in the officer corps and among the rank and file. In addition to recruiting from a remote area and the Terai region, the army also established two ethnically based battalions to make the military more national in character. Women were also inducted into the army for the first time. People started viewing the NA as a more inclusive national army, although some sectors still viewed it as the king's private guard, especially when it aligned with the palace after King Gynendra's rule.

Despite their broad intentions, the democratic leaders' lack of interest in the military and the military's skepticism towards civilian leaders impeded improvements in CMR. Although *de jure* the NA was under democratic control, *de facto* it operated

in a vacuum without substantial political control. Political leaders considered the NA as a threat to them, rather than their strength. The NA behaved like an autonomous organization, keeping itself independent of democratic forces during the initial years of democratization. The NA became a more unified institution when it started receiving exogenous threats from different directions. Desch argues an internal threat to the military institution from the state and society will unify it. The political leaders knew very less about the military. As the government turned away from the military, exerting stringent budgetary control, the NA gradually shifted its loyalty towards the king.

During the democratic period, 1990–2005, political parties' activities contributed to isolating the national army rather than making it a strong and credible institution of democracy and national security. However, during this period the NA engaged heavily in both national development and international peacekeeping. Although peacekeeping was not a new activity, the new orientation and profound involvement gave new direction and impetus making it seem like a new role. These new roles helped the army remain away from politics and achieve autonomy; thus the NA enjoyed somewhat objective civilian control during the first decade of the second democratic period. Had the army not gotten these new roles, the probability of the army engaging in politics would have been high. The army was hesitant to be involved in internal conflicts from the very beginning. Even after its involvement in counterinsurgency operations against the Maoists, the army tried to remain out of politics to preserve its control over domains such as officer promotion, appointments and participation in peacekeeping operations. Then King Gynendra's political ambitions dragged the army to the centre stage of the politics.

When the Nepali Congress Party was in power, the government tried to create a rivalry between the NA and other security agencies in order to exert control over the

army. Although rivalry could be one means of civilian control, it did not work because the government failed to create a central control mechanism such as National Security Council with executive power. Hence, the sole 'divide and rule' initiative did not work. Intelligence failure and information asymmetry between the government and the security agencies, especially the NA, led to unstable CMR and weakened the government. The new government did not feel it was necessary to restructure the old intelligence system or to establish a new intelligence agency after the huge political change. It is vital to realize that knowledge is power without which any government is likely to suffer heavily (Bruneau & Dombroski, 2006, p. 83). Throughout the democratic period, political leaders underestimated the importance of a reliable intelligence system. The security agencies, especially the NA, were reluctant to provide their 'private information' (information known only a particular institution) to civilians. This hindered the civilians' ability to make correct and timely decisions.

The relationship between the NA and the Nepali Congress Party's government became embittered when the government wanted to use the military against the Maoist insurgency. CMR became unstable after the NA was involved in counterinsurgency operations. Desch is right in claiming that "a state facing low external and high internal threats should experience the weakest civilian control of the military. The civilian leadership is less likely to be attentive to national security affairs" (Desch, 2001, p.14). This is because internal threats create complex effects on various groups within a state, and civilian institutions are likely to be weak and deeply divided. In such situations, civilian factions try to exert subjective civilian control over the military in order to gain military support.

It is apparent that the NA was swaying away from objective civilian control to subjective civilian control around the time when political leaders tried to employ the NA against the Maoists in the Dunai incident in September 2000. Until this time, the

NA seemed to maintain equidistant from the palace and party politics. The royal massacre in 2001, the political parties' attempt to mobilize the army against the Maoists in Holeri, and the Maoist attacks on an army barrack in 2001 all clearly brought the military under subjective civilian control. The new king Gynendra's political ambitions resulted in the subjugation of the military as his tool to control state power by mobilizing against other political forces in the country. The democratic political parties were trying to control the military to use against the Maoists with an ultra leftist communist ideology that aimed to annihilate the democratic forces and to establish a communist regime. In their attempt to clear the last hurdle to state power, the military, the Maoists clearly provoked and dragged the army into the centre of politics.

2.3.4 The Third Democratic Period (2006–2009)

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 21 November 2006 between the government of Nepal and the Maoist rebels after months of difficult negotiations. Domestic as well as international actors welcomed the CPA. It was instrumental in addressing the two key issues, the fate of the constitutional monarchy and the end of the Maoists armed struggle. The central elements of the CPA were constituent assembly elections, formation of an interim constitution, an interim legislature, an interim government, local administration and policing, the monarchy, human rights and transitional justice, management of arms and armies, and principles of social and economic transformation. The signing of a peace agreement with the Maoists in November 2006 paved the way for Maoist participation in the government.

As a result of the April 2006 movement, the dissolved parliament was reinstated. The parliament made a bold proclamation in May that had a watershed effect on reshaping national institutions. For instance, Nepal was declared a secular state. Not only did the parliament curtail the king's prerogatives, but also terminated

the concept of king-in-parliament. Parliament hurriedly took decisions for more radical socioeconomic changes. Regarding the military, it took far-reaching decisions. The proclamations made the following declarations:

> The name "Royal Nepalese Army" shall be changed to "Nepalese Army"; The Existing provision regarding the NSC has been repealed. There shall be a NSC under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister in order to control, use and mobilize the Nepalese Army; COAS of the Nepalese Army shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers; The existing arrangement of Supreme Commander of the Army has been revoked; The decision of the Council of Ministers on mobilizing the Nepalese Army, must be tabled and endorsed within 30 days from the special committee assigned by the House of Representatives; The formation of the Nepalese Army shall be inclusive and national in nature.[7]

The parliamentary proclamation not only severed the link between the king and the military, but also brought the military under civilian control. This action had a far fetching impact which ultimately paid off by the military support and smooth transition from monarchy to republic state in Nepal (Shah, 2010, p.138).

Amidst political turmoil and mistrust, Prachanda, the supreme commander of the Maoists, made his first open appearance in Kathmandu to sign an eight-point agreement with the SPA. This agreement was a crucial foundation for subsequent negotiations. Both sides decided to dissolve the parliament and the 'people's government' of the Maoists, and to form a new interim legislature. In the meantime, Maoist cadres were becoming impatient and their threats of an 'October Revolution'

[7] Nepal Parliament Sovereignty Proclamation, website, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gazette/2006/05/ nepal-parliament-sovereignty.php (accessed 12 March 2010).

created widespread fear. In addition, an anarchical situation developed, with marginalized and oppressed groups demonstrating to demand their rights. It was mainly because there was a strong correlation between the Maoists ideological movement and the ethnic movement in Nepal. During the armed struggle "the Maoists were able to transplant their communist ideology effectively into the ethnic movement. The energy created by the ethnic movement became a force multiplier for the Maoists to advance their communist agenda" (Rawal, 2011b, p. 75). The ethnic activists, whose campaigns had gathered momentum after the 1990 democratic movement and were put on hold after the start of the Maoist movement, re-emerged forcefully. The ethnic movement saw different trajectories before and after the emergence of the Maoists. The Maoists tried to utilize ethnic energy even after joining the political main stream, renouncing the decade long armed struggle. Hangen maintains:

> One indicator of the heightened politicization of ethnic movements is that ethnic political parties played and expanded role in the April 2008 Constituent Assembly elections. The increased mobilization of these movements led to an increase in the number of ethnic parties. In the 1990s only three ethnic parties ran in elections whereas 11 ethnic parties participated in the 2008 elections (2010, p. 153).

The Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities demanded a secular democratic republic. They also demanded ethnically-based autonomous regions empowered with legislative, executive and judicial authority.

In 2008, after successful Constituent Assembly elections, the monarchy was officially abolished. No political parties could secure the majority; however, the Maoists won enough seats to become the largest political party in Nepal. The former

rebel leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, aka Prachanda, was sworn in as the first Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. However, there was a political schism between the Maoists and other political parties, especially the Nepali Congress. "The politics of consensus, however, had broken down. The Nepali Congress (NC) wished to retain the defence portfolio in the new government, but the Maoists refused to give up their claim on the position. The NC decided to sit in the opposition" (Jha, 2014, p. 70).

The most recent civil-military problem in Nepal developed when the Maoists talked openly about launching of an October Revolution, establishing a People's Republic in Nepal, and integrating all the Maoist combatants into the NA. Acrimonious relations with the Maoists' government were further embittered when the NA did not stop its recruitment drive despite protests from the Maoist camp, stating that it was too late to stop. In the next move, the defence minister Ram Bahadur Thapa, a Maoist leader, refused to endorse the routine extension of the tenure of eight Brigadier Generals as recommended by the Army Headquarters. Shortly thereafter, NA's sports team walked out of a national sports event protesting the late entry given to the Maoists' 'Peoples Liberation Army.' Then, made desperate by their unsuccessful attempts to interfere with the army, the Maoists decided to fire the COAS, General Katawal, and sent a letter to him ordering that he explain why he should not be fired for insubordination and violation of civilian supremacy. General Katawal recounts, from the very beginning they took control over the MOD; the Maoists were trying to find ways and means to belittle and provoke the military. The defence minister Thapa warned him to take action several times (Katawal, 2014, p .3). He further mentions in his autobiography:

> Prime minister and defence minister treated the NA as 'step child'....When I briefed the defence minister at first formal discussion, and put forward army's problem, he replied by saying - 'Our party also has an army[referring to the Maoists' PLA], I have to look after that either.' This made me scared (2014, p. 430). The Maoist ministers were trying to drag the NA in controversies by making mountain out of mole in every issue. They were trying to weaken the national army by any means. I had two options in front of me - either protect the fundamental character of the state or to surrender in front of the Maoists' strategy - I chose the first (2014, p. 433).

This new row in the ongoing civil-military tension polarized political parties. Before the Maoists' decision to fire the army chief, most political parties were in favour of exerting more control over the military. However, the Maoists' unilateral decision to impose major changes in the army to serve their party's vested interest worried the rest of the political parties. This situation left the Maoists alone, without the support of any other political parties. The moment the Maoists unilaterally fired the army chief, the rest of the political parties requested that the President take a stand against the Maoists' move. The President, who cautioned the Maoists not to make such a sensitive decision without political consensus, finally sent a letter telling the army chief to stay in his position until further notice. The Maoist-led government finally fell when their position became untenable due to national and international pressure.

Despite the latest civil-military problem, some firmly believe that the NA has displayed a great deal of loyalty to the rulers of the day when they established themselves as legitimate rulers and underwent a successful transition. Bhandari

(2009) maintains, “There exist a bit of illusion and false allegation to the army about their loyalty towards the institution of monarchism and the king. If we look behind the history of Nepal Army - its loyalty had always been towards the legal ruler (accepted or enforced) or the legally/constitutionally established government” (http://kesharbh.blogspot.com/2009/02/ question-of-loyalty-nepal-army-analysis.html).

In its long history, the NA has served political leaders in many forms, including absolute monarch, regent, oligarch, democratic ruler, and authoritarian ruler. Finally, after the abolition of the monarchy and establishment of a republic system, the army was functioning under the new government and the president as per the constitutional arrangements. The NA's role in this transitioning was very crucial. General Katawal said, “Proclamation of republic was army's acid test....I did not disobey once the people's representative proclaimed republic on 28 May 2008....the NA had been branded as king's private army in national and international community....what would happened to the NA from global community had it become king's defender in such a circumstance” (Katawal, 2014, p. 399)? The NA mediated the smooth transition. Huntington asserts, “The shift from a traditional ruling monarchy to middle-class praetorian is also mediated by the military. The military is typically the most modern and cohesive force in the bureaucracy of a centralized monarchy, and the monarchy typically falls victim to those it has strengthened to serve its ends” (1968, p. 202). In fact, despite many ‘palace revolutions’ and ‘royal coups,’ there was not attempt at a military coup.[8] The quintessential example of the loyalty to the ruler is that the military readily submitted to the Maoist government

[8] Huntington argues that in the praetorian oligarchy, the struggle for power frequently involves coups d'etat, but these are simply “palace revolutions” in which one member of the oligarchy replaces another.

against whom it fought a bloody battle that had caused a large number of deaths in its organization. Also, the NA protected the same Maoist leaders, whom it had sought to kill during the armed rebellion, once they held different governmental positions.

Nevertheless, the 'Katawal episode' clearly showed that there was a dire civil-military problem despite the army's subservience to the legitimate ruler. The situation also confirms Huntington's claim that even without a coup, CMR can still be unstable. However, refuting the claim that by shirking its duties, the NA did not respect civilian supremacy, Brigadier General (Ret) Keshar Bahadur Bhandari asserts, "The army did try to be loyal to the constitutionally elected government and at the same time preserving its patronage towards the king" (Bhandari, 2009). This dilemma of dual loyalty seems esoteric. However, scrutiny reveals two main reasons behind it. First, the power sharing provision in the constitution specified dual authority over the military. Second, the loyalty towards the king was more path-dependent than politically motivated. The path dependency resulted not only because the democratic government did not try hard to consolidate and win the confidence and loyalty of the army, but also because of the historical legacy of allegiance to the king. Although the NA did not embrace any specific political ideology and had served both democratic and communist governments during second democratic period, the army was reluctant to trust politicians because of its thirty years of subjugation under the king and the *Panchayat* system.

The Nepalese case clearly shows that CMR is dynamic, with changes that depend upon the balance of power among various political forces. In Nepal, the dynamics of CMR changed, tipping the balance, when the Maoists unilaterally decided to impose their will upon the military, ignoring the roles of other political forces in the political equation. The Maoists' action resulted in a new polarization of political forces and destabilized the balance of power between the cabinet and the

President enshrined in the constitution. The Maoists' rhetoric of 'civilian supremacy' remained contradictory since they themselves tried to undermine the constitutional role of the president, who is not only the supreme commander of the NA, but also the civilian head of state. Here, it is worth noting that the slogan of civilian control was chanted not only in Nepal, but also in the English Parliament in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in an attempt to reduce the authority of the crown over the military and to maximize parliamentary control of the armed forces (Huntington, 1957, p. 81).

According to the interim constitution of Nepal, the President is the supreme commander of the army who must provide overall guidance and iconic leadership, but the executive must take actual political leadership of the army.[9] The prime minister, as head of the executive, and the defence minister, as head of the department, should assume leadership of the military. Other stakeholders, especially the legislature, must also show their interest in the military establishment by providing constant guidance, monitoring and supervision. The military, as the only institution with authority to hold a monopoly on violence, must be controlled with checks and balances; this is even more important during a transitional period. If any one of the branches is given exclusive authority to exercise control over the military, without checks and balances, that branch will effect an imbalance of power with other branches, monopolizing the coercive power of the military.

[9] According to the part 20, article 144 (2) The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Nepalese Army. (3) The Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepalese Army in accordance with the law. The Council of Ministers shall, with the consent of the political parties and by seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an extensive work plan for the democratization of the Nepalese Army and implement it.

CMR during the third democratic period were very unstable. The NA did not enjoy intimate relations with either the interim government or the Maoist-led government. NA's relations with the interim government were uncomfortable. This was obvious because of the collaboration between the democratic forces and the Maoists. The relationship became even worse when the Maoists led the government. It is argued that both military and civilian were responsible for the drift between the civilian and the military (Shah, 2010, p. 140). Since the NA had launched a counterinsurgency operation against the Maoists, the Maoist-led government remained antagonistic to the NA. The main reasons for misunderstanding between the government and the military were communication gap and personality clash between the Maoists and the military leadership (Shah, 2010, p.140).

This period is characterized by struggle between subjective and objective civilian control. The NA wanted to maintain professionalism, autonomy and its non-political nature by advocating objective civilian control, whereas the political parties, and especially the Maoists, wanted to bring the NA under subjective civilian control. The two major democratic parties, the Nepali Congress Party and the CPN (UML), seemed comfortable with objective civilian control 'as long as no political forces tried to use the military for their vested interests.' However, these two parties also tended to exert subjective civilian control by intervening politically when other political forces try to manipulate the military. This was evident during King Gynendra's reign in which the Nepali Congress Party tried to exert subjective civilian control when the king apparently subjugated the military in order to fulfil his interests. The Nepali Congress Party again advocated subjective control over the military when the Maoists were trying to form a government for the first time after the Constitution Assembly election. The Nepali Congress Party openly demanded control of the MOD as a precondition to participating in the Maoist-led coalition government. The NA was

also in a dilemma, despite its desire to maintain autonomy and objective civilian control. When the Maoists threatened army's autonomy and objective civilian control, the NA tacitly sought protection from non-Maoist forces, thus, digressing away from objective civilian control.

2.4 Nepalese CMR through Theoretical Lenses

Relations between the civilian and the military are complex, and CMR is a fairly nebulous topic in the Nepalese case. Many theories exist to explain CMR in different political settings and military institutions; it can be interpreted through different theoretical lenses. Therefore, determining what is good and bad in terms of CMR is often difficult since it depends on the context.

Many evaluate CMR in terms of coup d'état, but this is not the only form of measurement. Huntington points out that "a nation can have poor CMR without the threat of a coup" (1957). For instance, although not a military coup *per se*, Nepal has experienced civil-military problems of different intensities and in different periods. During the rift between the NA and the Maoist-led government, the army did not orchestrate a coup although CMR were still unstable. This episode of civil-military problems is considered the most severe in the history of democratic Nepal.

Janowitz suggests that good or bad CMR can be assessed by the extent to which the military interferes outside of military matters. He believes that if the military confines itself to the military sphere and does not transgress beyond it; the situation can be characterized as good CMR (Janowitz, 1960, p. 13). However, the dynamic nature of military roles blurs the distinction between civil and military roles. The limit of the military sphere depends upon the types of roles performed by the military. If a military is engaged in civilian types of roles, military and non-military matters are likely to be less distinctive. For instance, the NA's primary roles were to

defend the country from external and internal threats; however, for more than fifty years it has been involved mainly in peacekeeping missions, national development programs, and aid to civil authorities. Even after the establishment of the new political system, the roles of the NA have not changed. It may be difficult to distinguish between military matters and non-military matters when carrying out non-military functions such as national development programs to construct road networks. In explaining Nepal's CMR through the lens of Huntington's theory of civilian control, some scholars have characterized it as objective civilian control. Sauvagya Shah, presenting conference paper at the Nepalese Army Command and Staff College, Shivapuri claims, "the Nepal Army, on the other hand, has historically evolved along the objective control tradition" (2009, September 22-23). The autonomy enjoyed by the NA, its participation in peacekeeping missions and the level of professionalism displayed in its functioning might have lead to this conclusion. However, one should not be oblivious that the king subjugated the military to his own will, not that of the state. The military was treated as his private servant, making it subservient to his personal will and the *Panchayat.* This installed a form of subjective civilian control, subject to the will of the king.

Huntington's theoretical basis for objective civilian control is that a professional military readily submits to the civilian; it obeys the civilian order in any circumstance (Huntington, 1957, p. 84). This hypothesis may hold true in advanced democracies such as the U.S., but may not be the case in new democracies. It generally depends upon the socio-cultural, political and economic aspects of the society.

It is true that the NA has developed its non-political nature for almost half a century, following its massive restructuring. However, since the establishment of multi-party democracy and the decade-long Maoist insurgency, the whole gamut of

political and social dynamics has changed. Although the NA tried to remain non-political because of its *Panchayat* era legacy, it always remained in the centre of politics because of its pivotal role in *the political order in a changing society,* and its interests, preferences, and disagreements. Before the Baburam Bhattarai's prime ministership, the peace process was stalled many times and the Maoists were demanding group integration of their combatants into the NA. Similarly, the constitution and the military act required the NA to be more inclusive, incorporating specified percentages of women and Madheshi, Dalit, Janjati and other ethnic groups.[10] The Maoists, who exercised subjective civilian control over their 'Peoples Liberation Army' by following the Chinese and Russian model and provisioning a political commissar in the military organization, expect to see a similar kind of control in the national army.

Unlike Huntington's institutional approach that suggests "militarizing the military;" Janowitz's sociological approach advocates reflecting contemporary society in the military institution by "civilianizing the military." The institutional approach focuses on the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership, whereas the sociological approach emphasizes the relationship between the military and the larger civil society. When the Nepalese constitutional mandate demands "Making the national army national in character," what types of civilian control will become the function of CMR is a pertinent question.[11] It should be noted that without a fine balance between two important desiderata-- the functional and societal imperatives--

[10] Article 144 (4A) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 states, "In order to make the Nepalese Army national in character, the entry of citizens, including Madhesis, indigenous nationalities, Dalits, women and those from marginalized areas, shall be ensured through legal provisions on the principles of equality and inclusiveness."

[11] Article 144 (4A) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal - 2007.

neither the military could be professional, nor could it survive in the society in harmony (Huntington, 1957, p. 3).

Under authoritarian rule, a single political party which is likely to hold power for several years can have a monopoly over the use of the military. Hence, it is likely to exert subjective control effectively. Even in a well-established democratic system where the political situation is stable, subjective civilian control is likely to work well. However, subjective civilian control becomes more complicated in a new democracy full of uncertainties, fragmented political constituencies, mistrust among the political forces, and a history of frequently making and breaking political alliances with individual and group interests.

CMR often consist of determining who prevails when the civilian and the military preferences diverge (Janowitz, 1960). If civilians prevail over the military most of the time, then CMR is considered stable; otherwise not. In the past Nepalese scenario, there were many instances where the civilians did not prevail. When the Maoist-led government tried to fire the COAS of the NA, the president did not approve the move because almost all the political parties urged him not to approve. This example shows a clear rift between the civilians and the military.[12] The nature of CMR was paradoxical in this particular case.

Michael Desch asserts that civilian control over the military is likely to be most effective when the military engages in external missions. On the other hand, CMR is likely to be most worrisome when the military engages in internal roles. When the country faces an external threat, the military and civilians tend to converge and their differences diminish. During internal crises, the military and civilians, as part of the same society, are likely to have differences. For more than fifty years, the

[12] Twenty-three of 25 political parties were in favour of the Nepalese Army's position.

NA has focused on external missions by participating in peacekeeping operations; however, it did not enjoy stable CMR as the theory suggests. Nepal did experience unstable CMR once it mobilized the military for internal roles, as described by Moskos.

Nonetheless, one of the important frameworks for stable civilian control of the military is the constitutional provision. If a constitution does not allow a single branch of a state to monopolize the control of the armed forces, then civilian control and CMR are likely to be good. In the U.S., the President is designated as Commander in Chief of all armed forces by the Constitution, but the Constitution also empowers the Congress to create, regulate and maintain the military, determine its size and levy taxes to pay for it. Even though the executive branch through the Department of Defence proposes the defence budget, the legislative branch, the Congress, has the ultimate right to increase, decrease, or approve it. The Congress has an absolute right to scrutinize and check the validity of any military expenditure (Kohn, 1991, p.71). But it should not be confused with the necessity and importance of unambiguous single chain of command of the military in day to day functioning.

How to achieve checks and balances while controlling the military is another key issue. Executive should look after the issues relating to military operations and management of the force, whereas broader policy decision regarding the size and character of the forces should be the prerogatives of legislature. Checks and balances facilitate the civilian control as well as military effectiveness. Such divided but shared control mechanism helps grow civilian control stronger because no civilian entity can alone use the military to abuse power, and the military possesses both the efficiency of unitary command and the legitimacy of sanction by the people's representatives. But civilian authority must give institutional autonomy to the military to the extent

that is necessary for its effectiveness. In a nutshell, democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the military are two vital desiderata of good CMR.

Another important aspect of CMR is management of information. Strategic information is required not only for national security but also for nation building. Information sharing between the military and the government is crucial for both aspects. In this regard, the responsibilities of various security agencies to collect specific information and dissemination are important. At times, the military may show reluctance to share military information with the civilian, considering they are incapable of handling information related to national security. This military's skepticism of civilian's ability, as well as its own patriotism, tends to deprive the supreme leaders of making right and timely decisions on crucial issues. Moreover, this reluctance of sharing information is likely to culminate into bad CMR. Therefore, the military should share all of its information with the legitimate civilian leadership in timely manner. However, there should be an appropriate mechanism in place to protect the information (Rawal, 2013 p.39).

According to Peter D. Feaver, military agents work when they are monitored and shirk when they are not. Therefore, civilian principals must devise optimal monitoring mechanisms in order to avoid shirking by the military. Feaver says, “At the extreme end of shirking is the traditional civil-military concern of coup. At the extreme end of working is some ideal-type military that does everything the civilian has contracted with it to do, vigorously and without subversion” (Feaver, 2003, p. 62). Information asymmetry also plays an important role in the outcome of CMR. If the military agent holds private information that the civilian principal does not know, then chances of the agent's shirking is very high. The NA did not shirk under the *Panchayat* system because of a strong monitoring mechanism and absence of information asymmetry between the king and the military.

The conception that stable CMR prevail only in democracies may not be true. Certainly, democratic control of the armed forces is one model of the civilian control that may be suitable for new and old democracies, but it is neither an ideal type nor it is a panacea for all civil-military pathologies. However, democratic control is preferable because of its widely acceptable attributes and relations with other institution of the state. Nepal has facades of democratic institutions and control mechanisms enshrined in the constitution; however, some of these are either ineffective or non-functional. This shows that merely having constitutional provisions does not ensure good CMR and civilian control. Constitutional provisions should be reinforced by enabling and empowering the institutions necessary for civilian control. Some scholars emphasize that along with control, effectiveness and efficiency are equally important. Bruneau maintains, "The three fundamental issues of CMR are: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) effectiveness in achieving roles and missions; and (3) efficiency" (Bruneau, 2008, p. 450). This neo-institutional framework advocates that the essence of CMR is not just the 'civilian control of the military,' but rather the effective use of the military as an instrument of national power by civilians to realize national interests. Without effectiveness, mere democratic control may not serve the purpose of stable CMR and national interests. Yet, civilian control is the primary requirement for stable CMR.

In democracy, the civilian control is exercised by democratic methods. The focus of democratic control is installing accountability by strengthening the MOD and making it effective with civilian leadership. In Nepalese case, PMS was the de-facto MOD of Nepal, whereas the MOD was mere facade of democratic institution. At times, the PMS also played the role of NSC. When PMS was abolished through the proclamation of the parliament, there was a vacuum between the NA and the government (Shah, 2010, p. 138). Since, the MOD was in rudimentary stage lacking

administrative capability, it could not effectively handle the NA. Bruneau and Goetze say, “The four key competencies a MOD must master are in the areas of budgets, personnel, acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions” (2006, p. 83). While this framework is suitable for mature democracies, it is not easy to install these competencies in new democracies and in countries with serious political problems. Kumar maintains:

> Without the rule of law, a democratic constitution, a system of checks and balances and viable, functioning institutions, it would be difficult to conceive of democratic control of security sector. Furthermore, it would be hard to maintain civilian control over security forces in a country with a weak, risk-averse, infirm and intemperate leadership that desists from taking any initiative to adopt legislations and policies and refuses to implement laws that are relevant to the security sector (2008, p. 136).

Various dynamics come into play for the outcomes of particular CMR. To achieve stable CMR and effective civilian control, various combinations of civilian and military equilibrium can be applied depending upon the power-sharing agreement and other factors. Bruneau writes, “Although the 'proper' balance between democratic civilian leadership and military effectiveness in achieving roles and missions will clearly vary from country to country and era to era...equilibrium is fundamental to the success of authentic democratic governance” (2006, p. 1).

The national and international environments are important factors shaping CMR. The nation’s culture, history and traditions are crucial to CMR as well. The NA COAS, Gen. Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, says, “A country's national security system

must strike a balance between the mechanisms adopted to retain civilian control over the military and the scope of professional autonomy rendered to the military."[13]

There will be hardly any doubt that the control of the military is vital, however, the mere mechanical control may not be sufficient to achieve effectiveness of the military. There is an inherent correlation between ownership and loyalty. The wholehearted ownership of the military by political leaders generally results in unwavering loyalty from the military. The loyalty makes the military submissive to its leader, which in turn results not only in a stable CMR but also enables the military to serve as an effective instrument of national power. The ownership of the military may be implicit in CMR of some of the economically, socially, and politically developed countries because of the well developed state mechanism in place. However, this is not the case in many other scenarios. In case of those countries where political situation is fluid and democratic institutions are either non-existent or rudimentary, it is imperative to give emphasis on the securing political ownership of the military in order to have stable CMR (Rawal, 2011, pp. 81-83).

CMR involve different things for different people in different systems of governance. A successful model in a certain type of system may not be applicable to others. One size does not fit all. Culture, tradition, and perceptions matter, too. Some emphasize a pragmatic approach to CMR in contrast to Feaver's assertion that "civilians have rights to be wrong" (Feaver, 2003, p. 6). There is also a view that maintaining civilian supremacy and stable CMR does not mean that the armed forces should obey civilian orders imprudently (Kumar, 2009).

[13] Gen. Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, the Chief of the Army Staff of the Nepalese Army, addressing to seminar on "Developing Civil-Military Relations in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal" held at Nepalese Army Command and Staff College, Kathmandu, on September 22, 2009.

2.5 Conclusion

There have been ebbs and flows in CMR in Nepalese history. The tide of the civil-military problem reached the high water mark under the Maoist-led government. The swift evolution in Nepalese politics after the end of the Maoist insurgency highlights the dynamic nature of CMR. The successful alliance between the seven political parties and the Maoists ensured the downfall of the old regime. Political upheaval and the removal of the monarch from the helm of Nepalese politics brought the alliance to the centre of state power, where it sought to exert subjective civilian control over the military as it had been under the king. But after the Constitutional Assembly election, when the political equation changed and the efficacy of the alliance dissipated, the dynamics of CMR also changed. When the government tried to subjugate the military to serve the interests of political parties rather than the interests of the government or the state, the country faced a political disaster.

Examination of the civil-military situation in Nepal in post-Rana rule reveals different trajectories of CMR. These trajectories do not necessarily follow the political system or ideological pattern. Analysis of the political developments in Nepal suggests that rather than political system itself, other political attributes have dictated Nepalese CMR, such as political culture, weak political institutions, the personalities of political leaders, and the interests of political elites.

The first democratic period was a state of political turmoil marked by transformation and the NA's transition of loyalty. This was the period when political institutions were first introduced in Nepal, including the constitution, and CMR was unstable during this period. After the establishment of *Panchayat* system, political institutions started taking shape and CMR seemed to be stable. The three decades of *Panchayat* rule might have made the NA non-political at the institutional level, but

CMR remained under subjective civilian control as the NA became subjected to the king's interests.

After the establishment of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, CMR gradually became unstable because of the dual control of the NA. The nebulous constitutional provision for control of the military and political chaos led to military autonomy. During this period, the NA's professionalism also increased remarkably. Thus, the second democratic period showed many attributes of objective civilian control. In the third democratic period, with the end of the Maoist insurgency and the Maoist rise in power in a marriage of convenience with democratic political parties, CMR had been very unstable and completely polarized. Apart from the high level of political influence, the military's reserve domain and prerogatives had created tension in CMR and the nature of civilian control had oscillated between objective and subjective civilian control. It is obvious that there were many CMR related problems in Nepal during the period studied. Some dimensions were normative, while others were inherently structural. The lack of a strategic culture among the political leadership, ignorance about security, political instability, parochialism and individualism, mistrust, and a lack of common objectives and national interests were prominent factors contributing to Nepal's civil-military pathology. MOD's rudimentary functioning and the monarch's direct control of the army for several years were other important factors.

The military's resistance to complying with civilian interests, unwillingness to give up its prerogatives, and control over its reserve domain were other impediments to stable CMR. Unnecessary interference from neighbouring countries in Nepalese internal affairs was a main component of Nepalese political turmoil and had a direct link to CMR. These indicate that civilian control of the military and CMR are both dynamic and country specific phenomena shaped by several elements. Indeed, while

CMR simply cannot be explained or summarized by a single variable, the most important variable behind the civil-military pathology in Nepalese history is the failure of its political leaders to take an active interest in military matters.

The next chapter examines the Nepalese peacekeeping participations in the same four corresponding periods, and explores their impacts on CMR.

CHAPTER – III

NEPAL'S PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

3.1 Introduction

Nepal has been taking part in UN peacekeeping missions since three years after it became a member of the UN, and has contributed numerous peacekeepers in multiple missions. Nepal commemorated 50 years of participation in UN peace support operations in 2008. Currently, Nepal is the sixth largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.[14] Nepal considers its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations as a tool for implementing Nepalese foreign policy, which is guided by the principles of UN Charter. Whenever Nepal has to claim its space in international forums, it refers to the Nepal's contributions to international peace and security through peacekeeping participation. This shows the importance of peacekeeping participation in Nepal's foreign policy. Leaders of various political parties in different

[14] UN, "The Ranking of Military and Police Contributors to UN Operations," 31 December 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/dec14_2.pdf (accessed 6 February 2015).

timeframes have emphasized this. Addressing 54 General Assembly of the UN, on 30 Sep 1999, Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattrai said, "Nepal has participated in United Nations peacekeeping for over 40 years in all parts of the world. Some 35,000 of our troops and 800 of our police have served with many peacekeeping operations, 39 having been martyred and several more wounded in the line of duty. It is the firm policy of Nepal not only to maintain but also to increase our contribution to United Nations peacekeeping" (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N99/859/92/ PDF/N9985992. pdf?OpenElement).

The then Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, a former rebel leader, addressing to 63rd General Assembly of the UN on 26 Sep 2008 said:

> Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved as the soul of the United Nations. With that in mind, since 1958 Nepal has regularly placed its peacekeepers at the call of the United Nations. We are celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Nepal's continuous participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. I take this opportunity to reiterate Nepal's commitment to continuing to provide our troops for the cause of peace worldwide. Today, Nepal is the fifth largest contributor of troops and police personnel to the United Nations peacekeeping operations. We are glad that they have earned accolades for their professional competence and performance both at home and abroad. We consider that to be our modest contribution to international peace and security (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/72/PDF/N0852272.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed on 13 Dec 2014).

Similarly, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, in his address to the 64th session of UN General Assembly on 26 Sep 2009, said, "Let me recall here that Nepal has been one of the longest-standing continuing partners in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Today, we are the fifth largest troop-contributing country. Our commitment to international peace remains as strong as ever, and our support for the United Nations in its peacekeeping activities will continue unabated"(http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/525/86/PDF/N0952586.pdf?OpenElement).

Addressing 66th General Assembly of the UN on 24 Sep 2011, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattrai said, Nepal's participation in United Nations peacekeeping is long-standing and consistent. We remain steadfast in our commitment to international peace and security. Nepal has already provided more than 80,000 peacekeepers, with 62 of our soldiers having laid down their lives in the line of duty. We would therefore like to call for equitable representation at the leadership level (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/513/60/PDF/N1151360.pdf? Open Element. Accessed on 14 Dec 2014).

The peacekeeping contributions allowed Nepal to become an organizational committee member of the UN Peace Building Commission for 2008/2009 in the category of troop-contributing countries.[15]

3.2 Background

After becoming a member of the UN in 1955, Nepal participated in the 1958 peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, UNOGIL. Nepal has since contributed to UN missions in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe and the Caribbean. The contribution

[15] United Nations Peace Building Commission, website: http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ mem-orgcomembers.shtml (accessed on 19 December 2009), and information from BPOTC.

has been appreciated by many dignitaries. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon remarked,

> Bravery of one Nepali soldier is very fresh in my mind. In June 2005, Maj Kabindra Jung Thapa was helping to escort a Human Rights team to a dangerous part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. They were investigating that night, one of the worst atrocities of war there. When he was leaving, hundreds of armed militia surrounded helicopter and started fire. Maj Thapa made sure that every person got inside on the helicopter; he was the last to board. Just when he got inside the helicopter, he was shot and killed. Maj Thapa died protecting his comrades, he died protecting the cause of peace, and Human Rights—he died protecting UN" (NADPKO, 2008, DVD ROM).

Until October 2014, Nepal's contribution totalled 1,05,588 troops in 41 missions around the globe; and as of 19 October 2014, the NA deployed more than 4,441 peacekeepers in 14 different missions (Table 1) in the capacity of military observers, military liaison officers, staff officers in mission headquarters, and as contingent members.[16] The government of Nepal has signed to make 5,000 troops available, as and when requested, to the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS).

The increasing demand for peacekeepers is becoming a management challenge. To manage Nepalese peacekeeping missions, the NA established a dedicated peacekeeping directorate at the army headquarters. The Directorate of Peacekeeping is responsible for the management of the entire army's peacekeeping

[16] The Nepalese Army in UN Peace Support Operations. Retrieved from Nepalese Army's official website http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na_un.php? as of 19 October 2014.

system. The main function of the directorate is to make the army ready to succeed in the complex operational environment of modern peacekeeping.



Map1: NA's current deployment in UN peacekeeping missions (as of 19 October 2014)

Most NA members have participated in a UN peacekeeping mission at least once in their military career. After serving for a few years in the army, almost all NA officers participate in UN peacekeeping missions more than once. Participating in UN peacekeeping is an opportunity for professional enhancement for many Nepalese soldiers. Apart from gaining experience, the NA personnel also receive monetary benefits that help raise their living standards and keep them motivated during

peacekeeping activities and in their own country. The ICG report states, "UN missions not only serve an internal patronage system (allowing the top brass to reward or punish officers by granting or denying postings) but are a major source of income and prestige for the army as a whole, and senior officers in particular" (ICG, 2010, January 14, p.13). The UN allowance is four to ten times higher than a standard salary in Nepal. At the institutional level, economic benefits from peacekeeping have become an important source for the welfare fund. This shows that peacekeeping missions have become the NA's one of the major roles.[17]

3.3 Nepalese Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions

3.3.1 The First Democratic Period (1950–1960)

The first democratic period from 1950 through 1960 was a time of political upheaval and transformation in Nepal. This is also the period of establishing national identity and preserving national integrity and sovereignty. The king and the political parties considered the UN to be the protector and the guarantor of national identity, integrity, independence and sovereignty. Prime Minister B.P. Koirala addressed fifteenth General Assembly of the UN "laying the strongest emphasis on Nepal's historical independence and its full faith in the United Nations as the custodian of its integrity and sovereignty" (Joshi & Rose, 1966, p. 372).

Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations	
Mission	Year
UNOGIL, Lebanon (Military Observers)	1958

[17] The recommendation of ICG Report No. 184 is to "apply pressure to the NA where it hurts most," referring to putting pressure on the Nepalese Army's participation in peacekeeping missions—a centre of gravity.

Table1: NA's UN peacekeeping participation during first democratic period (1950–1960)

Thus, the decision to participate in UN peacekeeping missions in 1958 was a crucial one, a watershed moment in Nepalese foreign policy. This is because, when Nepal sought UN membership in 1949, the Soviet Union raised the question of Nepalese sovereignty. Nonetheless, Nepal became a UN member in 1955. The following year saw "the 1956 vote in the UN General Assembly on the Hungarian questions, in which Nepal voted with the West against the Soviet block... and not voted with India, thus establishing Nepal's credentials as a sovereign and independent state in the international forum" (Rose, 1971, p. 214).

The fluid domestic, regional and international political situation made Nepal's survival as a nation state of primary importance during 1950s and 1960s. In an address to the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly, on 29 Sept 1960, Prime Minister Bisheswar Prasad Koirala said:

> The foreign policy of Nepal is wholly inspired by the purposes and principles of UN. We regard UN not only as a bulwark of our independence and security, but also as the protector of our rights and freedom….We believe in the independent exercise of our judgment in considering international issues….While we welcome and are grateful for the help that is being given to us by friendly governments—those of India, the United States, China, the USSR, the United Kingdom and others—as well as by UN, we do not want any country to tell us how we should think, or how we should conduct our internal affairs (http://daccess -dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/NL6 /007/05/ PDF/NL600705.pdf? OpenElement. Accessed on 14 Dec 2014).

After the Rana rule and until 1960, the various governments in Nepal had different foreign policy preferences. Rose maintains, “for instance, Tanka Prasad Acharya's government was suspicious of Indian intentions and wanted to give a novel dimension to its diversification policy by establishing a closer tie with China; M. P. Koirala and Dr. K. I. Singh were pro-Indian” (1971, p. 214).

But the king wanted to have a balanced relationship between the two giant neighbours and to maintain the sovereignty of Nepal. While the king was searching for opportunities, he found that participating in international peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the UN was the best way to retain sovereignty and national independence. Invasion or any form of aggression against Nepal by its neighbours would instantly draw the attention of the UN, not only because Nepal was a member state but also because it was an important contributor to the cause of international peace.

Despite NA's participation in UN peacekeeping missions, civilians could not be effectively involved in peacekeeping activities. The government was weak most of the time, and the king tried to control the MOD by influencing the selection of the defence minister. The politicians were more interested in other ministries with larger budgets than the MOD. Therefore, the MOD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) could not play an active role in Nepal's internationalist approach. In a later stage, the powers of the defence ministry were centralized at the king's palace under the powerful PMS, which played a pivotal role in military matters thereafter.

3.3.2 The Panchayat Period (1961–1989)

The first Nepalese battalion-sized contingent, the Purano Gorakh Battalion, was deployed in Egypt with UNEF II in 1974. Throughout the whole Panchayat period, the NA participated in six different peacekeeping missions. In addition to

UNEF II and UNIFIL, in 1966 it participated in peacekeeping missions in India and Pakistan (UNIPOM), and in 1989 in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP I/II, OSGAP I/II/III as military observers) (Table 3) (Sharma, 2009, p.151).

Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations		
	Mission	**Year**
1	UNIPOM, India/Pakistan (Military Observers)	1966
2	UNEF II Sinai, Middle East (Peacekeeping Troops)	1974
3	UNIFIL, Lebanon (Peacekeeping Troops)	1978
4	UNMOT, Tajikistan	1989
5	UNGOMAP I/II, OSGAP I/II/III (Military Observers)	1989

Table2: NA's UN peacekeeping participation during the *Panchayat* period (1961-1989)

Nepalese peacekeepers have since made major contributions and Nepalese contingents have received appreciation from many force commanders and high-ranking officials for their commitment and professionalism (NADPKO, 2008). Maj Gen Claudio Giaziana, Force Commander, UNIFIL, maintains:

> Nepal has shown a lot of professional capabilities. They are experienced peacekeepers and they are very much able to run what is in reality the core value of a peacekeeper, to show firmness when it is necessary to be firm, and to show humanity to the range of operations when there is a case to show a humanitarian attitude (NADPKO, 2008).

The senior managers in the mission areas are found very comfortable with Nepalese peacekeepers mainly because of their adaptability, sincerity, obedience and amicable behaviour. For instance, Brig Gen Apurva Kumar Bardalai, Deputy Force Commander, UNIFIL, asserts:

> In case of the Nepalese Army, they have done a commendable job, the way they have forged a damn good relation with the civilian population. They have been able to win the hearts and minds of the people and they have been able to create a situation where they have been found widely acceptable to the entire population of South Lebanon. And, therefore, the contributions of the Nepalese Army in bringing back peace and security in this disturbed region have been excellent (NADPKO, 2008).

From 1961 through 1971, King Mahendra played a key role in shaping and implementing foreign policy, seeking to achieve three main objectives: maximization, diversification and mobilization. He first tried to expand the playing field of foreign policy by exploiting the preferences and the clash of interests between India, China and other major powers. Then he sought to go beyond a limited reliance on a few resources. Finally, he utilized Nepal's active participation in international forums like the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to pressure and mobilize regional and international powers in Nepal's favour (Muni, 1973).[18] Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal, based on Panchasheel, was a reflection of Nepal's aspiration to achieve and maintain its sovereignty, integrity and independence without interference from neighbouring countries. At the 1973 summit of the NAM in Algiers, King Birendra

[18] S. D. Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal, (Delhi: National, 1973), quoted in Jitendra Dhoj Khand, "National Interest and Foreign Policy," Nepalese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, ed. Sushil Raj Pandey and Pushpa Adhikari (Kathmandu: Sangam Institute, 2009), 104.

stated that “Nepal, situated between two of the most populous countries of the world, wishes her frontiers to be declared a zone of peace.” In Birendra's 1975 coronation address, he formally asked other countries to endorse his proposal.

A total of 116 countries supported the proposal, including four permanent members of the UN Security Council. The outcome of the internationalist approach was positive and significant. The election of Nepal as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1969-70 and in 1988-89 by an overwhelming majority was the result of Nepalese foreign policy, which emphasized Nepal's association with the UN peace initiative (Khand, 2009, p. 104).

To utilize peacekeeping participation as a tool to protect Nepal's sovereignty, the king dovetailed the army's peacekeeping efforts with country's foreign policy objectives, adopting an internationalist approach to foreign policy. It seemed that the king also wanted to divert the military's attention away from internal party politics by engaging it in a new role. He gave the military a new role by involving it in international peacekeeping missions.

This internationalist approach produced a synergic outcome by effectively utilizing NA's peacekeeping participation to search for Nepal's space in international forums. The internationalism came to fruition when Nepal was chosen for important responsibilities in the UN. For instance, Nepal led the Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances resulting in the tragic death of then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who was killed in a plane crash at Ndola in Lusaka in 1961. The internationalist approach also helped Nepal to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Additionally, this approach helped Nepal to project its image to the international community and to maintain its sovereignty, independence and national integrity.

3.3.3 The Second Democratic Period (1990–2005)

After the establishment of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in Nepal, there was a surge in NA participation in peacekeeping missions. According to the International Crisis Group Report No. 184, the number of Nepali military observers, police and troops deployed in peacekeeping operations was just under 1,000 from 2001 to September 2003. It nearly doubled in October and grew to over 2,200 in December 2003. It was 3,400 by the end of 2004, at which time Nepal was the fourth-largest troop contributing country overall (having been eleventh in 2001). It stayed in fourth or fifth position since then and had approximately 4,300 people deployed in late 2009. The army participated in scores of missions. There are three reasons for NA's increased involvement in peacekeeping missions after 1990. First, immediately after the establishment of multiparty democracy in Nepal, the NA was free to send more peacekeepers because it no longer had to protect the king's regime. Second, the new political leaders did not find any role for the army in the new democratic environment, except engaging a small portion of the army in national development works. Finally, there were growing demands for peacekeepers in the international arena, as the third wave of democratization and end of the Cold War resulted in a sharp increase in conflicts around the world (Posen, 1991).

During this period, the majority of NA troops were deployed in peace enforcement and multidimensional peacekeeping operations in which internal armed conflicts constituted the major problems.

Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations		
	Mission	**Year**
1	UNIKOM Kuwait/Iraq (Force Commander)	1991
2	UNMIH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops)	1991
3	UNTSO, Israel , Middle - East (Chief of Staff)	1992
4	UNISOM, Somalia (Peacekeeping Troops)	1993

5	UNPF/UNPROFOR, Former Yugoslavia (Peacekeeping Troops)	1994
6	UNGCI, Iraq (Peacekeeping Troops)	1995
7	UNTAES, Eastern Slovenia (Military Observers)	1996
8	UNPREDEP, Macedonia (Military Observers)	1996
9	UNOMIL, Liberia (Military Observers)	1996
10	UNMOP, Prevalaka (Military Observers)	1998
11	UNMIK, Kosovo (Military Observers)	1999
12	UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone (Peacekeeping Troops)	1999
13	MONUC, DR Congo (Peacekeeping Troops)	1999
14	UNAMET/UNTAET/UNMISET, East Timor (Peacekeeping Troops)	1999
15	UNFICYP, Cyprus (Force Commander)	1999
16	UNMEE, Ethiopia/Eritrea (Military Observers)	2000
17	MINUCI, Ivory Coast (Military Observers)	2003
18	UNOCI , Ivory Coast (Military Observers)	2003
19	UNMIL, Liberia (Peacekeeping Troops)	2003
20	UNDOF, Israel/Syria (Force Commander & Staff)	2004
21	MINUSTAH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops)	2004
22	ONUB, Burundi (Peacekeeping Troops)	2004
23	UNMIS, Sudan (Peacekeeping Troops)	2004

Table3: NA's UN peacekeeping participation during second democratic period (1990-2005)

The establishment of a multiparty democratic system in Nepal was a result of the worldwide third wave of democratization. Other parts of the world saw similar political agitation, conflict and transformation. The NA continued participating in UN peacekeeping missions. During this period, political instability on the African continent created a heavy demand for UN peacekeepers. Apart from Africa, the Nepalese peacekeepers also served in Caribbean, Middle East, and East Europe, where their roles were highly appreciated. Jayaraj Acharya, a Permanent Representative of Nepal to the UNHQ in 1991, says,

> Their performances were highly appreciated by the world leaders, particularly by the ambassadors of permanent five members of the Security Council. I was told by them that the discipline, commitment and professionalism of the Nepalese soldiers in peacekeeping operations were highly appreciated by the force commanders, and they had got very good feedback and they told me that Nepal would be appreciated if it would remain on standby to contribute more soldiers to peacekeeping operations (NADPKO, 2008, DVD ROM).

Nepal has taken part in peacekeeping missions in various conflict zones, and some of the NA's high ranking officers had assumed key appointments in peacekeeping missions. Lt Gen Krishna Narayan Singh Thapa became Force Commander of UNIKOM mission in 1993; Lt Gen Victory Shumsher Rana became Force Commander of UNFICYP in 1998-2000; Lt Gen Chitra Bahadur Gurung served as Military Advisor to the Secretary General of UN; Lt Gen Balananda Sharma served as Force Commander and the Head of UNDOF, the mission in Syria and the Golan Heights, in 2004-2006; and, Maj Gen Pawan Jung Thapa served as Force Commander of UNMIS.

The MOFA on its website states, "Nepalese peacekeepers have earned a very good reputation. In 1988 when the United Nations was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Mr. Ratna Gurung of Nepal Army was also included in the Secretary General's official entourage that visited Oslo to receive the Prize. This is indicative of the recognition of Nepal's contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security"(http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepals-role-in-the-un-peacekeeping-operations-116. html#sthash.YXhylcVV.dpuf. Accessed on 12 Feb 2015).

Various force commanders and high-ranking officials who directly monitor and supervise international peacekeeping in the field say that the NA's mission

performance is commendable. UN Peacekeeping Operation in Burundi (ONUB) awarded the Nepalese Army's Mahendra Dal Battalion the “Best Battalion Honour” for its excellent peacekeeping work in Burundi. ONUB Force Commander, Major General Derrick Mbeiskele Megyobe, says, “Nepalese Army personnel have a very polite nature and they blend in the society. They have been honoured because they are disciplined and fearless.” He further notes that compared to the other forces, the presence of the NA had eased the environment (NADPKO, 2008).

But the democratic government did not formulate any new policy or vision for employing the army in peacekeeping missions, nor did it interfere the NA from continuing its peacekeeping responsibilities. Thus the internationalist approach became dormant. The NA's profound contribution to UN peacekeeping missions could not be utilized to support foreign policy objectives and national interests. The MOD also kept a low profile. Without a dedicated defence minister and without the Ministry playing an effective role in peacekeeping activities, peacekeeping remained the army’s private domain. This situation resulted in unstable CMR.

When the Maoists launched an armed struggle against the government, the NA faced a challenge to continue participating in peacekeeping missions. However, with the gradual increase in the size of the NA after its involvement in counterinsurgency operations, participation in peacekeeping operations was no longer hindered. Nevertheless, CMR deteriorated.

3.3.4 The Third Democratic Period (2006–2009)

After the second people's movement, and following the establishment of a republic in Nepal, the NA had participated in new peacekeeping missions in Georgia (UNOMIG), Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Iraq (UNAMI) and Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (Table 5). Nepal’s peacekeeping participation had been further diversified during this period. By promptly supplying peacekeepers in many trouble

spots across the world, Nepal could further improve its image as a global peacekeeper, and also establish warm relation with the UN. Hira Bahadur Thapa asserts, "In enhancing the international image of the country, Nepal's useful contributions to the UNPKOs have been crucial. It is a fact that Nepal is one of the rarest examples in the world that has continued to respond positively to the UN's calls for troops in whatever complex the deployment mission might be."

Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations		
	Mission	Year
1	UNIFIL, Lebanon (Peacekeeping Troops)	2006
2	UNOMIG, Georgia (Military Observers)	2007
3	MINURCAT, Chad (Military Observers)	2008
4	UNAMI, Iraq	2008
5	UNMIT, Timor-Leste	2008

Table4: NA's UN peacekeeping participation during third democratic period (2006–2009)

There has been no change in the policy of Nepalese peacekeeping participation since the establishment of the republic system; however, Nepalese CMR has been very unstable in this period. Nepal faces various challenges in peacekeeping. Apart from logistical and management difficulties, allegations of human rights violations were also causing some problems (ICG, 2010, January 14).

Despite these CMR problems, peacekeeping participation continued. The interim government led by the Nepali Congress party, the Maoist-led government, and the CPN (UML) government all emphasized and praised the NA's peacekeeping participation wholeheartedly. While there was emphasis on the NA's participation in peacekeeping missions, there has been no attempt at involving civilians in

peacekeeping activities. The government did not understand the problems of the Nepalese peacekeepers, nor did it provide necessary logistic support and political direction. When democratic institutions were in place, civilians seemed apathetic towards peacekeeping operations.

3.4 Analysis of Nepalese Peacekeeping Participation

Historically, Nepal's shift towards internationalization was an effort to pursue foreign policy goals. NA's peacekeeping participation was part and parcel of that effort. The UN has provided an important forum for smaller countries like Nepal to pursue its national interests and exercise foreign policy with dignity and sovereignty. Maskay (1996) asserts,

> For a small landlocked state, the UN has not only struggled for its right of access to the sea, but also offered the choices in foreign policy matters. Freedom of choices is the hallmark of national independence, sovereignty and identity...the UN has proved not only a sounding board but a last resort to articulate national aspirations. The legitimacy of the UN comes from its role performance, where Nepal in many ways is in a better position, especially in the area of peacekeeping.

It has also provided small countries with moral and physical security from aggression, interference, and encroachment. Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, King of Nepal, addressing to the 22nd Session of the UN General Assembly, said, "for, to a small country as mine, the United Nations represents the ideal as well as the practical. It satisfies us in so far as it helps us to work actively for larger unity and for peace and prosperity of mankind; it satisfies us also in so far as it secures us morally and materially against encroachment and interference from others" (1967, November 6).[19]

[19] Nepal and the United Nations 1955-2012, http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-and-the-united-nations-1955-2012-117.html. Accessed on 12 Feb, 2015.

Nepal’s major engagement in UN peacekeeping operations came during the second democratic period, 1990–2005. There are many possible explanations why Nepal's troop contribution peaked in the 1990-2005 period despite weaknesses in the foreign policy front. It is pertinent to remember that this period commenced as a political vacuum, or confusion, aftermath of the first People's Movement. This was especially true in relation to the Nepalese Army's political leadership and ownership. During the first half of this period the NA was kept aloof by political leader, and was not given any significant role, so NA could spare more troops for international peacekeeping. The NA was also not given enough budgets, and had to undergo austerity, that forced the NA to seek for self-sustainment for its welfare. The new constitution of 1990 had enshrined the duel control over the military by the government and the king. With the promulgation of the new constitution, the king had somewhat loosened his grip but the political leaders had not fully embraced the ownership of the Nepalese Army. Because of the confusion of the dual control, the NA also maintained some degree of autonomy, and it could opt for more peacekeeping participation abroad for its welfare. On top of this, in the global scenario, after the end of the Cold War in 1989, the decrease in inter-state conflict and the rise in intra-state conflict created more demand of peacekeepers in the conflict trodden area around the globe. This led to a conducive environment for the increase in the number of Nepalese peacekeeping participation.

This period was crucial for CMR in Nepal. Nepal started sending troops under the provision of Chapter VII of UN Charter, when its troops participated in peace enforcement mission in Somalia in 1993. The NA acquired some experience and professionalism by operating with other professional armies. In addition, working with civilians during peacekeeping missions has considerably altered its approach to problems. Himalaya Thapa asserts, “The experience and skills developed in various

UN peacekeeping operations certainly helped the NA to launch successful counterinsurgency operations, paving the way for a political solution in Nepal" (Thapa, 2008). The long involvement in peacekeeping missions changed the nature and working pattern of the NA, which helps bring it closer to the civilian community. By working with civilians, the soldiers change and become more civilianized, their approaches to problem solving thereby becoming more like civilian approaches (Janowitz, 1960).

Nevertheless, other unintended consequences cannot be ruled out. Saubhagya Shah argues that Nepal's growing involvement in international peacekeeping needs to be read as a double-edged sword, as the NA is unavailable for defending the home front when needed. He asserts,

> While the UN peacekeeping missions to the far corners of the globe's hotspots has brought international visibility and recognition to Nepal's foreign policy based on peace and non-alignment, the time has perhaps come to reassess how such mission engagements impact its internal functioning and capability to defend the homeland.[20]

From 1990 through the end of 2000, the NA was oriented towards international missions. It was a decade characterized by policy inconsistencies between the military's internationalism and the government's internal orientation. The NA was solely focused on its international peacekeeping mission, while the political parties were entangled in domestic politics. There was a clear gap between the state's approach and the functioning of one of the instrument of national power, the military.

[20] Saubhagya Shah, "Democratization of Nepal Army: Establishing Civilian Supremacy," Conference Paper presented at Nepal Army Command and Staff College, Shivapuri, Kathmandu, 22–23 September 2009.

At the strategic level, Nepal lacked a coherent policy that would allow it to institutionalize the experience gained in international missions. This is why, despite long and successful involvement in international missions and interactions with other professional armed forces, the NA could not become as professional as it should have been.

In its many years of UN peacekeeping missions, Nepal has undergone through various experiences and evolution processes. The concept of peacekeeping missions emerged from the concept of collective security founded in the concept of collective defence that seeks to form alliances against any state which commits an act of aggression. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was limited to interposing troops between belligerent parties, supervising and verifying cease-fires, and observing, monitoring, and reporting. Peacekeeping duties were limited to maintaining the status quo, and emphasis was given on impartiality and minimum use of the force, in which neutral countries like Nepal, rather than the permanent members of the UN Security Council, played a crucial role. During the Cold War period the UN's permanent five (P-5) members did not send troops for peacekeeping missions because of the politicized and divided international context. This norm changed after the end of the Cold War, and P-5 members and middle powers started taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. Today, great powers tend to send their troops for peacekeeping missions under their own command rather than under the aegis of the UN. Lise Morje Howard asserts, "The P-5 members of the Security Council tend not to be very good peacekeepers in large part because it is difficult for the great powers to remain impartial while developing field-level capacities for learning (Howard, 2008, p. 332). These missions were mandated by Chapter VI of UN charter. Examples of such missions include UNEF I, UNEF II, UNYOM, UNIPOM, UNIMOG, UNTAG, UNAVEM I, and UNOMIG.

Most of the cases, in the past, Nepal contributed peacekeepers to missions under Chapter VI. The mere presence of blue helmets was enough to restrain the conflicting parties from further hostilities. Non-enforcement was the norm of traditional peacekeeping. Parties were deterred from relying on force; deployment of peacekeepers began after fighting halted; peacekeepers used to create buffers without seizing territory; and rather than taking territory, peacekeepers aimed to restore order or defend the territory. During those days national contingents did not have to make elaborative logistical arrangements, the United Nations assumed responsibility for major logistics supply, including maintaining the equipment. Such arrangements made UN peacekeeping participation logistically less challenging to developing countries like Nepal. Government and armed forces' peacekeeping responsibilities were limited to making political or operational decisions to participate in particular missions. The situation of CMR was not particularly challenging in the first generation peacekeeping missions.

The nature of conflict changed with the end of the Cold War, requiring a new approach to peacekeeping missions and the advent of the second and third generations of peacekeeping missions (Doyle, 2006, p. 10). The new multidimensional peacekeeping operations focused on facilitating political processes; creating a secure and stable environment and strengthening state security apparatus; and providing a framework for ensuring that all UN and other actors pursue their activities with close civil and military cooperation as the key to success. Although Nepal participates in most of the multidimensional peacekeeping missions, the NA's Directorate of Peacekeeping's stovepipe functioning has hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nepalese peacekeeping effort. The lack of civilian participation in the NA's peacekeeping efforts has impeded the most needed changes in the present context of multi-dimensional peacekeeping efforts.

The government treated Nepalese peacekeeping participation as the sole prerogative of the NA, showing a lack of enthusiasm to control, coordinate and supervise these activities. The MOD had not been competitive enough in managing peacekeeping efforts. The process of selecting, training, equipping, projecting and maintaining peacekeepers in conflict zones had not been effective. Hamal writes:

> The process of selection, training and equipping must be executed strictly with stringent standards. To send soldiers below standard to participate in UN peacekeeping operations as a welfare scheme should be stopped. The best commanders and the best soldiers and technicians should only be permitted to be included in the mission (2007, p. 51).

During the period studied, many questions had been raised about transparency and proper management of welfare funds from within and outside of the institution. Although the NA had made efforts to make the welfare fund activities transparent and better managed, these efforts were seen inadequate for projecting a positive image of the army and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of Nepalese peacekeeping efforts. There had been grievances regarding mismanagement in the procurement system and lack of transparency. These problems had caused a great setback in peacekeeping efforts by tarnishing the image of the NA.

The inability to demonstrate the relative competence of civilian and military institutions has resulted in inadequate performances in diplomatic as well as operational aspects of peacekeeping. Also, lacking a symbiotic relationship between the military and civilians with regard to peacekeeping involvement, foreign policy and security, Nepal has not been able to achieve maximum output. However, one of the reasons for this is lack of diplomatic effectiveness. Thapa writes, “Despite following

good principles and policies, Nepal's performance on the ground in terms of diplomacy has not been effective as it should have been" (Thapa, 2008, p.43).

A clear example of this weakness is Nepal's inability to establish a regional peacekeeping centre. The intention of hosting the first regional peacekeeping exercise was to develop *Panchkhal* as South Asia's Regional Peacekeeping Centre, according to statements reported during the exercise's launch (Kamiol, 2000, February 2).[21] Despite its favourable environment and contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, Nepal could not cash in on the opportunity to establish a regional peacekeeping training centre. Although there are many reasons for why the centre did not materialize, Nepalese political apathy and inaction, and diplomatic incompetency are the primary causes of the failure to realize this national interest.

During the third democratic period (2006-2009), Birendra Peace Operation Training Centre (BPOTC) trained approximately 8000 peacekeepers annually prior to their deployment in various peacekeeping operations around the world. Its main tasks are pre-deployment and specialized training. The UK government contributed for infrastructure development and other areas of the centre, while United States support is focused on capacity building programs for Nepalese peacekeepers.[22] Similarly,

[21] Karniol writes, "The Nepal News reported that Nepalese Army Chief Gen Prajwalla Sumsher Rana proposed during his remarks launching the exercise that Nepal be declared the South Asian Regional Peacekeeping Center. The newspaper said that this initiative was supported by Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Command Adm Dennis Blair and Assistant Secretary-General of the UN Peacekeeping Department, Yong Jin Choi, who were present at the ceremony."

[22] The U.S. has an interest in the South Asian countries contributing to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Nepal, as one of the largest and most experienced contributors, received U.S. funding to conduct regional exercises under the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (EIPCP). According to Jane's Defence Weekly, "Bangladesh and Nepal have emerged as pivots central to US efforts to promote peacekeeping activities in South Asia under its EPICP." Robert Karniol, "Asia

Global Peace Operation Initiatives (GPOI) assistance contributes to the production of competent trainers and specialized training. In February 2009, BPOTC conducted a pilot of pre-deployment training in close coordination with the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The centre, which aspires to expand its outreach to regional level, also provides training to students from friendly countries and contributes instructors to other school of instruction both at home and abroad.

3.5 Peacekeeping, Nepal, and the Constabulary Concept

There are some important differences between a nation's soldiers and its peacekeepers. Soldiers are always loyal to their nation, whereas peacekeepers are loyal to the international community. It has been seen that soldiers from some armed forces, especially from advanced countries, are reluctant to function under the command of a foreign army's commander. This is mainly because developed countries do not give high allegiance to the UN, which is not the case with the peacekeepers from Nepal and some other developing countries dedicated to international peace and security.

Peacekeeper militaries believe that peacekeepers' adherence to the principal of impartiality signifies their shift of allegiance from national parochial loyalty to a broader international loyalty (Moskos, 1976, p. 4). This shift in loyalty indicates their seriousness and dedication to the UN efforts for international peace. Apart from a broader international loyalty, there are other inherent qualities that make a normal soldier a peacekeeper. Moskos writes, "The skills of the peacekeeping soldier require such traits as the avoidance of violence, quiescent monitoring, negotiation, and

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Pacific, Bangladesh and Nepal to Support Peacekeeping Bid," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 31, Issue 10, 10 March 1999.

compromise" (Moskos, 1976, p. 9). Many troop contributing nations try to inculcate these traits in their peacekeepers through training before sending them overseas. However, it takes time to mould conventionally trained soldiers for peacekeeping duties. The NA's participation in UN peacekeeping has over time inculcated such qualities in its members. Upon analysis, these qualities are consistent with the constabulary concept put forward by Morris Janowitz and later advocated by Moskos.

Moskos argues that ad-hoc units and those with proportionately more officers tend to be more constabulary in nature compared with regular intact units with deep-rooted traditions and *esprit de corps*. The regular intact units are more concerned with soldierly qualities like valour, aggressiveness, regimental prestige and loyalty towards the nation. Since civilianizing is one of the attributes of a constabulary, and peacekeeping contingents tend to become civilianized as they increase the ratio of officers to other ranks in their peacekeeping contingents, peacekeeping troops reflect the constabulary attitude (Moskos, 1976, p. 59). The NA deploys peacekeeping contingents by forming ad-hoc units for specific six-month UN tours, and demobilizes them after their tour of duty. The NA's ad hoc units have more officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (Warrant Officers), resulting in a high ratio of officers to other ranks. The roles of *Subedar Major* (the most senior Warrant Officer) and Sergeant Majors (the most powerful figures in a regular unit) are less powerful in such ad-hoc units. If Moskos is right, over fifty years of such experiences may have inculcated a constabulary nature in the NA.

Additionally, on the country's national day and other occasions, Nepalese contingents organize parades, cultural programs and sports competitions with the local people and other contingents, fostering cross-national contacts. Thapa asserts, "The RNA troops serving in the UN peace keeping operation are exposed to different cultures and social environments through exchanges and meetings during ceremonies,

parades, sporting events and their day to day dealings with locals" (Thapa, 1995, p. 33).

Nepalese troops interact with civilian communities in a day-to-day basis while working together. The NA organizes Nepalese media reporters' visits to mission areas to give them first hand information about Nepalese peacekeeping activities in the field. Thus, NA members are very close to civilians and work with them in completely new environments to establish good working relationships. This is challenging as well as stimulating. Taking part in UN peacekeeping missions is also an opportunity to be operational in the field. Before its involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Nepal in 2001, the NA had a very few opportunities to deploy its soldiers in the field to hone their skills. Pyar Jung Thapa asserts, "The RNA troops serving in the UN peace keeping operation are exposed to different cultures and social environments through exchanges and meetings during ceremonies, parades, sporting events and their day to day dealings with locals" (Thapa, 1995, p. 33).

Similarly, a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) heads a UN peacekeeping mission. This propagates a culture of civilian supremacy among the contingents of troop contributing countries and may have influenced the NA as well. Many years of such interactions may have evolved a stable CMR between Nepalese peacekeepers and the civilian body of the UN. According to Moskos, "The form of civilian control over UN peacekeeping forces comes close to a pure model of objective control" (Moskos, 1976, p. 82).

The performance of Nepalese peacekeepers reflects high standards, with strict adherence to the minimum use of force, impartiality, the Rules of Engagements (ROE), and human rights. Although the 'minimum use of force' has been a part and

parcel of almost all peace support operations, there often remain gray areas regarding how effectively this goal is achieved. In many instances, peacekeepers want to have wider ROE to accomplish their mission whereas others wish to keep the engagement to a bare minimum (Rawal, 2009 p.71). In most of the circumstances, the Nepalese peacekeepers have sought resolution through pacific means, and have put emphasis on non-robust ROE; probably, by virtue of their nature. The minimum use of force is also directly related to human rights issues. Therefore, continued practice in peacekeeping missions seems to have institutionalized a certain level of human rights standards in the NA. Thapa maintains:

> The exposure to international peacekeeping has ensured that it remains one of the few organizations in Nepal where the teaching and practice of Human Rights has been long institutionalized. However, the army leadership needs to be more conscious and aware of rights violations being committed by servicemen as a result of error in individual judgment and action (2009, November 16).

The minimum use of force, a tenet of UN peacekeeping operations, was emphasized during counterinsurgency operations and other internal security mobilizations in Nepal. However, there are allegations of human rights violations by NA's personnel during mobilization in counterinsurgency operations.[23] Therefore, it is pertinent to analyze the NA's human rights violations during its counterinsurgency operations in Nepal vis-à-vis the excellent performance of the same soldiers in UN peacekeeping missions. Despite the emphasis on minimum use of force and human right protections, HR violations by NA members during counterinsurgency operations have been recorded. The puzzling question is what caused Nepalese soldiers with

[23] ICG, "Nepal: Peace and Justice," Asia Report No. 184.

such fine records of accomplishment in the UN missions to perform so poorly in their own country. Was it purely a problem of NA soldiers, or was there something more? This is a puzzling question. Although some human right reports point to the chain of command and accountability, according to the NA such violations were individual mistakes on the part of NA members and were not policy driven and intentional.[24] And the NA claims that it has "tried to minimize the grievances of the concerned and has taken adequate steps to ensure that violators are brought to justice." The NA punished 14 personnel found guilty of violating human rights while participating in UN missions over 50 years (the percentage of violators amounts to 0.02). It punished 67 personnel found guilty of violating human rights during security operations in Nepal (Baniya, 2008, p.1).

It is logical for the NA to be sensitive to human rights issues, not just because of its duty, but also to maintain its good image vis-à-vis UN peacekeeping. Netra Bahadur Thapa, Maj Gen, Adjutant General of NA, asserts, "The Nepalese Army has earned a very good reputation in UN Peace Keeping Operations and we do not want to tarnish that at home" (Human Rights Journal, NA, 2008). Whatever the justifications, there should be no protection or impunity for human right violations. This is where civilian control is relevant, and where accountability and responsibility come into play.

The reality is that the overall nature of the NA gradually changed over the half century of its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. The emergence of constabulary ethics indicates that Nepal is slowly departing from its traditional military posture. The behavioural adherence to the minimum use of force, and this

[24] Rookmangud Katawal, General, Chief of the Army Staff of the Nepalese Army, Human Rights Journal 2008, Directorate of Human Rights, Army Headquarters, The Nepalese Army, Kathmandu, (2008).

becoming universal as well as normative in the entire military institution, indicates a shift in the NA's character (Moskos, 1976, p. 93). The attitudinal change among Nepalese peacekeepers varies with individuals' personality and field experiences. The change is more evident in officers who take part in UN peacekeeping missions more than once and who are highly intermingled with civilians. On the other hand, some allegations of HR violations and excessive use of force by the NA during counterinsurgency operations indicate the paradoxical development of a constabulary ethic among Nepalese soldiers. Establishing the causes of this problem is a matter for further research.

3.6 Foreign Policy Aspects

The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) states, "the Foreign Policy of Nepal shall be guided by the principles of UN Charter, nonalignment, the *Panchasheel*, International law and the norms of world peace."[25] The previous Nepalese constitution, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (1990), also states that the UN Charter shall be one of the five guiding principles of Nepalese foreign policy. The MOFA maintains that Nepal has consistently supported UN efforts to maintain peace and security by its continued participation in the UN. It states, "Promotion of international peace and security are issues of paramount importance for the United Nations. Nepal has been consistently supporting the UN efforts in the maintenance of international peace and security through continuous participation in the UN Peacekeeping operations since 1958"(http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-and-the-united-nations-1955-2012-117.html, accessed on 12 Jan 2015). The success of the Nepal's previous foreign policy came from its continuous active engagement in UN peace initiatives that started with its first peacekeeping mission in 1958. Following

[25] The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, Clause 35.21.

the first mission, Nepal sent seven officers to supervise peace at the Indo-Pakistan border after the 1965 war. The RNA observers served there for a period of seven months. Pyar Jung Thapa, Retired NA General and COAS, writes, "This mission had a lot of significance for the foreign policy of Nepal and especially of the principle of neutrality keeping in view the close relationship with India and the fact that lot of domiciled Nepalese were involved in the war vis-à-vis the Indian Gurkhas. The trust that both the nations had when agreeing to keep Nepalese military officers in the area projected the non-aligned policy of Nepal" (1995, p. 31).

Nepal had some tangible results from its successful foreign policy during 1970s and 1980s. For instance, 116 countries, including four permanent members of the UN Security Council, supported Nepal's zone of peace proposal, which was based on five principles of peaceful coexistence, *Panchasheel,* and aimed at maintaining national sovereignty and independence. As another example, Nepal was twice elected as non-permanent member of the powerful UN Security Council during 1969-70 and 1988-89 with overwhelming majorities (Khand, 2009, p. 106).

Nepal's peacekeeping participation and foreign policy did not continue to parallel one another after the establishment of democracy in 1990. Balananda Sharma, Lt Gen (Ret), maintains, "Participation of Nepal's security forces in Peace Operations should be an extension of Nepal's peace and security policy. It should be enshrined in the constitution as our effort to help the world community to bring international peace and security. Accordingly, in this win-win proposal government ministries and agencies must support the security forces" (Sharma, 2009, July 15). In the new political order, the Nepalese diplomacy and peacekeeping participation did not go hand in hand. Thapa maintains, "In order to continue Nepal's participation in international peacekeeping it is important that Nepal address the present weaknesses [of diplomacy]" (2008, Aug 6).

Before, Nepal had an ‘equidistance’ or ‘equi-proximity’ policy regarding its two giant neighbours India and China. At the same time, Nepal supported internationalism to maintain national identity. The NA's peacekeeping participation dovetailed with an internationalist approach to foreign policy. However, after the establishment of the democratic system, the country's leaders ignored the internationalist aspect of foreign policy. In principle they keep pursuing an equidistance foreign policy, but in reality, they relied mostly on India. There are many reasons for the digressed foreign policy practice. One of the main reasons is political instability and the short life of regimes in Nepal. The political parties were always focused on making and breaking the government, and almost all the sectors were politicized. Huntington writes,

> In all societies, specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes such groups seem more “politicized” in a praetorian society is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system, social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict (1968, p. 196).

Since political attention to the internationalist approach was not sufficient, the NA's participation in UN peacekeeping missions continued without meaningful political-diplomatic congruity. Khanal asserts, “Now the foreign policy that Nepal has adopted long ago needs some revision...Nepal's emphasis should be more on increased cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies...It should seek more roles to play in the United Nations” (Khanal, 2009 July 15). This resulted in diplomatic setbacks. For instance, by eliminating Nepal, Indonesia was elected as

the UN Security Council's non-permanent member for a two years term starting in January 2007. There could be many reasons for this failure including the weakening of Nepali diplomacy on various fronts. However, some posit that it also points to the ineffectiveness of recent Nepalese peacekeeping initiatives. Chiran Thapa writes, "Despite Nepal's contribution to numerous UN led peace operations, the rejection of Nepal's candidacy by an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly clearly suggests that the international community deems Nepal as less capable of serving global security interests" (Thapa, 2006). In the face of Nepal's widely lauded participation in peacekeeping, why Nepal seemed 'less capable,' and unsuccessful in international forums is a serious issue.

3.7 Conclusion

Over fifty years, the NA's participation in UN peacekeeping has been remarkable. Although Nepal's first democratic period was full of chaos, the political forces in the country realized the necessity of taking an internationalist approach. Therefore, this period was a watershed in Nepal's peacekeeping participation as well as its approach to foreign policy. The *Panchayat* period was an extension and consolidation of the same policies with enhanced participation. The positive outcome of the peacekeeping effort was seen during the 1970s and 1980s. After the reestablishment of democracy in 1990, Nepalese peacekeeping efforts increased tremendously, but foreign policy did not go along the peacekeeping contribution. Despite some shortcomings, Nepal's performance in peacekeeping missions has been very successful and widely acclaimed. Nepal could have benefitted highly, both diplomatically and politically, but did not. Yet Nepal's peacekeeping participation has continued since the republic was established. Despite many political ups and downs and changes in political system, there is no difference in opinion in Nepal about its

participation in peacekeeping operations. This clearly indicates that there is a consensus among the Nepalese political parties that peacekeeping participation contributes to Nepal's vital interests.

Participation in peacekeeping missions can have effects at the individual level that can ultimately influence military institutions. There are different possibilities regarding the nature of civilian control exerted upon the peacekeeping contingents. On the one hand, peacekeeping participation exerts objective control of the military because of more autonomy and professional freedom, and the interaction with foreign militaries (Moskos, 1976, p. 82). On the other hand, the social interactions with civilian components of missions as well as with the local population erode the military tenets of individual soldiers, making them more civilianized (Sotomayor, 2007, p. 181).

Different types of missions affect civilianization or professionalization trends differently. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations, in which much of the mission consists of civilian activities, tend to civilianize a soldier. Peace enforcement operations are less likely to exert civilianizing effects. If peacekeepers interact with forces from countries that have civilian control, such as the U.S. or the U.K., then the soldiers are more likely to emulate their professional behaviours. On the other hand, if they are exposed to inferior or less professional armed forces, then soldiers are unlikely to acquire professional knowledge.

The nature of Nepalese CMR has various shades, and single theoretical lens cannot explain it in a holistic manner. Especially since the establishment of multiparty democracy in 1990, CMR has not been stable in the Nepalese case. On the face of it, the argument that countries with externally oriented military institutions tend to have stable CMR does not seem to fit in the Nepalese case. Despite civilianization of the military and the development of a constabulary attitude, stable CMR did not seem to

occur in the Nepalese scenario. Another argument, positing that peacekeeping tends to cultivate objective civilian control, also does not seem to fit in the Nepalese case. However, in the Nepalese case, peacekeeping participation has engraved various attributes of objective civilian control such as professionalism and autonomy. At the same time, peacekeeping participation has been civilianizing and has developed the constabulary attitudes described by Moskos in the Nepalese peacekeepers. Shemella writes,

> Establishing a reputation for one's country should result from a public debate, punctuated by decisions that guide the funding, structuring, preparation, and employment of military forces. A country's brand is both the result and the function of what was described...as macro roles. Many governments go beyond merely assigning macro roles to their military forces; they actively 'market' their countries to the rest of the world through branding....Peacekeepers countries are specialists in peace support operations and regard peace operations as the most important macro role their military forces perform. Peacekeeping as a macro role has grown in popularity for both global and domestic political reasons. It enables governments to gain international prestige (often at minimal cost) and to develop more professional armed forces, which remain focused beyond the nation's borders (Shemella, 2006, p. 125).

For instance, the NA put an emphasis on minimum use of force and sought political rather than military solutions, during counterinsurgency operations in Nepal. The NA's uninterrupted participation in peacekeeping missions during two major political revolutions in 1990 and 2006 and during its active involvement in

counterinsurgency operations indicate that the NA has been transforming into a ‘peacekeeper’ military as described by Paul Shemella.

To validate the deductions made in this chapter, the next chapters compare the Nepalese peacekeeping participation with Argentina and Mongolia and analyses different impacts on CMR.

CHAPTER - IV

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF NEPALESE PEACEKEEPING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND IMPACTS ON CMR

Argentine and Nepalese Peacekeeping and Impacts on CMR

4.1 Introduction

The Argentine case is cited as an excellent example of how peacekeeping can impact CMR in a positive way. The Argentine case also shows how a dovetailed military and political internationalist approach enhances foreign policy goals and changes the deep-seated interventionist attitude of the military. This case is comparable with the Nepalese scenario in many respects, and especially in regard to political history and peacekeeping activities. Both countries are geographically isolated and had a history of military involvement in politics. The comparison between the two is plausible because both started taking part in UN peacekeeping missions in 1958 and increased their peacekeeping participation after the end of the Cold War. Both countries adopted internationalist approaches, and both had good cooperation with the U.S. in peacekeeping activities. Both countries mobilized their armed forces for major military operations before a drastic change in the political system, and both suffered a negative image of the military in their post-democracy periods. Overall, both countries had intense civil-military tensions during a post conflict situation. There are some significant differences between the two countries as well. Their geographical proximity, size, and social, cultural and economic conditions are different. In addition, Argentina is a regional power, and had lost a war against the United Kingdom in 1982, which is not the case for Nepal. This chapter analyzes the similarities and differences between the Argentine and the Nepalese peacekeeping

participations in five key areas: dovetailing civilian and military internationalism, civilian involvement in peacekeeping activities, providing new roles for the military, the role of the MOD and the MOFA, and the outcomes of peacekeeping participations.

4.2 Dovetailing Civilian and Military Internationalism

After the establishment of democracy in 1983, the Argentine government adopted a new approach to foreign relations and national security. In this approach, the new government maintained a highly active presence in the international arena while the military was involved in UN peacekeeping missions. Norden says, "With respect to the government, UN participation fits neatly into the overall internationalist political orientation; for the military, interest stems from more institutional and professional concerns" (1995, p. 331).

Like Nepal, Argentina started sending military observers to Lebanon in 1958. Its peacekeeping activities began expanding in 1990 when its second democratic president, Carlos Menem adopted an internationalist approach. He encouraged the armed forces to take part in peacekeeping missions all over the world and to assume a new professional role. This approach perfectly suited the armed forces, as they also sought a new role was after their 1982 defeat by the U.K. The president carefully chose a highly qualified defence minister with expertise in foreign policy, the UN system and the military (Norden, 1995, p. 331). The success of Argentina's internationalist approach and its establishment of stable CMR show that a very capable, mature and influential minister is required in the MOD. Norden says, "Argentina's military became increasingly oriented towards international missions, both in terms of leadership (especially the Minister of Defence) and with respect to actual participation (Norden, 1995, p. 333). Menem integrated foreign policy, security

and economic policy to produce a synergic effect; the military contributed tremendously to his internationalist approach. The nature of CMR in Argentina since the establishment of democracy and Menem's adoption of internationalist approach can be termed very stable. The president took a keen interest in the army and established intimate relations with it. At the same time he had a broad national interest in taking leadership of the military.

Nepal's peacekeeping participation increased tremendously after 1990, but political leaders and the MOD did not pay much attention to NA's peacekeeping efforts, considering them as purely military missions. Not one single democratic government adopted an internationalist approach to peacekeeping to make it commensurate with foreign policy; nor did they discard peacekeeping. The NA continued to participate in peacekeeping, but without tangible political or diplomatic involvement. In Nepal, unlike Argentina, peacekeeping participation and foreign policy were never in tune with each other during the entire democratic period. The lack of political guidance and direction made diplomacy weak. Chiran Thapa asserts, "Nepal's diplomacy is plagued by a triple whammy. First, Nepal does not have a coherent foreign policy. Second, Nepal does not have competent diplomats. Third, Nepal does not have the luxury of allocating adequate financial resources for diplomatic ventures" (http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/#!/ 2006/11/rudderless-diplomacy.html). The NA was under the dual command of the government and the king and had a poor image among civilians. The army was kept aloof from the country's democratic framework until the Maoists made governance untenable by their armed movement. During the democratic period, almost all governments were focused on narrow interests rather than on redefining foreign policy, security and economic policies.

4.3 Civilian Involvement in Peacekeeping Activities

Argentina's peacekeeping participation has other important implications for CMR. The coordinated efforts of the MOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for peace operations improved CMR and civilian control of the military. Because of its external orientation, the military structure and organization were modified, and the decision-making process, procurement and recruitment policies were transformed. Civilian participation in Argentina's Joint Peace Operation Training Centre (CAECOPAZ), as instructors and as students, helped to promote CMR. Politicians, diplomats, and psychologists taught subjects such as International Humanitarian Law, International Law, and Psychology. Increasing the involvement of civilians in peacekeeping activities resulted in establishing institutional and legal frameworks that reduced military prerogatives. This strengthened CMR. If civilians were not involved in peacekeeping activities, the environment would be conducive for greater military autonomy and reserved domain, which would result in bad CMR (Sotomayor, 2007, p. 180).

Compared to Argentina, the Nepalese face impediments in using their peacekeeping participation for good CMR. There is a lack of meaningful coordination and cooperation between the army and the MOD, which resulted in low foreign policy achievement and inadequate performance in peacekeeping operations. Nepal’s military structure and organization have not been modified to keep pace with the changing international environment. Decision making, selection, training, deployment and procurement policies have not been as efficient and transparent as they should be. Although significant number of civilians, foreign military personnel and international organizations' personnel are invited to the BPOTC, the quantity and quality of civilian involvement are not sufficient to improve CMR. Few politicians, diplomats, professors, lawyers, and peace experts are involved in peacekeeping instruction,

seminars, discussions, research and strategy formulation. Hardly any publications relating to peacekeeping activities are generated within or outside of the NA. Civilian professors and educators are not incorporated into the framework for peacekeeping instruction. There is lack of coordination, cooperation and knowledge sharing among the NA, Nepal police and the armed police force. Because of this, Nepal lacks a concrete strategy for participating in future peacekeeping missions as well as best practices and lessons learned.

4.4 Providing New Roles for the Military

With the end of the Cold War, the role of international organizations has increased, and the UN especially has become a key player in resolving anarchy and conflict in various parts of the world. The transformation of the world order forced many militaries to redefine the nature of potential threats and the purpose of their organizations. With regime changes, many military institutions have faced serious challenges to their identities, causing serious civil-military problems. Norden believes that taking part in international peacekeeping missions can help to relieve such tensions (Norden, 1995, p. 347). She suggests that Argentina's international peacekeeping approach helped to diffuse a serious civil-military crisis in its post-democracy period. This approach helped to change the military's embittered relationship with political leaders and its interventionist attitudes.

The Nepalese post-conflict situation is comparable to Argentina's post conflict situation under the rule of its first democratic president, Raul Alfonsin. After coming into power, Alfonsin confronted the military head on while trying to establish democratic regime. Norden notes that he cut the military budgets “to the point that soldiers trained without bullets and pilots without fuel” (Norden, 1995, p. 331). The Argentine military not only remained under austerity, it was not given any meaningful role either. Sotomayor says, “The re-democratization process of Argentina left the

military without a role and in a moribund state, as civilians drastically cut budgets and closed military industries" (Sotomayor, 2007, p. 174). Immediately after taking office, Alfonsin ordered the prosecution of military personnel in the courts for violations of human rights. This added fuel to the fire. The gap between the military and the civilian widened. According to Norden:

> Within the armed forces, frustration brewed. Already in disarray from the disastrous Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the military now found more enmity than leadership in the newly elected democratic government. It was a time when many within the armed forces would have eagerly embraced an opportunity for apolitical professionalism, yet professionalization was not offered as an option. Instead, the government directed its efforts towards demilitarization—weakening the armed forces, rather than redirecting them (1995, p. 331).

When civil-military tension was at its height, Menem's farsighted vision changed the whole situation into a win-win strategy. He created a new role for the military by reshaping Argentina's position within the international community and pursued a liberal economic plan by extensive privatization. In this new vision, economic and foreign policies were intricately linked, with emphasis on cooperative security, diplomacy and trade. The previous narrow emphasis on national sovereignty and competition was seen as outdated. Argentina underwent a profound transformation in foreign policy and established good relations with the United States. Norden asserts that "Argentina's new internationalism, from economic policy to peacekeeping, has been inseparable from the country's new allegiance to the United States" (Norden, 1995, p. 339).

4.5 The Role of the MOD and the MOFA

The MOD and the MOFA play an important role in promoting stable CMR by engaging in international organizations like the UN when the military participates in international missions. The active engagement of civilians in the UN helps to establish good relations with mission heads, allowing civilians to intervene in military affairs. However, the mere fact of civilian intervention may not exert positive effects on CMR. A mature and well thought out intervention is likely to have positive effects. In the Argentine case, there was a positive impact because of the two-level strategy, domestic and international, adopted by the MOFA. At the domestic level, the political strategy was to send maximum military personnel on peacekeeping missions so that the military would be busy on international missions and remain out of domestic politics. At the international level, Menem pursued the internationalist foreign policy extensively in order to fulfil national interests. These two strategies converged, supporting each other. This also transferred the decision making authority of peacekeeping from the military to civilians, thereby allowing civilian control of the military. However, it is worth noting that civilian intervention took place in Argentina only after Argentina was defeated in the Falklands War. The reorientation of Argentina's foreign policy and approach to security generated public debate among scholars, policy makers and think tanks, which created more civilian expertise in defence policy and contributed to improved CMR. It also led to increased publication by journalists and scholars on peacekeeping issues (Sotomayor, 2007, p. 181).

Peacekeeping participation requires equipment and a considerable investment. With a budget allocation just large enough to pay for salaries, the Nepalese government has barely invested in enhancing the professionalism of the army. This has a severe impact on the NA's professionalism and performance in peacekeeping missions. Although NA personnel gained personal benefits and some professional

experience on an individual basis, the lack of necessary logistics, including equipment and weaponry, prevent the institution from instilling needed professionalism.

The Argentinean government acquired resources for enhancing peacekeeping participation through various means. Commensurate with the internationalist approach, Argentina took measures such as appropriate training and an emphasis on the English language for peacekeepers. The MOD submitted a proposal to the UN in an effort to establish a multinational training camp in Argentina. Argentina also created a standby force for peacekeeping missions. However, Menem restructured the military while reforming and reconstructing peacekeeping activities.

Although the NA increased its peacekeeping participation after 1990, it could not increase its logistics capability because of the government's stringent control of the budget. The NA tried to supply logistics from its own private welfare fund created with contributions from soldier's peacekeeping allowances. To make its peacekeepers competent and efficient, the NA established the Birendra Peace Operation Training Centre, and hopes to develop the facility into "a full-fledged centre of excellence" and possibly a regional centre (Thapa, 1996, p. 179). [26] Because the government has not assumed significant political and diplomatic roles, NA's endeavour to make the BPOTC a regional level peacekeeping training centre is less likely.

4.6 The Outcomes of Peacekeeping Participations

Despite the problem of finding financing for peacekeeping, Argentina gained significantly from its political investment. Its internationalist policy helped in debt negotiations and created a more credible image of the government. Its internationalist policy also helped Argentina to play an important role in the international arena,

[26] Dharmapal Bar Singh Thapa, General (Rte), says, "It may be desirable that a regional training centre for peacekeeping forces of the SAARC countries be established—possibly in Nepal."

fulfilling its national interests, while the military enjoyed the benefits of acquiring modern equipment and other logistics. In contrast, despite its army's highly regarded participation in peacekeeping, Nepal could not take advantage of peacekeeping to advance its national interest because of the lack of government interest and the dilemma it faces in foreign policy. Seminar report on Nepalese Foreign Policy, Sangam Briefs, states:

> The conclusion of [Lt. Gen. (Rte) Bala Nanda Sharma's] presentation [Peace Support Operations and Nepal: Past Experiences and Future Perspectives] was that although Nepalese Peacekeeping Operations are held in high esteem worldwide, there is not much to praise the government or the attitude of the political leadership about when it comes to supporting the soldier in these difficult missions. His question—Have we been able to produce even one candidate for the United Nations Secretary General's post in spite of our 60 years of services in its peacekeeping missions?—must have generated private appraisals by the participants about the way we have been conducting our foreign policy" (2009, July, p. 3).

Participation in peacekeeping missions by the Argentinean armed forces provided tangible benefits at the individual and institutional levels. Individual participants enjoyed an opportunity to travel, professional enhancement and monetary benefits. The institution also benefitted by increased professionalism among their soldiers with relatively less investment. According to Norden, "Argentina's relative geographical isolation, the military's lack of professional experience, the constrained economic conditions and the armed forces' pressing need to improve their image all contribute to a higher level of receptivity to international peacekeeping" (Norden, 1995, p. 340).

Despite the high emphasis on international peacekeeping missions, the military's primary role is to defend the country from internal and external threats. Peacekeeping missions remain the second highest priority. Over time, the concept of national security has been transformed and international security has been superimposed on domestic security. However, the Argentinean military still holds that national defence cannot be risked in the interest of cooperative security, and the nation-state continues to be the basic subject of international negotiation.

While peacekeeping missions have played an important role in promoting CMR in many instances, they have not always strengthened CMR. Sotomayor notes, "Different levels of military prerogatives have varying consequences when they interact with variables such as participation in peace operations" (2007, p. 179). The quality and quantity of military prerogatives and reserve domain plays an important role in determining CMR, as "Involvement in peace operations is likely to improve civilian control in democratizing countries that have low levels of military prerogatives" (Sotomayor, 2007, p. 180). Checks and balances, transparency and strong sense of accountability from both the military and civilian sides are necessary to avoid unintended and negative consequences for civilian control. According to Sotomayor, "Participation in peace operations can have unintended and even negative consequences for civilian control, unless Foreign Ministry and civilian bureaucrats assume a very active role in the decision-making process regarding peace deployments" (2007, p. 183). Additionally, Sotomayor also argues that involvement in peacekeeping operations required a large investment of resources in Argentina, which corrupted top civilian decision makers.

4.7 Conclusion

The comparative study of the Argentinean and Nepalese cases shows that mere participation in peacekeeping missions does not promote stable CMR. Both countries have participated extensively in peacekeeping missions, especially since the end of the Cold War. Not only were there similar levels of peacekeeping participation, but both countries also experienced the process of democratization. However, there was a sharp difference in one respect: Nepalese political leaders were not involved in peacekeeping activities, while the Argentinean political leadership was deeply involved in decision making about peacekeeping activities and policies to dovetail peacekeeping with Argentina's foreign policy goals. By participating in peacekeeping missions, Argentina became a successful example of both stable CMR as well as foreign policy goal achievement. In contrast, because of lack of political leadership, Nepal could not utilize its contribution to peacekeeping missions to realize its foreign policy goals or to achieve stable CMR. Unlike Argentina, Nepal has not been successful in dovetailing its foreign policy with peacekeeping operations by adopting an internationalist approach and creating a symbiotic relationship between civilians and the military.

Mongolian and Nepalese Peacekeeping and Impacts on CMR

4.8 Political Development in Mongolia

The Mongolian history is full of state making and war making activities. Mongolia conquered a huge Eurasian empire in the 13th century under the leadership of Genghis Khan. After his demise, however, the empire was divided into numerous powerful Mongol states. These states further broke apart reducing their size and forcing the Mongols to retreat to their original homeland. It came under the Chinese

rule in the late 17th century. The Mongols got independence in 1921 with the help of Soviets, and communism was adopted in 1924.

After the long communist rule, Mongolia saw democratic revolution in 1990 and eventually installed multiparty democracy in the country. Yet, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) with communist background won the elections in 1990 and 1992. But Democratic Union Coalition (DUC) defeated MPRP in parliamentary election of 1996. In 2000, the MPRP could again secure victory in the parliamentary election with overwhelming majority. Then, it lost election of 2004 and shared power with democratic coalition parties during 2004-08. Again in 2008 another coalition government formed despite the MPRP winning the parliamentary election with majority seats that lasted until January 2012. At present, there is another coalition government of four political parties led by the Democratic Party. Current President Elbegdorj won presidential elections two times consecutively in 2009 and 2013.

4.9 The Military of Mongolia

The Mongolian military has a glorious history of warfare. Its war fighting capability and military organization profoundly developed around the thirteenth century, during the reign of Genghis Khan. However, the Mongolian military disintegrated with the downfall of the Mongol empire. Following the separation of Mongolia from the Manchu Dynasty, the Mongolian military was formed again second time at the beginning of twentieth century. It played a significant role in World War II as well as in the liberation of northeast China and various regimes of Inner Mongolia from Japanese invaders.

After the democratic revolution of 1990 and replacing compulsory military service with the alternative between military and other service, the Mongolian

military is becoming more professional. In the new political milieu, mainly two forces have been conceived for the national defence of Mongolia. First, the General Purpose Troops are the core of the armed forces that are responsible for defense of the country by military means. Second is the volunteer Civil Defence Force, which gets training from Mongolian General Purpose Troops. The reform in Mongolian military started in 1997 and resulted into some significant organizational restructuring: the brigades became the main units with mixed personnel organization.

The General Purpose Troops of Mongolia are comprise of combat, combat support and combat service supports arms such as motor rifle brigades, independent motor rifle battalions, artillery brigade, independent combat aircraft units, and combat supply and services units. Depending on the organizational specifics of military units and organizations, the General Purpose Troops are also divided into training, training combat, and stockpile and service units.

4.10 Peacekeeping Participation of the Mongolian Military

Recently, Mongolia has been extensively participating in peacekeeping mission across the world. It sent military observers for the first time to the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo in 2002. Since its first mission, more than 12,000 Mongolian soldiers have participated in 15 different missions under the aegis of UN and other international organizations. UN missions in Congo (MONUSCO), Liberia (UNMIL), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Chad (MINURCAT), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), South Sudan (UNMISS), Sudan (UNMIS), Darfur (UNAMID), Georgia (UNMIG), and Sudan - Abyes (UNISFA) are the examples of Mongolian contribution under the auspices of the UN (Jargalsaikhany, 2007). And there has been more than 900 Mongolian soldiers deployed in various UN missions including South Sudan as of September 2014 (UN, 2014).

Mongolia has accomplished major achievements by involving in peacekeeping missions. Some of the major achievements can be enumerated as follows (Peace Support Operation Training Centre, PSOTC, 2014):

(a) The Mongolian military has gained good experience and skills on peacekeeping missions.

(b) The Mongolian military has created pool of well trained and educated officers and NCOs that contribute to professionalism.

(c) The Mongolian military has transformed its staff structure.

(d) Mongolia's contribution to peace support operations has increased.

(e) Mongolia has secured higher command assignments in UN missions.

(f) The Mongolian military has developed capability to train personnel according to mission requirements.

(g) Mongolia has acquired better equipment for its military.

(h) Mongolia has successfully implemented its foreign policy.

The Mongolian military has significantly transformed and became professional since taking part in peacekeeping operations. Mongolian 'Armed Forces Development Program' is aimed at developing the Mongolian military, and is one of the important spinoffs of its decision to take part in peacekeeping missions. The details of the stages of the program through the year 2015 are as follows (PSOTC, 2014):

(a) Fiscal Year 2006 - Authorization by the President.

(b) Fiscal Year 2006 - Implementation Plan/Approved by the government.

(c) Fiscal Year 2006-2010 - Phase 1 - Provision of legal and material basis for fulfilment of the goal and objectives of the program.

(d) Fiscal Year 2010-2015 - Phase 2 - Complete implementation of the program.

4.11 The Military: Foreign Policy Tool of Mongolia

Following the political change, Mongolia started diversifying defense and foreign policy. This new orientation of Mongolian foreign policy also influenced its two giant neighbours China and Russia. These two countries have transformed their relationship into a new dimension taking into account of their national interests. Mongolia's new approach to foreign policy has not only galvanized the relations between China and Russia at state level but also at the military to military level. Some argue that the Mongolian defence diplomacy has completely transformed in its 'form and content' since the introduction of democratic system in 1990 (Ganbold & Ragchha, 2003).

While diversifying foreign policy, Mongolia adopted 'third neighbor' concept, and utilized the military as an effective tool. Mongolia wanted a platform for political and diplomatic manoeuvre through forums such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU and the US. Mongolia's multilateral foreign policy endeavour was focused on avoiding to become 'a yam between two boulders,' as it was with the Nepalese case. Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan (2013, p. 209) argue:

> Mongolia employed peacekeeping as a complementary means to operationalize the “third neighbour” concept, which was coined in the early 1990s to increase support and recognition for its democracy and security from Western and other developed nations. Landlocked between two authoritarian regimes, it is impossible for Mongolia to

> join any Western-led multilateral organizations or to enlist a security umbrella from other liberal democracies.

In the changed environment, Mongolian political leaders and diplomats wanted to come out of that narrow bilateral foreign policy situation. So, the civilians needed to employ right tool. Ganbold & Ragchha (2003, p. 2) assert:

> As result of this new orientation, the foreign policy of the defence sector of Mongolia pursues a beneficial policy in order to properly use the fruits of cooperation and military relations with two neighbouring countries, plus other foreign countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

They did it with an indirect approach, and appropriately identified that they could achieve national interests through peacekeeping. On top of achieving national interests, the peacekeeping participation could also enable Mongolia to develop its overall military capability and establish military to military bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The Mongolian MOD passed 'the main orientation of foreign relations and cooperation of the defence sector' in 1997 on the basis of various legal documents such as Concepts of National Security, Foreign Policy Concept of Mongolia, and Bases of the State Military Policy (Ganbold & Ragchha, 2003, p. 2).

Peacekeeping participation was one of the means to achieve political end. Through peacekeeping capability enhancement activities, Mongolia not only became successful to achieve internationalist approach but also secured more support from its two giant neighbours. Such foreign policy objectives gave common goal to both civilian and military whereby bringing them together to face common challenges and find common solutions. To be progressive, the foreign policy of any country cannot remain monolithic. In the similar vein, Mongolia has been trying to diversify its

foreign policy by going beyond regional boundary. It has embraced 'third neighbour' concept, and has been trying to engage with super and major power countries like the US, Russia, Germany, China and India for the successful implementation of the concept. It has found peacekeeping participation as an appropriate launching pad for this.

Mongolian emphasis on peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool is loud and clear. Their high level visits to mission areas and priority given to peacekeeping demonstrate this. The Mongolian president, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, visited his country's troops, who were serving as UN peacekeepers in South Sudan, in February 2013 (Sudan Tribune, 2013). Although the primary aim of president's visit was to address Mongolian peacekeepers serving in UNMISS, the visit also aimed at strengthening Mongolia's diplomatic relations with the African country and the UN.

The perception of the government and the public towards their military also changed after its effective engagement in peacekeeping missions. Today, the government and the public regard the military as nation's useful instrument to achieve foreign policy objectives. However, the perception was completely different before this change. Both considered the military as unproductive sector and cut its budget significantly. After identifying the employment of the military in UN peacekeeping missions as a foreign policy tool, the Mongolian politicians have prioritized peacekeeping capacity building program in government action plans. Military deployment was not initiated by the Mongolian military but initiated and approved by the civilian (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013). This led to procurement of necessary equipment for peacekeeping contingents by the Mongolian government.

Participation in peacekeeping missions provided opportunities for Mongolia to establish defence cooperation with many Western countries and maintain cordial relationship with international organizations. Such peacekeeping and defence

cooperation engagements contributed to produce pool of intellectual officers capable of formulating and implementing modernization plan for the armed forces at operational and institutional levels (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013). As a result, the Mongolian military came up with 'Armed Forces Development Plan' to modernize its military by 2015. This needed substantial funding and was approved by the parliament in 2007.

The Mongolian military not only gained supports from foreign countries to uplift its peacekeeping capability, it also received significant funding from the government to establish and equip two battalions and three engineering units for potential deployments for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction missions (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013).

4.12 Defence Diplomacy of Mongolia

Over the last few years, Mongolia has been striving for strengthening defense diplomacy as well as enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities through organizing multinational peacekeeping training events at home, and taking part in such activities abroad. Mongolia organized latest episode of multinational training event 'Khaan Quest' in 2013 with more than 1000 troops participating in the exercise from scores of countries, and also observers from few other neighbouring countries. The presence of US Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the United States Pacific Command, and Lieutenant General Terry G. Robling, the commander of the US Marine Forces in Pacific in opening and closing ceremonies respectively indicates the success of this endeavour (Jargalsaikhany, 2013). The vigorous defence diplomacy resulted into positive outcomes. One of the examples of such outcomes is the US support in

development of regional peacekeeping training centre in Mongolia. Jargalsaikhany (2013) asserts:

> The importance of Khaan Quest goes beyond the direct military training it provides for Mongolia's soldiers. At the request of the Mongolian government, the US has provided the country assistance in transforming its former Soviet style military training field (known as the Five Hills Training Center) into a regional peacekeeping training center.

The Khaan Quest has not only contributed to the successful defence diplomacy and augmentation of professionalism in the Mongolian military, it has also created conducive environment for the Mongolian military and the civilian to work more closely for the purpose of national interests. With increasing involvement of the civilians in peacekeeping activities, the military is also gaining full backing from the government.

This exercise was not the first of its kind. Mongolia has been organizing 'Khaan Quest' exercise since 2003. Other major peacekeeping exercises conducted by the PSOTC are Nomadic Elephant, Selenge, Peace Messenger, Anadolu, and Decisive Decision. The centre also runs various peace operation training courses such as NOLES Training, MPAT Tempest Express, Pre-Deployment Training, UN Courses, Peace Support Operation (PSO) Units Training, and PSOs Seminars and Workshops (PSOTC, 2014).

Beyond peacekeeping training, the Five Hills Training Centre is hosting bilateral training exercises making it a resourceful and important training facility. Jargalsaikahany claims - “Today, Mongolia's Five Hills is the only multi-national peacekeeping training centre in Northeast and Central Asia” (Jargalsaikhany, 2013).

The Mongolian military is organizing bilateral training exercise with global, major and regional powers such as the US, Russia, China, India and Germany with a view to boost conventional and non-conventional military as well as peacekeeping capabilities. In this regard, the Russian and Mongolian troops conducted a repair and maintenance exercise of military equipment for peacekeeping purpose in 2009, and a joint counter-terrorism tactical exercise in 2013. Also in 2009, the Mongolian military participated in a joint exercise with Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China. And, in 2013, PLA's disaster relief experts went to the Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Centre to share their experiences and knowledge with Mongolian military personnel.

While military to military cooperation and defence diplomacy are being progressed, the government is also working in tandem with the Mongolian military to synergize military activities. For instance, the Mongolian MOD concluded an important agreement with the PLA to develop joint military-technical cooperation. The Mongolian military and the civilian are working hand-in-hand to turn the geostrategic constraints into geostrategic advantages. Jargalsaikhany (2013, p. 2) maintains:

> Rather than being signs of geostrategic competition over Mongolia by Washington, Moscow and Beijing, the three recent exercises demonstrated Ulaanbaatar's active defense diplomacy strategy. All three major powers with which Mongolia held its military drills-the US, Russia and China --are actively supporting Mongolian military's participation in global peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the recent exercises all contributed to regional confidence building measures.

On the one hand, the bilateral and multilateral training exercises helped the Mongolian military develop and hone its peacekeeping capabilities; and, on the other, it helped them enhance professionalism in order to transform it into a modern military force.

Within a decade of its first peacekeeping participation in 2002, Mongolia has become a major troop contributor for UN peacekeeping in its region. It has also been able to secure substantial assistance from the US in the areas of training and capacity building for peacekeeping. For instance, training for Mongolian peacekeeping contingents; establishment of the regional peacekeeping training centre; and, establishment of field hospital and military police units have been completed. The assistance has enabled Mongolia to run a Level II Field Hospital in UN peace mission in Darfur since 2010.

Not only from the US, Mongolia has also been able to secure military assistance from its two neighbours China and Russia. Military engineering equipment from China for equipping peacekeeping engineering battalions and armoured vehicles and equipment from Russia have already been acquired by the Mongolian military. This cooperation has been a part of the declaration of strategic partnership with China and India.

Geostrategy of Mongolia is constricted. It is a landlocked country, surrounded by two giant neighbours, having very limited space for traditional strategic and diplomatic manoeuvres. However, with the synergic efforts of the civilian and the military, Mongolia not only could come out of that cocoon, but also converted the constraint into strength. Jargalsaikhany (2013) argues:

> Mongolia's defense and security policies are not being driven in response to the geostrategic interests of its neighbors or international

great powers. Rather, the US, Russia and China are attracted to Mongolia's non-threatening, sustained interest in taking part in global peacekeeping efforts. And developing those skills is helping Mongolia to modernize its armed forces, raise its international profile and increase the country's importance in the eyes of foreign powers and institutions. Overall, Mongolia's defense diplomacy, whose stated aim is developing Mongolia's international peacekeeping capabilities, has contributed to positive, balanced relations with the major powers and gained support from each of them.

4.13 CMR in Mongolia

The CMR in Mongolia was subjective or 'ideological heavy militarized' during communist regime (Bruneau & Jargalsaikahn, 2013). The CMR during the transitional period after the democratic revolution of 1990s was the worst. There was a drastic cut in defence budget severely impacting on military's manpower, equipment, exercises, and facilities. At the time of political transition, the major concern of all the stakeholders in Mongolia was to sever the relationship of the military from erstwhile political system. The military was left to survive in austerity, whereas the police got favor as civil unrest and criminal activities increased.

Although some signs of democratic CMR were seen from the beginning of Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia, it was still in transition. In the absence of external threats in the changed situation, the military was heavily criticized as an unproductive force by the politicians and the public. The new constitution of 1992 paved the way for democratic civilian control by establishing a clear cut and unambiguous chain of command in the military. The president became the Commander-in-Chief and the head of NSC. The MOD was restructured and

strengthened, and there was separation of power between it and the General Staff. At the same time, the system of checks and balances was also instituted by establishing policy and budgetary oversight by the parliament. All the policies shaping the military such as roles, missions, size, and organization were promulgated by the parliament.

Mongolia's military has been reoriented to peacekeeping operations from its conventional role of defending the nation from external threat. Today, Mongolia is among many significant troops contributing countries in the UN. The military's external orientation and the civilian's foreign policy goal coincided since 2002. Following this, institutionalization of democratic civilian control has become more profound. Bruneau and Jargalsaikhan (2013) argue that the peacekeeping participation of the Mongolian military contributed to the development of healthy CMR in Mongolia.

Peacekeeping as a military role was not conceived by the Mongolian military; rather, they were skeptical and thought it would degrade the fighting capability of their organization in the event of external aggression. Before 1998, the military was constitutionally given the role of defending the country from its powerful, giant and nuclear neighbours Russia and China. Most people perceived the Mongolian military incapable of performing this task. So, many used to think spending on the military as unproductive and useless. Within such wide-ranging antimilitary opinion, it was the initiative of the civilian to use the military as a foreign policy tool. The Defence Minister advocated the peacekeeping participation and formulated an Action Plan to build peacekeeping capacity in the Mongolian military in 1996 and onwards. Taking part in peacekeeping missions has been explicitly recognized as 'political diplomatic means of national security' in the main defence policy document (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013).

Moreover, an office in charge of preparing peacekeeping operations was set up in concordance with the MOD and the General Staff. Following these developments, the parliament promulgated the 'Law on Participation of Military and Police Personnel to UN Peacekeeping and International Activities' which is the principal legal document for the Mongolian armed forces to participate in peacekeeping (Palamdorj, 2003, p. 3). And the Mongolian military took part in the UN peacekeeping mission for the first time in Congo in 2002. Today, the participation in peacekeeping missions has become a major role of the military.

Apart from the UN peacekeeping operations, the Mongolian government engages its military also in other overseas missions such as coalition operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. These were the endeavours of the Mongolian government's internationalist approach which provided Mongolia forums with NATO, the EU and the OSCE. It was clear that the civilian and the military were in unison for achieving national interest and foreign policy goals. For this, the civilians such as the President, Prime Minister, parliamentarian, and bureaucrats regarded the military as a foreign policy tool (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013). Such synergic diplomatic manoeuvres of the military and the civilian enabled Mongolia to secure foreign support for building capacity in peacekeeping operations. The Mongolian military received equipment for peacekeeping missions and established regional peacekeeping training centre with the help of the US.

Participation in peacekeeping operations abroad has helped the Mongolian military to be more professional. Peacekeeping missions have not only augmented professionalism in the Mongolian military but also contributed to organizational reform and increase in readiness. The Mongolian military incorporated best practices in their military - doctrine, hardware, and organization were restructured as per the lesson learnt. For instance, as the consequence of role and requirement of non-

commissioned officer in peacekeeping mission, the Mongolian military established academy for more number of non-commissioned officers, and delegated more responsibilities to senior non-commissioned officers (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013).

The peacekeeping participation enabled the Mongolian military to implement various welfare programs that was lacking before 1990. As the peacekeeping participation of the Mongolian military increased, the government provided funds for welfare programs such as pay raises, insurance, and military housing. Similarly, “in 2010, the parliament allocated additional funding to assist military housing projects and to increase financial incentives for military personnel” (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013, p. 212).

There are various factors that contribute to good CMR while participating in peacekeeping missions. Legal basis for participation in peacekeeping missions is one of the important factors. In a sense, it is a contract between the civilian and the military to use the military as a tool to achieve foreign policy objective; the absence of which, neither there would be civilian control mechanism in place nor would there be forum for interaction between the two. The several military related laws are the bases of the state military policy in Mongolia. 'The Bases of the State Military Policy of Mongolia (1998)' was one of the milestones to carry out reform in the military (Palamdorj, 2003). The primary law relating to UN peacekeeping participation is the 'Law on Engagement of Military and Police Personnel in UN peacekeeping and International Activities' promulgated by the legislation in 2002. This law is focused on management, organization, power and roles of various government activities:

> This law includes provisions to regulate relations with respect to the management and organization (Government powers, power of the

> Minister of Foreign Affairs, power of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Justice, relations connected with professional management and preparation) as well as provisions defining the salary of military personnel and policemen who participate in such [UN peacekeeping] activities, and the corresponding penalties for law-breaker (Myagmarjav & Nergui, 2003, p. 9).

The promulgation of fundamental law on military matter demonstrates that the civilians are active in military matters. And military matters are not just the issue concerning one institution, but it has far and wide implications that concern the state and the civilian. In other words, the military matters are so important to the state that civilians do not want to leave it 'in the hands of Generals.' This mindset gained momentum in Mongolia just after few years of the political change. This is also a process in which the civilian and the military brainstorm and finally agree on a common agenda or goal. Peacekeeping activities of the defence sector were made one of the foreign relation facets in Mongolia after the democratic revolutions in the 1990s. Mongolia started some principal reforms in its defence policy around this time, and promulgated some laws, legislation, and legal documents in accordance with the reforms. At this juncture, the defence reform was commensurate with the political change. Ganbold & Ragchaa (2003, p. 1) maintain:

> In the context of ...policy change, it was necessary to modernize the Mongolian Armed Forces, and this objective was considered at the state policy level. A main factor to successfully implement military reforms was to develop foreign relations of the defence sector in connection with state policy.

If the NSC, Parliament, and Prime Minister's Cabinet take the responsibility of sanctioning of contingents to be deployed in peacekeeping mission, the legitimacy for such military deployment would be more. This also contributes to the civilian control. While giving approval, these democratic institutions should also devise mechanism for monitoring and supervision in order to rightly direct it towards achieving political objectives. The democratic institutions function in such manners in Mongolia. A good example of this is the change in 2002 legislation related to peacekeeping deployment after a review of Mongolian peacekeeping missions between 2002 and 2009. The President and the Defence Minister introduced the changes, and the parliament approved the revised legislation in 2010 (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013, p. 213).

4.14 Case comparison between Mongolia and Nepal

Mongolia's geostrategic situation and environment resemble with Nepal's in many respects. Both are landlocked countries surrounded by two giant neighbours having very limited space for traditional strategic and diplomatic manoeuvres. Nepal has not been able to come out of the rooted idea of 'a yam between two boulders'; and, not diversifying its foreign policy strategies, especially since the democratic transition of the 1990s. However, with the synergic efforts of the civilian and the military, Mongolia not only could come out of that conundrum, but also converted the constraints into strength.

Both in Nepal and Mongolia, during political transition, the major concern of all the stakeholders was to sever the relationship of the military from its erstwhile power centre - the king in Nepal and political party system in Mongolia. Both in Nepal and Mongolia, the militaries were left to survive in austerity, whereas the police got favour as civil unrest and criminal activities increased.

After the change in the Nepalese political system in 1990, mindset towards the military at the NSC, the MOD, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) also changed. This not only created a vacuum in the military's peacekeeping participation as a tool for foreign policy goal, also severed the continuity of cooperation and coordination between the military and the civilian. This cleavage between the two remains until today, in one way or other.

However, NA's participation in peacekeeping mission has never been a contentious issue in Nepal. Even during the armed conflict, the Nepalese participation in peacekeeping mission did not dwindle. The Maoists leaders who fought against the NA also lauded the NA's contribution to international peace and security through peacekeeping missions at the UN General Assembly. Then, questions arise: why the government does not actively support to peacekeeping contingents for acquiring major equipment? And why CMR is not as good as it should have been?

The Mongolian government provided profound support to the military for building peacekeeping capacity. Bruneau and Jargalsaikhan (2013, p. 211) argue that "one explanation for this increased support is that both Mongolian politicians and Western government have witnessed successful deployments for peacekeeping operation." But this assertion does not seem to be plausible in the Nepalese case because the NA has an outstanding record of troop's contribution and successful missions. Many dignitaries including UN Secretary Generals have lauded NA's contribution to international peace and security as outstanding. Despite all these successes, why the NA doesn't get such support from the government is puzzling. Yes, it is true that equipping peacekeeping contingents are costly, especially for resource strapped countries like Nepal. And the NA has been doing it from its own resources. This query points towards the fact that unless the civilian see peacekeeping missions as a tool of political goal; and, unless they don't see peacekeeping just as the

military's private domain, they are reluctant to provide such support citing various government constraints.

It is argued that defence diplomacy and defence assistance from developed western countries to developing countries contribute to better peacekeeping participation and civilian control (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhan, 2013). But this cannot be taken as automatic. Key to the successful CMR is the active participation and interactions of both civilian and military. In the absence of such interactions, CMR remains stagnated. That is why, without meaningful civil military interactions, just taking part in peacekeeping missions or getting foreign military assistances does not always help better CMR.

As long as peacekeeping becomes military's prerogatives rather than overall country's endeavour, chances of fulfilling broader national interests would be slim. On top of that, it also does not contribute to a good CMR. The government should take the lead. In Mongolia "the military did not volunteer to take on peacekeeping as a new mission, rather this was tasked by the civilian authority in 1998. The military's role in the decision making process is limited to an advisory role for the President and the civilian Defence Minister. The military has not initiated any peacekeeping deployments on its own so far" (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhany, 2013, p. 213). This has not been the case in Nepal. The civilian should take ownership of peacekeeping participation as a foreign policy tool. In Nepal, such process seems to be in place, but in reality these are mere facades. Almost everything is done by the military, the other government institutions are hardly in the loop.

In Mongolia, both civilian and military decision makers firmly believe that the rule of law principle should be followed while deciding the use of military force. The Mongolian deployment in peacekeeping missions gets legitimacy from its legal framework established in 2002. Nepal lacks such legal framework. Some people

believe that parliamentary approval “can be vitally important to ensure the democratic legitimacy of military operations by helping increase public consent for the executive's use of force” (Bruneau & Jargalsaikhany, 2013). This is a widely adopted system for military mobilization even in peaceful purposes. For instance, the arrangement and method for deployment of Russian civil and military personnel in peacekeeping missions have been laid down in the law called ‘The Procedure of Providing Civil and Military Personnel for Participation in the Activity on Maintenance and Restoration of the International Peace and Security’ which was promulgated in 1995 (Law, 2004). Such legal documents not only give legitimacy and framework for decision making and deployment of military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions, but also make the activities transparent and accountable.

Mongolia adopted 'third neighbour' concept that was similar to Nepal's internationalist approach in the first democratic period (1950s) and Panchayat era. Nepal wanted a platform for political and diplomatic manoeuvre through the UN or the NAM or other international mechanisms (Rawal, 2011, p.53). Mongolia has been doing the same through the US, the EU, NATO or the OSCE. Mongolia's reoriented foreign policy endeavour was mainly because it did not want to be 'a yam between two boulders': it wanted to come out of that cocoon. So, politicians were seeking right tool to employ for this. They found the military. However, in the Nepalese case, it seems the civilians lacked that broad vision of achieving national interests through 'third neighbour' or 'internationalist' approach. There were certain engagements but were not focused and result oriented. In other words, after the innovation of democracy in 1990, Nepal could not make peacekeeping participation the means to achieve political ends (Rawal, 2010). Leadership's vision and willpower could not commensurate with needed foreign policy to harness the peacekeeping potentiality of Nepal.

There were many indicators of political apathy in using peacekeeping as a tool of foreign policy in Nepal. One of the indicators was visits of diplomatic and political sectors to mission areas. Unlike Mongolia, Nepal's political or diplomatic community rarely visited mission areas to acquire understanding and firsthand information from the field. Let alone having diplomatic engagement for common goal, the diplomatic community did not even develop any significant mechanism to establish contact with contingents in mission areas. Military contingents were not given explicit political agendas or goals of peacekeeping participations; rather, given leverage to use their own initiative. This ultimately led to disjointed efforts without any clear common politico-military objectives. A clear example of repercussion of disjointed efforts is the cholera case of Haiti where the Nepalese peacekeepers were allegedly blamed for importing the disease. There was not sufficiently coordinated diplomatic and military effort to address the situation.

Like the Mongolian military, the NA has been enjoying diplomatic relations with major and regional powers since long; and, has intellectual pool of officers in its organization. But it could not materialize substantive military modernization plan as Mongolia did. This is mainly because Mongolian politicians realized the usefulness of the military as a tool to further nation's political endeavour in the international forum. Yet, it was not the same comprehension in the Nepalese case.

It is said that foreign military assistance contributed to good CMR in Mongolia. The NA had also got assistance from foreign militaries in many areas such as Professional Military Education (PME), military hardware, training, and peacekeeping in the past decades. However, Nepal did not enjoy good CMR during that time. Therefore, it is clear that merely receiving foreign defence supports do not guarantee CMR. The good CMR in Mongolia has to do with something else apart from the foreign support. After some analysis, it is evident that the effective

interactions between the military and the civilian were instrumental for the good CMR. The foreign supports provided forum for the Mongolian military and the civilian to understand the common challenges and missions.

The Mongolian military incorporated best practices in their military - doctrine, hardware, and organization were restructured as per the lesson learnt. Nepal also incorporated such things in the military but still there is enough room for improvement. Participation in peacekeeping operations abroad has helped the Mongolian military to be more professional. Prolonged participation in peacekeeping missions has certainly augmented professionalism in the NA, but level of professionalism is not up to the mark or not as much as should have been. Bruneau and Jargalsaikhan (2013, p. 211) maintain that "Peacekeeping provides at least three opportunities for the military: (1) to intensify the reform; (2) to increase military readiness, and (3) to solve the social issues of its personnel." Unable to cash these opportunities, the NA lacked deserved high level of expertise.

As argued by Bruneau (2007), one aspect of CMR is to have effectiveness in carrying out military missions. The Nepalese government's policy has been using NA's peacekeeping participation as one of the tools for the furtherance of foreign policy goals. The success or achievement of goal should be measurable. If that be the case, the effectiveness of NA's participation in UN peace operations should be measured against stated government policy. Then, to identify objective achievement of peacekeeping participation, it is necessary to ask some questions: what benefits did Nepal get participating in UN peacekeeping missions? How many senior positions at UNHQ did Nepal get so far? How many Nepalese politicians or diplomats have become SRSG or DSRSG? How many Nepalese are in senior management position in UN peace missions? Are the numbers of senior appointments Nepal received proportionate with the troop contribution? Could Nepal play important role in any

international issues/forum by virtue of taking part in peacekeeping missions? And so on. Just getting personal allowances, reimbursements for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) or securing a position in top five troop contributors is not the acme of success or effectiveness of participation in peacekeeping missions. Monetary gain is just one aspect of achievements. Attainments of foreign policy goals through peacekeeping participation will have not only wider impacts, but also make it more sustainable and pragmatic.

While the NA has relatively good military-media relations, good defence diplomacy, and successful peacekeeping participation, yet the main aspect of CMR has not been fully realized. For good CMR, government's active engagement with the military is paramount among all other successes, which has not been very encouraging. Hardly any senior government officials from the MOD and the MOFA regularly go to mission areas to understand the ground realities. This shows lack of sufficient interest in the part of the civilian. The NA is not asked to regularly update the MOD and MOFA on peacekeeping issues: this hesitation exists also in the military. The MOD, MOFA and the MOF don't seem to be willing to take initiative to bear the burden of supporting peacekeeping participation. The NA has been trying to get major equipment for peacekeeping missions from the government, but has not been materialized yet. This could, at times, threaten the continuity or reputation of Nepalese peacekeeping participation by compromising quality and quantity of its peacekeeping.

In the Nepalese case, government has hardly funded for military welfare program. Almost the entire military welfare program in Nepal is funded from the military welfare fund (A private fund raised from cutting certain percentage of peacekeepers allowances and reimbursement), whereas government takes care of the military welfare program in Mongolia. The Nepalese type of self-reliance and

institutional autonomy may have certain benefits. However, we should not forget that, such self-reliance also seals the military from government's engagements and interactions, and civilian control.

Moreover, involvement of the civilians in the military's higher academic institutions such as Command and Staff College and the Peace Operation Training Center is important for good CMR. More academicians, civilian bureaucrats, NGO/INGO personnel, policy makers, and representative of various think tanks must be involved in a regular basis. The military should devise ways and means to incorporate certain portion of the aforementioned civilians in the two institutions in a permanent basis to promote CMR. The civilians should be encouraged to conduct research in the field of military's areas of interest independently or with the cooperation of military officers. They should be given an access to the non-secret private information of the military (The military should maintain a central data bank of information and categorized it). Some capable and interested civilian researchers, academicians, and think tank should be involved in the R&D of the military.

4.15 Conclusion

There has been a significant change in Mongolian CMR relatively in a very short

period of time. Compare to the number of Nepalese peacekeepers deployed in UN peace missions so far, the Mongolian contribution is very small. Over the past 55 years Nepal has already contributed more than 100,000 peacekeepers, whereas Mongolia has contributed only around 12,000 in 12 years. Yet, not only the nature of CMR positively changed in Mongolia, but also it contributed to consolidate democracy after the transitional period. The military has been under the democratic civilian control and became professional, thereby submitting it to the wishes of legitimately elected civilians. There have been continuous as well as substantive

interactions with the civilians for the common goal and challenges. Reorienting the military to peacekeeping missions from its conventional role has firmly established civilian supremacy over the military in Mongolia.

A good civil-military relation is symbiotic for achievement of civilian and military goals. Military's peacekeeping participation or bilateral and multilateral activities contribute to civilian's foreign policy goals. Also, civilian's diplomatic and political manoeuvring contributes to secure defence and military objectives. In Mongolian case, the military's peacekeeping participation has contributed to civilian's 'third neighbour' concept of foreign policy; also, the civilian's bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and political engagements have helped securing defence cooperation thereby facilitating military's capability enhancement and quality peacekeeping participation. This has not been in the similar extent in the Nepalese case. Without effective interactions and interests between the civilian and the military, the external military missions or foreign defence cooperation is unlikely to contribute to good CMR.

The roles and missions of the military should be determined through the democratic process wherein civilian legitimacy and military's expertise are taken into considerations. Democratically established roles and missions of the military are the shared politico-military view to safeguard vital national interests in democracies. Although Mongolian military's constitutionally mandated primary role is to defend the country from external threats, after military-civil understanding and analyzing geostrategy, peacekeeping has been adopted as a de-facto primary role. This has been one aspect of national security strategy and has been codified in the legal documents promulgated by the parliament. Both Mongolian civilian and military are committed to this role. Nepal also has the similar geopolitical, geostrategic and military situations, and has been adopting somewhat similar foreign and defence policies. Yet,

Nepal has not codified military roles and missions explicitly in a legal document with politico-military shared vision. Codification of the military security issues in legal documents prepared through the democratic process likely to facilitate achieving good CMR. By reforming the armed forces and their roles, the Mongolian government has been addressing the fundamental issues of CMR and defence matter. Nepal does not explicitly realize this ground reality that it needs to reorient its major role as peacekeeping - for many reasons. In no legal promulgation it has been embraced explicitly. This should be the first step towards civil military common commitment. Such legal provisions are necessary but not sufficient condition. Intimate cooperation, coordination and interactions thereafter, between the military and the civilian, are necessary; not only for successful military missions, but also for CMR and democratic process.

CHAPTER – V

SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary and Findings

After analyzing the various issues such as Nepalese political development in four different periods; Nepalese peacekeeping participations; and, comparative study of Argentina and Mongolia with Nepalese peacekeeping contribution, it can be safely said that the peacekeeping participation does not automatically contribute to good CMR. There are certain conditions and activities that creates conducive environment for good CMR. It may well be possible that there could be good participation in peacekeeping missions without having reasonably good CMR in troops contributing countries. Based on the study, therefore, the findings, conditions and mechanisms of peacekeeping participation contributing to good CMR can be summarized as under:

5.1.1 Finding on 'The political changes and CMR in Nepal in different timeframes ' (Objective 1).

(a) In post-Rana rule, Nepal experienced different trajectories of CMR. However, rather than political system itself, other political attributes have dictated Nepalese CMR, such as political culture, political instability, weak political institutions, the personalities of political leaders, the lack of a strategic culture among the political leadership, ignorance about security, parochialism and individualism, mistrust, lack of common objectives and national interests, the rudimentary functioning of the MOD, and the king's direct control of the army.

(b) The first democratic period was a state of political turmoil marked by political transformation and the NA's transition of loyalty; and, CMR was unstable during this period.

(c) The three decades of *Panchayat* rule might have made the NA non-political, contributing to stable CMR, but it remained under subjective civilian control as the NA became subjected to the king's interests.

(d) After the establishment of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, CMR gradually became unstable because of the dual control of the NA. With the Maoist rise in power, CMR had been very unstable in later period.

(e) The most important factor behind the civil-military pathology in Nepal, after the democratic transition of 1990, is the failure of its political leaders to take an active interest in military matters.

5.1.2 Finding on 'Nepal's participation in UN peacekeeping missions and its impacts on CMR' (Objective 2).

(a) NA's UN peacekeeping participation for more than half a century has been remarkable. The positive outcome of the peacekeeping effort was seen during the 1970s and 1980s.

(b) After the reestablishment of democracy in 1990, Nepalese peacekeeping efforts increased tremendously, but foreign policy did not go along the peacekeeping contribution. Nepal could have benefitted highly, both diplomatically and politically, but did not.

(c) Participation in peacekeeping missions civilianizes soldiers, especially those who participate more than one time, by reducing the gap between the civilian and the military sphere. In so doing, bringing the military under civilian fold.

(d) Despite civilianization of the military and the development of a constabulary attitude, by participating in peacekeeping missions, stable CMR did not seem to occur in the Nepalese scenario.

(e) The monitoring and supervision mechanism at the level of the MOD helps to avoid military's working on its own without any purposeful foreign policy objectives.

5.1.3 Finding on 'Comparative study between Nepal and other peacekeeping countries vis-a-vis CMR' (Objective 3).

(a) The sanctioning of peacekeeping contingent by legislatures gives legitimacy to the military and, at the same time, controlling authority to the civilian.

(b) When the basis of peacekeeping participation is founded on legal document of military mobilization promulgated by the legislature, the civilian control becomes more effective.

(c) When the government provides major equipment and other necessary logistics to the military for taking part in peacekeeping missions, it contributes to make the military subservient to the civilian or submitting to the will of the politician.

(d) Looking after military welfare by the government helps interactions between the military and the civilian and military becoming loyal to civilian, once civilian assumes political ownership of the military.

(e) The UN provides reimbursement to the troop contributing countries in lieu of contingent owned equipment (COE). These earnings if funnelled to national coffer helps military to contribute to national

economy thereby invoking the civilian concerned about any obstacles in peacekeeping participation.

5.1.4 Finding on 'Why Nepal's CMR seemed so unstable (during the period studied) even though its armed forces had an externally oriented mission?'(Objective 4)

The followings are important for promoting stable CMR through participation in peacekeeping missions, which were partially or completely lacking in Nepal during the period studied:

(a) Peacekeeping participation as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives of the country gives both the civilian and the military a common agenda which encourages working in cooperative way and synergizing the effort.

(b) The peacekeeping participation provides a forum to establish regular contacts between the civilian and the military through submission of periodic reports and progress by the military.

(c) The active involvement of both the civilian and the military helps to avoid peacekeeping becoming civilian or military's private domain.

(d) Peacekeeping participation gives troop contributing countries external missions which would, as per the conventional wisdom, be conducive to good CMR back home.

(e) Involvement of civilian and the military in the process of acquiring and procuring equipment and other logistics for peacekeeping contingents allows transparency putting in place checks and balance mechanism.

(f) In new democracies or democratizing countries, the military and the civilian both endeavour collectively to seek bilateral cooperation for

peacekeeping capability enhancement. This likely to help to further overall defence capability, defence diplomacy and foreign policy goals.

(g) Involvement of the civilians in peacekeeping planning and subsequent processes may further allow responsible decision makers of the country to access in the military's 'private information,' thereby enabling timely decision making process.

(h) With civilian participation and contributions in peacekeeping activities, the military no longer becomes autonomous organization shielded with outside interactions or interventions.

(i) Maximum interactions between military and civilian at peacekeeping training centre can help to initiate a new dimension of CMR.

(j) When the military primarily focuses on external missions, pays less attention to domestic politics in that way contributing to good CMR. However, if the military is used both in peacekeeping missions and in internal security operations, the situation is likely cancel out the civil-military relational positive impacts harnessed through taking part in external missions.

(k) Military becomes more professional when provided with quality major equipment from the government for peacekeeping missions. Professional soldiers readily submit to the will of the civilian thus making civilian control effective.

(l) Peacekeeping participation enables troops contributing countries to bring their civilian and the military together for purposeful interactions thereby giving both the parties opportunities to understand each other's capabilities and constraints.

There is another dimension that explains why Nepal did not have good CMR during last two decades despite its profound participation in peacekeeping missions. It is pertinent to note that when the CMR was ebbing away NA had been not only focusing on peacekeeping activities but also involving in internal security missions. The participation in internal security missions diluted the little positive impacts generated through peacekeeping participation that could contribute to good CMR. However, it should be noted that, the CMR was not very encouraging even during when the NA was not involved in internal security mission until 2001 November. Therefore it can be deduced that peacekeeping participation did not contribute to good CMR in Nepal, particularly when the NA did not have interactions with the civilians. In Panchayat period, during when there was civil military congruity in achieving foreign policy objectives, the peacekeeping participation resulted in good CMR.

Peacekeeping participation impacts on CMR fundamentally from two different spheres of activities - activities within and outside the country. All the peacekeeping activities at home such as planning, preparations, law promulgation, policy formulation, arrangement of major equipment, training and coordination provide platform for civil-military interactions which ultimately likely to contribute to good CMR. The outside-the-country activities such as engagement with local population in the host countries, INGOs and NGOs, donor agencies and the civilian component within the mission also contribute to good CMR in mission areas as well as back home. Unlike first generation peacekeeping with interpositional force, the latter generations of peacekeeping missions are becoming multidimensional and headed by a civilian known as Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG). This also gives the military an environment and exposure of civilian control and civilian supremacy to some extent. Bilateral and multilateral civil-military endeavour by troop contributing countries, especially with regard to peacekeeping activities, also likely to

contribute for better CMR. The troop contributing countries' foreign policy and defence cooperation endeavours with regard to peacekeeping capability enhancement likely to remain intertwined most of the time giving synergic and symbiotic effects to civil and military's efforts.

Moreover, peacekeeping participation is likely to be a pragmatic approach to national security strategy for small countries. This strategy not only allows small countries to maintain a credible defense force, which can be effectively utilized as a nucleus force to fight a war of national liberation in the event of external aggression, but also provides a deterrent force against national threats coming from within. During peacetime, when used as a peacekeeper, this force can contribute to realize state's internationalist approach and foreign policy goals. However, just maintaining a capable peacekeeping force is not sufficient for the purpose of national security; it has to be integrated into the system of internal and external security. The well thought-out peacekeeping participation strategy linked with diplomatic instrument of national power is likely to play an important role to ward off internal and external threats effectively (Rawal, 2010).

5.2 Conclusion

This thesis focuses on Nepal’s historical contribution to UN peacekeeping missions and identifies an empirical puzzle: even while Nepal supports UN peace efforts with large peacekeeping deployments, it suffers from unstable CMR at home. This finding is counterintuitive because the conventional wisdom in CMR argues that participation in international peacekeeping operations promotes stable CMR by making young soldiers more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, and more resistant to calls for military “salvation” via coups in times of crisis. Why does Nepal suffer from constant civil-military crises if the armed forces have a well-defined external mission

to perform? Why has participation in peacekeeping operations not exercised a larger positive effect on Nepal's CMR?

To answer these questions this study first analyzed Nepal's political history and evolution in terms of CMR. The analysis in Chapter II indicates that the armed forces have had a dynamic and at times quite unstable relationship with their fellow civilians. After the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty democratic system, the Army enjoyed a certain level of autonomy due to the balance of power between the king and the government. During this period the armed forces also underwent professionalization in the form of military instruction, education and training. To some extent, peacekeeping contributed to these efforts, as UN demands created domestic pressures for larger and more professional forces.

Nevertheless, the latter half of second democratization period, which took place from mid 1990s to 2005, saw an increased sense of uncertainty and reinforced feelings of mutual distrust among political actors and the armed forces. By the 1990s, CMR in Nepal had deteriorated, a result of the conflict between the king, Nepal's traditional supreme commander, and the emerging political parties. Although the military enjoyed professional autonomy, the nebulous provision in the new constitution regarding the control of the military led to political chaos, especially in the face of internal threats like the Maoist insurgent movement. The Maoists, with whom the Army had fought a bitter military campaign, subsequently came to power, generating even more mutual distrust between civilians and the military. Political instability in Nepal generated two negative dynamics in CMR: it politicized the armed forces, and most political parties tried to subjugate the military to their own political interests, leading to a fragile system of subjective civilian control.

Consequently, CMR in Nepal have been subject to dynamic and dramatic changes in the past two decades. Ironically, throughout this time of political turmoil,

Nepal continued to contribute to UN peace efforts with peacekeeping troops. In fact, Nepal's peacekeeping participation increased in the 1990s, precisely when the country was facing its most severe domestic problems. There is substantial evidence that the military benefited both professionally and economically from its international experience. However, the country did not gain concrete diplomatic benefits from its international contributions. In fact, Nepal's regional neighbours, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, often get far more international credit than Nepal for their peacekeeping contributions.

Furthermore, Nepal's large peacekeeping deployments during the 1990s did not seem to help de-escalate the emerging crisis in CMR. Although a military coup did not take place, there was rampant speculation of a military rebellion by armed forces dissatisfied with the civilian government. Why was there political instability in Nepal at a time when its armed forces were deployed abroad in U.N. peacekeeping missions?

A close look at Nepal's political evolution indicates that political instability had an effect on CMR, as state institutions, whether the King or Parliament, were unable to exert civilian control during times of political transition. At the same time, civilians share the blame. They turned their backs on the conduct of military operations, including peacekeeping, because of their lack of expertise and inability to trust in their own judgments. To some extent, lack of civilian interest in defence matters has eroded CMR, too.

Consequently, the evidence presented here seems to support, at least in principle, the argument developed by Michael C. Desch in *Civilian Control of the Military*. In Desch's view, "states that face primarily internal threats are likely to have inattentive civilian leaders working through weak and divided institutions. The

civilian leadership is likely to adopt subjective control mechanisms, and the military is likely to be highly unified but internally focused" (Desch, 2001, p. 119).

Paradoxically, the Nepalese case also shows that one of Desch's policy recommendations for countries facing internal threats, participation in peacekeeping, is unlikely to resolve crises in CMR in all transitional societies. In his book, Desch argues that "the Argentine government, in an effort to keep the country's once internally oriented military externally focused, has recently been having the military participate in international peacekeeping missions. This is a realistic and beneficial post-Cold War military mission" (Desch, 2001, p. 130). As analyzed in Chapter IV, the conditions that made Argentina and Mongolia so successful in pacifying the military through peacekeeping are not present in Nepal today. Civilians are not actively involved in peacekeeping strategic decisions, so they often delegate such operations to the military, thus increasing the military's institutional autonomy. In such scenarios, peacekeeping is merely a military mission dominated by the armed forces with no clear civil intervention or foreign policy goals.

Although peacekeeping participation tends to promote objective civilian control, the nature of civilian control in the troops contributing countries depends heavily on the nature of domestic political involvement and interest in military matters. Peacekeeping contributes to civilianizing the military through interactions between the armed forces and diverse civilian communities in the field. Indeed, the military is more likely to become civilianized through interactions with civilian staff members, including non-governmental organizations, UN civil personnel and diplomats. However, these interactions will not prevent a CMR crisis when there is political instability at home. As this study shows, despite its involvement in peacekeeping, the military is likely to intervene in domestic politics when the country suffers from political turmoil and internal threats such as insurgency.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 General Recommendations

Given this analysis, what can countries like Nepal do to improve its CMR while it contributes to peacekeeping? This study summarizes at least four policy recommendations for countries facing CMR challenges in times of political transition. First, it seems imperative to develop programs targeted towards civilian education in defence matters, enabling civilian leaders to become more knowledgeable about military issues and thus more capable of making informed policy decisions. Second, since peacekeeping is an external mission, diplomats and bureaucrats in the Foreign and Defence Ministries should be more heavily involved in the decision-making process regarding peace operations. This can allow for more civilian integration in the decision making process, while also contributing to improving relations between civilian and military staff members. Likewise, this can assist in identifying clearer foreign policy goals when Nepal contributes to peacekeeping operations. Third, the military has to engage in profound organizational reform and modernization that includes more transparency, especially when it comes to peacekeeping operations. Finally, the parliament should promulgate law regarding military's deployment in peacekeeping mission.

5.3.2 To the government

(a) Make the MOD capable of handling country’s peacekeeping participation activities by restructuring and strengthening; and educating civilian in defence matters.

(b) Government should take ownership of peacekeeping missions not only by controlling and supervising it but also providing major equipment and fulfilling other requirements.

(c) Civilians should also involve in peacekeeping training activities to inculcate civilian and national interest perspectives into the military.

(d) Since peacekeeping participation is one of the tools for foreign policy goals, the civilians should heavily involve in decision-making process. And put their effort to bring all peacekeeping activities under one umbrella for concerted effort.

(e) Civilian should always endeavour to make the military more professional thereby helping them to submit to the civilian and bringing the military under civilian control.

(f) Civilian should involve actively in defence diplomacy, and bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation.

(g) Make law(s) for peacekeeping participation.

(h) Avoid making peacekeeping military's private domain; devise ways and means to incorporate civilian throughout the spectrum of peacekeeping activities.

(i) Devise monitoring and supervision mechanism at army headquarters as well as at the MOD level.

(j) The government should look after the welfare of the military personnel. Unless and until the military itself looks after its welfare, there would be no incentives for the military to submit to the civilian's will. Also, this self-sustainment of welfare activities seals the military from civilian interventions, thereby creating a gap between them.

(k) A mechanism should be developed to funnel the reimbursement coming from the UN in lieu of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) to national coffer. The mechanism must also ensure providing fund for the military when required for peacekeeping activities. Such transactional activities are essential and conducive for CMR.

5.3.3 For future research

This study is mainly focused on the contribution of UN peacekeeping participations to CMR of troops contributing countries. While the study is focused on Nepal, with case comparison to Argentina and Mongolia, it is extrapolated that the findings are valid for both developed and developing countries of various geographical regions. To identify whether this finding is equally applicable to developed countries, whose role in international system is more complex, influential and dominating, further research could be carried out.

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